SICILY AND THE IMPERIALISM OF MID-REPUBLICAN ROME : (289-191BC)

John Serrati

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



2001

Sicily and the Imperialism of mid-Republican Rome (289-191 BC)

John Serrati

Ph.D. Ancient History

19 January 2001

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Date 19/1/01 Signature of Candidate 

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Date 19/1/01 Signature of Candidate 

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Date 19/1/01 Signature of Supervisor 

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Date 19/1/01 Signature of Candidate 

Abstract

This thesis will use Sicily as a microcosm to illustrate the imperialism of mid-Republican Rome, in particular in the western Mediterranean. Here, Rome received tangible benefits from occupying the places they conquered, as opposed to the east, where subjugation brought with it few short term benefits other than movable plunder. In Sicily, the revenue of occupation was grain, specifically grain for the Roman army. The second aim of the thesis is to demonstrate the process of Roman administrative imperialism in Sicily; that Roman control and administration expanded as the island became more important as a source of military provisions. That Sicily became not just the granary of Italy, but also of the Roman legions, was not a result of the Roman conquest or of the later administration that was put into place. Instead, the reverse is true; Roman government on Sicily was a byproduct of the fact that the island provided Rome with the means to make war.

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St Leonard's College, St Andrews J.S.

Abbreviations

Collections, Inscriptions, Papyri, and Other Documents

AE	(1888-), *L'année épigraphique*, (Paris).
Austin	Austin, M.M. (1981), *The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest: A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation*, (Cambridge).
BE	Robert, J. and L. Robert, 'Bulletin épigraphique', in *REG*.
Broughton*MRR*	Broughton, T.R.S. (1951-1986), *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, I-III and sup. I-II, (New York).
CGCBMSic	Poole, R.S. (ed.), (1876), *Catalogue of Greek Coins in the British Museum. Sicily*, (London).
CIL	(1863-), *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum*, (Berlin).
CRRBM	Grueber, H.A. (1970), *Coins of the Roman Republic in the British Museum*, I, (London).
Degrassi *Act. Tr.*	Degrassi, A. (1947), *Acta Triumphales*, in *Inscriptiones Italiae*, XIII. 1, (Rome).
Harding	Harding, P. (1985), *From the End of the Second Punic War to the Battle of Ipsus*, (Cambridge).
IG	(1873-), *Inscriptiones Graecae*, (Berlin).
IGCH	Thompson, M. *et al.* (1973), *An Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards*, (New York).
OGIS	Dittenberger, W. (1970), *Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae*, (Hildesheim).
OLD	Glare, P.G.W. (ed.), (1982), *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, (Oxford).
RE	Pauly, A. *et al.* (eds), (1893-1981), *Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenshaft*, (Stuttgart).
RRC	Crawford, M. (1974), *Roman Republican Coinage*, I-II, (Cambridge).
RRCH	Crawford, M. (1969), *Roman Republican Coin Hoards*, (London).
SEG	(1923-), *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* (Amsterdam).

SIG	Dittenberger, W. (1915-1924), *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, third edn, (Leipzig).
Steinby *Lexicon*	Steinby, E.M. (ed), (1993), *Lexicon Topographicum Urbis Romae*, I, (Rome).
Tod	Tod, M.N. (1985), *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, (Chicago).
Welles *RC*	Welles, C.B. (1934), *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period*, (Chicago).

Abbreviations for journals follow Marouzeau, J. (1923-), *L'année philologique*, (Paris).

Fragmentary Sources

Cato, Marcus Porcius, *Orationes*	Malcovati, H. (1967), *Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta*, fourth edn, (Turin).
Cato, Marcus Porcius, *Origines*	Chassignet, M. (1986), *Les Origines (Fragments)*, (Paris).
Cincius Alimentus	Chassignet, M. (1996), *L'annalistique Romaine*, I, (Paris).
Claudius Quadrigarius	Peter, H. (1883), *Historicum Romanorum Fragmenta*, (Leipzig).
Ennius, Quintus	Skutsch, O. (1985), *The Annales of Q. Ennius*, (Oxford).
Fabius Pictor	Chassignet, M. (1996), *L'annalistique Romaine*, I, (Paris).
Festus, Sextus Pompeius, *De Significatione Verborum*	Lindsay, W.M. (1930), *Sexti Pompei Festi De Verborum Significatu quae Supersunt cum Pauli Epitome*, second edn, in *Glossasria Latina*, IV, p. 93-467.
FGH	Jacoby, F. (1923-), *Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*, (Berlin).
Ineditum Vaticanum	Arnim, H. von, (1892), '*Ineditum Vaticanum*', in *Hermes*, XXVII, p. 118-130.
Jerome, St, (Eusebius Hieronymus), *Chronica (Ab Abraham)*	Helm, R.W.O. (1984), *Hieronymus Chronicon*, third edn, (Berlin).
Livius Andronicus	Blänsdorf, J. (1995), *Fragmenta Poetarum Latinorum*, (Stuttgart).

Naevius, Gnaeus (epic fragments)	Blänsdorf, J. (1995), *Fragmenta Poetarum Latinorum*, (Stuttgart).
Naevius, Gnaeus (comic and tragic fragments)	Ribbeck, O. (1962), *Comicorum Romanorum Fragmenta* and *Tragicorum Romanorum Frangmenta*, second edns, (Leipzig) and Warmington, E.H. (1967), *Remains of Old Latin*, II, (Cambridge, Massachusetts).
Nonius Marcellus	Lindsay, W.M. (1965), *Nonius Marcellus' Dictionary of Republican Latin*, (Hildesheim).
Paulus Diaconus, *Epitoma Festi*	Lindsay, W.M. (1930), *Sexti Pompei Festi De Verborum Significatu quae Supersunt cum Pauli Epitome*, second edn, in *Glossasria Latina*, IV, p. 93-467.
Posidonios	Kidd, I.G. (1988), *Posidonius*, I, (Cambridge).
Sallust (Gaius Sallustius Crispus), *Historiae*	McGushin, P. (1994), *Sallust the Histories*, II, (Oxford).
Varro, Marcus Terentius, *Saturae Menippeae*	Astbury, R. (1985), *Saturarum Menippearum Fragmenta*, (Leipzig).

All other sources follow Glare, P.G.W. (ed.), (1982), *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, (Oxford), for Latin authors, and Liddell, H.G. and R. Scott, (1996), *A Greek-English Lexicon*, revised and augmented version of the ninth (1940) edn, (Oxford), for Greek authors, with the notable exception of Diodoros Sikulos, who is abbreviated to D.S.

Weights and Measures

1 Roman *modius*=8.74 litres
1 Sicilian *medimnos*=6 Roman *modii*=52.44 litres


N
1 Kyamosoros flumen
2 Longanos flumen
3 Symaethus flumen
Lipara
Panormus
Soluntum
Messana
Tyndaris
Castroreale San Biagio
2
Eryx
Drepanum
Thermae Himeraeae
Himera
Halaesa
Cale Acte
Segesta
Iaitas
Amestratus
Tauromenium
Halicyae
Imachara
Lilybaeum
Timpone Rasta
Monte dei Cavalli
Agyrium
1
Hadranum
Selinus
Monte Adranone
Assorus
Centuripae
Aetna
Henna
Catina
3
Herbessus
Campanaio
Morgantina
Heraclea Minoa
Agrigentum
Leontini
Megara Hyblaea
Acrae
Phintias
Gela
Aguglia
Netum
Syracusae
Borgellusa di Avola
Camarina
Mutyce
Major towns
Towns
Rural settlements
Villas and farms
100 km

Introduction

In Sicily one sees that the Mediterranean evolved at the same rhythm as man. One interpreted itself to the other, and out of the interaction, Greek culture was first born.

L. Durell, *Sicilian Carousel*, 1977

God first created the world, and then he created the Straits of Messina, in order to separate the men from the madmen.

Sicilian Proverb

Sicily is the largest island within the Mediterranean. The central location of Strabo's 'storehouse of Rome' (VI. 2. 7) has given the place a rich history and a cultural diversity that was unique in the ancient world, yet at the same time its position has made it the victim of countless wars of conquest, often resulting in the impoverishment of the local population. In the northeast, the Straits of Messana separate Sicily from the Italian mainland; a barrier that has always been more physical than cultural, as from archaic times, Sicily, like southern Italy, was populated in the interior and in the east by a mixture of natives and Greek colonies. The west coast of the island is the closest point in Europe to the coast of Africa (180 km) and the perennially powerful Phoenician city of Carthage. The island links the eastern with the western Mediterranean, and Italy with Africa.

As a result, Sicily has been home to innumerable displaced peoples, a theme that has been ingrained in Greek folklore, as Herakles, Odysseus, and Aeneas, the great wanderers of the classical world, are all said to have passed through. Many of the historical peoples who founded colonies or trading posts remained, and became part of the permanent population. In the west, the Phoenicians first established trading centres and under the Carthaginians these became major cities. But culturally, the island was Greek. The natives, pushed into the interior in the seventh and sixth centuries, adopted Greek wares and Greek architecture. The west, although religiously and linguistically Punic, also underwent a process of Hellenisation, so that although the political geography of the island was traditionally a patchwork of nominally independent states or areas,

the place was unified by a Hellenic culture evident to a degree in all settlements and inhabitants.

Sicily's position and its fertile grain fields combined to make the island a great trading centre. This also caused the place to become strategically important to anyone who wished to control the central Mediterranean, or the passages of ships between east and west. As a consequence, Sicily has, throughout its history, been both portal and crossroads, meeting place and battlefield. Sicily has always been under the covetous gaze of a host of foreign invaders: Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Ostrogoths, Byzantines, Arabs, Normans, Spaniards, Neapolitans, Garibaldi's Redshirts, Germans, and finally the Allied forces of the Second World War. This seemingly endless struggle has raped Sicily of much of its wealth and natural resources, as, along with trade and armed conflict, poverty is the third of the three major themes in the island's history.

The only real times of peace for Sicily have come when the island has been under the control of an external power for an extended period. Some conquerors remained for centuries, and left behind a rich cultural, architectural, and archaeological legacy. Greek influences survive in things such as place names (Mussolini's alterations aside), while the Arabs have left their mark on the Sicilian dialect and on the local cuisine. Yet of all the invaders, it was the Romans who were present for the longest. Answering the plea for aid from the Mamertines of Messana, they invaded in 264.[1] For twenty-three years they fought the Carthaginians in a war of attrition, emerging victorious in 241. Sicily now became the first extra Italian possession to be conquered by the Romans, and over the next fourteen years, the first 'regularised *provincia*' would take

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[1]All dates are BC unless otherwise stated. I have attempted, whenever possible, to use Greek spellings over Latin; thus Tauromenion rather than Tauromenium, and Drepana rather than Drepanum. This applies to all circumstances where the Greek and Latin names are approximately close. Where this is not the case, I have opted for names that would be more familiar to readers, whether Greek, Latin, or modern; hence Agrigentum rather than Akragas, Girgenti, or Agrigento, Tarentum rather than Taras or Taranto, and Syracuse rather than Syrakousai or Siracusa.

shape.[2] The Carthaginians made an attempt to recapture the island at the outset of the Second Punic War in 218. On this occasion, they succeeded in winning over Hieronymos, the child king of Syracuse, thus precipitating a major rebellion. Marcus Claudius Marcellus took two years to fully capture the city, and after mopping up operations in the following year, Sicily settled down to being part of the Roman Empire for the next seven centuries.

This thesis will use Sicily as a microcosm to illustrate the imperialism of mid-Republican Rome, in particular in the western Mediterranean. Here, Rome received tangible benefits from occupying the places they conquered, as opposed to the east, where subjugation brought with it few short term benefits other than movable plunder. In Sicily, the revenue of occupation was grain, specifically grain for the Roman army. The second aim of the thesis is to demonstrate the process of Roman administrative imperialism in Sicily; that Roman control and administration expanded as the island became more important as a source of military provisions. That Sicily became not just the 'nursemaid of Italy', but also of the Roman legions, was not a result of the Roman conquest or of the later administration that was put into place.[3] Instead, the reverse is true; Roman government on Sicily was a byproduct of the fact that the island provided Rome with the means to make war.

Part I of the thesis will comprise six chapters and will explore the patterns of Roman imperialism in Sicily, through an examination of the sources and the events that made Sicily a regularised *provincia*. Chapter 1 illustrates the debate among ancient historians over Roman

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[2]'Regularised *provincia*' is a term that I use to differentiate between a *provincia* that was a general's assigned zone of command and a *provincia* that was a Roman possession, governed by an annually elected praetor. Throughout this thesis, the word *provincia* on its own refers to any sphere of military command, or to a Roman territory before annual praetors were sent out, but where an *imperium*-holding magistrate and troops were present; regularised *provincia* shall refer to any place outside of Italy that had a more permanent form of Roman administration, with an *imperium*-holding magistrate, who had been elected solely for the purpose of governing the territory, at its head. A regularised *provincia* can be roughly equated to our modern word 'province'; the reasons for this terminology shall be explained below on p. 235.

[3]Quotation from Wilson 1990, p. 1.

imperialism in general, and goes on to argue that Roman intervention in 264 was an act of aggression designed to further their southward expansion and to break the Punic trading monopoly on the western Mediterranean. Chapter 2 will scrutinise the sources for Roman imperialism in the third century, centring on Polybios. A Greek of the mid-second century, Polybios composed most of his history in Rome at the time when the latter's empire was expanding as a tremendous rate. He therefore saw the Romans as natural conquerors, and as a result he often gives them the benefit of the doubt when writing about the reasons behind their wars. For our purposes, the greatest example of this comes from his passages on the Roman invasion of Sicily in 264. Chapter 3 will examine various treatments of the treaties between Rome and Carthage.

Chapters 4 and 5 offer an examination of the interaction between Rome and Sicily in the third century, and how these events shaped the patterns of Roman imperialism. Their effects on the Romans were great, and in many ways turned them from an Italian power into a Mediterranean power. Sicily was the first place where Rome ruled over others as subjects, not as participants in their process of creating an empire, as were the peoples of Italy (albeit of an inferior stature). These narrative chapters will demonstrate the system by which Rome was able to emerge victorious in long wars of attrition, as well as provide us with the tools necessary to examine the effects of the conquest for both Rome and Sicily alike.

Chapter 6 will offer some conclusions for Part I, and also will provide a bridge to Part II. After 241, the occupation of Sicily brought with it two concerns for Rome, security and exploitation. Chapter 7 deals with the concerns over the security of the island in light of its proximity to Carthage, and how it might once again become a battleground if the latter were to begin another war. Although no sources attest to a Roman presence prior to 227, it will be argued that Rome would not have allowed a territory that was so close to Carthage and still had

a substantial Punic population, that it had expended so much energy conquering, and that was providing grain for its armies, to go without a garrison and an *imperium*-holding magistrate. The chapter also explores these early forms of Roman control and how they evolved in Sicily into a regularised *provincia*. Finally, Chapter 8 will deal with the grain supply and the mechanisms of the grain tithe in Sicily. The main purpose of these last two chapters will be to illustrate Roman imperialism in its administrative guise, and how political control of the island increased with Sicily's logistical importance to the legions.

The work will begin with the death of Agathokles in 289, which facilitated the rise to power of the Mamertines in Messana and Hieron II in Syracuse; it will use 191 as a *terminus*, as this was the first time the Romans demanded a double grain tithe from Sicily, the culmination of the processes of imperialism and exploitation that have formed the core of this thesis.

Part I
Patterns of Roman Imperialism

Chapter 1
The Nature of Roman Imperialism in Sicily

'Sicily...was the first to teach our forefathers what a splendid thing it is to rule over foreign nations.' By the time Cicero (*Verr.* II. 2. 2) made this comment in 70, Sicily had been a Roman possession for over one hundred seventy years. In 241, the Romans emerged victorious over the Carthaginians after the twenty-three year First Punic War. The conflict had centred around Sicily, and at the war's end Rome had wrested complete control of the island from Carthage and Syracuse, with the former forced to abandon any claims to Sicily and the latter constituting a small independent kingdom to the southeast, the only part of the island not under Roman military control.

The First Punic War, and the Sicilian theatre in particular, comprise a turning point in the history of the Roman Republic; it was the first time the Romans had left the Italian peninsula for the purpose of not only making war, but of conquering a foreign land, and Roman imperialism now turned towards the non-Italian world for the first time. Sicily held preeminence as the original overseas territory of the fledgling Roman Empire, receiving an administration that was very different from the forms of control previously exerted in Italy. Sicily was the first place to be ruled over directly by the Romans, and as the above words of Cicero illustrate, it holds a special place in Roman history. It was the archetype of many elements of provincial administration that would transform Rome from an Italian power to a Mediterranean power.

The debate on Roman imperialism has periodically swung between what has come to be termed 'defensive' and 'aggressive' attitudes towards empire. After a summary of past and contemporary schools of thought on the matter, this chapter will attempt to apply these theories to Roman interaction with Carthage and Sicily in the years preceding the First Punic War. The debate however, often stops short of exploring the aftermath of military campaigns. Scholars

have usually been content to examine Roman imperialism as it relates to the causes of wars, and non-military models of imperialism have been studied only intermittently. Roman power extended far beyond the realm of the legions, and control was exercised with more than the point of a sword; as a result, Roman imperialism took on many forms, and in Sicily in the third and early second centuries, administrative imperialism was put into practice. The island was governed at the highest level by the new Roman authority (a first for Sicily as well, as the place had never been unified for any length of time) that was in place to keep order in the territory, and to exploit it both for the benefit of Rome, through the grain tithe and Sicilian service in the Roman navy, and for the advancement of individual political careers, in the form of provincial appointments. Sicily eventually became the prototype for the regularised *provinciae*, undergoing a process that for the first time transformed an overseas possession into a defined administrative and bureaucratic area of control.

The Historiography of Roman Imperialism

The concept of imperialism, defined as, 'The behaviour by which a state or people takes and retains power over other states or peoples or lands', first came into existence in the nineteenth century.[1] It was used by various scholars, most often French, English, and German, or more specifically Prussian, to justify the territorial aims of their own imperialist states. Imperialism then, as opposed to our western concept of the term now, was not seen in a negative light, and in the political arena it was perfectly acceptable, and even beneficial, for men such as Bismark, Napoleon III, and Disraeli to throw out imperialist rhetoric. In the realm of scholarship, this ideal was expounded no more firmly than by T. Mommsen's seminal work *Römische Geschichte*, which

[1]Quotation from Harris 1979, p. 5. For historiographical surveys of the debate between Roman aggressive and defensive imperialism see Frézouls 1983, p. 141-162, Hermon 1989, p. 407-416, Rich 1993, p. 38-44. Specifically on 264 see Serrati 1996, p. 1-7.

first appeared in 1874 and was largely a justification of the Roman, and hence the German, Empire. The foremost example of this aspect of his work can been seen in his treatment of the conquest of Italy, and how this in turn mirrors German unification.

This was taken further in the early twentieth century by the American classicist T. Frank, who originated the doctrine of defensive imperialism, that claimed the Romans only defended themselves, conquering only to protect their own interests and those of their allies.[2] This line of thought was furthered by E. Badian and A.N. Sherwin-White, who maintained that the Romans usually only conquered for defensive reasons, and their conclusions have been echoed more recently in the works of E.M. Eckstein and B.D. Hoyos.[3] The main argument of this group of scholars is based on the idea of a Roman fear of powerful neighbours. Apparently, Rome had been going to war for so long that a 'neurosis of fear' had developed within them. In 264 they were afraid of Punic expansion and thought that if Carthage dominated all of Sicily, then undoubtedly Rome would be next. Therefore, their protection of Messana in 264 was more psychosomatic than aggressively imperialist. In short, Rome went to war only when necessary and did not always conquer, doing so only when its own territory was threatened. Furthermore, many subscribers to this belief claim that Rome sought no economic benefits from expansion, and any profit incurred was purely coincidental. Those who assign economic motives to the Romans are being anachronistic, taking modern concepts of a more mercantilist imperialism and placing it upon the Romans.[4] As a result, the Romans went to war with Carthage in 264 in order to protect their possessions in Italy and out of *fides* for their Italian cousins, the Mamertines, in

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[2]Frank 1914.

[3]Badian 1968a, p. 6, Eckstein 1985, p. 265-282, 1987, p. 77-91, Errington 1971, p. 3, 34, Frank 1914, p. 90-91, Hoyos 1998, p. 19-22, 30, 54, 271-274, Sherwin-White (who coins the expression 'neurosis of fear') 1980, p. 178-179.

[4]Badian 1968a, p. 17, 18, 20.

Messana. Originally, they did not plan to take over the rest of Sicily, but only did so once they realised they would have to safeguard their gains from Punic aggression.[5]

The latter theory has been attacked and largely debunked by W.V. Harris' *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 BC*, published in 1979.[6] He maintains that the Romans were in fact the aggressors in most of their wars, finding excuses to declare an *ius bellum* solely for territorial expansion, economic gain, and individual political advancement. Moreover, the fact that the Romans were so aggressive and mobilized for war year after year proves that they were less, not more afraid of powerful neighbours than other states. Rome went to war nearly every single year, and warfare represented more than just territorial ambition. In third century Rome, there was as yet no difference between a politician and a general, and the greatest exploit of any Roman aristocrat with political ambitions was victory in battle. Warfare was the surest way of achieving *dignitas* and *gloria*, and the consul, who had but one year in office, always had to make sure that he had equal access to the glories of his predecessors. In this way warfare was a necessary means towards political advancement. Warfare was also necessary to maintain the Roman alliance system with the Italians, as the latter were taxed not in money or kind but in men for the communal army. Therefore a year without war meant the remittance of one year's tax. Furthermore, many of the allies did not serve by compulsion, as both they and the common soldiery saw for themselves the economic benefits brought about by plundering others.[7]

The majority of contemporary scholars now recognise that the Romans were an

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[5]Badian 1958, p. 35, Eckstein 1987, p. 91, Hoyos 1998, p. 111.

[6]It should be pointed out that, as much as the political climate of the nineteenth century affected scholars like Mommsen, surely the fact that Harris and some of his contemporaries began their studies in the United States at the time of the most vehement protests against the Vietnam War, in the late sixties and early seventies, coloured their views on imperialism. Still, this fact should not take away from their achievements or their conclusions.

[7]See also Harris 1971, p. 1371-1385, 1984, p. 13-58, 1984a, p. 89-113, North 1981, p. 7, Rich 1993, p. 43. For a more Marxist, and less scholarly, approach to aggressive imperialism, see Carney 1958, p. 19-25, who claims that the *nobilitas* intentionally started wars to curb revolution among the lower classes.

aggressively imperialist people, who were not more but less afraid of their neighbours in comparison to other ancient societies. The thesis of Harris has been modified of late by scholars such as E. Hermon, J.A. North, and J. Rich; these have adopted an approach to Roman imperialism that allows for defensive wars, such as the early fourth century Gallic conflicts, and a certain amount of Roman trepidation concerning other imperialist states, for example the Roman concern over the rapid rearmament of Carthage in the mid-second century.[8] Nevertheless, this school of thought still contends that the Romans were an aggressive imperialist power, even though not all of their wars fell into this pattern. The bulk of conflicts however, can be classified as aggressive on the part of Rome. There is strong evidence to support the conclusion that there was a pattern of Roman aggressive, not defensive, imperialism. Cicero (*Rep.* 3. 35) himself admitted that by his time, Rome had won its empire by protecting its allies, and according to Diodoros (XXIII. 1. 4), Hieron of Syracuse at one point accused the Romans of using *fides* as an excuse to start wars. He was not far from wrong; under the banner of *fides* Rome had gone to war over Lucania in 298, Thurii in 281, Messana in 264, and Saguntum in 218. In 238 the senate accepted the Sardinian mercenaries into their *fides* but war was averted in that instance. In each one of the proceeding circumstances, the Roman government used *fides* to enter into a war which they eventually won, bringing them new territory and in most cases hoards of plunder and slaves. The viciousness with which Rome conducted these wars illustrates that they were out in the field for more than their own personal protection or that of their allies. If they were, why did the First Punic War not end in 263? In that year both Carthage and Syracuse were swept from the field and the city of Messana was safe, yet the Romans continued the conflict for twenty-two more campaigns, beginning with a siege of Agrigentum, after which, Polybios (I. 20. 1-2) remarks

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[8]Hermon 1983, p. 177-184, 1984, p. 259-267, 1989, p. 407-416, North 1981, p. 1-9, Rich 1993, p. 38-68, 1996, p. 1-37.

that they then decided to conquer all of Sicily since they were not satisfied with the amount of booty they had taken up to that point. Once again we may look to Cicero to illustrate a point; in *De Officiis* I. 38 the orator admits that with Carthage, Rome fought strictly for supremacy and not for survival. M. Finley put it best when he wrote, 'It would have been small consolation to the 25 000 inhabitants of Agrigentum who were sold into slavery in 261 BC...to be assured that Rome had only *intended* a defensive war.'[9]

It is this last approach, the middle ground, that the present work hopes to follow. There is little doubt that the Romans were an aggressive and an imperialist people, yet at the same time we must leave room for other explanations for the wars of the third century. In this vein, one should never discount the fact that Carthage too, had showed strong imperialist tendencies in the western Mediterranean, and in Sicily in particular, as they had been fighting intermittently with Syracuse for control of the island long before Rome even broke out of Latium. The fact that in 264 they slaughtered all the Italian mercenaries in their service as a show of defiance towards Rome illustrates that they too had a belligerent streak.[10] So Carthage cannot be exonerated from the causes of the First Punic War, but with the lack of Punic sources it is impossible to say whether or not they had actually intentionally orchestrated the conflict. The same cannot be said about Rome however, and it is possible to discern a pattern of aggression on the part of the Romans towards Carthage, as there exists a strong possibility that the former was attempting to goad the latter into war.

Roman Imperialism (273-264)

An examination of the pattern of events down to the year 264 will attempt to show that

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[9]Finley 1978, p. 4.

[10]Zonar. VIII. 9. See La Bua 1981, p. 241-245.

Rome went to war with Carthage, not out of some ingrained fear or out of defence of the Mamertines, but as part of a larger devise. The first aspect we must take into consideration on this matter is the Roman system of mobilizing its citizen army and going to war annually. By the third century, this system had become so instinctive in the Roman psyche that between the beginning of the Second Samnite War in 327 and the the First Punic War in 264, a sixty-three year period, there were but four or five seasons in which Rome did not wage a war.[11] Furthermore, if we look at the senatorial debate of 264, we find the consul Appius Claudius making promises of great profit to all those who served in Sicily.[12] Appius Claudius knew that if the senate voted for war, then, as the conflict's leading proponent, he would most likely be the one chosen to command the mission to Messana. This is a fine illustration of the Roman war system at its best. The primary way for a senator to move up socially and politically was through war; if successful, warfare made a general famous and often won him the ultimate prize of a triumph. Both he and those senators who served with him would incur tremendous monetary and occasionally territorial benefits from a victory, and this in turn would gain the senator a stronger power base of *clientes*.[13] It has been argued that most senators would not have been very bellicose since the majority of them did not go to war in any given year.[14] While the latter is true, it is more likely that a pattern developed whereby senators fostered each others aims on the battlefield; a Roman aristocrat knew, that upon becoming consul, his chances of being voted a war to wage as he saw fit would be much greater if he had supported previous consuls in the same situation. Hence developed the never-ending circle of warfare which characterised mid-Republican Rome. Although a group of

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[11]Harris 1985, p. 9-10, 256-257, Nicolet 1969, p. 117, Rich 1993, p. 44.

[12]For the senatorial debate over Messana see Plb. I. 10. 3-11. 3. See also Eckstein 1980a, p. 175-190, 1987, p. 81.

[13]Harris 1984, p. 14, 1985, p. 11.

[14]Sherwin-White 1980, p. 178.

senators certainly did oppose a war in 264, it is more likely that they were simply wise enough to see that any conflict with Carthage would have had to be a drawn out bloody affair and not the quick victory that Appius Claudius had promised. So we can see that while there is little evidence to lend credence to the theory that the Romans were born with an instinctive fear of powerful neighbours, there is cause to support the theory that they were socialised to make war.

It is difficult to reconcile the evidence with the notion that suddenly in 264 the Romans felt threatened by the possibility of Punic domination in Sicily; Carthage had almost conquered the entire island no less than three times in the preceding two centuries. Furthermore, we must ask why the great naval power of the western Mediterranean, Carthage, would have needed Sicily as a bridge for an Italian invasion. They certainly succeeded in raiding Italy without control of Messana during the First Punic War, and surely they could have staged a full scale invasion by sea if they had have been so inclined; the control of Messana in the end was academic.[15] Regardless, an argument can be made to suggest that Sicily was merely the natural extension of Roman ambitions. To the north lay the Gauls, a less advanced people with little to offer the Romans save land and slaves, but to the south was Sicily, an island with huge tracts of fertile fields, a rich population, and a tremendous amount of movable plunder. The choice was obvious, Sicily was the natural continuation of the empire's expansion. In order to achieve this aim, the Romans took deliberate steps in preparation to wrest the island away from Carthage.

Rome may have first become open to the idea of conquering Sicily around 300, when it has been conjectured that the historian Timaios of Tauromenion called upon Rome to aid the eastern Sicilian Greeks in ridding themselves of the Carthaginians.[16] This would fit well with the history of the Greeks in the west, as many cities had previously called upon champions to rid

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[15]Punic raids on Italy: Oros. IV. 7. 7, 10. 4, Plb. I. 20. 7, 56. 3, Zonar. VIII. 10, 16.

[16]Heurgon 1969, p. 24, Momigliano 1959, p. 529.

themselves of their neighbours. The appeal from Tarentum and then Syracuse to Pyrrhos being the example closest to the time period at hand. But at the end of the fourth century, Rome was in no position to carry out any such proposal, regardless of whether Timaios actually made the appeal. The process that led the Romans to war with Carthage began first with little steps in the late 270s and by the middle of the next decade Italy was ready to be mobilised, on land and sea, for a confrontation with Carthage.

First Rome sought to diplomatically isolate Carthage. In 273 the state entered into friendly diplomatic relations with Ptolemy II Philadelphos of Egypt, and the two powers exchanged ambassadors.[17] Although it might be argued that this was just one of many foreign ties that Ptolemy had, and therefore he did not give it much attention, he did in fact, have much to gain from a Roman alliance. Wood, slaves, sulphur, mercenaries, and safety for Egyptian merchants in Italian ports could all be acquired by an affiliation with Rome, and although the latter was not yet a major power, the city did control all of Italy, and therefore had to be taken seriously.[18] Thus the two were brought into a state of *amicitia*, as Appian (*Sic.* 1) describes Ptolemy as a friend (φιλία) of Rome throughout the First Punic War, and the fact that Ptolemy denied Carthage a lone to continue the war with Rome in 252 was perhaps the fruition of this plan.[19] Also in that year Rome founded Latin colonies at Cosa to the north and Paestum to the south. The fact that both were on the western coast of Italy has been seen as no coincidence, and it is highly plausible that their locations had been specifically chosen to defend Italy from possible Punic raids in the oncoming war. Rome also took steps to prepare for a naval war; the following

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[17]Dio, fr. 41, D.H. XX. 14, Eutrop. II. 15, Just. XVIII. 2. 9, Liv. *Per.* XIV, Val. Max. IV. 3. 9, Zonar. VIII. 6. Dio, Eutropius, and Zonaras all state that it was Ptolemy who took the initiative, but this does not refute the thesis that it was a Roman plan that the king's friendship be used against Carthage, which is what happened.

[18]Fraser 1972, I, p. 153-154, II, p. 169-170 n. 347, Lampela 1998, p. 44, 48-50, Lomas 1993, p. 109-110.

[19]On the *amicitia* between Rome and Carthage in the First Punic War see Badian 1958, p. 44, Gruen 1984, p. 62-63, Lampela 1998, p. 33-34.

year, after defeating the Bruttians, they annexed half the Sila forest in southern Italy, and Dionysios (XX. 15) comments that this forest produced excellent wood for the construction of ships.[20]

Furthering their ambitions in Sicily, the Romans may have concluded a treaty with Hieron II of Syracuse in 270. Dio (XI. fr. 43) and Zonaras (VIII. 8) mention such a treaty in the context of Hieron sending the Romans aid for the siege of Rhegium in 270. Although the absence of this treaty in the narrative of Polybios does call its authenticity into question, if a pact did exist then this was an obvious step towards was with Carthage. If Rome was looking for an excuse to intervene in Sicilian affairs, then it was a safe bet that they could do so out of *fides* with Hieron, since Syracuse and Carthage were rarely at peace for long.

In 267 Rome added two new quaestors to its government.[21] Their functions were to marshall Rome's *socii navales* into a coherent force by collecting money and ships from them in times of need, as well as to safeguard the Roman grain supply.[22] This most likely the origin of the *quaestores classici* who commanded ships during the First Punic War.[23] The new system was put to its first test in the same year when Rome conducted naval operations against the Sallentines in the heel of Italy.[24] The preparedness of Italy for a naval war was the final step in the arrangements to fight a war with Carthage, all that they now required was a way to draw the enemy into a conflict.

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[20]Harris 1985, p. 183-184. Lazenby 1996, p. 39 makes an unconvincing argument that these steps were taken, not out of aggression, but out of fear of Carthaginian imperialism.

[21]Liv. *Per.* XV.

[22]Meiggs 1973, p. 25, Rickman 1980, p. 32.

[23]Plb. I. 52. 7.

[24]Auct. *De. Vir. Ill.* 40, Cic. *Fin.* 2. 65, Flor. I. 15, Liv. *Per.* XV, Verg. *G.* 3. 1, Zonar. VIII. 7.

Economic Motives and the Campanian Connection

A further aspect of Roman imperialism has yet to be taken into account. Evidence exists which suggests that, on top of the above reasons, the state felt that it would economically benefit on a tremendous scale by the conquest of Sicily. For some, these benefits would come by way of land. Senators may have looked at the fertile lands of Sicily with an envious eye, envisioning the addition of them to their holdings in Italy and thus furthering their interests in the Italian grain trade. The senate was undoubtedly aware of just how much grain Sicily was capable of producing; the fact that Rome had been importing grain from the region in times of famine for over two hundred years would have weighed heavily in the mind of any landowning aristocrat. Furthermore, if it could be made so that Sicilian grain were imported into Italy every year, the market price would undoubtedly fall, and mass production combined with low prices has historically served the interests of the gentry, as opposed to the small farmer.[25] The possibility of Sicilian wheat in Italy would mean that the aristocratic landowning class could eliminate some of its smaller competition.

Another important factor in the minds of both the landowning and the growing manufacturing class may have been the state contracts that would arise from a war with Carthage. The Sicilian expeditionary force would have to be fed, and extended service would mean that the arms that the soldiers supplied for themselves would eventually be damaged or lost and would have to be replaced through private contractors at state expense. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that extended service would, and did, have the opposite effect on the landowners hoping to supply the army with food, since the longer the army spent in Sicily, the more it came to rely on both Sicilian grain and the donations of Hieron.

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[25]Scramuzza 1959, p. 228-229.

While the advantages to the above classes would have been great, the group which would have profited the most from a Carthaginian war over Sicily would have been the mercantile class of traders from Rome and Campania. Cicero (*Man.* 11) says that before his time the Romans often went to war to protect the interests of its merchants, and the Romans never disguised the fact that this was the reason behind the First Illyrian War of 229.[26] Polybios (VI. 56. 2) commented that the Carthaginians were ruthless traders and profit hunters, and the treaties Rome had made with Carthage (see below, p. 74-97) served greatly to limit the interests of this class in the western Mediterranean; the Punic trading system was incredibly exclusionist, and their brand of closed mercantilism meant that the vast majority of ports would have been off limits to Italian traders.[27] In the early third century the Italian trading class began to expand at a rapid rate, and Capuan wares were for the first time challenging the supremacy of Greek goods in the west.[28] Yet, they would have found themselves greatly stunted by where and with whom they could trade. Moreover, if Carthage were permitted to hold Messana and dominate northeastern Sicily they could have easily used their powerful navy to close off the Straits of Messana to all Italian traders. In turn this may have barred some merchants from ports in the extreme south of the peninsula, and furthermore would inhibit trade with the Syracusans, one of the mercantile metropoleis of the west. Again, these classes would also have had state contracts on their minds as supplies and reinforcements would have to be transported to the armies in Sicily. After the war, if Rome were to obtain hold of Sicily, the profits to be made from having a monopoly on the transportation of Sicilian grain all over the Mediterranean would have been significant. True, this mercantile class of senators could not have been in the majority or else the *Lex Claudia* of 218, restricting the

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[26]App. *Ill.* 7, Plb. II. 8. See Feig Vishnia 1996, p. 20.

[27]Palmer 1997, p. 23.

[28]Frederiksen 1984, p. 328-329, Picard and Picard 1969, p. 188-190.

senatorial role in oversees trade, could never have been passed;[29] but this does not mean that they were not a vocal minority, influencing the other hawks in the Roman senate. Therefore, in essence, not going to war with Carthage in 264 would have been economically harmful to the Italian merchant class, while a victorious war with Carthage would have brought tangible economic benefits.[30]

The evidence may also lead one to the conclusion that the majority of these merchants who pushed for war in 264 would have been Campanians, or more specifically Capuans, who sought to use the militarism of the Roman state to their advantage. Campania had been economically linked with Rome for centuries because Rome lay in the centre of the heavily travelled western Italian trading routes between Campania, Latium, and Etruria. There is ample evidence that the Campanians and the Romans had strong business ties since the sixth century, and the fertile fields of Campania were always turned to in times of famine.[31] Furthermore, it has been calculated that in the third century, Campanians made-up as much as seventeen percent of the of the foot soldiers in the legions.[32] In this way the two regions of Italy became vitally linked. Since their entrance into the Roman confederation in 343, this process had only accelerated. Capua now became Italy's second city, rivalling Rome in terms of prosperity; in fact, the Capuans, a city-state of traders, probably even outstripped Rome when it came to maritime commerce.[33] We can see this as due mainly to the benefits Capua and all of Campania incurred being under the

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[29]Feig Vishnia 1996, p. 34-37, Harris 1984, p. 17.

[30]Opposing the above views are Badian 1968a, p. 18-19 and (strangely) Harris 1985, p. 57. The claim of Badian, that through imperialism Rome, 'sought no major economic benefits', has little basis in fact.

[31]Rome imported grain from Campania in 508 (D.H. V. 26. 3 and Liv. II. 9. 6), 492 (D.H. VII. 1. 3, Liv. II. 34. 3), 476 (Liv. II. 52. 1), 440 (D.H. XII. 1. 9), and attempted to in 411 (Liv. IV. 52. 6).

[32]Baronowski 1993, p. 190.

[33]References to Capuan prosperity abound: D.S. XX. 36. 3, XXVI. 11. 1, Flor. I. 11. 6-7, 34. 1, Liv. VII. 31. 10, VIII. 11. 16, IX. 19. 4, XXI. 31. 10-12, XXIII. 2. 1, 5. 8-9, XXVI. 33. 3.

protection of Rome. New and safe markets would have been gained as the Capuans began to create a small mercantile empire of their own, an empire that by the early third century was ready to challenge the Punic trade monopoly. One theory claims that the office of the *duumviri navales*, which was created in 311 to take charge of the Roman navy, had the sole purpose of protecting the Campanian coast and thus ensuring the area's trade interests.[34] There is also a possibility that Capua acted as Rome's mint for silver coinage from 338 until 268, and afterwards still continued to mint coins in the name of Rome.[35] One thesis, although doubtful, proposes that the image of Romulus and Remus on a coin in fact represents the twin cities of Italy: Rome and Capua.[36]

Livy (VIII. 14. 10) states that it was only five years after their amalgamation into the Roman alliance system that the Capuans were granted *civitas sine suffragio* and over the next several decades some of the wealthier Capuan families migrated to Rome and began to align themselves through marriage to the Roman upper classes. The *gens* Claudia appear to have had Campanian links, and the Roman *cognomines* Caiatinus and Calenus are etymologically connected to the to the Campanian towns of Cales and Caiatia.[37] These names, save for Calenus, are familiar as generals and admirals from the First Punic War, furthering the conclusion that those with Campanian connections represented the hawks at Rome. Many Capuans now began to hold political office and gained entrance to the senatorial class; the Atilii and the Otacilii being two elite Roman families who could trace their heritage back to fourth century Capua,[38] and in the First Punic War these two families accounted for no less than eight consulships. It is idealistic to think

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[34]Rickman 1980, p. 32. For the creation of the *duumviri navales* see Liv. IX. 30. 4.

[35]Crawford 1974, I, p. 23-24, Heurgon 1969a, p. 219-220, Mattingly 1945, p. 65, 67, Mitchell 1966, p. 65, Thompsen 1957, I, p. 49-54. See also Plin. *NH*, 33. 42-44, Liv. *Per.* XV, Zonar. VIII. 7.

[36]Carcopino 1925.

[37]Corsaro 1982, p. 1006-1007, Hoyos 1998, p. 20-21.

[38]Frederiksen 1984, p. 227-229, Scullard 1973, p. 32.

that these Capuans and Campanians in the senate would not have at looked out for their own interests as well as those of their native land. It is likely that they were at least partially responsible for the Roman annexation of southern Italy which gave them brand new markets for their wares. We may now apply the same principle to the crisis of 264, with a small but vocal minority of Campanians urging the Roman senate to protect the Mamertines in order to foster their own mercantilist aims.

Finally, the statement of Polybios (I. 10. 2) that the Mamertines appealed to Rome as a kindred people should not be forgotten. While this tie may have slightly impressed the Romans, it may have had a profound effect on the Campanians at Rome, who, like the Mamertines, were Oscan.[39] Campanian mercenaries had a long history of service in Sicily and it is not unreasonable to think that some of the Campanians at Rome had either done service there themselves, or at least knew someone who had. These factors could have combined to give the Campanians in Rome further reason to urge the senate to grant *fides* to Messana.

In this manner Rome facilitated the invasion of Sicily. Over the next twenty-three years, Carthage would eventually be evicted from the island and Rome would emerge victorious in the First Punic War. Roman imperialism does not end for Sicily in 241 however, as at the war's conclusion that the Romans first established a firm military hold on the territory. After a number of years in which administration largely remained *ad hoc*, Sicily was converted into a Rome's first regularised *provincia* in 227, thus furthering Roman imperialism on the island, which had now taken on an administrative form.

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[39]Palmer 1997, p. 125, thinks that the Mamertines were Samnite Oscans who were forced out of Italy by a *ver sacrum*, and that they are the people Strabo writes about at V. 4. 12. There is nothing to say that this is incorrect; many bands of Italian mercenaries had originally been victims of a *ver sacrum* (see Tagliamonte 1994, p. 62-64, 67), and the Mamertines would still have been able to appeal to the Campanians at Rome as fellow Oscans. There may have even been an element of sympathy involved because of their forcible expulsion from Italy. See Krasilnikoff 1996, p. 8-10.

Sicily as the First Regularised Provincia

Although it has been demonstrated that the Romans could be aggressively imperialist, it does not follow that the Roman Empire was deliberately designed; the Romans went to war purposefully but did not always occupy the places they conquered. Provided they maintained their yearly contributions to the Roman army, they left the Italian states to govern themselves. Other places were defeated, and sometimes occupied, but government still functioned on the whole in the pre-Roman manner, and it would often take years to convert a territory outside Italy from a recently conquered land to a regularised *provincia* with Roman governmental structures at the highest level. This goes against the views of Polybios, who was writing in an age when Rome was already a fully developed imperial power, and the most militarily energetic state in the Mediterranean. He saw the Roman Empire as a naturally expanding entity, and therefore the place of Rome in the world was to conquer others.[40] The evidence does not bear out the ancient author's central theme. Upon the conquest of Sicily in 241, the Romans occupied the island but did not immediately convert the area into a permanent administrative zone. The early institutions that governed the territory are obscure, but a praetor was not put in charge of Sicily until 227, and for fourteen years Roman political structure was characterised by *ad hoc* measures of a temporary nature, as the island, like many other conquered places from Norman England immediately after 1066 to post-1945 Germany, began the largely unconscious process of conversion from a zone of military occupation into an area of administrative control (see below, p. 246-248).

In this sense the importance of Sicily cannot be overstated. Most work on Roman imperialism has contented itself with scrutinizing the causes of Roman bellicosity, and few have taken on the task of examining the consequences of these wars upon both the conquerors and the

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[40]Derow 1979, p. 1-15, Finley 1978, p. 3, Hermon 1984, p. 261, Momigliano 1975, p. 27-29, 48, Richardson 1979, p. 1-11, Walbank 1972, p. 163.

conquered. This deficiency was recognised by E. Hermon in 1983, but Roman administrative imperialism was not fully explored until the studies of E.S. Gruen, A. Lintott, and J.S. Richardson, who raised questions about the nature of *provinciae* and Rome's relationship to its conquered subjects that were not addressed by Harris or those who followed him.[41] The debate over this aspect of Roman imperialism has usually centred upon Rome's conquest of the Hellenistic east, a process that did not really get underway until the second century. Here the Romans met a culture much older than theirs, with fantastically wealthy kingdoms and empires both much larger and more populous than their own to the west. Gruen maintains that even now, Rome had precious little experience in running an empire, and was still largely ignorant of how to rule over conquered peoples.[42] While his conclusions are sound, his starting point comes too late, and in order to understand Roman aggression in the Greek east it is necessary to look at the first conquest outside of Italy - Sicily. Here the Romans encountered Greeks as well, and the Kingdom of Syracuse was one of the richest states in the Mediterranean, but on the whole Sicily was militarily weak, and the only threat to Roman dominance came from Carthage, a people who had also come to the island as conquerors. Sicily would become the first Roman conquest and the first regularised *provincia*, and as such it was the place where the concept of term *provincia* was first used to denote a conquered and defined territory that was administered by a Roman government at the highest level (see below, p. 237-238). Richardson has used Spain to illustrate the concepts of the earliest regularised *provinciae*, but Spain was a different type of environment from that to which the Romans had become accustomed. It was largely rural, with few cities, and the population resisted fiercely for nearly two hundred years. Agriculturally wealthy with

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[41]Hermon 1983, p. 176-177. Gruen 1984, Lintott 1981, 1993, Richardson 1976, 1986, 1991. See also Arnold 1914.

[42]Gruen 1984, p. 76-95.

abundant natural resources, Spain would remain a zone primarily of military occupation even beyond the fall of the Republic. Not only was it different from the majority of the places conquered by Rome until the first century, it was not occupied until late in the third century, and is therefore predated by Sicily by nearly four decades. Sicily was the place where Rome first learnt not just how to conquer, but how to administer and govern foreign lands and peoples. Although the Romans were unconscious of it, Sicily was the forerunner of what were to become the regularised *provinciae* of later centuries, as what came to be some of the provincial and taxation structures in the east were first developed in an *ad hoc* fashion on the island in the third century. When Rome assigned praetors to govern its new possessions, it could look back at the experiment of 227 (and it was indeed an experiment) for proof that this arrangement was successful.

Roman practice up until 241 had involved individual cities being left to govern themselves, but the foremost purpose of the conquest of Sicily and the later installation of a bureaucracy to run the island was for security; Sicily represented a bridge between Carthage and Italy, and its control would be vital for either side should one decide to strike at the other. So based on the fact that Sicily was a recently conquered land, and that the island was meant to serve as a major source of grain for the Romans, it is unlikely that there would have been no Roman supervision. In the context of Sicily, both security and grain supply were interrelated; the primary purpose of the *lex Hieronica* (see chapter 9) was to feed the Roman garrisons on the island, and in the second century to feed Roman armies overseas. Roman government structure appeared on Sicily not as a result, but as a by-product of this process. It cannot be overstated that Sicily was the very first extra-Italian possession, and in 241 the senate had no model upon which to base any kind of lasting settlement. Administration and taxation of conquered lands in the third century therefore either continued native practices already in place, or, 'developed in response to conditions on the

spot, rather than being imposed from the centre.'[43] In this sense, many institutions which modern scholars associate with provincial governments - tithes, tributes, large bureaucracies, and such, evolved out of a series of extemporaneous measures designed to meet immediate needs.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to illuminate the historiography and the current lines of argument concerning Roman imperialism. The principles established by other scholars have then been applied first to the Roman invasion of Sicily in 264, and then to the creation of Sicily as a Roman territory and later as a regularised *provincia*. There is little doubt that Rome could be an aggressively imperialist power, and to this end the evidence would appear to show that a war against Carthage over Sicily had been in the planning stages since at least 273. Their relations with Ptolemy, the founding of colonies on the west coast, the alliance with Hieron, annexing half the Sila forest, and the appointment of two new quaestors to manage the naval allies and the grain supply all point to preparations for a war with a naval power. Moreover, in the decades leading up to 264, the Romans had established a pattern of the use of *fides* for belligerent purposes; in this case the excuse to continue their southward expansion was the protection of the Mamertines. Many a Roman landowner would have benefited from a war in Sicily, both through plunder and the possibility of acquiring new territory; though the class that stood to gain the most was the shippers and traders in Rome and especially Campania. The Campanians in Rome now exercised their ties with the government to promote their own trading interests. War with Carthage meant the strong possibility that they could break the Punic monopoly on trade throughout most of the western Mediterranean. In 264 these factors combined to bring the Romans into the First Punic

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[43]Richardson 1976a, p. 151. In general see p. 147-151. Richardson's work has convincingly demonstrated the lack of provincial structure in the Roman world well into the second century. See also Lintott 1993, p. 72-76, Richardson 1986, *passim*, especially p. 1-10, 57-58, 75-94, 109-123, 1989, p. 580-589, 593-598.

War, that in turn would lead to Rome acquiring its first overseas possession - Sicily.

Yet for Sicily, Roman imperialism did not cease with the culmination of the war in 241. Too many scholars have ignored the aspects of Roman imperialism that go beyond the military sphere. This is especially surprising in modern times, as we live in an age where the United States of America have conquered the world not with guns and bullets, but with dollars, consumer products, and films; what many would call economic and cultural imperialism. After the First Punic War, the military battle for Sicily was over, at least temporarily, but the assay to maintain control over the island was in its infancy. A process was now under way by which the Romans would learn how to govern foreign peoples and territories. During its early history as a Roman territory, Sicily was governed by a series of improvised measures that came into being as they were necessitated by the Romans; the more the resources of the island were exploited, the more governmental structure was necessary. This would eventually lead to the regularisation of Roman administration in the decades and centuries to come. As the first regularised *provincia*, the importance of Sicily's subjugation and subsequent exploitation are crucial towards the understanding of early modalities of Roman imperialism.

Chapter 2
Sources

The period 289-191 is on the whole poorly chronicled for Sicilian history until the narrative of Livy begins to detail the defection of Syracuse from Rome in 215. From this point onwards we are relatively well-informed about affairs in Sicily, as the island was gradually becoming more important to the Romans as a granary. Unfortunately, for the time before 215, no contemporary sources survive, and, more importantly, no even near contemporary Sicilian accounts have come to us except through the barest of fragments. All is not lost however, in that we know that at least one historian, the Greek Polybios, read and quoted from the main sources of the third century. Although more of his history survived than any other Hellenistic historian, his account is only complete to the year 216; afterwards, we are left with some brief, though often informative, fragments concerning the defection of Syracuse, the early stages of the Roman siege of the latter, the spoils from the city's sacking, and a note on the computation of the size of Sicilian cities. After 211 the extant fragments of Polybios only touch upon Sicily as it was relevant to the Roman war in Africa. After 201, the island receives hardly a mention. To confound matters, Polybios considered 220 to be the actual start of his work, and books I and II, chronicling the years 264 to 220, are an introduction and merely summarise major events, most notably the First Punic War.

This chapter will examine the major sources for the history of Sicily in the third and early second centuries, centring on Polybios. Polybios, like his Greek contemporaries and predecessors, was in essence a professional historian. Working under patrons who were often Hellenistic monarchs, a Greek historian's sole employment was the writing of history. This worked well in that it allowed them the time to conduct research, but at the same time they might find themselves limited when it came to writing things about their benefactors, as was the case

with Polybios and Scipio Aemilianus. Roman Republican historians, on the other hand, with the notable exception of Livy and his patron Augustus, had no such restrictions. Most Roman historians were senators; wealthy men who lived off of the fruits of their estates. Their main occupation was as a senator at Rome, and on occasion they might also serve as a general. While this freed them from the watchful eyes of a patron, their lifestyle also restricted them in that they were not able to travel or conduct research on the scale of their Greek counterparts. Also, and more importantly, their role and position in society made them fiercely loyal to Rome, and they were therefore rather biassed in their recording of events.[1] Polybios (I. 14. 1-3) records the biassed nature of Fabius Pictor's account of the third century. Pictor was himself a senator and statesman, and by all accounts greatly favoured the Romans in his writing. None of these points about Greek or Roman historians should take anything away from their works, but have only been raised to illustrate the cautions that must be taken in the realm of ancient historiography.

Unlike in the modern world, written histories from ancient times were not widely disseminated to the public at large. While many beyond the upper classes did have access to histories, in written form they were the preserve of the aristocracy. Most people, from kings to paupers, listened to works being read aloud by the author or, more often, a professional reader. The only form of publication or public dissemination of works came by the author personally sending copies out to various places and then having them recited by others.[2] Authors who did read out their works often did so before they were committed to writing, thus in essence trying out various techniques and devices on an audience to gauge reaction.[3] This tendency towards

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[1]Wiseman 1987, p. 248-249. See Nep. *ap.* Suet. *Rhet.* 3.

[2]Plin. *Ep.* IV. 7. 2.

[3]The reading of a work in public was known as ἀκροασις (see Hp. *Praik.* 12, Plb. XXXII. 2. 5) or *acroasis* (see Cic. *Off.* I. 147, Suet. *Gram.* 22. 4, Var. *Men.* 517A). See Pfiffer 1968, p. 235, 238-246, Wiseman 1987, p. 384-385. On *recitationes* see Cichorius 1922, p. 261-269, Walsh 1970, p. 6; for the importance of reading aloud, with a defence of silent reading as an alternative, see Gavrilov 1997.

public recitation is one of the factors that accounts for the ubiquitous use of speeches as a was on conveying information within the body of a historical work. For our purposes, the two former aspects are most evident in the works of Livy, who wrote in a style that was suited to stirring the emotions of a crowd. Thus a historians style as well as his material, might very well be heavily influenced by the opinions of his audience at a public or private reading. And therefore in this sense all history in the ancient world was of a popular nature.[4] Lukian (*Hist. Conscr.* 5, 10-11, 44), in his treatise on the writing of history, even went so far as to say that a popular tone should be a prerequisite for all historians.

Archaeologically, it is difficult to trace exactly what came to Rome via Sicily rather than from southern Italy or Greece. Moreover, the Romans left few traces of their presence in Sicily during the mid-Republic, and thus the use of archaeology as a source for this time period is limited. Only a handful of Latin inscriptions survive from Sicily from any time period, but Greek epigraphy is a different matter. Here, we are fortunately to have lengthy documents from the First Punic War in the mysterious Entella tablets. Found sometime in the early 1960s, these nine bronze inscriptions (of which at least one is a modern forgery) give us rare insight into Hellenistic Sicily, the First Punic War, and the coming of the Romans.[5] They are offerings of thanks by the city of Entella to various people and places that helped them to repopulate after a disaster, which was most probably a Carthaginian sacking sometime between 254 and 250.[6] Their usefulness is diminished however, by the fact that they were unearthed in clandestine digging and as such next to nothing is known about their excavation; furthermore, the locations of only three of the nine

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[4]Walbank 1960, p. 230-231.

[5]On Tablet VII as a forgery see Loomis 1994, p. 135-137, 159-160, pl. 3-4.

[6]Corsaro 1982, p. 1031, Gallo 1982, p. 930, Lombardo 1982, p. 872-873, Loomis 1994, p. 149-150.

tablets are known.[7]

Contemporary Sources

As previously outlined, there are no surviving sources contemporary to the period in question until we reach the works of Plautus in 205. This section will cover the sources from Timaios to Ennius, including only those that are used largely independently of the sources from which their fragments were taken. This method excludes Philinos and Fabius Pictor, as these authors must be read in conjunction with Polybios, and therefore will be addressed in the section concerning the latter. Save for the works of Timaios, all sources in this section are poetic or dramatic.

Timaios was the most well known Greek historian of the western Mediterranean before the time of Polybios. Only the last part of his work, covering 289-264 and added on to his thirty-eight book *Sikelikai Historiai* late in his life, is relevant to the period in question. His work endures in one hundred and sixty-four fragments and was a widely read history.[8] He is the main source for Fabius Pictor and Polybios for the events leading up to the First Punic War.[9] He was also the victim of a lengthy attack by the latter (XII. 11-15, also II. 16. 15); from this passage it is obvious that Polybios knew the works of Timaios extensively, and, even though his sentiments are largely negative, Polybios does at times accord Timaios some respect (III. 32. 2, VIII. 10. 12). He does take issue with the popular nature of Timaios' work, filled as it was with anecdotes, myths, and omens. Polybios also charges him with bias over his treatment of several persons, especially Agathokles, but considering that the tyrant exiled Timaios (*FGH* 566 fr. 124d) this is

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[7]Falsone in Nenci 1982-1983, p. 310, Loomis 1994, p. 129, Wilson 1982, p. 104.

[8]Pearson 1987, p. 1, 39, 270-271.

[9]Walbank 1957, I, p. 27-28.

hardly surprising. Still, Polybios does praise him for his claim that history should be equated with truth.

He is important in that he established the technique of dating events by Olympic years, the method adopted by Polybios. He was also the historian who popularised the Aeneas myth in Sicily. First recorded by Stesichoros in the sixth century, Timaios was concerned especially with the origins of people and places, and as such he saw Aeneas as the great ancestor to many of the peoples of Sicily, both Greek and otherwise.[10] This may also have been a political manoeuver, as he perhaps brought the Trojans to Sicily in order to illustrate that the island was in fact belonged tp the Greeks, and their enemy Carthage had no claim to the place.[11] It also appears that Timaios was the first historian to take notice of Rome in any serious fashion, and was the first person to claim in writing that the Romans were also descendants of Aeneas. By the second quarter of the third century, Rome controlled all of Italy, and was quickly becoming the superpower of the western Mediterranean. The Greeks of the west now began to sit up and take notice of the Romans, but as well they were becoming more interested in them, and began to ask questions about their history. Sicilian historians responded to this demand, and they gave Greek audiences what they had come to expect, as when one set about telling the history of a certain place, one started with a foundation story, complete with the genealogy of the founder.[12] By accepting the Trojan origins of Rome, and by Hellenising the Trojans themselves, the Greeks sought to bring people they had encountered around the Mediterranean into their world, and Rome was not the only city to receive this treatment; the incorporation of the Elymians into the

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[10]Brown 1958, p. 34, Pearson 1987, p. 87. See *SEG* XLV. 1465.

[11]Pearson 1975, p. 192, 1987, p. 87.

[12]Timai. *ap.* D.H. I. 67. 4, 74. 1, Gel. XI. 1. 1, Lyk. *Al.* 615, Plb. XII. 4b. See Loicq-Berger 1967, p. 264, Pearson 1987, p. 85-86, Wiseman 1995, p. 1, 52.

myths of Herakles is one of many examples.[13] This would eventually allow cities like Kenturipa and Segesta to claim a kinship with Rome, and heavily influenced Fabius Pictor's history when he came to write about the origins of his people (fr. 1C).

The influence of Timaios upon the canon of ancient historians cannot be underestimated, and although very little of his history comes after 289, his effect on the histories of the third century is most visible in Polybios' concepts concerning the conflict between Rome and Carthage and the imperialism displayed by both sides. Carthage was bound to play a strong role in any history of Sicily in the fourth and third centuries. Timaios, however, appears to have been the first historian to juxtapose Carthage not with the eastern Sicilian Greeks, but with Rome. One of the main themes of his work was the synchronisation of the histories of Rome and Carthage and the inevitability of the First Punic War. He places the foundation of each city in 814 (*ap.* D.H. I. 74. 1) thus setting them in opposition from the very start. And he ends his history in the tumultuous year of 264, perhaps indicating that his work culminated at the point where the two powers came into conflict.[14] This is the ideology adopted by Polybios, that the three great wars between Rome and Carthage were inevitable due to the imperialist policies of both sides.[15] Each of them had expanded as far as eastern Sicily and it was therefore predetermined that these two states would enter armed conflict over the area, and this would eventually boil over into a life and death struggle, resulting in the aggrandising of one empire and the extermination of another. The larger view of the Punic Wars and the juxtaposition of the Roman and Punic Empires and the synchronisation of their histories culminating in 264, was the greatest contribution of Timaios to the histories of Polybios, although the latter, having lived much later than the former, saw the high

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[13]D.S. IV. 23, Pi. *O.* XII. 27. See Frederiksen 1984, p. 138, Gruen 1992, p. 8-10, Veyne 1979, p. 10.

[14]Brown 1958, p. 35-36, Pearson 1987, p. 47, 85. See also Timai. *FGH* 566 fr. 82.

[15]Walbank 1972, p. 161.

water mark of the history of the two powers as the Hannibalic war.

It is a great loss to the student of the third century that the writings of Gnaeus Naevius, whom we may speak of with confidence as the first great writer of Roman drama, are lost. Thus we are deprived not only of a first hand account of the First Punic War, but also of one written by soldier who served in the Sicilian theatre. We have no idea as to the rank of Naevius within the Roman army, but he was certainly not a commander of consular or praetorian level, thus the loss of his works is doubly lamentable as nothing like the account of a lower ranking soldier exists for any period of Roman or Greek history, with the possible exception of Josephos.

Naevius produced his first play in 235.[16] The titles of thirty-two comedies and six tragedies survive. As with his predecessor Livius Andronicus, all of these were modelled on Greek originals; however, he went even further than his Andronicus in Romanising his works, and in many ways he established the style and form of Roman drama. He also began the practice of combining two Greek plays into one Roman work, and this technique was used by many of his more famous successors. Finally, Naevius is important in that he also composed two wholly original tragedies. The performances of his plays were popular in his day and well beyond.

Regardless of the fact that none of his work survives intact, Naevius is highly significant to this line of argument in that a fragment of the *De Poeta* by Varro Atacinus (*ap.* Gel. XVI. 21. 45), which claims to be a quotation from Naevius himself, actually states that the playwright served in the First Punic War. This service is reflected in his masterpiece, the *Bellum Poenicum*, an epic on the history of the war itself. Aulus Gellius (XVII. 21. 45-46) establishes a rough date for composition at c. 233. Therefore, the work was probably written for the dual purpose of lauding the achievements of Rome and the Italian allies (since Naevius was most likely Campanian

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[16]Var. At. *Poet. ap.* Gel. XVII. 21. 45.

by birth) and to offset the pro-Carthaginian history of Philinos, in wide circulation at this time.[17] In many ways the *Bellum Poenicum* was the *Iliad* to the *Odissia* of Andronicus, composed sometime before 240. Using Timaios' dating, the *Bellum Poenicum* traced the history of Rome and Carthage back to the origins of both cities, which were both founded in 814. Therefore, they were cast in the roles of eternal antagonists within the poem, forever opposed to each other in an enmity that went back to Aeneas and Dido. The Trojan origin of the Roman people was heavily stressed, thus juxtaposing the Trojan Romans with the Greeks on Sicily. The work was also filled with gods and prophesies, at least until Naevius reached historical times. It is an extraordinary synthesis of myth and legend with historical fact. The Hellenistic influence on Naevius is obvious, and it is likely that he drew on the culture and knowledge taken in during his tour of duty in Sicily. The *Bellum Poenicum* was the first truly Roman epic, for it was not based on a Greek original. Cicero (*Senec.* 50) states that Naevius took great pleasure in reciting the poem in his old age, and so it probably served as a rallying cry to the Romans in the dark days of the war against Hannibal. Scholars in the fifth century AD still debated just how much of Virgil's *Aeneid* had been borrowed from Naevius.[18]

While it is possible that some Romans soaked in Greek culture while conquering Sicily by spending their time in the theatres and libraries of the island, of course the majority of the common soldiery would not have taken interest in such pursuits. Like all soldiers, these men were far away from home, and would have often found themselves with a tremendous amount of spare time on their hands. They probably spent a significant amount of this free time in bars or brothels, especially while billeted in cities. Naevius, having served in the war, would have been acutely aware of this, and accordingly he wrote about subjects to which the members of his audience

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[17]On the Campanian origins of Naevius see Rowell 1949.

[18]Macrob. *Sat.* 6. 2.

could easily relate. And so we find several fragments of Naevius which describe drinking, gambling, and prostitution; it certainly would have formed a large part of his play *Pellex* (Concubine).[19]

These topics move even further to the forefront with the writings of Plautus, the first master of Roman comedy. Plautus was heavily influenced by Naevius and the two may even have collaborated on some plays.[20] In his *Miles Gloriosus* (210-212), Plautus expresses sympathy for his friend Naevius who is languishing in a Roman prison for public slander. Writing between 205 and 184, Plautus is somewhat removed from our time, but his writings are the first extant source we have for just how much Greek culture had been adopted at Rome by the late third century. Twenty-one comedies survive in whole or in part, most of them based on Greek originals.[21] Of the plays adopted from Hellenic examples, Plautus at times did not bother to change the titles of the works and often named the original author in the prologue. Most of his plays were set in Greece and were ubiquitous with Greek words and puns, which the veterans of the First Punic War, having served in a Greek environment for so long, in the audience would have had the ability to understand.[22] Like Naevius, Plautus also wrote about things to which soldiers could easily relate. In the *Captivi* (723) he uses the Doric form *latomia* for the quarry in which the captives are imprisoned; a likely allusion to the Athenian captives in the Doric city of Syracuse. The Athenian expedition and its fate would have been a piece of history that was closer to veterans who had served near the scene of one of the most decisive battles in ancient history. Furthermore,

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[19]Ex. *Com.* fr. 74-79W (=75-79R), 102W (=100R), comic fr. of unknown location 20W, 22W, 32W (=118R, 120R, 135R).

[20]Gratwick 1982, p. 93.

[21]Goldberg 1978, p. 81-91 and Gratwick 1982, p. 96-97 have successfully challenged the notion that Plautus based all of his plays on originals from Greece.

[22]On the composition of Roman theatrical audiences see Beacham 1995, p. 18, 29, 120 n. 8, 122. See also Frank 1956, p. 69-73, Harris 1979, p. 43, Hough 1934, p. 350 n. 8, 362. For a general overview of the subject see Shipp 1953, p. 105-112, 1955, p. 139-152.

most of the Greek used in his plays is Doric, the language of the majority of the residents of southern Italy and eastern Sicily. In a similar way he (*Mil.* 24) uses the Sicilian Doric *epityrum* to describe an olive and cheese salad, which Varro (*L.* VII. 86) claims is a dish of Sicilian derivation. Finally, Plautus did not just connect small themes and his vocabulary to the veterans in the audience, but composed entire plays around the seedier aspects of military life. Central to the plots of five of his plays (*Bacchides*, *Curculio*, *Miles Gloriosus*, *Pseudolus*, and *Truculentus*) is the theme of young men and mercenary soldiers in competition for the attentions of prostitutes. This must have been a very familiar memory to the veterans in the audience, who may have on occasion run into trouble with native Sicilian or mercenary soldiers, who were possibly even their allies on the battlefield, and, as was the case in the *Iliad*, the disputes may often have centred around women.

Plautus is followed by the poet and playwright Ennius, who wrote three comedies and twenty tragedies between 204 and 169. From his home near Livius Andronicus' guild of poets and playwrights on the Aventine, Ennius adopted the style, metre, themes, and plots of Greek works to an unprecedented extent.[23] The greatest example of his writing is the first Latin epic written in Greek hexameter: the *Annales*. Here Ennius sheds many of the Latinisms of his predecessors and drops Camena of Naevius in favour of reinvoking the Greek Muses, even going so far as to portray himself as a reincarnation of Homer.[24] More than anything else, this illustrates how deeply Greek culture had imbedded itself within the Roman psyche by the third decade of the second century. The *Annales* are an epic history of Rome from the foundation of the city down to Ennius' own time, and, like Fabius Pictor, through the work Ennius sought to give Rome

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[23]Unlike his predecessors, Ennius had received a strong education in Greek culture and tradition. See Fest. 374L, Jer. *Chron.* 240 BC, Suet. *Gram.* 1. For the location of his home see Jer. *Chron. Olymp.* 134. 4. See also Loicq-Berger 1967, p. 264.

[24]Skutsch 1985, p. 7.

a place in the Hellenistic world; to show that Rome was deserved of an epic history equal to the *Iliad*.[25] The *Annales* are divided into eighteen books: nine cover the years up until 201, and nine cover from 200 down to the 170s. Of the first nine books, his structure is directly taken from Fabius Pictor: one to three deal with regal Rome, four to six with the Italian wars, and seven to nine with the Punic Wars.

Cicero

For Sicily as a Roman possession, our main, and often only source, are the *Verrines* of Cicero. In these speeches we are told, in an indirect fashion, about the government of Sicily and the legal status of its cities in the first century. The *Verrines* themselves are not historical documents, and in fact are hardly legal ones either; although they relate the proceedings of the trial of Verres from 70, most were written after the defence in the case had been abandoned, and as such were never delivered. Cicero could therefore feel free to take as much license as he pleased, for there was no one to provide a retort. It is well known that the case had a purpose that was greater than the guilt or innocence of Verres; Cicero opens the *Verrines* (I. 1) by explaining that it is the *Quaestio de Pecuniis Repetundis*, the Extortion Court, that is really on trial. In 70, Crassus and Pompey, the future triumvirs, were in the process of removing many of the measures instituted by Sulla more than a decade earlier. One of their bills, the future *Lex Aurelia*, proposed to take the right to sit in judgement in the Extortion Court away from the senate and restore it to the *equites*, as it was in pre-Sullan times. Cicero tells the senatorial jury that they must prove to the people that they can convict one of their own if they wished to have any hope of retaining control of the court, even going so far as to claim that Verres was sent to

[25]Gratwick 1982a, p. 63.

them by the gods specifically so they could regain their honour.[26] This was the foremost issue of the *Verrines*, with the guilt or innocence of Verres coming second. Or perhaps even third, as this was the largest trial yet undertaken by Cicero, and his opponent was Quintus Hortensius Hortalus, the most well known lawyer in Rome; therefore defeat could be his ruin, while victory in this case would catapult Cicero's reputation from being that of a good lawyer, to that of a great, or even the greatest one. As such he was well aware that this case meant everything to his career, and therefore his performance had to be more memorable and more convincing than any that came before.[27]

In the end the *Verrines* remain works of rhetoric, designed more to show off a speaker's talents than to relate matters factually. Cicero of course had his own agenda; in his early speeches, Cicero was concerned with his own personal political and social advancement, and the *Verrines* are perfect examples of the young orator portraying of himself as the underdog, who was fighting on behalf of other underdogs, against the established, exclusive, and corrupt *nobilitas*.[28] Cicero admits as much himself (*Div. Caec.* 66-69, *Verr.* I. 35-36), even grandiosely declaring war against government corruption as a symbol of this fight, and he claims that by this practice he is following in the footsteps of his great Roman oratorical predecessors. Yet it should never be forgotten that at the same time as Cicero placed himself at odds with the *nobilitas*, it was in fact his goal to be fully accepted into this very closed circle. He never realised this ambition, but the overwhelming desire of this *novus homo* from Arpinum to be accepted as a fully fledged Roman aristocrat is present in every speech of his career. His fight against the *nobilitas* in the *Verrines* was never meant to alienate himself from this body, only to force its tacit acceptance of Cicero

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[26]Cic. *Verr.* I. 42-50. See Brunt 1980, Wiedemann 1994, p. 36-38.

[27]May 1988, p. 38, Riggsby 1997, Smallwood 1981, p. 37-47, Vasaly 1993, p. 205.

[28]May 1988, p. 45, 164.

as their equal.[29] Although in this respect he failed, this technique bore fruit in other senses - by the time the trial began in the late summer of 70, Cicero was already aedile elect for the year 69.[30] As the aediles were in charge of importing grain into the capital, victory for his new Sicilian *clientes* would mean access to the vast granaries, and the gift of a large amount of grain from Sicily to Rome in 69 should be seen as no coincidence; Cicero sold this produce to the Roman population at heavily subsidised prices, thus gaining in popularity, specifically because of his success over Verres in the previous year.[31]

'As an orator working under the Roman convention of advocacy, it was absolutely necessary that he not only deal with the characters of his client and opponent, but also with his own ethos and that of the opposing counsel.'[32] Within these parameters, Cicero, as the prosecutor, sought to portray Verres in the worst light possible; to show that his behaviour was doing a disservice to Rome and to Roman values. There are times when he accuses Verres of implementing certain measures for personal gain. It will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters that at least some of these measures were common to most agricultural tithe systems from the ancient world, and were therefore most likely present in Sicily from the time of Hieron. Therefore, Cicero is accusing Verres of bringing certain previously unregulated aspects of the *lex Hieronica* under centralised control, and perhaps reaping a profit in the process.[33] Government regulation was the innovation, which would have been simple to present in a bad light as centralised control usually brought with it more bureaucracy and expenses for the individual, and

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[29]See *Verr.* II. 3. 7.

[30]Cic. *Div. Caec.* 70, *Verr.* I. 24-26, 29, II. 1. 14, 19, 145, 5. 36-37.

[31]Plut. *Cic.* 8. 1. The role of the aediles in the grain supply goes back at least as far as 299, see Liv. X. 11. 9, Broughton *MRR*, I, p. 173 n. 3. See also Deniaux 1994, p. 249, Rickman 1980a, p. 169.

[32]Cerutti 1993, p. 86.

[33]Clemente 1988, p. 113.

would have been unpopular with the Sicilian farmers whom Cicero was defending.

It is Cicero's purpose to show that by undertaking these corruptions, Verres was acting in an un-Roman fashion. He sought to convince the jury that Verres was not their peer, he was a betrayer of citizens and provincials alike, and if he was acquitted then Rome and all it stood for would be condemned. In legal terms, Cicero portrays the case as 'open and shut', as the crimes of Verres were well-known; only the fortune of Verres and the loyalty of the senate to one of their own stood in justice's way.[34] This technique was a weapon common to most of Cicero's contemporaries; 'That Cicero...exploited this advantage almost ruthlessly...that *auctoritas* makes its presence felt in most Ciceronian speeches of this period, all confirm that a character's personal authority, or lack of it, became in Roman oratory a commonplace of ethical argumentation.'[35] He was attempting to make the crimes of Verres matter to the Roman people, and to separate Verres from the *nobilitas* by turning him into a political pariah, an enemy of the state. In other speeches where he defends corrupt officials, he does not try and hide the fact that all of these governors did something that some considered wrong, but while the answers remain the same, with Verres in essence what Cicero was doing was changing the questions. He was not calling the actions of the men into question, but whether, as magistrates with *imperium*, they had the right to undertake the measures for which they now stood trial.[36] This is in marked contrast to the speeches of Cicero where he is defending corrupt governors. In the *Pro Fonteio* of 70 and the *Pro Flacco* of 59, he portrays the accused as champions of Roman values whose provincial innovations brought with

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[34]'Gaius Verres appears, to stand trial before you: a man already condemned, in the opinion of the world, by his life and deeds; already acquitted, according to his own confident assertions, by his vast fortune.' (*Verr.* I. 2)

[35]May 1988, p. 79, see also 39, Cic. *Verr.* I. 2-4. On top of the crimes the defendant committed in Sicily, Cicero tells us that Verres embezzled money from Gnaeus Papirius Carbo while he was his proquaestor in 83 (II. 1. 34-40), and then later betrayed Gnaeus Cornelius Donabella. In 78 he looted the Parthenon in Athens (II. 1. 41-102). See Nisbet 1992, p. 2-3, Shipley 2000, p. 398.

[36]Cerutti 1993, p. 84, Ludwig 1982, p. 177-184, May 1986, p. 39-40.

them prosperity, not economic decline. The provincials he lauded so much in the *Verrines* were now discredited; they are fickle and distant from the morals and culture of the Romans.[37] In the *Verrines* he made great use of witnesses, where as in these other speeches their general reliability is later called into question (*Flac.* 23). In defending corrupt governors he appealed to the jury's sense of patriotism and argued that convictions of fine Romans doing their duty were tantamount to convictions for the Roman way of life. Perhaps by these two defence speeches we may gauge how the defence of Verres may have been conducted; for Cicero's part, it is obvious that the *Verrines* were written on a set pattern with the purpose being to discredit the accused both as an honest man and as a Roman.

The greatest use of the *Verrines* for our purposes comes in its descriptions of Sicilian agriculture and the *lex Hieronica*. This will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 8 (see below, p. 283-290). For now, it will suffice to say that, although caution must be exercised in using Cicero's rhetoric, the historian of mid-Republican Sicily can in fact count himself as lucky that such detailed pieces exist. While for other early Roman regularised *proviniciae* we are forced to use sources that only mention things such as administration and taxation in passing, and often when anomalies occurred, with Cicero we have the only surviving Republican document that specifically describes these aspects of provincial bureaucracy, and as such the *Verrines* put us in a stronger stead than normal for such an investigation.

The Biographers

Small portions of first century writer Cornelius Nepos' biography of Hannibal are relevant to third century Sicily, and he is especially important for the Battle of the Aegates Islands in 242

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[37]Craig 1993, p. 48, May 1988, p. 47, 79, Vasaly 1993, p. 110-111, 205, 215. See Cic. *Div. Caec.* 38.

and the peace treaty to end the First Punic War in the following year. Nevertheless, the only biographer truly pertinent to this time period is Plutarch. Born c. AD 46 in Boiotia, Plutarch wrote a series of twenty-three parallel lives where he would pair one Greek with one Roman. All of them save for one survive. For our purposes, his lives of Pyrrhos and Cato the Elder provide a minimal amount of information at the beginning and the end of the period in question. That of Fabius Maximus gives us another view on the Second Punic War. But the most important of Plutarch's biographies for Sicily in the third century is that of Marcus Claudius Marcellus; this provides us with an important alternative to the narrative of Livy concerning the siege, and eventual sacking, of Syracuse in 211.

Marcellus was one of the most famous generals in Roman history, and a well deserving candidate for one of Plutarch's lives. Hannibal supposedly said that he respected Fabius Maximus as a teacher, but feared Marcellus as an enemy. And Poseidonios (*ap.* Plut. *Marc.* 9. 4) reports that Marcellus was known as the 'Sword of Rome'.[38] Plutarch was writing at the end of the historical tradition concerning Marcellus, and had a wide variety of sources from which to draw. Most were probably favourable to the general, but some were certainly hostile, seeing him as the barbarous plunder of the fair city of Syracuse. This anti-Marcellan view manifests itself occasionally within Plutarch's biography. Polybios is the most likely candidate for this stance, as he criticises the general in his own history and the citations of his work by Plutarch also put Marcellus in an unfavourable light.[39] It has been postulated that Posidonios was the main source for the *Marcellus* and that he was also hostile.[40] This argument is based on five passages of

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[38]See Malitz1983, p. 363.

[39]Plb. II. 34-35, X. 32, 35. 2-4, Plut. *Marc.* 8. 1, *Comp. Pelop./Marc.* 1.8.

[40]Ferrary 1988, p. 576-578. See Duff 1999, p. 64 n. 41.

Posidonios from which Plutarch quotes.[41] This assertion has little basis however, as there is only slight evidence to show that Posidonios wrote anything specific on Marcellus. Moreover, Posidonios has traditionally been seen as a pro-Marcellan source; he journeyed to Rome in 51 during the consulship of another Marcus Claudius Marcellus and was thought to have had links with the family.[42] It has also been pointed out that Posidonios could not have been that knowledgeable about our Marcellus since he was wholly mistaken on his etymology of the name the general's name.[43] The main sources for Plutarch's *Marcellus* appear to have been Livy and Cornelius Nepos, both of whom were patriotic writers. The latter seemed to have favoured Marcellus, while the former certainly did.

The purpose of Plutarch in composing his parallel lives was to make his subjects examples of virtue that both he and his readers should attempt to emulate. His main theme was moral improvement, and he equated virtue with greatness.[44] Unlike Livy, he does not appear to have visualised history as a steady moral decline from a more virtuous past, but he did believe that people in general should always attempt to better themselves. He states himself that he hopes to fashion his life according to the virtues of these great men (*Aem./Tim.* pref. 1-5), and he wishes his readers to enrich their own moral standings by the appreciation of his subjects (*Per.* 1-2). His explanations of certain Roman customs leave little doubt that he was writing for a Greek audience, while another reason behind his writing may have been to illustrate to the Greeks that the Romans were not barbarians.[45]

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[41]Plut. *Marc.* 1. 1, 9. 4, 7, 20. 11, 30. 7.

[42]Cic. *Fam.* XII. 15. 2, Plut. *Marc.* 45. 7. See Kidd 1988, II. 2, p. 4.

[43]Fr. 261K, Plut. *Marc.* 1. 1-3. See Kidd 1988, II. 2, p. 896-902.

[44]Duff 1999, p. 52-53, 82-84, 93, 97-98.

[45]Jones 1971, p. 103, Ziegler *RE*, XXI. 1, col. 897.

The Historians

There are numerous historians who shed light on the third century, however most are either fragmentary, epitomised, or are preserved only in quotations from others. This section aims to cover all the major historians who were concerned with the third century, save for Polybios and his sources who have been allotted their own segment. Specifically the present section will centre on Diodoros, Dio, Dionysios, Appian, some minor works, some major sources whose works do not survive, and will culminate with an exploration of Livy and his epitomators..

The *Bibliotheke Historike* (*Library of History*) of Diodoros Sikulos, represents the largest preserved history by a Greek author from the ancient world. Only fifteen of the original forty books survive intact, but extensive parts of other books do remain. Books XXIII-XXVIII deal with the time period in question but these are horribly fragmentary, some excerpts containing no more than a sentence or two. Nonetheless, what we do possess is of immeasurable importance for a number of reasons. Primarily, Diodoros is the only preserved source who actually comes from Sicily, born as he was at Agyrion sometime in the mid-first century. Although he is prone to exaggeration and over imagination, his topographical and geographical knowledge of the island is beyond question. Furthermore, he is useful in that for the third century he is thought to have employed few if any Latin sources. Instead, his main sources appear to have been Timaios, Philinos, Silenos, and Polybios.[46] The exclusive use of Greek sources allows us a rare opportunity to read a history that is not steeped in pro-Roman bias. In particular, Philinos and Silenos were

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[46]D.S. Timai.: IV. 21. 7, 22. 6, 56. 3, V. 1. 3, 6. 1, XIII. 54. 5, 60. 5, 80. 5, 82. 6, 83. 2, 84. 1, 85. 3, 90. 5-8, 108. 4-5, 109. 2, XIV. 54. 6, XX. 79. 5, 89. 5, XXI. 16. 5, 17. 1-3; Philinos: XXIII. 8. 1, XXIV. 11. 2; Plb.: XXVI. 24. 1. Next to nothing survives of Silenos, who was from Kaleakte in northern Sicily and who accompanied Hannibal to Italy. La Bua 1966, would like to see Silenos as the main source for Diodoros, but his thesis has been strongly refuted by Badian 1968. Diodoros does not mention Silenos, but most likely did use him. Silenos could be the main source at XI. 88-89, XIX. 72. 8, XX. 57. 6. For possible fragments of Silenos' *Sikelika* see Walbank 1968-1969, p. 487-497. See also La Bua 1966, p. 204, 277-279.

both pro-Carthaginian and contemporary to the events that they reported. Therefore, Diodoros' history gives us a description of events that augments and is at times even opposed to those of Polybios and Livy, and his writing cannot be underestimated as it tends to either be neutral or to favour the Carthaginian side. He is the sole representative of a lost Sicilo-Punic historical tradition.

Cassius Dio was a Roman senator of Greek descent who was born in Bithynia in c. AD 164. Much of his eighty book history of Rome is lost, though large parts of it survive in the epitomes of Zonaras and Xiphilinus. For our period, we are mostly dependent upon the writings of the twelveth century Byzantine monk Zonaras, whose accuracy to the original is illustrated by substantial fragments. Dio is most useful for filling in the gaps when Polybios and Livy are not available, or when the former is summarising. Note should also be taken of his views on Roman imperialism; Dio (fr. 43. 1-4) believed that in the events which led up to the First Punic War both Rome and Carthage were guilty of mutual suspicion, greed, and imperialism. The two sides sought to conquer all of Sicily and use it as a base for further conquest. He claimed that both parties used such things as the Tarentum incident and Rome's alliance with Hieron (see below p. 89; 94 respectively) in order to justify the true causes of the war: greed and territorial ambition. In this sense it was an advantage that Dio was so far in time removed from the events of the third century, as this allowed him to espouse a more equitable view of the distant past, since he was not writing to propagandise the Punic wars.

Dionysios of Halikarnassos was a first century historian who wrote twenty-two books on Rome from the foundation down to 264. Exactly half of his *Roman Antiquities* is preserved intact, while of the rest several excerpts remain. He is significant as one of the main sources for the foundation of Rome. It was his intention to illustrate that the Romans were in fact of Greek origin. He claims Rome was founded through a series of migrations; Herakles was said to have

passed through as was Aeneas. But in relation to the latter Dionysios declared that the Trojans were in reality Peloponnesian Greeks. He believed that the Romans were the true heirs, both literally and culturally, to the traditions of classical Greece. His design was to make the Romans, as conquerors, appear more attractive to the peoples of the Greek east.[47]

Appian of Alexandria is also of some use for the time period at hand. Born in the late first century AD, he wrote a twenty-four book history of Rome arranged ethnographically in the order in which various peoples were conquered. Only seventeen of his books survive, and of these the first five, which includes the First Punic War, are quite fragmented. VIII and IX, covering the Punic wars, are preserved however. Appian is important for periods where other historians are not available, but overall his work is an abridgement of those histories that came before. As a result, minor details are often omitted. He also cannot always be trusted on geography and dates, presumably because he appears to have used such a wide breadth of source material. Finally, his views on imperialism were extremely pro-Roman, and he saw the empire as being conquered both by the sword and by the overriding virtue of the Roman people.[48]

Of the many annalists who preceded Livy, only Claudius Quadrigarius is significant for the third century, as a fragment of his history (I. fr. 31P) mentions a Roman treaty with Carthage. Quintus Claudius Quadrigarius was a Roman who lived during the first half of the first century. He wrote a history of Rome in at least twenty-three books that was by all accounts a romantic view of the past filled with prodigies, portents, and dreams. This style had its influences upon Livy and was not uncommon in Quadrigarius' day. To the Romans of the first century, style mattered more than accuracy and, like orators, historians were expected to embellish for the purposes of entertainment. It is alleged that even annalists who wrote about contemporary events,

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[47]Fox 1991, p. 49-95 esp. p. 51, 53-55, 75, 81, 94, Gabba 1991, p. 16-20, 109, Hill 1961, p. 88.

[48]Gowing 1992, p. 273-274, 282.

like Lucius Cornelius Sisenna and his history of the Social War, placed things such as the gods, the fates, and various omens into their narratives.[49] They were giving the public what they expected, so upon this criteria it would be wrong to judge them as historians. Little is known about the works of Quadrigarius; although his history is thought to have been very pro-Roman, he was the most well known annalist prior to Livy, and was also known as a historian who took the time and effort to go into great detail concerning certain subjects.[50]

Other historians who are of some use include Valerius Maximus, first century AD author of nine books compiling memorable deeds and sayings; Frontinus, also of the first century AD, whose *Strategemata* collected clever pieces of Greek and Roman military strategy, including some examples from the third century; Polyainos, who wrote a similar work a century later; and the anonymous *De Viris Illustribus*, a book on famous men including some from the First Punic War, its author and date are wholly unknown (though it was written in the first century BC at the earliest). Other than Polybios, Livy is the main source for our time period. For the years when his work is lost we can sometimes look to the various summaries of his history written mostly in the late empire. These include Florus of the second century AD, Eutropius of the fourth, and Orosius of the fifth.

Titus Livius was born in 59 into an aristocratic family from the city of Patavium. Moving to Rome, in c. 29 he began the largest history ever written in antiquity - the mammoth one hundred and forty-two book *Ab Urbe Condita* (*From the Foundation of the City*).[51] Writing under the auspices of the emperor Augustus, he lived until AD 17, and his history was a project that probably took the vast majority of his life to complete. When viewed as a whole, the

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[49]Mellor 1999, p. 22-24, Rawson 1991, p. 363-365, Wiseman 1994, p. 18.

[50]Walsh 1982, p. 1065.

[51]For c. 29 as the start date for Livy's writing see Ogilvie 1965, p. 1.

achievement of Livy is staggering; he traces the history of Rome from the foundation of the city right to his own day. He never summarises, and composes with style, flair, and a keen insight, that serves to bring out the author's enthusiasm for his subject. Sadly only thirty-three of his books survive intact, but even this paltry amount lends greatly to our knowledge of the Roman Republic. Three other books are preserved in fragments, and summaries of his work began to appear as early as the first century AD. We possess papyrus epitomes from Oxyrhynchus of a further twelve books and *Periochae*, short abstracts of each book compiled in late antiquity, for all save two books.

Livy appears to have been a Stoic, and hence one of the main themes of his history was the moral degeneration of Rome. He saw the Rome of his day as corrupt, luxurious, impious, and nearly ruined by decades of civil war.[52] He, like Cicero and Cato the Elder before him, looked back to the middle and early Republic as a golden age; a simpler time where Romans practised simpler values, where great men still undertook deeds in the name of Rome and the senate and people were sovereign. His own day he saw as a fall from grace, a time where individuals mattered more than the state. In short, Livy looked to the past to explain Rome's present greatness as an empire. In chapter nine of his preface, he says himself that his study of the past will illustrate the moral decline of Rome.[53] The only cure for this was a regeneration of the state and a sense of renewed patriotism, and he hoped this could be achieved by holding up the past as an example for those living in the present.

The cause of this moral decline was foreign luxury, making Rome abandon traditional values. As such, Livy sought out a single act in Roman history which began this downward spiral; he found it with Marcellus and the Syracusans. Livy portrays two versions of Marcellus, one is

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[52]Gruen 1992, p. 98.

[53]Kraus and Woodman 1997, p. 52, Mellor 1999, p. 57-58, Moles 1993, p. 152-153, Woodman 1988, p. 133-134.

the sacker of Syracuse who brought so much Greek art back with him that it introduced luxury and softness to Rome (XXV. 40. 1-2); the other is a great general, the avenger of Cannae, a man whose repulse of Hannibal from Nola in 216 was the 'greatest victory of the war.' (XXIII. 16. 16) At nearly all other stages before and after his moralising over the statues of Syracuse, Livy paints a picture of Marcellus as one of the greatest Roman generals of all time.[54] So from this contradiction we can see how his condemnation of Marcellus because of some Greek booty is his own invention. The one event starting the chain reaction of moral degradation was used again by Livy in relation to the looting of Asia in 167 at XXXIX. 6. 7. His history in general looked for one specific cause of this moral decline, leading to the conclusion that this was a literary topos in the *Ab Urbe Condita*. This topos was used by Livy to illustrate that with the conquest and looting of Syracuse, the city of Rome was forever transformed, and its inhabitants began to show a dangerous affection for things Greek, and thus was the start of their descent into immorality.[55] His penchant for moral decline also led him to investigate and criticise not only Rome's looting of Greek art, but also the influence of foreigners at Rome, and the behaviour of both the aristocracy and the masses.[56]

In this sense Livy cannot be divorced from Augustus and late first century Rome. Through their writing, Livy and his contemporaries were endeavouring to make sense out of Augustus and the new world order. All of them had come of age in a time fraught with civil war, proscriptions, land seizures, and general destruction caused by more than one army roaming around the Italian peninsula. Augustus was seen by many, Livy included, as a saviour, a man who brought about peace and *concordia* for the first time in living memory. In addition, the first

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[54]Walsh 1970, p. 36, 101-103.

[55]Feldherr 1998, p. 37-50, Jaeger 1997, p. 127-131.

[56]Feldherr 1998, p. 45-50, Ridley 1990, p. 132-133.

Roman emperor had his own concepts of Roman history and the past, and presented novel and revolutionary innovations as reincarnations of a lost age of Roman glory for the purposes of his own propaganda.[57] In many ways Livy towed this line. He presented the past as an era when true and virtuous Roman traditions were still valued.[58] And he believed that his readers had the power to rejuvenate Rome if only they could relive the lessons of their own history.[59]

Livy is trying to save the present by subverting it with the past. And although he questions the foundations of contemporary society, he is still fiercely patriotic. This he does not attempt to hide within the course of his writing. Like so many of his contemporaries, Livy felt that there was nothing wrong with Roman imperialism and Rome had won its empire through superiority of skill and the magnificence of its people. The fact that they controlled most of the known world merely attested to this fact. In particular, the Second Punic War was the high water mark in the process of empire, where Rome survived after being brought to its knees and went on to conquer its greatest adversary.[60] Nevertheless, Livy is not purely a Roman propagandist; much of the time he is fair and even handed, especially when he follows Polybios, which he does mostly after 201. His main problem however, is that he is not nearly as skilled as the latter in critically evaluating the evidence before him. His Achilles heel was that he, purposefully or not, put far too much stock into biassed Roman annalist sources. One cannot blame Livy for relying on Fabius Pictor for the history of much of the Hannabalic war anymore than one can blame Pictor himself for being biassed against Hannibal, the man who nearly destroyed his native city. As well, by Livy's time a host of this sort of blatantly pro-Roman literature was in circulation. The patriotic

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[57]Evans 1992, p. 92-103, Galinsky 1996, p. 38-41, Wallace-Hadrill 1987, p. 221-230.

[58]See Liv. XLIII. 13. 1-2.

[59]Ogilvie 1982, p. 170.

[60]Briscoe 1973, p. 133-134, Galinsky 1996, p. 280-287.

inclinations of Livy do not always manifest themselves in his writing, but usually do so by his choice to follow certain sources.[61]

Livy's leanings and his choice of sources are immediately felt as he blames Carthage completely for the Second Punic War (XXIII. 11-13, 32, XXIX. 3-4). He states in many places (ex. XXI. 10-11, 18) that the treaty of Catulus ending the First Punic War in 241 and the Ebro treaty of 226 both gave *fides* and protection to Saguntum in Spain, but this could not possibly be correct, or else the origins of the war, especially according to Polybios (III. 29), would not make sense. During the war itself, he portrays the Punic commanders, most notably Hannibal, as rogues who operated individually. They are tough, cunning, godless, and they hate the Romans with a passion.[62] This is opposed to the piety and respect for the state that Roman generals possessed. They respected the gods, and acted in conjunction with one another, all adhering to the will of the senate.[63] When the Romans lost battles, it is only because an individual broke ranks, and the Romans were vanquished because of the arrogance, over-confidence, or rashness of individual generals; the state or the people were never to blame, only the lack of character of one man.[64] In relation to this, Livy believed that the people, the army, and the senate all worked hand-in-hand to win the war, in a way that suggests that this was Rome's most idyllic time - a period that was to be emulated by his contemporaries.

Nevertheless, according to Livy, Rome won the Second Punic War because of the

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[61]Luce 1977, p. 140-151, Walsh 1982, p. 1060, 1062.

[62]Livy describes Hannibal (XXI. 4. 9): 'Has tantas viri virtutes ingentia vitia aequabant: inhumana crudelitas perfidia plus quam Punica, nihil veri nihil sancti, nullus deum metus nullum ius iurandum nulla religio.' ('His praiseworthy qualities were equalled only by his heinous iniquities: inhuman cruelty, faithlessness worse than most of his kind; with no regard for truth, and none at all for piety, he had no respect for the gods, he did not honour his oaths, and he had no religious scruple.') See Walsh 1970, p. 103-104.

[63]For example Marcellus: XXVII. 25. 7, XXIX. 11. 13; the elder Scipio: XXI. 41.

[64]The greatest example of this is Livy's depiction of Gaius Flaminius' conduct at Lake Trasimene in 217: XXII. 3. 3-6. See also *Per.* XIX, XXI. 43. 2.

greatness of its leaders, and although everyone cooperated to win the war, he assigns little credit to the central and consistent authority of the senate, Rome's reserves of wealth and manpower, and the Italian alliance system. This attitude leads him to heroicise certain generals, most notably for our purposes the person of Marcellus. As previously noted, he levels criticism at Marcellus for his plundering of Syracuse (XXV. 40. 1-3), and his savagery is more than once contrasted with the magnanimity of Fabius Maxiumus (XXIV. 19. 9-10, XXVII. 16. 7), on the whole the general is nevertheless treated as a sanctified saviour of Rome.[65] In relation to Syracuse, he is praised for commanding that no free person should be harmed during the sacking of the city (XXV. 25. 7, 31. 7), and later he laments the death of Archimedes (XXV. 31. 10). He weeps upon entering the walls of Syracuse, both because of his achievement after such a long struggle and because of the beauty and history of the great city. He thus decides to ask for surrender in order to preserve the place from destruction (XXV. 24. 11-15). Marcellus is further portrayed as the only man who truly conquered Hannibal, as again his victory at Nola in 214 is called, 'the greatest of the war' (XXIII. 16. 16). Later on Livy says that he was so effective that '[he], not Hannibal, appears to have been victorious at Cannae' (XXIII. 42. 5), and that given the right conditions to face Hannibal, Marcellus, 'could have scored a victory similar to Cannae' (XXIV. 17. 7). This portrayal would seem to distort the truth and hide much of the ruthlessness of Marcellus. Nevertheless, Livy's aims of characterising past Romans as examples of virtue were served.[66]

The aforementioned example of Marcellus' weeping upon entering Syracuse places Livy firmly in the Greek historiographcal tradition. Tears shed by a general over the fate of an enemy was a literary topos that was used to illustrate both the magnanimity of the figure and the concept,

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[65]Gruen 1992, p. 95, 100-101.

[66]Walsh 1970, p. 102-103, 1982, p. 1064, 1067.

specifically Greek, that human events take place within a undeviating circle of rise and fall. Livy uses this motif in order to show that Marcellus is great leader, on par with any Greek general.[67] The commander's penchant for things Greek is well attested and Livy placed tears in his eyes with the further purpose of demonstrating Marcellus' philhellenism.[68] The topos originated with Homer (*Il.* XXIV. 507-509) and was used by both Polybios (VIII. 20. 10, *ap.* App. *Lib.* 132, D.S. XXXII. 24) and Plutarch (*Pyrrh.* 34. 4).[69] Livy employs the device on two more occasions (XLV. 4. 2-3, *Per.* CXII. 9). As previously discussed, Livy saw the fall of Syracuse as the opening step towards the moral degradation of Rome. Therefore, just as Rome began to lose its identity to the Greeks because of this conquest, so too Marcellus, in many ways the ultimate Roman, adopts a Hellenic trait by his weeping.[70]

There are certain negative aspects to Livy's work that should be noted. As a military historian, he is poor. There is no record of Livy ever serving in the army and judging from his descriptions of military matters, it would be surprising if he did. He is vague concerning battlefield geography, and he puts far too much stock into biassed Roman sources when it comes to numbers, and in general his accounts of battles, sieges, and diplomatic exchanges tend to follow a set pattern (ex. XXVI. 49. 3, 6). These weaknesses are underscored for the years in which we have Polybios as a comparison. He is also ethnocentric, placing institutions, such as the senate, and problems of his own time on to both other cultures and on to the Roman past. At times, this may have been done out of ignorance of foreign governmental structures or foreign cultures, but Livy was not blind to historical change, as the juxtapositioning of contemporary issues with the

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[67]Burck 1971, p. 32-34, Henrichs, p. 243-261, Rossi 2000, p. 59, Walsh 1970, p. 82-84.

[68]On Marcellus' philhellenism: Plat. *Marc.* 1. 2.

[69]Romilly 1977, p. 6.

[70]Carawan 1984-1985, Henrichs 1995, p. 251, Jaeger 1997, p. 127.

past was often meant to serve as an example of how these current problems might be overcome.[71]

It is easy to direct criticisms at Livy, especially when held up next to Polybios. Yet he does have many laudable traits. Primarily, he is accurate concerning the major events that he relates, and his diligence on reporting the victors in the annual elections and the offices held or prolonged, coupled with his reports of the dispositions of the legions is every theatre gives us a rare insight into the strategy of Rome during many of the wars of the Republic. This is especially evident during the war with Hannibal, as we do not possess such a firm basis for tactical, strategic, and logistical analysis for any other war in antiquity.[72] He is also excellent on economic history, and adds greatly to our knowledge of Roman taxation schemes, state income, finance, and trade and transport (see chapter 9). Livy is also stronger than most when dealing with the social aspects of history. Rather than write a straightforward narrative, he prefers to explore how people may have thought and felt during the events he describes. And his forays into the emotions of his major historical players are some of the most dramatic features of his work. His descriptions of sieges are particularly interesting. Showing little care for the military aspects, Livy appears to sympathise with the besieged, and his depiction of the conditions inside doomed cities such as Syracuse in 212 (XXV. 25. 5-10) and 211 (XXV. 29. 2-7, 31. 2-11) and the humbleness and degradation the people feel before the final sacking of their home are some of the *Ab Urbe Condita*'s more tragic moments.[73]

This penchant for human psychology also manifests itself in the speeches he places into the mouths of his characters. He appears to have mastered Greek and Roman rhetorical techniques, as these masterfully crafted pieces of oratory are used to convey not just the feelings

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[71]Conte 1994, p. 370, Luce 1977, p. 230-249, Kraus 1994, p. 28 n. 119.

[72]Oakley 1997, p. 125-128.

[73]Burck 1971, p. 21-46, Rossi 2000, p. 58, Walsh 1970, p. 191-193, 1982, p. 1071-1072.

of the speaker but also some of Livy's most important messages about morality.[74] Some speeches are paired and contrasted (XXI. 41-44), while others stand on their own. For our purposes, the speech of the shamed soldiers of the *legiones Cannenses* is very illustrative (XXV. 5. 10-7. 4). In the speech, which Livy has delivered to Marcellus in early 212, a select group of these soldiers explain to Marcellus that they are the shamed remnants of the army that fought at Cannae, condemned to serve in Sicily for the remainder of the war. Their complaint is not that they have not been discharged, but that they have not seen combat during the siege of Syracuse; they have not been permitted to regain their dignity on the field of battle. They speak of honour, and they want for nothing more than to regain it by service to the state. Livy invokes history when they ask to have the right to distinguish themselves as their fathers did against Pyrrhos. Moreover, they cite examples from the past of defeated armies that had been given the chance of redeeming themselves. They fall short of blaming the generals at Cannae for the disaster, but they certainly state that they were only following their consuls as honourable and loyal Romans. They also praise Marcellus, saying that if he were the commander at Cannae, their fortunes and those of the state would have been better. Finally, they reiterate their plea that they be permitted to redeem themselves by 'Laborem et periculam' ('Hardship and danger') in the service of the state. The speech is meant to elicit sympathy for the soldiers, punished for a crime not of their doing, but there are also several Livian devices at work here, all of which we have already encountered. Personal honour; service to the state; the invoking of history; the portrayal of men from the past as virtuous; loyalty to the consuls and the offices of state; the loss of a battle because of a commander's pride; the lauding of Marcellus; and finally the theme that honour and virtue can be regained. Livy skilfully combines these motifs in order to both relate a historical occurrence, to

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[74]Oakley 1997, p. 117-120, 139-141. Ancient praise for Livy's speeches: Quint. *Inst.* X. 1. 101, Sen. *Ira*, I. 20. 6, Suet. *Dom.* 10. 3, Tac. *Ann.* IV. 34.

evoke sympathy, and to deliver a message to his readers.

Regardless of its messages or its moralising, the *Ab Urbe Condita* remains a work of history, in fact it must be considered one of the greatest historical achievements of all time. Without it, the historian of the mid-Republic would be lost. While his work does not survive for the history of Sicily during the First Punic War, the summaries of his books do at times provide vital information on the island as a Roman possession. For the Hannibalic war in Sicily, Livy is the main, and at times only source. His narrative can be trusted to deliver the major events concerning the fall of Syracuse, and our knowledge of late third century Sicily would be deficient without him. Although he has his faults and his biasses, in the end he is usually trustworthy concerning the events he relates. His history in told with passion and insight, and his characters, for good or ill, were meant to be examples from the past for those in the present, as Livy saw history as a weapon for change. His work has been described as 'at once a criticism and a celebration of Rome, a text that both affirms and questions the traditions on which the city was built, and with which it may rebuild itself.'[75] As an author who combined history with emotion and entertainment, Livy has few equals, but as a pure historian, researcher, and analyst of past events, his work for the mid-Republic is overshadowed by only one name - Polybios.

Polybios and his Sources

Although he is primarily known as a historian, Polybios spent much of his life as a soldier and statesman. He was born in Megalopolis in c. 200 into a wealthy and politically active family. His father was a strong supporter of the Achaian League and its prominent general Philopoemen, whose funeral urn was supposedly carried by a young Polybios. The latter was active in domestic

[75]Kraus and Woodman 1997, p. 74.

and League politics and was appointed the Achaian cavalry commander in 170. After the Roman victory over Macedonia at the Battle of Pydna in 168, Polybios was suspected of anti-Roman sympathies and taken to Rome as one of a thousand hostages. During this period he composed at least the first part of his history down to Pydna and his coming to Rome. As a learned Greek he quickly made his way into the intellectual circles at Rome and fell under the patronage of Scipio Aemilianus. He accompanied the general on his Spanish campaigns in 151, returning to Italy by Hannibal's route across the Alps. In 146 he was again with Scipio at the destruction of Carthage, and after the destruction of Korinth in the same year he was active in Rome's political settlement of Greece. Later on in life he may have returned to Scipio's side to witness the general's victory at Numantia in 133.[76]

Polybios wrote a history of Rome in forty books. These originally covered the period from 220 to 168, but were later expanded to include an introduction from 264 and the *terminus* was taken down to 146. The purported aim of his work was to relate to his fellow Greeks, 'by what means and under what system of government the Romans succeeded in less than fifty-three years in bringing under their rule almost the whole of the inhabited world.' (I. 1. 5) By fifty-three years, Polybios is only referring to the first part of his work: 220-168. He was writing because he believed that the people of his native land were on the whole ignorant about the Romans and their customs. And he surmised that, as the Romans were the new powers of the Mediterranean and the eventual conquerors of the east, the Greeks had to sit up and not only take notice of them, but understand them as well. Of the forty original books, only the first five survive. A substantial abridgement of the first eighteen books gives us a fair bit of what was originally in VI-XVIII, and

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[76]For his dates see *RE* XXI. 2, cols 1440-1578. Carrying Philopoemen's urn: Plut. *Phil.* 21. 5; cavalry command: Plb. XXVIII. 6. 9; Roman hostage: Plb. XXX. 13, XXII. 1-12, Liv. XLV. 31. 9, Paus. VII. 10. 11; service with Scipio: Plb. XXXI. 23-25. 1, XXXVIII. 19-22, App. *Pun.* 132, D.S. XXXI. 26. 5, Plut. *Mor.* 199-200, Vell. I. 13. 3; role in the settlement of Greece: Plb. XXXIX. 5, Paus. VIII. 30. 9.

parts of sixteen others come to us by way of Polybian excerpts collected in the tenth century. Four more books are partially preserved because of quotations from later authors, while two others have perished altogether.

Polybios claims that he utilised two main sources for the history of Rome down to the end of the First Punic War. These were Philinos of Agrigentum, who wrote a monograph on the war, and Fabius Pictor, who composed the first history of Rome down to the late third century and was no doubt used by Polybios for both the interwar period and the Second Punic War. Of these two sources he says,

> Another factor, that is of no small influence, for me to relate the history of [the First Punic War] is that what has previously passed for competent accounts, those of Philinos and Fabius Pictor, do not communicate to us the actual truths. Judging by their lives and their characters, I can say without a doubt that this was unintentional, but they seem to me akin to a pair of lovers; because of the sympathies of Philinos, he finds all the actions of the Carthaginians to have been just, admirable, and brave, and those of the Romans to have been the exact opposite, while for Fabius these views are reversed.
>
> (I. 14. 1-3)

This was the dichotomy which faced Polybios; he had two main sources that directly contradicted each other, one pro-Carthaginian, the other pro-Roman. He goes on to say that he does not fault them for their biasses, as it was the duty of each man to be patriotic. But he considered his job as a historian to sift through these accounts to find an independent truth. Before examining both how Polybios went about this process and how successful he was, the lives and writings of Fabius and Philinos will be surveyed. They are crucially important for this time period because of their use by Polybios.

Fabius Pictor was a soldier and politician from one of the most prestigious Roman *gentes*; in the late third century he composed the first native history of Rome. Like most Republican historians who would follow him, Fabius Pictor was first and foremost a Roman senator and aristocrat. His writings are therefore pro-Roman, as stated above by Polybios, and also pro-

senatorial, a style that would be of great influence upon successors, most notably Livy.[77] Precious few facts are known about his life, and even the dates of his birth and death are not above speculation. A fragment (fr. 29C) from his history records his service in the Ligurian War of 238-233, and so the best estimate for the time of his birth appears to be c. 270, though pushing the date back to 280 would not seem impossible.[78] If he were old enough, or young enough, to serve in the army in 238, then it is also possible that he saw action late in the First Punic War, which had ended only three years earlier; in fact, the amount of Hellenistic knowledge that Pictor possessed perhaps points to an extended period of time spent immersed in a Greek environment.

Besides being the first Roman historian, Fabius Pictor is significant for the fact that he composed his history not in his native Latin but in Greek. If he did indeed serve for a time in Sicily, then he may have had access to material the libraries of Syracuse and Panormos, that in all probability were much more voluminous that anything in third century Rome. Here he could have read what his Greek predecessors had written about his home, with Timaios being of particularly strong influence.[79] Timaian influence manifests itself in Fabius' use of Greek measurements and, more significantly, the dating of events by Olympiads. Moreover, this influence is likely to have been reason for his choice of language. Pictor would have read for himself what the Greeks were writing about Rome, and undoubtably much of it was second or third hand and therefore at times exaggerated or mistaken; conceivably he hoped that by writing a history in Greek he could clarify these previous errors. Also, there was the anti-Roman history of Philinos, that will be explored shortly. If Pictor had read this, as he almost certainly did, then he may have hoped that his

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[77]Wiseman 1987, p, 248. See Nep. *ap.* Suet. *Rhet.* 3.

[78]For c. 270 as the birth date of Pictor see Frier,1979, p. 231.

[79]Brown 1958, p. 15, Cornell 1995, p. 8, Naudé 1974, p. 54, 60.

history, in the eyes of the Greeks, would serve as a counter to this slander of his homeland.[80]

Exactly which Greeks Pictor was writing for is a matter of dispute. Some scholars maintain that he published his history of Rome from the foundation down to 201 in about the year 196. But the date of 270 is the latest that he was probably born, and so by 196 he may have been quite old by the standards of the time. By publishing in 196, a year after the end of the Second Macedonian War, these scholars theorize that he was the first person to attempt to explain Roman customs and justify Roman policies to the people of Greece.[81] If this was the task of Fabius Pictor, he failed miserably, for both Dionysios of Halikarnassos (I. 4. 2) and Polybios (VI. 3. 3) state that, even by the mid-second century, people in mainland Greece were quite unfamiliar with the Romans and their history. What is more likely is that Fabius Pictor started writing in 216 and published about 210. This is bolstered by the fact that the final fragment of his history comes from 217, and in this case we may see that he would have been writing for the Greeks of southern Italy and Sicily. This seems the more plausible of the two theories; an attempt by Pictor to have Rome's closest neighbours, those who had been most recently absorbed into the empire, gain a better understanding of the Roman people and their foreign policies.[82]

The conjecture that Pictor was writing for Sicilians is supported by the first two fragments of his history. They suggest that he had a strong interest in the link between the Romans and Sicilians through Aeneas. He was definitely read in Sicily, since the first fragment is actually a dipinto found scrawled on the wall of a gymnasium at Taromenion in the northeast of the island.[83]

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[80]Chassignet 1996, I, p. l-li, Nauté 1961, p. 53-54, Frier 1979, p. 281.

[81]Badian 1966, p. 3, Nauté 1961, p. 53, Usher 1969, p. 131.

[82]Chassignet 1996, p. lii, lvi-lviii, Laistner 1947, p. 26. Gruen 1992, p. 231 argues unconvincingly that Pictor wrote for an exclusively Roman audience. Nauté 1961 p. 55 n. 19 claims that Pictor translated his history into Latin in later life, but Chassignet 1996, p. lix-lxiv leaves little doubt that the Latin *Annales* of the second century were written by another Fabius Pictor, almost certainly a direct descendent.

[83]*SEG* XXVI. 1122. See Manganaro 1974, p. 389-409, Frier 1979, p. 243-244, 281 n. 70.

Several more reasons exist for Pictor's choice of language. It has been proposed that Greek was chosen because Latin was not, as yet, sophisticated enough to handle a major history.[84] This point may or may not be true, but it is academic, since writing in Latin probably never even occurred to Pictor. As his sources were undoubtably all Greek, it is reasonable to suppose that he viewed Greek as the language in which proper history should be written. This is similar to the modern phenomenon of English being the language of popular music, regardless of the native tongue of the artist. Also, as we have already seen, he was writing primarily for a Greek audience. By writing for Greeks in their native language, Pictor sought to establish a place for Rome in the Hellenistic world. While researching, he would have come across histories of Egypt, Persia, and even Rome's enemy Carthage, all of which had been composed in Greek. Presumably he realised that Greek was at this time the *lingua franca* of history, and that by writing in this international language, he could reach more people and at the same time show that the Romans were not barbarians, but fully civilised members of the Mediterranean world. Pictor rightly realised that establishing a proper Hellenistic history for Rome was essential for his people to be taken seriously in the international arena.[85] Such was the status that Greek had taken on in the late third century.

Even compared with our scant knowledge of Fabius Pictor, we know next to nothing about Philinos. He was born at Agrigentum sometime before the First Punic War. The only piece of literature he produced was his history concerning the latter conflict; as he is not quoted for any events after 241, it appears safe to assume that his writings were a monograph that covered the war alone.[86] The work was known to have been anti-Roman and pro-Carthaginian; a sentiment

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[84]Badian 1966, p. 3. In defence of Latin see Chassignet 1996, p. liii, Laistner 1947, p. 25-26, Nauté 1961, p. 55.

[85]Chassignet 1996, p. lii-liii, Frier 1979, p. 264, 278, Nauté 1961, p. 54, Usher 1969, p. 131.

[86]Walbank 1957, I, p. 65.

doubtlessly influenced by his birthplace. He is thought to have published his history shortly after 241, and so in all likelihood he was born prior to 261, the year the Romans sacked Agrigentum and sold the population into slavery.[87] If Philinos was involved in this episode, and it seems likely that he was, it surely had an effect on his feelings towards Rome, and may even have been the impetus for him to begin his work. Polybios is able to say a fair bit about some of the Greek mercenaries during the war, such as Xanthippos (I. 32-34, 36) and Alexon (I. 43. 2-8); these passages most likely come from Philinos and this has led Walbank (1945, p. 11) to posit that Philinos himself may have been a Greek mercenary in Carthaginian employ.

Hardly anything of Philinos' history survives, and of the five fragments that we possess, all come from either Polybios or Diodoros.[88] Philinos is thought to have written in the style typical to Hellenistic authors of his day, using speeches as a major way of conveying information, and filling his history with sensational, and at times supernatural, events and tragic characters. Yet he was indeed taken seriously by Polybios as a historian; the latter admits that Philinos had biasses, but Polybios does not attack him on nearly the same scale as he does Timaios for example. Philinos is also thought to have included fortune, *tyche*, as a major player in his history, a concept that was put to great use by Polybios.[89] In this regard, the work of Philinos is quite important to our concept of Polybios, especially concerning the latter's opening book. However, the parallels between the two cannot be taken too far, as for the most part we have very little idea exactly which parts of Polybios are derived from Philinos and which parts are taken from Fabius

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[87]D.S. XXIII. 9. 1, Plb. I. 19. 15. For Philinos' publication date see Walbank 1968-1969, p. 493.

[88]*FGH* 174.

[89]Momigliano 1959, p. 66-67, Pédech 1952, Walbank 1945, p. 8-12 n. 2, 1957, I, p. 65, 1968-1969, p. 486-487. Philinos was not, as La Bua 1966, p. 233-241, would have us believe, the main source for Polybios concerning the First Punic War, with Fabius Pictor only used for occasional supplementary information. This goes directly against the words of Polybios at I. 11. 13-12. 4, 14. 1-3, and 15. 2-5, where he clearly gives equal weight to both accounts. Moreover, the fact that Polybios mentions twenty-eight of the forty-six consuls for the war surely points to Fabius as a major source.

Pictor. This problem is confounded by the fact that Fabius himself in all probability used Philinos as a source.[90] Only once does Polybios expressly state (I. 15. 12) that he is giving both versions of events for the sake of comparison; usually he choses between the two without comment. It has been argued that this points to an intermediary, someone other than Pictor or Philinos, perhaps Silenos, who was the main source for Polybios.[91] But this is not necessary, Polybios may have his biasses, but is neither openly pro- nor anti-Roman, and he was more than capable of sifting through partisan sources, as he directly states at I. 14. 1-3 that that is in fact his intention.

It is this kind of research and source criticism that has won Polybios such praise from ancients and moderns alike, and is one of the reasons his work survived, if only partially. He claimed (XII. 25e. 1) that the writing of history consisted of three parts: diligent research into documentary evidence; geographical survey; and a knowledge of political events. Here, he expresses the belief that only those who are learned in politics should write on the subject.[92] Polybios has often been described as one of the first true historians in the world because he undertook archival research, travel, and at times displays a neutral, dispassionate, and evenhanded style rarely seen before modern times. Some have gone quite far in praising him, even saying unequivocally, '...that there is rarely any absolutely compelling reason to doubt the truth of what he says.'[93] This is mainly because he was an eyewitness to so many of the events that he relates; furthermore, as a military and political man, he was well placed to interpret and describe these

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[90]Walbank 1945, p. 1, 1957, I, p. 65.

[91]Pédech 1952, p. 249-258.

[92]Derow 1982, p. 529.

[93]Lazenby 1996, p. 5.

events.[94] He envisioned his history on a grand scale, and claimed that he could not understand why someone would not want examine whether, 'the dominion of the Romans is an evil or a good thing.' (III. 4. 7) For him, this process began at the Naupaktos conference in 217, when the Greeks began to make war and peace with the opinion of Rome in mind (V. 105. 5). This illustrates another aim of his history - to show not just how, but why things happened as they did. It was not enough to simply say that the First Punic War started when the Romans and Carthaginians clashed over Messana, but, in the style of Thucydides, one had to explain how the two armies came to be there in the first place.[95]

This technique is used for the benefit of Polybios' audience, whom he at times addresses (III. 38. 5, VIII. 1. 4, IX. 9. 10), and whom, again like Thucydides (VII. 71), he puts into the narrative as the observers of events. These are the masses, the witnesses to political events, the onlookers, the soldiers listening to a general's speech. His audience he likens to spectators at sporting events, who, although not participating, are able, through keen observance, to obtain an idea of, and learn from, the spectacle before them (I. 57. 1-3, III. 63. 2).[96] Events in themselves count for little or nothing, it is only people's perception of these happenings that make history. A great victory by a general is hollow if no one is there to observe it. In 242, the true power of Hamilcar Barca in Sicily is only revealed once the Romans go to great lengths to avoid clashing with him (I. 60. 8). Similarly, Hannibal's crossing of the Alps, achieved several times by the Gauls (III. 47. 6), only becomes a feat of daring when it is so admired by the elder Scipio (III. 61. 5), at which point it becomes a symbol of the power of Hannibal and the terror of Rome.

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[94]The military expertise of Polybios is rarely questioned and often praised (see Marsden 1974), yet Rawson 1991, p. 34-57, has convincingly demonstrated that, even as an eyewitness, his descriptions of the Roman army are not above question, and he is not always as reliable as claimed by modern scholars.

[95]See III. 6. 1-3, 7, 30. 3-4.

[96]Davidson 1991, p. 14-15.

The speeches Polybios put into the mouths of his generals highlight certain events, and are filled with examples of previous successes so to highlight their importance to the army, and to Polybios' audience. In the speeches before Cannae (III. 108. 6-109. 12, 111. 3-10), again we see the Polybian motif of perception brought to the fore, as it is not the actual strength of the armies that is important, but their perceived strength. Polybios has the generals give a brief history of the engagements of the war thus far; Aemilius Paullus claims that the Romans have yet to suffer a true defeat, falling victim to poor weather or inexperienced troops, while Hannibal claims three successive victories and says there is no reason that a another should not be forthcoming. Only the outcome of Cannae proves whose strength was perceived and whose was real.[97]

As with Paullus' speech, the theme of perceived strength is also used when generals try to discount previous defeats, as they frequently do in the work of Polybios. During the First Punic War, the fact that in 255 the Roman fleet was wrecked in a storm is placed in the background, as by their perceived strength their primary purpose was to terrorise coastal cities into defecting to their side (I. 37. 5-6). In the next war, Scipio Africanus dismisses the defeat of his father in Spain by blaming the disloyalty of the Spanish allies (X. 7. 1-2). The greatest denial of defeat, mixed on this occasion with the theme of perceived strength, comes from Polybios himself in describing Hamilcar Barca's situation in 241, where Carthage had just lost the First Punic War, but the general was 'undefeated in spirit, as he felt that he had maintained his army at Eryx combative and resolute until the end.' (III. 9. 7) Although Carthage was vanquished, Hamilcar remained only because of the strength accorded to him by the Romans, and his enmity over this episode was carried on by his son into the next war with Rome.[98]

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[97]Pédech 1964, p. 211, 548, who also notes the importance of the perceived strength of cities and garrisons during the sieges described by Polybios.

[98]Davidson 1991, p. 20. See also II. 29. 7, III. 12. 5-6, 64. 8, 68. 12, 72. 2, 92. 3, V. 55. 1, 85. 13, XI. 34. 15, XXIX. 27. 13.

Another concept that runs throughout the narrative of Polybios is that of *tyche* (τύχη) or fortune. Of this he says, 'The most vigorous and indeed the only way to nobly bear the vicissitudes of fortune is to recall the misfortunes of others.' (I. 1. 2) To Polybios, the study of history was the means by which one should achieve one's goals by learning the lessons of the past, but we must always keep in mind this 'incalculable and capricious power' that is fortune.[99] And one the most important of these lessons was how one should react in the face of fortune. *Tyche* is something that affects Polybios' history in its entirety, all characters are subject to and must respect it. Disrespect for *tyche* usually brings about one's downfall, and while it cannot be controlled, the wise learn how to cope when it blows against you.

Polybios' *tyche* is thoroughly ambiguous, and can mean a number of different things through the history. At times it is no more than blind luck, while at others it is personified, and becomes a *deus ex machina*, a divine puppeteer pulling the strings of hapless mortals.[100] Polybios sums up his ideas concerning *tyche* in three passages:

> Thus as ever *tyche* decides the greatest of events against all reason.
> (II. 70. 2)

> *Tyche* makes no compact with our lives, and despite all of our foresight can still cause our downfall, she reveals her power against all of our expectations.
> (XXIX. 21. 5)

> For my part...I think that those who assign happenings both public and private to *tyche* and destiny (εἱμαρμένην) are in error, and I will state my opinion on this as far as it is permissible to do so in a work of history. As regards things that are difficult or impossible for men to understand, one may be justified in referring to them as the action of a god or of *tyche*.
> (XXXVI. 17. 1-2)

So here we see that *tyche* could be anything in the words of Polybios. *Tyche* was arbitrary and unbiassed, it was blind fortune, an unforeseen variable, a freak change of weather, an unexplained

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[99]Walbank 1957, I, p. 16.

[100]Blind luck: I. 7. 4, V. 42. 8, X. 33. 4-5; *deus ex machina*: XI. 24. 8, XXIX. 21. 1-6. See Shipley 2000, p. 173.

anomaly, a quick change of circumstances, good or ill timing, poetic irony, a guiding force, all the way to a deity who worked behind the scenes and dealt out luck with no rhyme or reason or even intentionally took revenge on the proud.[101] While *tyche* for Polybios applied to all people and to all circumstances, it was mainly associated with the incalculable elements in warfare.

Tyche could be fair and mete out justice to the guilty (I. 84. 10, IV. 81. 5, XX. 7. 2), but at other times gave scoundrels glorious and honourable deaths (XXXII. 4. 3). The innocent as well could suffer at her hands (XV. 20. 5, XVI. 32. 5), while others fell victim to *tyche*'s twisted sense of irony, as during the Truceless War in 238 a Punic general named Hannibal is crucified on the same cross that he had recently placed one of his opponents, 'as if it were the design of *tyche* to compare the two.' (I. 86. 7, also XXIX. 21. 3-6) The personified *tyche* displayed characteristics comparable to other Greek deities; she sometimes took revenge or killed out of spite, she vanquished the proud and at times was ruinous towards successful men out of shear jealousy (XXXIX. 8. 2). Allotting *tyche* such a prominent role in history was a novel approach to the concept of fortune by Polybios, but as an actual goddess Tyche was worshipped long before the second century. Writers as far back as the fifth century mentioned the goddess and she was revered at a sanctuary in Thebes and sacrificed to at Athens.[102]

Polybios perceived events as being parts of chain reactions, with individuals and states responding to situations and thus provoking a reaction from another party. In this sense Carthage may have started the Second Punic War, but they were merely reacting to Roman provocation. This perception manifests itself in Polybios' ideas concerning Roman imperialism, as one Roman victory started a chain reaction that led them to crave more.[103] In 261 the Roman victory at

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[101]Walbank 1986, p. 219-220.

[102]Chairem. *ap.* Stob. I. 6. 16, Men. *ap.* Stob. I. 6. 1, Pi. *O.* 12, Paus. IX. 16. 1. See Shipley 2000, p. 173-174.

[103]Davidson 1991, p. 22, Derow 1982, p. 1979, p. 2, 1982, p. 531, Walbank 1972, p. 161-162.

Agrigentum led the Romans to seize all of Sicily (I. 20. 1); then after their victory at Mylai in the following year, 'their determination to prosecute the war doubled.' (I. 24. 1) The plan to invade Africa only came about because of their victory at Tyndaris in 257 (I. 26. 1-2), and confidence grew after the Carthaginian fleet was smashed at Ekonomos in the next year (I. 29. 4). Each successive victory brought with it increased determination and, more importantly, an expansion of Roman aims. On a grander scale, Polybios claimed that the First Punic War extended Roman ambitions, while victory over Hannibal gave the Romans a desire to achieve universal domination.[104]

The Romans are not singled out for this kind of imperialist behaviour however. Hannibal rebuffs the Roman protests over Saguntum because his confidence has been bolstered by his victories in Spain, and this gives him the ambition to take on Rome (III. 15. 6, 89. 6, 90. 4). The victories of Antiochos III in 221 make him seek to expand his empire at the expense of the Parthian Artabazanes (V. 55. 1), while in 218 the Selgians of Asia Minor achieve some military success, and this pushes them to try for greater glories (V. 73. 8-9).

This is a motif that runs through the narrative of Polybios. Yet, it is usually applied to the Romans. In this way the initial conquests of the First Punic War, in Polybios' mind, lit the fuse for Roman imperialism, and the Roman desire to conquer only doubled with their victorious emergence from the struggle with Hannibal. Nevertheless, this does not appear to be a condemnation of the Romans as much as it is an account of their defensive imperialist ways. This is evident in that it was the potential for Punic expansion to Italy that brought them into war in 264. At I. 10. 5-9 Polybios says that the Romans, in part, went to war with Carthage because they understood that if they let Carthage take Sicily, then Italy would undoubtedly be next. Some

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[104]I. 3. 6, 6. 6, III. 2. 6, V. 104, 3, IX. 10. 11. See also II. 31. 8, where the victory at Telamon in 225 gives the Romans a desire to expel the Celts from the entire Po region.

scholars have put this down to a piece of Roman propaganda derived from Fabius Pictor, but looking at the views concerning imperialism in the rest of his work, we can see that this merely follows the standard Polybian pattern.[105] It was not that if Sicily fell then Italy would definitely be invaded, but Polybios is making the point that if Sicily were won by the Carthaginians then their confidence would be bolstered, so much so that it might embolden them to attack Italy. According to Polybios, the Romans were protecting themselves not from Punic aggression so much as the threat of it.

This defensive imperialist motif manifests itself in others ways in the narrative of Polybios. He says (XXXVI. 2, fr. 99) that the Romans always took time and care to look for an excuse to go to war, that way they always appeared to be fighting for a cause that was just. Furthermore, if such an excuse was unavailable, a war may not actually be undertaken.[106]

A distinction must be made between these two concepts at work in Polybios. In the latter, it is the Romans who are attempting to justify their expansionism by claiming that their wars of conquest are undertaken in the name of just causes. In the former, it is Polybios who is making the point that conquest was at times necessary as a sort of preventative imperialism. While Polybios has been known to chastise the Romans on occasion, he also believed in the entity that was the Roman Empire, what he called their 'universal rule' or 'universal ambition' (I. 3. 6, 10, 63. 9, III. 2. 6). By the time of his writing Rome was the most powerful state in the Mediterranean world, and Polybios believed that they had come to be in that position through an intrinsic process. He saw the Roman Empire as a naturally expanding entity, and for this reason

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[105]Davidson 1991, p. 22-23, Derow 1979, p. 9, Walbank 1972, p. 77 n. 60. *Contra* Gelzer 1933, p. 151, Harris 1979, p. 110 n. 1, who claim much of Polybios concerning the early stages of the First Punic War was derived from Fabius.

[106]On the concept of just war among the Romans see Rich 1993, p. 61. See also Cic. *Rep.* III. 35.

it was Rome's purpose in the world to conquer other peoples.[107] In relation to 264 and the Roman invasion of Sicily, the view of Polybios was tinted by the fact that this was the beginning of the Roman Empire. He knew very well that it was to be Sicily that brought Rome onto the world scene and gave the state its first overseas possession. Moreover, it was also the beginning of the end for the Carthaginian Empire, the final destruction of which he himself witnessed. His stated purpose, to inform the Greeks about the Romans, was in fact secondary, as his primary design was to convince his fellow Hellenes of the new world order. This order, the Roman order, was a universal empire, and therefore the Greeks should learn to work with this new system.[108]

It would be a gross overstatement to say that Polybios was justifying Roman imperialism, but he certainly does not always place the blame upon them for wars. In Illyria, it was the highhanded and arrogant tactics of Queen Teuta and later Demetrios that forced Rome to act; in 218 Polybios claimed that the wrath of the Barcids was the true cause of the Second Punic War; while it was the Greeks themselves who were responsible for their own plight with Rome.[109] Leaders like Kallikrates, who not coincidently was a political enemy of Polybios' family, receive a scathing review in the narrative because they pandered to Rome and sold out their fellow Greeks.[110] In this sense it was not the Romans who were at fault; they were an expansionist power, and one should not blame them for seizing an opportunity to conquer, but it was Kallikrates and the party that invited them in who were, 'the originators of great evil for all the Greeks.' (XXIV. 10. 8) By making the Greeks responsible for their own fate Polybios does in fact

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[107]Davidson 1991, p. 12-14, Derow 1979, p. 1-15, Finley 1978, p. 3, Momigliano 1975, p. 27-29, 48, Richardson 1979, p. 1-11, Walbank 1972, p. 163.

[108]Shipley 2000, p. 8.

[109]Illyria: II. 8. 2, III. 16. 7, 18-19; see Derow 1973, Walbank 1957, I, p. 159; Derow 1973, p. 132 says the pro-Roman portrayal of the enemy Queen Teuta from Polybios' source (probably Fabius Pictor) was, 'very much to Polybius' taste.' Wrath of the Barcids: III. 9. 6; see Eckstein 1995, p. 57. Greece: XXIV. 8-10, XXXVIII. 1-3; see Derow 1970.

[110]XXX. 29. 1, 5-7, XXXII. 4-5. 4. See Derow 1970, p. 13, 23.

exonerate the Romans, and in turn he shows that the political arrangement that followed the Roman conquest was a positive circumstance, in no small way because it was he himself who played a major role instituting this settlement (XXXVIII. 18. 12, XXXIX. 5. 1-3).[111]

Polybios saw that cooperation with Rome was a blessing, and, perhaps as a piece of personal propaganda, it was this type of collaboration with Roman that he praised within the pages of his history. Hieron II is applauded for being a wise and benevolent monarch (I. 8. 3-17. 1, VII. 8. 1-8), and of course he was one of Rome's staunchest allies. This is also true of Polybios' portrayals of Attalos I and Eumenes II of Pergamon and of Massinissa. In contrast, Hieron's grandson Hieronymos, who opposed Rome, is shown as a pampered spoilt child who ruled unwisely and like a tyrant (VI. 7. 6-8, VII. 7. 1-6). Again, other kings who opposed Rome such as Philip V, Antiochos III, and Perseus, all attract criticism, and are at times characterised as poor rulers. Although Polybios appears to have started out as loyal Greek, there is evidence to support the argument that he was not anti-Roman, and this may have become especially true once they imbued him with power during the aforementioned settlement of his homeland.[112]

We have thus far explored two ways in which Polybios did not portray Roman imperialism in a negative light - by saying they struck pre-emptively, and by blaming others for Roman aggression. He often absolved the Romans from blame in their wars, and his methods for doing so in the case of Sicily can be illustrated by his treatment of the Romans and their diplomatic dealings with their enemies, specifically in the realm of the negotiating and signing of treaties. This was perhaps not Polybios' explicit intention to portray the Romans as blameless; he does on

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[111]Shipley 2000, p. 369. Eckstein 1995, p. 60-64, has suggested that Polybios considered the Romans to be a very honourable people, and even pushed back the date of their defeat at the Po from 215 to 216 so as to juxtapose it with Cannae (III. 118. 1-8), thus making their emergence from these two disasters that much more glorious. While Polybios is not above suspicion, he was no Roman propagandist, and whether or not he considered the Romans excessively honourable does not appear to be something that can be gleaned from his writings.

[112]Eckstein 1985, p. 265-268, 275, Walbank 1972, 166-183, 1974, p. 14-18.

occasion condemn them and, although he had biasses, it is highly unlikely that he ever falsified history. As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, he believed firmly that a treaty that barred the Romans from intervention in Sicilian affairs did not exist. While there is strong evidence to the contrary, and while Polybios may have been quick to believe the Roman version of events, it is doubtful that he was lying, and more likely that he genuinely believed that the Romans were within their rights to invade. Yet this is not the same as saying that the Romans themselves during Polybios' time knew about such a treaty, a document that, as I will now attempt to show, did in fact exist but by the second century was no longer in circulation.

Chapter 3
The Treaties Between Rome and Carthage

In book III. 22-27, Polybios surveys the diplomatic history of the relations between Rome and Carthage; here he outlines six treaties, five authentic and one false, which are relevant to his narrative concerning the Punic capture of Saguntum and the outbreak of the Second Punic War. As four of these six pacts come before 264, any analysis of Roman imperialism in Sicily during the third century would be incomplete without taking them into account. It is hoped that this examination will shed new light on the events of 264, and whether the Romans, the Carthaginians, or both, acted in contravention of an existing treaty barring each one from the other's territory.

The five treaties that Polybios claims are authentic were signed in 509, 348, 279 or 278, 241, and 226, while the one he states to have been false was allegedly signed in 306. Only the first four plus the 306 treaty are relevant to Sicily. The Treaty of Lutatius ended the First Punic War in 241, while the treaties of 509 and 348 are virtually the identical. Carthage was negotiating with Rome as a stronger power and therefore dictated most of the terms. Both pacts are almost wholly economic and contain few military clauses; Carthage was looking to expand its maritime interests in Italy, and had been dealing with the Etruscans long before the establishment of the Republic, while Rome in 509, as a fledgling state, was looking for recognition and independent access to grain markets controlled by Carthage. In 348 Rome wished to safeguard these routes from the growing threat of Punic piracy. In 279/8 a defensive pact was signed in the face of a mutual threat from the Epirote general Pyrrhos. This was only treaty between Rome and Carthage to contain provisoes relating to mutual military aid. Polybios claims that the rest of the treaty was merely a renewal of those that came before, but, considering how much their power had grown by 279, it seems unlikely the Romans would have been willing to renew a seventy year old pact that allowed for Punic military intervention in Italy, as did the treaty of 348. This would

appear to be where the highly controversial treaty of 306 comes into play. Also known as the Treaty of Philinos, Polybios says that the treaty did not exist and was a fabrication in the pro-Carthaginian history of Philinos. The treaty apparently included the clause that the Romans and Carthaginians should not venture into each other's spheres of influence. As this is the treaty that most relates to Roman imperialism on Sicily, the chapter will focus on the claims of Polybios as to the treaty's non-authenticity. As already stated, the treaty of 279/8 does not make sense without the treaty of 306, and much evidence exists that points to the conclusion that there was in fact such an agreement, and that it may have been covered up by the Romans for the purposes of hiding a blatant act of aggression. Finally, the Ebro Treaty of 226, while it is of no importance to Sicily, is illustrative of both Roman imperialism concerning Carthage and the attitude of Polybios concerning treaties and the growth of the Roman Empire. Therefore, the chapter will conclude with a look at Polybios' writings concerning the Ebro Treaty, the Saguntum affair, and the outbreak of the Second Punic War.

The First Treaty

In 524 Etruscan domination in central Italy was smashed in a defeat at the hands of the Cumaeans. Tradition has Rome breaking away from Etruscan control and establishing a republic in 509. Polybios (III. 22. 3) tells us that the newly independent state now negotiated a treaty of its own with Carthage. His quotation of the treaty is as follows:

> ἐπὶ τοῖσδε φιλίαν εἶναι Ῥωμαίοις καὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίων συμμάχοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις καὶ τοῖς Καρχηδονίων συμμάχοις· μὴ πλεῖν <μακαῖς ναυσὶ> Ῥωμαίους μηδὲ τοὺς Ῥωμαίων συμμάχους ἐπέκεινα τοῦ Καλοῦ ἀκρωτηρίου, ἐὰν μὴ ὑπὸ χειμῶνος ἢ πολεμίων ἀναγκασθῶσιν· ἐὰν δέ τις βίᾳ κατενεχθῇ, μὴ ἐξέστω αὐτῷ μηδὲν ἀγοράζειν μηδὲ λαμβάνειν πλὴν ὅσα πρὸς πλοίου ἐπισκευὴν ἢ πρὸς ἱερά, <ἐν πέντε δ' ἡμέραις ἀποτρεχέτω.> τοῖς δὲ κατ' ἐμπορίαν παραγινομένοις μηδὲν ἔστω τέλος πλὴν ἐπὶ κήρυκι ἢ γραμματεῖ. ὅσα δ' ἂν τούτων παρόντων πραθῇ, δημοσίᾳ πίστει ὀφειλέσθω τῷ ἀποδομένῳ, ὅσα ἂν ἢ ἐν Λιβύῃ ἢ ἐν Σαρδόνι πραθῇ. ἐὰν Ῥωμαίων τις εἰς Σικελίαν παραγίνηται,

ἧς Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπάρχουσιν, ἴσα ἔστω τὰ Ῥωμαίων πάντα. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ μὴ ἀδικείτωσαν δῆμον Ἀρδεατῶν, Ἀντιατῶν, Λαρεντίνων, Κιρκαιιτῶν, Ταρρακινιτῶν, μηδ' ἄλλον μηδένα Λατίνων, ὅσοι ἂν ὑπήκοοι· ἐὰν δέ τινες μὴ ὦσιν ὑπήκοοι, τῶν πόλεων ἀπεχέσθωσαν· ἂν δὲ λάβωσι, Ῥωμαίοις ἀποδιδότωσαν ἀκέραιον. φρούριον μὴ ἐνοικοδομείτωσαν ἐν τῇ Λατίνῃ. ἐὰν ὡς πολέμιοι εἰς τὴν χώραν εἰσέλθωσιν, ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ μὴ ἐννυκτερευέτωσαν.

There will be friendship between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians and their allies under the following conditions: the Romans and their allies are not to sail beyond the Fair Promontory, unless forced to do so by storm or by enemies. If anyone contravenes this for the above reasons, it is forbidden for him to buy or take away anything but what is necessary for repairs to his ship or for sacrifice, <and he must depart within five days>. Those coming to trade may not undertake any business unless in the presence of a herald or a clerk, and everything that is sold in front of these two will be secured to the seller by the state if the transaction takes place in Libya or Sardinia. If any Roman comes to that part of Sicily that is controlled by the Carthaginians, he will have the same rights enjoyed by others. The Carthaginians will do no wrong to the peoples of Ardea, Antium, Laurentum, Circeii, Terracina, or any others of the Latin people who are subject to Rome. As for those who are not subjects, they will keep away from these cities, and if they should seize one, they will hand it over unharmed to the Romans. They will not build any fort within Latium; and, if they come under arms to this territory, they will not remain overnight.

Polybios III. 22. 4-13

This treaty was certainly more beneficial towards Carthage, yet contained advantages for Rome as well. Roman trading was restricted in areas under Punic control, especially Africa. The clause that forbids the Carthaginians from conquering cities in Latium, having to hand them over to Rome immediately if they do, is the earliest example for both Roman and Punic territorial aggression.[1]

The treaty would appear to have been drawn up, and possibly initiated by, Carthage. In style, it matches other Punic treaties for which we possess exact texts, especially that between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedonia in 215.[2] Thus the treaty of 509 was probably set out in a standard Punic style, with specific clauses and provisions to suit the occasion. This set diction for

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[1]*Contra* Whitaker 1978, who claims that the Carthaginians were not imperialist until they sought a land empire in Spain. On the Sicilian clauses see Ameling 1993, p. 151-153.

[2]Plb. VII. 9. See also App. *Mac.* 1, Liv. XXIII. 33. 10-12, Zonar. IX. 4.

diplomatic documents is likely to have been derived from the Greeks. The signing of treaties was standard practice in Greek diplomacy and much of the Mediterranean took their lead from the Greeks in this field. The Carthaginians signed several treaties with the Greeks over Sicily, and it would seem probable that over time they adopted a set style for these written agreements.[3]

Some scholars have doubted the authenticity of this treaty, asking why the Carthaginian Empire would waste its time with a small city-state on the Tiber.[4] They claim that the Romans simply were not important enough for Carthage to wish for a treaty with them. Moreover, it is doubtful that Rome actually controlled the Latin states that are listed in the treaty. Instead, these scholars follow Diodoros (XVI. 69. 1) and Livy (VII. 27. 2) who report the first treaty as coming in 348, which according to Polybios (III. 24. 1) would be the date for the second treaty. The latter however, these scholars date to a Punic embassy visiting Rome in 343.[5] This would seem unlikely, as five years is a very short span of time within which to renew a treaty, and judging from the wording of the second pact (see next section), it is very doubtful that Roman aims within Italy could have changed so much between 348 and 343.[6]

More recent studies, however, rightly find no reason to discount the pact, and most accept the word of Polybios that he actually saw the treaty and even remarked on its archaic Latin. Polybios does not include the date for the treaty in his quotation of the wording, but he does say he is not quoting the full text (III. 22. 3-4). He gives the date as the consulship of Brutus and Horatius, 509. This is possibly an error that, if not featured on the treaty, would likely derive from either Fabius Pictor or Cato, as Brutus was slain in battle during his consulship, while Horatius

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[3]Punic treaties with the Greeks: D.S. XI. 26. 2, XIII. 114. 1, XIV. 96. 3-4, XV. 17. 5, XX. 69. 3, 79. 5. See Palmer 1997, p. 15.

[4]Cary 1919, p. 70, De Sanctis 1907-1953, II, p. 407, Woodhead 1962, p. 100-101.

[5]Liv. VII. 38. 2.

[6]Cornell 1989a, p. 355-357.

abdicated, yet this does not discount the treaty, as they probably still gave their names to the year.[7] Regardless, the fact that Tarseon in Spain does not feature in this treaty, while doing so in the second, means the document must be older than the mid-fifth century, when the Carthaginians first began making serious military inroads into Spain.[8]

Furthermore, a treaty with Rome at this time would not have been out of step with Punic policy in Italy. A set of inscriptions found in 1964 at Santa Severa, ancient Pyrgi, port to the Etruscan city of Caere, are highly significant. These three documents, two in Etruscan and one in Phoenician, have been dated to c. 500, and thus they illustrate a Carthaginian interest in the west coast of Italy that is contemporary with the Roman treaty of 509. It has been speculated that Pyrgi may have been a Punic *emporion*, while certainly the fact that Caere had another port named Punicum would seem to indicate to a permanent Carthaginian presence in the area.[9] This is bolstered by the attestation of Etruscan-Punic cooperation in Aristotle (*Pol.* III. 5. 10) and Herodotos (I. 166), who tells us about a military alliance between the two powers, where they combined to defeat a Phokaian navy near Sardinia in the Battle of Alalia sometime between 540 and 535.

With a heavy Punic presence on the west coast of Italy in the sixth century, a treaty with Rome in 509 should not come as a surprise. Although it is obvious from the wording that Carthage is largely dictating the terms as the stronger power, the latter still had something to gain from this agreement. From the text of the treaty, it appears that Carthage was attempting to expand its trading rights in central Italy, dictate navigational limits upon the Romans, and impose

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[7]Alföldi 1964, p. 351-352, Cary 1919, p. 69, Cornell 1995, p. 218-223, Mitchell 1971, p. 634, Toynbee 1965, I, p. 519 n. 4, Walbank 1957, I, p. 339-345. On the consulship of 509 see Broughton *MRR*, p. 1-3.

[8]Oakley 1998, II, p. 256.

[9]Ferron 1972, Macintosh-Turfa 1977, Momigliano 1977, p. 104. For inscriptions and further evidence of Punic presence see Smith 1996, p. 145, 160-162.

restrictions on their activities outside these limits. As we can see by their dealings with the Etruscans, this treaty was probably a standard one that the Carthaginians had with many of the cities of western Italy, thus expanding their trading empire while regulating those who acted within it.

For the Romans, the treaty would have contained a wealth of benefits. As a new self-governing city-state, Rome in 509 would have been looking for diplomatic recognition from nearby states, and a treaty with a large foreign power demonstrated the independence of the new Republic, and that it was now the master of all territory once administered by the Tarquins.[10] As well, treaties involving the Romans could have existed between the Carthaginians and the Etruscans prior to 509, and when Rome threw out its last Etruscan kings then these pacts had to be renegotiated if international trade was to continue.[11] Of course, the Romans would have benefited from the increased trade that came with access to exclusive Carthaginian controlled ports, but the true reason behind the treaty, for the Romans at least, may be necessity brought on by famine. Rome desperately needed an agreement with Carthage so that the city could import grain from Sicily to alleviate the famine of 508.[12] On this occasion, Livy does not mention any grain imported from Sicily, but he does for the famine of 492 (II. 34. 2-5) and both he (IV. 12. 8-16. 8) and Dionysios of Halikarnasos (V. 26. 5, VII. 20. 3-4, 37. 3, XII. 1-4) explain how the senate was forced to search far and wide for grain to curb the devastating shortage of 440-439. Therefore it is likely that the senate sought to purchase grain from Sicily in the late sixth century, but before they were permitted to do so, the Carthaginian authorities there demanded a written

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[10]Oakley 1998, II, p. 256.

[11]David 1946, argues unconvincingly that the 509 treaty proves that some sort of Roman *ius commercium* or international maritime law existed in the western Mediterranean in the sixth century.

[12]Liv. II. 9. 6.

agreement.

The *status quo* remained much the same for the next century and a half, as Rome slowly broke out of Latium and began conquering the central peninsula. The Romans themselves were not at this time great maritime traders, and therefore the treaty of 509 was satisfactory to them for quite a lengthy period. By the mid-fourth century however, the situation had changed. Perhaps because of their new interest in southern Italy, where the majority of cities were situated on the coasts and were home to many an overseas trader, the Romans renewed and slightly redrew their agreement with the Carthaginians in 348.

The Second Treaty

This treaty took the form of a nonaggression pact, that still favoured the Carthaginians, though slightly less so. If Punic forces captured any non-Roman settlements in Latium, they again had to hand the places over to Rome, yet this time they were able to keep any booty and people they managed to take with them. Libya and Sardinia were now closed to Rome, the latter most likely because of a Roman colonising attempt in 378.[13] Carthage and all of western Sicily were free ports.[14] Polybios' text is as follows:

> Μετὰ δὲ ταύτας ἑτέρας ποιοῦνται συνθήκας, ἐν αἷς προσπεριειλήφασι Καρχηδόνιοι Τυρίους καὶ τὸν Ἰτυκαίων δῆμον. πρόσκειται δὲ καὶ τῷ Καλῷ ἀκρωτηρίῳ Μαστία, Ταρσήιον· ὧν ἐκτὸς οἴονται δεῖν Ῥωμαίους μήτε λῄζεσθαι μήτε πόλιν κτίζειν. εἰσὶ δὲ τοιαίδε τινές· ‘ἐπὶ τοῖσδε φιλίαν εἶναι Ῥωμαίοις καὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίων συμμάχοις καὶ Καρχηδονίων καὶ Τυρίων καὶ Ἰτυκαίων δήμῳ καὶ τοῖς τούτων συμμάχοις. τοῦ Καλοῦ ἀκρωτηρίου, Μαστίας, Ταρσηίου, μὴ λῄζεσθαι ἐπέκεινα Ῥωμαίους μηδ’ ἐμπορεύεσθαι μηδὲ πόλιν κτίζειν. ἐὰν δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι λάβωσιν ἐν τῇ Λατίνῃ πόλιν τινὰ μὴ οὖσαν ὑπήκοον Ῥωμαίοις, τὰ χρήματα καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐχέτωσαν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἀποδιδότωσαν. ἐὰν δὲ τινες Καρχηδονίων λάβωσί τινας, πρὸς οὓς εἰρήνη μέν ἐστιν ἔγγραπτος Ῥωμαίοις, μὴ ὑποτάττονται δὲ τι αὐτοῖς, μὴ καταγέτωσαν εἰς τοὺς Ῥωμαίων

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[13]D.S. XV. 27. 4.

[14]See D.S. XVI. 69. 1, Liv. VII. 27. 2.

λιμένας· ἐὰν δὲ καταχθέντος ἐπιλάβηται ὁ Ῥωμαῖος, ἀφιέσθω. ὡσαύτως δὲ μηδ' οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι ποιείτωσαν. ἂν ἔκ τινος χώρας, ἧς Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπάρχουσιν, ὕδωρ ἢ ἐφόδια λάβῃ ὁ Ῥωμαῖος, μετὰ τούτων τῶν ἐφοδίων μὴ ἀδικείτω μηδένα πρὸς οὓς εἰρήνη καὶ φιλία ἐστὶ <Καρχηδονίοις. ὡσαύτως δὲ μηδ' ὁ> Καρχηδόνιος ποιείτω. εἰ δέ, μὴ ἰδίᾳ μεταπορευέσθω· ἐὰν δέ τις τοῦτο ποιήσῃ, δημόσιον γινέσθω τὸ ἀδίκημα. ἐν Σαρδόνι καὶ Λιβύῃ μηδεὶς Ῥωμαίων μήτ' ἐμπορευέσθω μήτε πόλιν κτιζέτω, ... εἰ μὴ ἕως τοῦ ἐφόδια λαβεῖν ἢ πλοῖν ἐπισκευάσαι. ἐὰν δὲ χειμὼν κατενέγκῃ, ἐν πένθ' ἡμέραις ἀποτρεχέτω. ἐν Σικελίᾳ, ἧς Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπάρχουσι, καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι πάντα καὶ ποιείτω καὶ πωλείτω ὅσα καὶ τῷ πολίτῃ ἔξεστιν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὁ Καρχηδόνιος ποιείτω ἐν Ῥώμῃ.'

Later, they made another treaty, in which the Carthaginians included the peoples of Tyre and Utika; to the Fair Promontory was added Mastia and Tarseon as points beyond which the Romans could not sail under arms, found cities, or conduct trade. These were approximately the terms of this treaty: 'There will be friendship between the Romans and their allies and the Carthaginians, the people of Tyre, the people of Utika, and their respective allies under the following conditions: the Romans will not sail under arms, trade, or found a city on the farther side of the Fair Promontory, Mastia, and Tarseon. If the Carthaginians capture any city in Latium not subject to the Romans, they will keep the plunder and the captives, but must give up the city. If the Carthaginians capture any citizen of a city that has a treaty with the Romans but is not subject to them, they will not bring him ashore at any Roman harbour, but if he is brought ashore and a Roman takes hold of him, he will be set free. The Romans will do likewise. If a Roman takes water or supplies from any place subject to Carthage, with these supplies he is not to do harm to any citizen from a city with whom the <Carthaginians> have peace and friendship. <And the Carthaginians will do likewise>. In cases to the contrary, the aggrieved will not take private vengeance, for if he does, it will be a public offense. No Roman will trade or found a city in Sardinia and Libya, ... nor remain there for longer than it takes for him to resupply or repair his ship; if driven to Sardinia and Libya by storm, he is required to depart within five days. At Carthage and in that part of Sicily that is controlled by the Carthaginians, he may do and sell anything as is permitted to a citizen. The Carthaginians in Rome will do likewise.'

Polybios III. 24

Like the first, this treaty is also in typical Punic style and Carthage was certainly still the stronger of the two powers, but the Romans were slowly growing bolder in their demands. Polybios again does not date the treaty, but we know from Diodoros (XVI. 69. 1) and Livy (VII. 27. 2) that the year was in fact 348. This is supported by two details: the treaty does not mention Campania, meaning it must have come before 343, as Rome accepted Capua into its *fides* in this year; and

the fact that it still contains a clause for cities in Latium not belonging to the Romans places the document before 338, when after a revolt nearly all of Latium was assimilated.[15]

The treaty may have been initiated by Rome, if we can judge from the clause dealing with the capture of citizens on the high seas. According to Livy (VII. 25. 4, 12-13, 26. 13-15), in 349 a group of Sicilian pirates blockaded the mouth of the Tiber. They were a raiding party looking to loot the coast, and, despite their best efforts, the Romans could not get rid of them. The pirates only left after a time due to lack of provisions.[16] The Punic Empire was notoriously pirate infested; many of the brigands were themselves Carthaginian, and the aforementioned Sicilians may have come from the part of western Sicily under Carthaginian control.[17] It would also appear that these pirates often dealt in human spoils, and made a livelihood out of kidnapping people for the slave trade. Thus Plautus in his *Poenulus* contains numerous references to this trade in human cargo and has his main characters kidnapped by Punic slave traders. Certainly the clause in the above treaty dealing with captured citizens is in reference to this sort of Carthaginian piracy, and the incident of 349 may have caused the Romans to demand a new treaty with Carthage in an attempt to curb this trade.[18]

As outlined above, a Punic embassy did visit Rome in 343, but this is unlikely to have resulted in a renewal of the treaty as the situation between the two sides had not radically altered in the intervening five years. Nevertheless, the treaty was renewed again at some point, and the renewal came for the first time with the added feature of military provisoes. Polybios (III. 25. 1-5) says that this treaty was signed in 279/8, but there is evidence that points to a treaty coming

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[15]Oakley 1998, II, p. 257.

[16]See Palmer 1997, p. 24, 32, 104.

[17]See Souza 1995, p. 187-188.

[18]On Punic piracy see Ameling 1993, p. 127-134.

in between 348 and 279/8, and this was supposedly instituted in 306. This would make sense in terms of timing; in the late fourth century Rome made an attempt to colonise Corsica that scholars have dated to 311.[19] As the first two treaties contain clauses concerning where the Romans may and may not found cities, this act may have irked the Carthaginians enough for them to ask for a new treaty, that would have been signed at Rome in 306.[20] Rome was on the verge of victory in the Second Samnite War and Carthage had defeated Agathokles in Africa and was besieging Syracuse, therefore, both sides sought to negotiate from positions of strength.

The Third Treaty

From what little we know about the treaty, it becomes obvious that Rome was now negotiating with Carthage on an equal basis. It probably contained roughly the same economic guidelines as the concordat of 348, though on this occasion the military provisos were radically altered. Carthage was no longer given the option of conducting military operations on the Italian peninsula; from now on Rome defined all of Italy as being within its sphere of influence, and militarily off limits to Carthage. Similarly, the Punic government closed off Africa, Sardinia, and, most importantly, all of Sicily to Rome, with the independent eastern half of the island now considered part of the Carthaginian sphere.

This of course would place the Romans squarely in the wrong for the outbreak of the First Punic War in 264, crossing into what Carthage defined as its territory. Polybios however, vehemently denies the existence of this treaty, saying that the Romans were not guilty of any violation upon going to war with Carthage. He claims that the whole affair concerning a treaty in 306 is an error of the pro-Carthaginian historian Philinos. This denial has led to a scholarly

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[19]Thphr. *HP.* V. 8. 2. Cary 1919, p. 76 n. 3, Cornell 1989, p. 315, 1995, p. 321-322, Thiel 1954, p. 18.

[20]Claudius Quadrigarius, I. fr. 31P, Liv. IX. 43. 26, XXI. 10. 8, Serv. *A.* IV. 628.

debate over the issue, with historians positioning themselves in either agreement with Polybios or in defence of the validity of the 306 treaty.[21] As outlined in the previous chapter, there is no doubt that Polybios is on the whole a fair and evenhanded historian, yet he is not above suspicion. This should not, of course, imply that he fabricated facts, only that on this occasion, there is evidence to show that he may simply have been wrong. He has been known to be misleading or just plain wrong on several occasions, and these include his descriptions of treaties between Rome and Carthage. Oakley (1998, II, p. 260) is more direct, saying that, 'It is not always stressed adequately that this whole section of his narrative is slanted to prove that the Roman invasion of Sicily in 264 violated no treaty with Carthage.' Again Polybios possibly erred in ascribing the first treaty to the consuls Brutus and Horatius, and his writings on the second treaty are both vague and dateless.[22] Moreover, the two main sources for Polybios' history were Philinos and Fabius Pictor, the former was from Agrigentum and was possibly a Punic mercenary, thus his pro-Carthaginian stance, while the latter was a Roman senator from the Second Punic War. Fabius used Philinos and was probably aware of the controversy over the 306 treaty. Polybios (I. 14. 3, III. 9. 1-5) himself comments that Fabius is just as pro-Roman as Philinos is pro-Carthaginian (see above, p. 58), and therefore we must keep in mind the strong possibility that Polybios simply chose the Fabian version of the events that led up to the First Punic War rather than the Philinian. This is not without parallel in terms of other treaties described within his histories, as he bought into the pro-Roman propaganda of Fabius in describing the Ebro treaty between Rome and Carthage in 226 (see below, p. 99) and the treaty between Rome and Queen Teuta of Illyria in 228

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[21]For full bibliographic information and a summary of the arguments for the treaty see Mitchell 1971, p. 633-655, Palmer 1997, p. 16-17, Scullard 1989, p. 530-536, Serrati 1996, p. 3-7; against the treaty see Eckstein 1987, p. 77-78, Hoyos 1985a, p. 92-109, 1998, p. 9-16. Oakley 1998, II, p. 258-262 argues in favour of a treaty for 306, but denies that this was the pact described by Philinos. Yet if this were the case, and a treaty from 306 did exist, and it did not place the Romans in the wrong for the invasion of Sicily, it is difficult to see why Polybios would have missed such an important point.

[22]Walbank 1957, I, p. 339-345.

(II. 12. 3).[23] As outlined in the previous chapter (see above, p. 69-70), Polybios was writing under the auspices of his Roman patrons, and he saw the Roman Empire as a naturally expanding entity, it being Rome's place to conquer. Therefore, the view of Polybios on the events of 264 may have been clouded by the fact that the first Roman steps into Sicily in that year were the very beginning of their world empire. He knew that it was to be Sicily that brought Rome onto the world scene and gave the state its first extra Italian conquest. Moreover, it was also the beginning of the end for the Carthaginian Empire, an end he himself witnessed. It was through these blinkers that Polybios looked back at the situation in 264, and for these reasons he was more likely to simply accept the non-existence of the Philinos treaty as fact.

The argument against the treaty rests on a number of points, the most important of which is the statement of Polybius himself that he saw the other three treaties in the Roman archives, and, when he could not find any trace of the Philinos treaty, was firmly convinced that, 'There is, in fact, no such document at all, nor was there ever.' (III. 26. 5) But we cannot even be sure about where the treaties were kept, and if Polybios himself had full access to the place, or if he had to make a request for the material from one of the aediles. He does say (III. 22. 3) that he had help reading the first treaty because of its archaic Latin, and it is possible that these were the same men who gained Polybios access to the documents.[24] As for where the treaties were kept, he says that they were, 'on bronze tablets beside the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus in the treasury of the aediles (ἀγορανόμων ταμιείῳ).' (III. 26. 1) The aediles and the quaestors had the care of the records in the *aerarium*, that was attached to the temple of Saturn, but Polybios is here

[23]Derow 1973, p. 123, 128-129, Hammond 1968, p. 7 n. 24.

[24]Rawson 1985, p. 240.

referring to a separate building.[25] There are no other references to the treasury of the aediles in Rome, and Polybios may have mistakenly given the incorrect name for a building that was under the charge of the aediles, yet it is equally possible that such a building existed. Furthermore, it would make sense that the treaties were in their care, since their office was in charge of trade at Rome, and as we have seen the first two treaties were basically economic agreements with only occasional military and political provisoes.

It was tradition that treaties were displayed on the walls of public buildings, and the area of the Capitol of which Polybios speaks in particular housed many state documents.[26] The treaties may have been stored in a building attached to the temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitol, as it was one of the most prominent public edifices within Rome, and it displayed several treaties. We know that it housed the treaty with Cymbra of 188, the alliance with Pergamon of c. 129, the treaty with Astypalaea of 105, and the treaty with Plarasa/Aphrodisias of 39.[27] The temple of Fides, also on the Capitol, is another candidate, as Dio (XLV. 17. 3) tells us that it housed bronze tablets, while Valerius Maximus (III. 2. 17) says that Fides was the goddess of diplomacy, and therefore it would come as no surprise to find treaties there. The temple of Concordia did house the treaty with Callatis of the late second century and from its name we can see that it was most likely under the auspices of the aediles, yet the place was not dedicated until 216, so if this was where Polybios saw the treaties, it could not have been their original resting

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[25]Frederiksen 1965, p. 186, Walbank 1957, I, p. 353. For the *aerarium* see Dio, LIV. 36. *Contra* Coarelli 1995, p. 33-34, who thinks that Polybios was mistaken, and treasury of the aediles was somewhere in the Forum. Culham 1989, p. 108 n. 38 also thinks that Polybios erred, and that the treaties were housed in the *aerarium* of the temple of Saturn, in the Forum.

[26]Josephus (*AJ*, XIV. 188) says that all of Rome's treaties with the Jews were kept on the Capitol.

[27]Cymbra: *SEG* XXXIV. 1723, Liv. XXXVIII. 14. 3, Plb. XXI. 34, XXX. 9. 13-15, Str. XIII. 4. 17; Pergamon: *SEG* XXXIV. 1244; Astypalaea: *SEG* XV. 506; Plarasa/Aphrodisias: *SEG* XXXII. 1097.

place.[28] It has been proposed that Polybios was actually referring to the Aedes Thensarum, a building on the Capitol under the control of the aediles and used to store gear for religious and triumphal processions.[29] This building however, is unattested until the reign of Nero, and is therefore unlikely to date all the way back to the third century.[30] It is possible that the treaties were in one of these buildings, but it is also possible that Polybios misunderstood *aedes*, the inner part of any temple, for aediles, yet this seems doubtful. Likewise, these suggestions do not appear adequate as none of them take Polybios at face value and assume he was correct in that there was such a place as the treasury of the aediles that housed the treaties with Carthage.

If his words are accepted, and there is no notable reason that they should not be, we must assume that the treasury of the aediles was somewhat obscure, however it would not necessarily have been little used, as Walbank suggests (1957, I, p. 354). Polybios does say that the building was on the Capitol beside the temple of Jupiter, and therefore it is difficult to see how this could not have been a place that was viewed daily by many people, given its highly public location. And consequently it is more likely that the treaties were in the treasury but not on display. This is born out by Polybios' statement (III. 26. 2) that the treaties were not known to most of the Romans of his time. Surely it was not uncommon for such inscriptions not to be on display; the Romans must have accumulated hundreds of state documents by the mid-second century, they simply could not exhibit them all.[31] This would be especially true if the government was originally trying to cover-up a treaty that they had violated. The vocabulary of Polybios would also correspond, as he uses the word ταμιεῖον to describe the building that housed the treaties.

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[28]Treaty: *CIL* I. 2. 2676; dedication: Liv. XXIII. 21. 7.

[29]Mommsen 1887, p. 500. See Walbank 1957, I, p. 353-354. For the location of the aedes thensarum see Platner and Ashby 1929, p. 1, Steinby *Lexicon*, I, p. 17.

[30]*CIL* III. 1, p. 845, III. sup. 1. 1, p. 1963, Suet. *Ves.* 5. 7.

[31]Cornell 1991.

Usually translated as treasury, this could have the connotation of a storehouse, and thus Polybios could be referring not to a building that had inscriptions on public display, but to an archive, a depository for state documents that were in the care of the aediles.[32] As the treaties were not known to the public but were in a centrally located building, it is therefore more plausible that they were in an archive and not on display.

Thus Polybios would have required assistance in gaining access to the treaties. Even if he did have full access, this document incriminated Rome in a blatant act of imperialism, so there was at least a fair chance it would have been either destroyed or hidden. If the treaty was hidden, there was a very good chance that it would never again be found, for even nearly a century later, the public records in Rome were still in a poor state of organization, as Cicero frustratedly complained in his *De Legibus* (3. 46).

The treaty could have also been destroyed in a fire. In 214 the Atrium Publicum on the Capitol was set ablaze by lightening, while another serious fire struck the Capitol in 172.[33] Still, it would be quite fantastical if the only treaty between Rome and Carthage destroyed in a fire was the one that the Romans violated. It is not a strong enough argument to say that simply because Polybios could not find the treaty, it did not exist.

It has been suggested that in 306 Rome would never have defined all of Italy as its sphere of influence since they did not even come into contact with Magna Graecia until they accepted Thurii into their protection in 282, and not even at this point did they consider all of Italy to be their domain.[34] This is contradicted by the existing evidence; hardly more than a decade after the treaty, during the Third Samnite War in 294, we find the Romans referring to all of Italy as if it

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[32]Ταμιεῖον meaning storehouse: Arist. *Oec.* 1344b. 33, Thuc. VII. 24, Xen. *Eq.* IV. 1.

[33]Liv. 214: XXIV. 10. 9; 172 XLII. 20. 1.

[34]Badian 1958, p. 31, Oakley 1998, II, p. 259, Walbank 1957, I, p. 354.

belonged to them, and this before much of the southern peninsula was firmly in their hands.[35] Again in 280, prior to Rome's capture of such Italian Greek centres as Paestum and Tarentum, and their recapture of Rhegium, they speak of defending all of Italy against Pyrrhos as if they were defending what was already theirs.[36] In light of this evidence it is difficult to believe that Rome could not have considered Italy to be within its sphere of influence as early as 306.

The next major objection to the 306 treaty is based on nothing more than a misreading of Polybios. At III. 26. 2 he states that, '...in my time, the eldest among the Romans and Carthaginians and those most knowledgeable in public affairs were ignorant of [the treaties].' He claims to have spoken to elder statesmen from both Rome and Carthage on the matter, the latter probably came as an embassy to Rome while he was a hostage there. The treaty's detractors have been overzealous in leaping on this phrase as proof of its non-existence.[37] Although if this were the case, this statement would also disprove the existence of all four treaties, since Polybios is saying that people in his time were ignorant of all of the pacts, including the three to which he attests. Previously in the same passage, Polybios implies that Philinos himself mentioned no other treaties save for the agreement of 306. The fact that the Agrigentine historian began his history with the death of Agathokles in 289 means that not only was he contemporary with the treaty of 279/8, but it fell within the scope of his work. As Polybios does with the years 264-220, Philinos may have began his history with a summary of the events from 289 until the start of his main narrative in 264. Because 279/8 was mostly a direct renewal of 306, save for some military clauses, he may have felt its inclusion to be unnecessary; furthermore, as for the issue of which side was in violation of an existing treaty in 264, the treaty of 306 would really be the only

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[35]App. *Samn.* 10. 2.

[36]Plb. I. 6. 6, Plut. *Pyr.* 19. 3.

[37]Hoyos 1985a, p. 102 n. 60.

agreement that was relevant to his narrative.

In 272 the Punic government sent a fleet to Tarentum with the alleged purpose of aiding the Romans with the siege of the place. The aid mission, from the point of view of the Romans, appears to have been both unexpected and unwanted and the ships promptly sailed away without striking a blow. This incident is recorded in two places by Livy (*Per.* XIV, XXI. 10. 8), and according to him the Carthaginians were planning to seize Tarentum for themselves and even had designs on Rome. In his view, this was the original violation of the 306 treaty and therefore Rome's intervention in Sicily eight years later was completely justified. The popularity of this tradition in Rome is illustrated by the fact that it was recorded by four other later historians.[38] Certainly it is unlikely that the Carthaginians sought to invade Italy, though the aid mission itself may be historical. If this is the case, and the treaty of 306 was broken, why did the Romans not go to war then and there? Orosius (IV. 5. 2) records an embassy to Carthage following the affair, and perhaps this averted war. Yet many would like the answer to be that it was because the Philinos treaty never existed. If we look at the treaty of 279/8, it is obvious that the action is perfectly in line with the last clause which allowed for Carthage to offer Rome its naval services. Moreover, the fact that Livy reports the incident proves that he, as well as the annalists, firmly believed in the 306 treaty, and his claim of Punic designs on Rome may also prove that he thought the Romans were the true violators of the agreement. If the Tarentum incident is not historical, then its appearance in the ancient sources must pre-date Livy, and therefore we must ask why previous Roman historians felt the urge to invent an episode where Carthage violated the 306 treaty if such a treaty never existed. The fact that Polybios so vehemently denies the existence of the Philinus treaty indicates that there was at this time a tradition that the Romans were guilty

[38]Ampel. 46. 2, Dio, fr. 43. 1, Oros. IV. 3. 1-2, Zonar. VIII. 8.

of violating the accord.[39]

Besides Livy, other literary evidence exists that attests to the validity of the 306 treaty. The first is a passage from the grammarian Servius (*A*. IV. 628), that expressly mentions a treaty which bars the two parties from approaching each others shores:

> Litora litoribus contraria aut quia in foedere cautum fuit ut neque Romani ad litora Carthaginiensium accederent neque Carthaginienses ad litora Romanorum, aut potest propter bella navalia accipi inter Romanos et Afros gesta;
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> Either because it was specified in a treaty that neither the Romans should approach the Carthaginian shores nor should the Carthaginians approach the Roman shores, or it can be interpreted as alluding to naval battles between the Romans and the Africans.

Here, Carthage could easily have included the eastern half of Sicily, and Rome all of Italy in what was designated as their shores. The second piece of evidence also comes to us by way of Servius (*A*. I. 108) as he quotes the Roman historian Claudius Quadrigarius (I. fr. 31P):

> Haec autem saxa inter Africam, Siciliam et Sardiniam et Italiam sunt, quae saxa ob hoc Itali aras vocant, quod ibi Afri et Romani foedus inierunt. Quidam insulam fuisse hunc locum tradunt, quae subito pessum ierit, cuius reliquas saxa haec exstare, in quidus aiunt Poenorum sacerdotes rem divinam facere solitos. Has aras alii Neptunias vocant sicut Claudius Quadrigarius I annalium: Apud aras, quae vocabantur Neptuniae.
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> However, these rocks are between Africa, Sicily, Sardinia, and Italy, the Italians call them the Altars, because the Africans and the Romans entered into a treaty there. They record this place to have been a certain island, that was suddenly destroyed, of which these remaining rocks are visible, on which the priests of the Carthaginians used to preform religious ceremonies. Others call them Neptune's Altars, as they are called by Claudius Quadrigarius in Book I of his history.

It is highly unfortunate that these fragments can only be given a vague date at best. Claudius Quadrigarius began his history of Rome with the Gallic sack in 390, and the earliest certain date

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[39]Eckstein 1987, p. 78 claims that the Romans invented the Tarentum incident to defend themselves against the lies of Philinos. Yet if the treaty of 306 did not exist, the proof was with the Romans, and therefore it is difficult to believe that they invented an episode to defend themselves for violating a treaty that they knew to be false. Also, this assumes that Philinos was widely read in Rome.

we have for Book II is 294; therefore we may safely assume that this passage refers to either the treaty of 348 of that of 306.[40] The only case to be made for 306 is the fact that the first three places mentioned: Africa, Sicily, and Sardinia, basically outlined the Punic Empire, while Italy may represent the Roman. Perhaps if he was referring to 348 Quadrigarius may simply have written Rome rather than Italy.

The third piece of literary evidence comes from the *Menaechmi* of Plautus. In lines 233-237 two of his characters set out on a voyage of what they considered to be the entire world. While no treaty is mentioned, what the two travellers understood to be the outside world just happened to be everything which Rome did not describe as its sphere of influence in 306.

Ultimately, it would appear that the man who had the strongest revulsion for the Carthaginians in all of Roman history, Cato, believed in the existence of the 306 treaty. In his *Origines* (IV. fr. 9C), he states, 'Deinde duoetuicesimo anno post dimissum bellum, quod quattuor et viginti annos fuit, Carthaginienses sextum de foedere decessere.' ('And so, twenty-two years after the end of the war, that had lasted twenty-four years, the Carthaginians violated a treaty for the sixth time.'). The passage in ambiguous and could have one of two meanings. While it is certainly plausible that he may be referring to six separate violations of one treaty, it is equally conceivable that Cato meant that the Carthaginians had broken six treaties.[41] The only way this could make sense is if the 306 treaty existed, because if it did not that would leave only five treaties: 509, 348, 279/8, 241, and the Ebro treaty of 226.[42] Therefore, in order for Cato to

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[40]Claudius Quadrigarius fr. 34P.

[41]Chassignet 1986, p. 91 sees it as six separate violations over time of one or more treaties. She does however, leave room for the passage to be referring to the violation of six treaties.

[42]It should be added here that the settlement over Sardinia in 237 was not a treaty, but an appendix to an existing one (ἐπισύνθηκαι, Plb. III. 27. 7).

speak of six treaties, he would have to have considered the 306 treaty as fact.[43]

It has been argued that the provisoes delineating Roman and Punic spheres of influence invalidate the 306 treaty because such clauses would have been too disruptive to Italian-African trade.[44] Yet an examination of the 279/8 treaty, outlined in the next section, disproves this. Here we have the strongest piece of evidence in favour of the Philinos treaty. Polybios (III. 25. 2) states that the treaty of 279/8 was an exact renewal of the previous treaty with the exception of the new military clauses, therefore, the concordat must have contained non-military clauses governing trade. It is simply incomprehensible that Rome was content to renew the limited and minor role it was given in Italian affairs from the treaty of 348. In the seventy years since the second treaty Rome had come to dominate large parts of the peninsula and had acquired new holdings in Etruria, Latium, Samnia, and from the northern Gauls; to renew a treaty that allowed for foreign military intervention in Italy would have been unthinkable to the Romans of the 270s.[45] Though the renewal of a treaty that designated Italy as Rome's domain would have made perfect

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[43]Another piece of evidence that should be noted is Ennius' fragment that refers to the Roman declaration of war against Carthage: 'Appius indixit Karthaginiensibus bellum' ('Appius declared war against the Carthaginians') (*Ann.* VII. fr 216S). The Appius of the passage is Appius Claudius Caudex, the consul of 264 who invaded Sicily. The words ***bellum indicere***, taken together, almost always refer to a declaration of war by ritual ceremony that included the fetial rites, as is illustrated by their use among other authors (Liv. VII. 12. 6, 19. 10, Val. Max. VII. 5. 2, Verg. *A.* VII. 616-617; see Rich 1976, p. 106-107, 125-126). Eckstein 1980, p. 175-177 and Skutsch 1985, p. 386-387 however, argue that war had not been declared, firstly because Frontinus (*Str.* I. 4. 11) mentions an undeclared war in reference to 264, secondly because of a lack of evidence in the historical narratives, and finally by the fact that Caudex was denied a triumph (see Gel. V. 6. 21 on consuls being denied triumphs for undeclared wars). Skutsch in particular, views this as Roman propaganda on the part on Ennius. He claims that the passage, coupled with the later invention of a triumph for Caudex (Eutrop. II. 18. 3, Sil. VI. 660-662, Suet. *Tib.* 1), constitute an attempt by the Roman sources to coverup their violation of the 306 treaty by couching the first year of the war in the traditional language of fetial rites and triumphs. This theory would appear to be invalidated by an allusion to the fetial rite in the *Bellum Poenicum* of Naevius: 'Scopas atque verbenas sagmina sumpserunt' ('To make the tufts of holy herbs, they took twigs and sacred branches') (IV. fr. 35B) (*sagmines* were carried by the *fetiales* as symbols of their inviolability; see Paul. *Fest.* p. 321L, Liv. I. 24. 4, XXX. 43. 9). The latter was contemporary to the events in question, and is therefore difficult to dismiss. Besides, an actual ritual declaration of war, or a lack of one, is no proof that the Romans broke the treaty of 306, since any declaration of war would have still contravened the agreement. Therefore, while I maintain that the Romans were in violation of a treaty when they invaded Sicily in 264, I do not consider this passage from Ennius to be proof that this was the case.

[44]Hoyos 1998, p. 10-11, 13, who uses the Pyrgi inscriptions (see above, n. 9) as evidence for trade between Italy and Africa in the third century. While there was surely trade between the two places, inscriptions from two centuries previous prove little. On third century Punic contacts with Rome see Palmer 1997, p. 27, 40, 80-103, 105, 119.

[45]*Contra* Hoyos 1998, p. 9, who claims that Polybios may not have noticed this significant change to the treaty. Considering that he relays at least part of it *verbatim*, this seems far fetched.

sense at the time. Also in relation to the 279/8 treaty, the new defensive alliance clauses which called for Rome and Carthage to have the right to assist each other if attacked can only be intelligible if both sides were prevented from landing on each others territory by a previous agreement. So only by seeing the treaty of Philinos as authentic can the agreement of 279/8 be fully understood.

A treaty in 306 would also have greatly benefited the Carthaginians. Several Italian peoples, including Campanians, Celts, Etruscans, and Samnites had served as mercenaries in the army of Agathokles that invaded Africa in 310.[46] Etruria had also officially committed to the cause by 307 if not earlier, as we hear of eighteen Etruscan ships battling the Carthaginians outside the harbours Syracuse.[47] By making a new treaty in 306 the Punic government may have hoped that Rome would use the sphere of influence clause to reign in these marauding soldiers.

Finally, the claim has been made that the treaty of 306 is, 'just too good to be true.'[48] An agreement that puts the Romans squarely in the wrong in 264 and leaves no doubt about who was the aggressor puts the entire incident at Messana into far too neat a package. This is very true. Some scholars who defend the treaty are indeed extremely harsh towards the Romans and see them as being wholly in the wrong.[49] A quick examination of some incidents will illustrate that Roman-Carthaginian relations were mostly governed by confusion and misunderstanding in the years leading up to the First Punic War. In 282, the city of Rhegium called upon Rome for protection against Carthage, even though the threat was not immediate.[50] This may have been the

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[46]Dio, fr. 40. 8, D.S. XIX. 106, XX. 11. 1, D.H. XX. 4. 8, Plb. I. 7. 2, 8. 1, Str. VI. 2. 3 (268), Zonar. VIII. 8.

[47]D.S. XX. 61. 6, Just. XXII. 8. 4-6.

[48]Hoyos 1985a, p. 107, 1998, p. 10-11, 13.

[49]Mitchell 1971, p. 634-643. While he makes no judgement on the Philinos treaty, Harris 1985, p. 185-190 does construct a scenario that makes the Romans the sole aggressors in 264.

[50]D.S. XXII. 1. 2-3, D.H. XX. 4-5, Plb. I. 7. 6-7.

first instance where Rome contemplated that part of Italy might fall victim to Punic aggression. Then in 277, when the Carthaginians in Sicily were in their most desperate hour against Pyrrhos, they began peace talks with the Epirote king and even offered him ships and money with which to leave.[51] If the Punic forces had indeed signed an armistice with Pyrrhos, this would have been a blatant violation of the treaty of 279/8 that called for no separate peace to be made by either Rome or Carthage with Pyrrhos (see next section). In the situation discussed above at Tarentum in 272, the Romans may indeed have considered the Punic fleet a breech of the 306 treaty, yet were in no position to act at the time. Also, this may have served to irk the senate by showing them just how easy it would be for Carthage to land an army in Italy. Finally, in 270 Hieron II of Syracuse sent ships to aid Rome with its recapture of Rhegium in accordance with a treaty between the two states.[52] If this was the case, then Rome was dangerously close to a violation of the 306 treaty, that expressly forbade military intervention but may not have covered any diplomatic contacts. Still one can easily see how Carthage would have been concerned at Rome making an alliance with its oldest and most bitter enemy, Syracuse. All these incidents, while not violations of the exact letter of either the treaty of 306 or 279/8, were certainly violations of their spirits, and would have only served to increase tension and suspicion on both sides. Therefore, like any war, the build up to 264 was surrounded by confusion, intrigue, and miscommunication; and the issue at Messana was merely the spark that ignited a simmering conflict. In fact, this was Cassius Dio's (fr. 43. 1-4) opinion of the events, writing in the third century AD.

The above arguments have attempted to illustrate that, despite the denial of such a prominent historian as Polybios, there is strong evidence that attests to the validity of the treaty of 306 as recorded by Philinus. I believe the strongest objection to Polybios rests on the argument

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[51]D.S. XXII. 10. 5-6, Plut. *Pyr.* 23. 2.

[52]Dio, fr. 43. 1, Zonar. VIII. 8.

that without a treaty in 306, the treaty of 279/8, as a renewal of that of 348, allowed the Carthaginians to seize cities within Latium, and this is quite simply an impossibility. The arrival of Pyrrhos in the western Mediterranean changed everything. The Romans were now forced on to the defensive in southern Italy, while the Carthaginians, rightly fearing the Epirote king's ambitions, sought to keep him away from Sicily. As the political and military climate had radically altered, so did the relations between Rome and Carthage. They became allies, and a new treaty was signed in 279 or 278.

The Fourth Treaty

A Punic fleet was dispatched to the mouth of the Tiber in late 279, though the final version of the pact may not have been drawn up until 278.[53] The terms of the 306 treaty were renewed, and additional clauses, all concerning military cooperation, were added. Each party had the option of providing aid to the other and could set foot with an army in each other's territory only when asked to do so. Carthage was to supply Rome with any transport ships it needed, though each state had to provide its own crews. The Punic navy was also to render assistance to Rome but its crews could not be forced to disembark. Finally, neither state was to sign a separate peace with Pyrrhos.[54]

> ἐν αἷς τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τηροῦσι πάντα κατὰ τὰς ὑπογεγραμμένα. 'ἐὰν συμμαχίαν ποιῶνται πρὸς Πύρρον, ἔγγραπτον ποιείσθωσαν ἀμφότεροι, ἵνα ἐξῇ βοηθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ τῶν πολεμουμένων χώρᾳ· ὁπότεροι δ' ἂν χρείαν ἔχωσι τῆς βοηθείας, τὰ πλοῖα παρεχέτωσαν Καρχηδόνιοι καὶ εἰς τὴν ὁδὸν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἔφοδον, τὰ δὲ ὀψώνια τοῖς αὑτῶν ἑκάτεροι. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν Ῥωμαίοις βοηθείτωσαν, ἂν χρεία ᾖ. τὰ δὲ πληρώματα μηδεὶς ἀναγκαζέτω ἐκβαίνειν ἀκουσίως.'
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> In this [treaty] they upheld all the clauses contained within the previous

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[53]Just. XVIII. 2, Val. Max. III. 7. 10.

[54]Plb. III. 25. 1-5.

> agreements, and they added the following: 'If they make a treaty with Pyrrhos, both will make it a condition that they may give aid to each other in the region that is attacked; regardless which of the two requires the aid, the Carthaginians will provide the ships for transport and battle; but each party will pay its own troops. The Carthaginians will come to the aid of the Romans by sea as well if necessary, but no one can force the troops to disembark against their will.'
>
> Polybios III. 25. 2-5

There is very little that can be said about this treaty without entering into the debate over the authenticity of the 306 pact, because, depending on which side one takes in the debate, this treaty is either a renewal of the one from 306 or the one from 348. Therefore, the two sides would see the unquoted parts of the treaty as being substantially different. Suffice to say that the treaty was never put into practice; the Romans and the Carthaginians did not cooperate in the fight against Pyrrhos, and the Carthaginians tried, unsuccessfully, to conclude a separate peace with him, perhaps illustrating that they considered war with Pyrrhos less risky than war with Rome over a treaty violation.[55] This did not help the feeling of mutual distrust between the two powers in the years before the First Punic War.

The Ebro Treaty and the Saguntum Affair

As a final illustration of how Polybios dealt with treaties between Rome and Carthage, the events leading up to the outbreak of the Second Punic War will be examined. While Polybios does not exonerate the Romans, again on the accusation of violating a treaty he gives them the benefit of the doubt. Briefly, in 237 Hamilcar Barca began the Punic conquest of Spain. He was followed by his son-in-law Hasdrubal from 228 and his son Hannibal from 221. Their conquests brought them, and Carthage, a fantastic new source of wealth in the Spanish mines and gave them a bountiful supply of well-trained mercenary soldiers from the local tribes. These actions primarily

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[55]D.S. XXII. 10. 5-6, Plut. *Pyr.* 23. 2.

alarmed the Greek city of Massilia in southern Gaul; no doubt the Punic conquest endangered some Massilian trades routes and they most likely lost several *emporia* as Carthage extended its territory along Spain's Mediterranean coast. As Massilia was an ally of Rome, the city constantly beleaguered the Romans to intervene on its behalf, and stop the Carthaginian advance. It has been speculated these Massilian diplomatic tactics were one of the primary reasons behind the eventual onset of the war.[56]

In 231 the Romans responded to the Massilian requests for intervention by sending an embassy to meet with Hamilcar. They were rebuffed however, as the general told them that the conquest of Spain was the only way in which Carthage could pay off its massive indemnity to Rome incurred after the First Punic War.[57] In 226, another Roman delegation travelled to Spain and concluded a treaty with Hasdrubal; Polybios (III. 29. 3) mentions this treaty very briefly, saying only that it contained the clause that, 'The Carthaginians will not cross the Ebro River under arms.' It therefore appears that the two powers were again defining their own spheres of influence, as Carthage was left with Spain, while Rome was left with everything north of the Ebro. The Romans were too occupied with wars in northern Italy and Illyria over the next several years to pay more than cursory attention to the Massilian pleas over Punic aggression in Spain. That is, with one notable exception, Saguntum, a coastal city of eastern Spain lying south of the Ebro.

At some point in the 220s, the Romans took the Saguntines under their *fides* and claimed the city as a protectorate. Under Roman protection, the Saguntines began to harass their own neighbours, who were allies of the Carthaginians. In late 220 or early 219, another Roman delegation visited Spain, meeting with the new commander, Hannibal. They ordered him to keep away from Saguntum in accordance with the Ebro treaty, but he disregarded their words, implying

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[56]Kramer 1948.

[57]Dio, XII. fr. 48.

that Saguntum was not a Roman ally, and his decision was later ratified by the assembly at Carthage. He attacked the Saguntum the following spring and captured the city after an eight month siege. In March of 218 a Roman delegation visited Carthage and demanded the surrender of Hannibal; when the Punic assembly refused, war was declared.[58] Herein lies the modern scholarly debate as to who was in the wrong in the Saguntum affair and *ipso facto* the Second Punic War. For Polybios (III. 30. 1) does not say exactly when Saguntum placed itself under Roman protection, but only says that it was, 'many years' ('πλείοσιν ἔτεσιν') before the accession of Hannibal in 221. Thus it is impossible to tell exactly which side was in violation of the Ebro agreement; if Saguntum was an ally of Rome before 226, then Carthage was guilty of breaking the treaty by its assault in 219, but if the city was not mentioned in the Ebro treaty as a Roman protectorate, then Rome was breaching the agreement by interfering south of the river.[59]

On three separate occasions (III. 21. 1, 29. 1-3, 30. 3), Polybios implies that it was the Carthaginians who were guilty of the treaty violation by attacking Saguntum. Yet if he is so sure about the whole affair, why is he so vague with the date under which the city came under Roman protection? Undoubtedly it would have been easier to have mentioned that Sanguntum has special status in the treaty rather than to leave the matter open to question. Perhaps he is implying that, while the Carthaginians could not cross the Ebro under arms (after all, this is the only clause we know from the treaty), the Romans could feel free to meddle all they wanted south of the river. But this would not make sense from a Punic standpoint, and it is doubtful they would have concluded such an unfavourable and dangerous agreement with their enemies. In apparent contradiction to the surety of Polybios that the Carthaginians were in the wrong, it seems that not

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[58]App. *Hisp.* 10, Liv. XXI. 6. 1, 11. 2, 12. 5, XXIV. 42. 11, XXV. 39. 8, Plb. III. 15. 2-8, 17, 33. 1-4.

[59]For the most recent account of this debate, with full bibliography, see Hoyos 1998, p. 154-195. The writings of Lazenby 1978, p. 22-29 and Walbank 1957, I, p. 355-358, 361, are invaluable concerning this matter.

even the *fides* Rome had with Saguntum was a cut and dry affair. It would appear that Saguntum made an appeal for protection to Rome based on the tried and tested method of claiming kinship with either Rome or a near by Italian city, as Kenturipa and Segesta had done in Sicily some years earlier (see below, p. 263, 272-274). They claimed kinship with the Ardeans, a people less than forty kilometres southwest of Rome.[60] After making the appeal however, all does not seem to have gone according to plan, as Polybios reports (III. 15. 5-8, 30. 2) that the Romans put to death some of Saguntum's leaders in the late 220s. This implies that there was a pro-Carthaginian, or at least anti-Roman faction in the city, and that they were dealt with harshly by the Romans after some sort of dispute. This might indicate that Saguntum was not as happy under Roman protection as Polybios makes it seem, and perhaps an appeal to Carthage was even made. This could also lead to the conclusion that the Roman alliance was still new in the late 220s, thus making it unlikely that Saguntum had been a protectorate before 226.

For his condemnation of Hannibal in relation to the Ebro treaty, it is likely that Polybios was following only one source for this time period, Fabius Pictor. He does cite Pictor for part of the affair at III. 8. 1-8, and perhaps used him exclusively for the rest of his account concerning the outbreak of the war. Thus he would be following a very biassed and pro-Roman source. This is reinforced by his description of Hannibal at III. 15. 8-13, that appears very un-Polybian. Here he says Hannibal became devoid of reason and was aroused by violent anger; he lied to the Punic assembly and he lied to himself in alleging his quarrel with Rome was over Saguntum, as its true reason lay with the wrath of his family, the Barcids, and his anger over the seizure of Sardinia in 238 and the subsequent unlawful indemnity charged by Rome. While these reasons are in harmony with Polybios' main statement on the matter (III. 9. 7-9), the description of Hannibal is

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[60]App. *Hisp.* 7, Liv. XXI. 7. 2, Plin. *Nat.* XVI. 216, Str. III. 159.

very negative and it likely to have been prejudiced by Fabius Pictor.[61]

As we have seen, Polybios certainly felt that it was the Carthaginians who were in the wrong concerning the Ebro treaty when they attacked Saguntum. Very significantly however, he reports (III. 21. 1-5) that the Punic senate, speaking to a Roman delegation, claimed that the treaty with Hasdrubal was invalid because it had not been approved at Carthage. This is quite possible, as it seems that the Barcids did in fact exercise a government in Spain that was quite independent from the home assembly in Carthage. Control of Spain had passed between three members of this family and we hear of no interference from Carthage during the years of conquest. The Barcids appear to have been *de facto* monarchs in Spain.[62] Thus invalidating the Ebro treaty, the Punic assembly instead referred to the treaty of Lutatius that ended the First Punic War in 241, this stated that all allies of both sides should be left unharmed. They said that Spain was not at all mentioned in this accord, and therefore, as Saguntum was not an ally at the time, they could feel free to attack.

This seems strange reasoning, as Polybios himself admits (III. 29. 6) that as he understood the treaty of 241, both sides agreed not to make war on both present and future allies.[63] Perhaps here again Polybios is following Fabius Pictor and we are only getting the pro-Roman side of the story. It would have been far more legitimate for the Carthaginians to say that they were denying the existence of the 226 treaty as the Romans had done with the treaty of 306 when they invaded Sicily four decades later. It is possible that the Carthaginians could have considered the Ebro agreement invalid specifically because it was the Romans who broke it by taking Saguntum under

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[61]Walbank 1957, I, p. 323; '[Polybios'] didactic, moralizing tone shows little appreciation of the psychological background to the clash.' See Rich 1996, p. 16-18.

[62]Richardson 1986, p. 18-20.

[63]On the treaty of 241 see Serrati forthcoming.

their protection in the first instance.[64] In reference to the Lutatius treaty, they could have also claimed that the Romans had violated this pact with their seizure of Sardinia in 238, and thus it was not forbidden to attack a Roman ally as the treaty prohibiting such action was null and void.[65] While Polybios only says that they did not consider their attack on Saguntum to be in breach of the 241 treaty, it seems likely that this was not the whole story, and it is perhaps more probable that they claimed the Lutatius or Ebro treaties already violated by 219.

Various other historians followed Polybios' line that it was Hannibal who broke the treaty of 226 by attacking Saguntum. Livy (XXI. 2. 7, 19. 4) claimed that the independence of Saguntum was guaranteed by the Ebro treaty, while Appian (*Hann.* 2, *Hisp.* 7, *Lib.* 6) made the outrageous assertion that Saguntum was actually north of the river. More recently, it has been postulated the Dio's Roman embassy of 231 (XII. fr. 48) confirmed that Saguntum was a Roman protectorate, and therefore no provision was necessary in the Ebro treaty.[66] Yet if this were so, it is very peculiar that this embassy was not mentioned by Polybios, especially because he is laying the blame at the feet of the Carthaginians for the violation of the Ebro treaty. Looking at his treatment of Roman treaties as a whole, it seems more likely that Polybios, while he was not a Roman apologist, was ignorant of the facts. He faithfully records the treaties of 509 and 348, even quoting from their texts. These would likely have been initiated by Carthage and the agreements bare witness to the fact that Carthage was the stronger power. The first treaty gave Rome access to the grain markets of Sicily at a time of famine, while the second hoped to curb Punic piracy. By 306 Rome was ready to negotiate a new treaty that would eliminate the clauses that allowed for Carthaginian intervention in Italy and defined the entire peninsula as Rome's

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[64]Hoyos 1998, p. 250.

[65]Astin 1967, p. 586-588, Dorey 1959-1960, p. 6, Walbank 1957, I, p. 171-172.

[66]Eckstein 1984, p. 57.

sphere of influence. This would make sense considering how much Rome had grown in power since 348. As well, the fourth treaty of 279/8 cannot be understood unless the 306 treaty is seen as authentic, because the Romans quite simply would not have renewed a treaty that allowed Carthage to seize cities in Latium. And yet when Polybios found no evidence of the 306 treaty, he assumed it had never existed. It seems that with treaties, when he could not find evidence that condemned the Romans, he gave them the benefit of the doubt. As he could not locate the 306 treaty, it therefore did not exist, and so the Romans were not in the wrong when they invaded Sicily in 264. Likewise, he could not find out exactly when Saguntum came into alliance with Rome, and therefore placed it before 226, thus making Hannibal the treaty breaker. Polybios was writing more than a century after the commencement of the First Punic War and half a century after the outbreak of the Second. This was ample time for documents to be lost or destroyed and pro-Roman traditions to develop through the writings of Fabius Pictor and Cincius Alimentus. These were the sources upon which he drew, and, though not an advocate of Roman imperialism, in many ways Polybios wrote parts of his history as the Romans had intended their actions to be viewed. Buying into at least some Roman propaganda, Polybios was more than a historian of Rome, he was an instrument of Roman imperialism.

In 264, Roman aggressive imperialism towards Carthage and Sicily came to its fruition with the landing of a consular army at Messana. We have seen above that there rests a strong possibility that this act was in violation of a treaty between Rome and Carthage from 306. Roman imperialism now moved from the political sphere of goading the Punic Empire into war, to the military sphere of fighting the aforementioned conflict. The following two chapters shall examine the methods by which Rome came to dominate all of Sicily.

Chapter 4
The First Punic War

The First Punic War was the single most important event in the history of ancient Sicily. The twenty-three years from 264 until 241 determined the fate of the island for the next seven centuries. The struggle was the longest and by far the most destructive in the history of the island, with every settlement and city becoming involved on one side or the other. There is no doubt that the war itself was for control of the island as the vast majority of the fighting took place there; indeed, although the war was known as the 'Punic War' very early on, there is also a tradition that referred to the conflict as the 'War for the Possession of Sicily'.[1]

As the first time that a Roman army had left Italy, the First Punic War is fundamental to the understanding of Roman imperialism in the third century. In this conflict, Rome appears to have started off with little ambition beyond the securing of a toehold at Messana, but by the time Agrigentum fell in 261, Polybios (I. 20. 1-2) says that the war had now expanded, and Rome's goal had become the conquest of the entire island. Previous narratives often go over the war too quickly, or do not offer enough analysis. This chapter hopes to illustrate the clash's importance within Republican history, as well as to describe the process of Roman imperialism in Sicily in its military form.

In this war, Rome would for the first time confront an enemy that used mercenary armies recruited from across the Mediterranean. While the Pyrrhic War was undoubtedly good training for fighting trained hoplites, in Sicily the legions encountered not just Greeks but also Africans, Spanish, Celt-Iberians, Ligurians, and Gauls. Never before had the Romans faced professional forces with such diversity; the fact that they emerged decisively victorious on land represents a significant advancement in the experience level of Rome's infantry. Furthermore, the war

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[1]Naevius' epic, the *Bellum Poenicum*, was composed in c. 233 (see Gel. XVII. 21. 45-46). 'War for the Possession of Sicily: Plb. I. 13. 2.

represented the first time that a Roman army had set foot in a Hellenistic kingdom, where it was greeted by heavily fortified cities capable of waging very efficient counter-siege warfare. Roman deficiencies in the construction of engines capable of demolishing masonry is one of the primary reasons that the war lasted as long as it did. Yet by the war's closure they had adopted many siege techniques from the Greeks. Ironically, it was Hieron who sent them their first siege train in 258, and the skills they acquired from its use were put into play forty-five years later against his native Syracuse (see Chapter 5).

The greatest military innovations brought about by the First Punic War occurred at sea, as Rome constructed its first fleet in 260. Prior to this date, they had maintained only a small number of ships for coastal defence, but by the war's end, they were in virtual command of the western Mediterranean. This dominance was maintained throughout the third century, and goes a long way towards explaining the course of the Second Punic War, especially the Punic strategy of invading Italy by land and the Carthaginian government's inability to resupply Hannibal.

In 264, Sicily had the unfortunate role of being positioned between the expanding Roman and Punic empires, and so was strategically vital as a possible embarkation point for an invasion of either Africa or Italy. As examined in the previous chapter, relations between the two powers were governed by mistrust and suspicion in the years leading up to the conflict, and eventually Rome acted first, quite possibly violating a treaty in the process. For Rome and Carthage, control of Sicily meant control of the western Mediterranean; the island was located at a crossroads, and it could be used to regulate passage between east and west. For the Romans, Sicily represented a natural expansion of their land based empire, and strategically, the control of the Straits of Messana was important to the safety of the Roman possessions in southern Italy. For Roman traders, the conquest of Sicily represented the breaking of the exclusionist Punic trading monopoly (see above, p. 18-21).

The Carthaginians could not have achieved their merchant and naval thalassocracy were it not for the control of the western portion of the island. It was a vital boundary to their empire, and it allowed them to control and regulate shipping in the southern and central Mediterranean. Sicily was rich in grain and a bountiful trade existed from the major cities along the island's coasts. The transport of this produce was a necessary part of the Punic economy, and so the Punic assets in western Sicily were fundamental to Carthaginian trade and to the security of Africa. Sicily was an essential part of the Punic Empire because its position defined the westernmost reaches of their lands and allowed them to control the busy shipping lanes of the central Mediterranean. Trade and tariffs from its ports were also lucrative to Punic merchants.[2] Therefore, the defence of the island was vital.

If the Romans could emerge as dominant in Sicily, they would gain a new territory, that was both agriculturally and materially wealthy. This could become a new source of plunder for the Roman army, and could serve as a new field for generals to gain triumphs. Although they did not know it at the time, Sicily for them would become a linchpin in their conquest of the Mediterranean; in the immediate sense it provided plunder and increased trade, but eventually Sicilian grain would become the staple of Roman armies as they marched throughout Europe and Africa.

The war itself was one of attrition, characterised by lengthy sieges and long periods of inactivity. The Romans set the pace for the conflict, as Carthage mostly reacted to various Roman offensives. The Carthaginians refused to engage the Italian heavy infantry legion on the open battlefield, and instead preferred to rely upon their naval supremacy and the defensive walls surrounding their major urban centres - Agrigentum, Panormos, Drepana, and Lilybaion. Their

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[2]See Liv. XXXIII. 47. 1 on Punic harbour dues.

efforts in Sicily were also hampered by a lack of support for the war at home in Carthage, and by the intermittent rebellions of their African subjects. The Romans therefore were forced to take the war to the Carthaginians; they were initially successful at sea, but eventually their lack of experience began to tell as more damage was done to their fleets through storms than by the Punic navy, as too often they ventured without caution into the central Mediterranean between Sicily and north Africa, an area notorious for storms and high winds.[3] On land, their strategy of invading Africa came close to bringing the struggle to a decisive conclusion, yet here they were defeated by superior generalship. As previously stated, although they were capable of laying siege to the major enemy cities, they were unable to break down the walls of the Punic fortresses and were forced to use direct assault or ruse. At Drepana and Lilybaion in particular, the Romans were forced to conduct extended campaigns of attrition, as neither place could be conquered and fully cut off from resupply. The Battle of the Aegates Islands in March of 241 proved decisive, as it finally gave the Romans command of the sea to buttress their superiority on land that they had achieved eight years previously. Having already dealt with the causes of the war from the Roman and the Carthaginian standpoints, this chapter will begin with an examination of the political situation in Sicily upon the death of Agathokles in 289.

The Prelude to War (289-264)

In the year 289 Agathokles, tyrant of Syracuse, was assassinated, thus leaving Sicily in a state of anarchy. Previously, he had succeeded in carving out an empire that spanned over two-thirds of the island, parts of southern Italy, and parts of the Ionian Sea. The army with which he conquered these lands was largely composed of mercenaries. Throughout the city's history,

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[3]Rickman 1985, p. 107.

mercenary armies had a reputation for supporting coups and establishing strongmen at Syracuse; this was the fashion in which Agathokles himself came to power in 317.[4] The mercenaries who were stationed in Syracuse were largely mistrusted and disliked by the city as a whole, and therefore, when a group of Campanian mercenaries was returning from the field, the Syracusans simply closed the gates of the city on them, refusing to allow entrance to this dangerous armed mob. The soldiers accordingly threw their support behind a Carthaginian backed tyrant until, fearing a Punic siege, the people acquiesced and allowed them to settle within city, but only as non-citizens.

Things apparently did not go well since within a year the mercenaries had sold their belongs and left the city of their own accord. They headed north to the Messana on the northeastern tip of Sicily, a city that was under Syracusan control. This may have been regular practise as Diodoros (V. 76. 5) tells us that in 460 the rulers of Syracuse disposed of a band of mercenaries by sending them to Messana.[5] Regardless, being received as friends, the soldiers entered Messana peacefully and settled as guests in the homes of many of the upper class. This arrangement did not last long though, as the soldiers soon fell upon the Messanians in the dead of night and slaughtered most of the male population, seizing their property and dividing up their wives amongst themselves. They became the new ruling class of Messana, and they formed an oligarchic government and began to issue their own coinage.[6] They styled themselves as the 'Mamertines' or 'Sons of Mamers', after the Oscan war god who was the equivalent of Mars. The Mamertines soon proceeded to venture out of their new homeland to raid and plunder much

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[4]For the life of Agathokles see D.S. XIX. 69-XXI. 17.

[5]See Serrati 1999, p.171.

[6]*CGCBMSic*, p. 109, Hill 1903, p. 168-170, Valsone 1965, p. 44.

of eastern Sicily.[7]

In 281 all this changed as Pyrrhos, son-in-law of Agathokles, came to the aid of western Hellenism and sought to win an empire for himself. He first attacked Italy and campaigned there until 279. By this time another in a long series of wars had flared up between Syracuse and Carthage and he answered an appeal from the former to fight the Punic barbarians. From 278 until 276 Pyrrhos visited Sicily and brought the Carthaginian Empire there to the brink of extinction.[8] Nevertheless, soon his constant demands for troops and money from the allied Sicilian states took its toll as support for the adventure began to wain. Disillusioned, Pyrrhos crossed back to Italy and was handily beaten by the Carthaginians in a naval engagement on the way. He returned to Italy only to be defeated by Rome at the Battle of Beneventum in 275 and was forced to retreat to Greece. Upon leaving Sicily in 276, Pyrrhos supposedly gave the omen without which no work on the First Punic War would be complete; looking back at the island, he remarked, 'What a wrestling ground for the Carthaginians and the Romans we are leaving behind us.'[9]

A new general, Hieron, led Syracuse in a continuation of the Pyrrhic War against Carthage but this conflict appears to have been uneventful and peace was concluded sometime around 272; the only engagement being a Punic naval victory off north eastern Sicily recorded by Polyainos (VI. 16. 4). Thus the last in a long and bloody series of Carthaginian-Syracusan wars came to a quiet end.

In 270 things began to accelerate. During the summer, Rhegium, which was under the command of mercenaries who had rebelled from Rome, was retaken by the Romans, possibly with

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[7]D.S. XXI. 18. 1-3, XXIII. 1. 4, Plb. I. 7. 1-5, 8. 1. See Tagliamonte 1994, p. 191-198, Valsone 1965, p. 33-48.

[8]Plut. *Pyr.* 22-24. See Franke 1989, p. 462-483, Lévêque 1957, pt II.

[9]Plut. *Pyr.* 23. 8.

the help of Hieron's navy, and the surviving Campanian rebels were scourged and executed in the Forum.[10] This severely undermined the position of the Mamertines as it deprived them of kindred allies across the Straits. Seeking to put an end to the Mamertine raids, Hieron began a campaign against them. He immediately retook the important port city of Tauromenion, but in the following year a Mamertine army defeated him at the Kyamosoros River. This army would have been composed mostly of mercenaries hired by the Mamertines, since the natural death rate would have taken its toll on their numbers in the last two decades, and even by the best estimates, a majority of the actual Mamertines would be in their mid- to late forties by now.[11]

Some historians claim that Hieron quickly reformed his army in 269 and again marched upon the Mamertines. This time he was victorious at the Battle of the Longanos River. Others however, have shown that the Longanos battle actually took place in 265.[12] The date of the battle is important as it gives us the date for the Mamertine appeals to Carthage and Rome, that I place in 265 and 264 respectively (see above, p. 13-14). The controversy begins with a statement made by Polybios (VII. 8. 4) that upon Hieron's death in 215 the king had reigned for fifty-four years, thus placing his ascension to the throne in the year 269. Earlier on (I. 9) Polybios had stated that Hieron had become King of Syracuse immediately following the Longanos, and therefore the battle must also be placed in 269. Diodorus (XXII. 13..7) informs us that it was immediately after the engagement that the Carthaginians occupied Messana. If these two passages are to coincide, and there is no reason that they should not, then the Carthaginians would have had to have held Messana for four years by the time the appeal to Rome went out. In this case Rome in 264 would

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[10]Plb. I. 7. 8-12, Zonar. VIII. 6.

[11]Plb. I. 9. 4-5. See also Hoyos, 1985, p. 48, 50-51, Valsone 1965, p. 48-51.

[12]The most notable historians who place the battle in 269 are Finley 1968, p. 111, Harris 1979, p. 188 n. 3, Thiel 1954, p. 145-148. Roussel 1970, p. 68-69 argues for 268. Those who claim 265 are Caven 1980, p. 13, Lazenby 1996, p. 36, Walbank 1957, I, p. 54-55, 57. Hoyos 1985, p. 37-45, makes a very convincing argument for not placing the battle in 269 or 268, but then goes on to make a weak case for placing it in 264.

have been overtly invading Carthaginian territory upon landing on Sicily. Yet this is contradicted by Diodoros (XXII. 13. 3), which says that Hieron was already king at the time of the Longanos, and he was definitely not king prior to 269. It is possible that Hieron was acclaimed king in 269 after the Battle of the Kyamosoros, not the Longanos, but this would be to say that Polybios was in error.

A more plausible explanation is that in 269, Hieron became *strategos autokrator*, or general plenipotentiary, a position traditionally occupied by Syracusan strongmen, most notably Dionysios I, Timoleon, and Agathokles, before they became tyrants.[13] It was only after wielding power for four years that the people conferred upon him the ancient title of king. What this is saying is that Polybios could very well have telescoped his years as tyrant and king into one fifty-four year period; there may be a similar occurrence with Attalus of Pergamum (XVIII. 41. 7-8). And where Diodoros claims he was king at the Longanos, we may possibly assume that he meant *strategos autokrator*. It should also be remembered that at these points in their narratives Diodoros and especially Polybios were summarizing, so events may seem to move much quicker than they actually happened.

So in 269 Hieron retreated back to Syracuse and licked his wounds. He would spend most of the next four years training a new citizen army. In the meantime the Mamertines experienced a new self-confidence and began gradually to annex more and more territory south of the Kyamosoros until Syracuse felt ready to strike back. After taking a number of places by siege, Hieron marched along the north coast in late summer or early fall in 265 until a Mamertine force caught up with him at the River Longanos. Here he used a picked band of four hundred soldiers accompanied by two hundred Messanan exiles serving in his army, to wheel around the

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[13]Davies 1993, p. 195, 249, Grimal 1968, p. 71, Hoyos 1998, p. 39, Karlsson 1993, p. 31, Serrati forthcoming.

Mamertine phalanx and attack it in the rear, thus winning the day. After twenty-three years of exile it was Messanans (or more likely their sons) who carried out the *coup de grâce* against the Mamertines.

Polybios (I. 10. 1) states that, after the battle, the Mamertine army retreated to Messana. Fearing a Syracusan siege, the Mamertines appealed to the Carthage, the traditional enemy of Syracuse, to come to their aid. This request was granted, and a Punic garrison was installed within the city.[14] It is clear that Hieron was taken aback by the news that Messana was under Carthaginian protection, as he quickly retreated. He returned victorious to Syracuse where the population hailed him as king.[15] Over the winter of 265-264 it would appear that the Mamertines began to question whether the tiny Punic garrison could protect them from a renewed Syracusan effort the following spring. The Campanian born Mamertines were most likely aware of the Roman practice of accepting allies into their sphere and protecting them under the banner of *fides*. Therefore in early 264 they made a new appeal for protection to Rome.[16]

The issue, according to Polybios (I. 10), was furiously debated in the Roman senate, but in the end it was decided to accept the appeal. The consul Appius Claudius Caudex was appointed to command the mission. After holding a levy and accepting volunteers, he marched south with a consular army (about 20 000 men) and an unknown number of warships procured from Rome's

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[14]See also D.S. XXII. 13. 7, Zonar. VIII. 8.

[15]Plb. I. 9. 8.

[16]Plb. I. 10. 2. This issue is not so cut and dry. Why did the Mamertines appeal to both Rome and Carthage? How far apart were the two appeals? Some would place the appeal to Carthage in 269, thus making the Roman landing of 264 an invasion of Punic territory. As well, were the Mamertines aware of the fact that their second appeal would mean war between Rome and Carthage? The answers to these questions need not concern us here, as the fact remains that Carthage held Messina first, Rome somehow managed to get into the city, and this created a state of war between the two powers. For the major arguments and further bibliography see Hoyos 1985, 1998, p. 47-51, Lazenby 1996, p. 35-39, Valsone 1965, p. 48-61.

socii navales (naval allies) of Elea, Locri, Neapolis, and Tarentum.[17]

At this point the Mamertines somehow persuaded the Carthaginian garrison commander, Hanno, to leave, though Polybios (I. 11. 5) seems to imply that threats may have been involved. That the Carthaginian government considered this the wrong decision on Hanno's part is obvious, for he lost his life on the cross upon returning to Africa. At this point Hieron comes back into the picture. Having heard that the Romans were now on their way to Messana, the newly crowned Syracusan king approached the Carthaginian commander to form an alliance, and this was accepted.[18] The Syracusan-Punic forces had now laid siege to Messana. Arriving at the Straits, Appius Claudius sent one of his tribunes, Gaius Claudius, on a reconnoitring mission.[19] Gaius twice slipped across into the besieged city in a small boat, the second time receiving the enthusiastic invitation of the Mamertines to garrison Messana. He then attempted a crossing with a few ships. The first engagement of the war was a small one, and Gaius was defeated and forced to return to Rhegium. It is clear that the Carthaginians did not as yet consider there to be a state of war since Hanno sent back the captured ships and men and told the tribune not to attempt another crossing. Observing the winds and tides, Gaius again put to sea and this time made it across without a fight. The main body of the Roman army however, was still barred by the Carthaginian fleet in the Straits. Wishing to avoid a very hazardous naval engagement, the consul sent embassies to both Hieron and Hanno asking them to lift their sieges.[20] Although Polybios (I. 11. 11) places the embassies after his landing at Messana it would make much more sense if it was before, since once on land he had little to fear with his army. In a fragmentary passage,

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[17]Plb. I. 20. 14. It is Livy who first uses the term *socii navales* at XXI. 49. 8 in describing preparations on Sicily for the Second Punic War in 218.

[18]D.S. XXIII. 1. 2, Plb. I. 11. 7.

[19]Dio XI. 43, Zonar. VIII. 8-9.

[20]D.S. XXIII. 1. 4, *Ined. Vat.* 3. See Badian 1964, Hoyos 1998, p. 68-69.

Diodoros (XXIII. 1. 4) says that Gaius reminded both enemy generals that Messana was under Roman *fides* and that he would force a crossing if necessary. His message to Hieron in particular seems to have said that the Romans bore him no ill will, but the king responded that his war with the Mamertines was just, and that there would be no withdrawal. So Appius Claudius, probably with information about the wind and tides provided by the tribune Gaius, made an attempt at night to cross the Straits into Messana. Punic resistence appears to have been halfhearted, as Diodoros (XXIII. 3) says that Hieron seemed to think that he had been betrayed by Hanno because of the ease of the Roman crossing, thus implying a bloodless entry into Messana. There may have been skirmishing and Polybios (I. 20. 15) says a Punic ship even ran aground, implying Carthaginian pursuit. Fragments of Naevius (*Poen.* IV. fr. 35B) and Ennius (*Ann.* VII. 216S) (see above, p. 92 n. 43) may lead us to the conclusion that from this point a state of war existed between Rome and at least Carthage, but probably Syracuse as well.

Opening Phase (264-260)

Polybios (I. 11. 10-12. 4) claims that, breaking out of Messana, Appius Claudius easily routed first Hieron's army and then the land forces of Hanno in two separate victories. He then marched on Syracuse and laid siege to the city. Dio (XI. 11-15), Livy (*Per.* XVI), Orosius (IV. 7. 2-3), and Zonaras (VIII. 9) all record the two Roman victories over Hieron and Hanno, yet, as Appius Claudius did not celebrate a triumph upon returning to Rome, it seems that his victories were neither as large nor as complete as Polybios would lead us to believe. It is more likely that the consul was victorious in two skirmishes with enemy forces that in all probability were much smaller than his own. This enabled him to march on Syracuse and Echetla. Here he was forced

to withdraw after suffering heavy losses during an assault at the town.[21] In all probability, Appius Claudius was not equipped to undertake a full siege of Syracuse; his army was too small to blockade the city from its landward side, and he had no fleet. He was also operating in enemy territory with no established supply line. Afterwards he returned Rome and the campaigning season of 264 came to an end.

In 263 the Romans decided to take the offensive and may have sought to put an end to the war with a quick decisive stroke. Both consuls, Manius Otacilius Crassus and Manius Valerius Maximus, were sent to Sicily, each commanding a consular army, giving the Romans upwards of 40 000 men on the island.[22] The campaign was to be a massive operation winding its way down the east coast and ending at Syracuse, which was the main objective this year as the Romans sought to inflict a determined blow on the fragile Syracusan-Punic alliance by striking at the weaker partner. In turn this might lead to the surrender of Hieron and peace with Carthage on terms favourable to Rome.

As the column moved south, Diodoros (XXIII. 4. 1) writes that Kentoripa was taken by storm and Halaisa, Enna and Kamarina all sent envoys to the consuls offering submission. More significantly, the Romans took Katana, an important city within Hieron's empire. Eutropius (II. 19. 1) claims that the place went over willingly to the Romans, but Varro (*ap.* Plin. *Nat.* VII. 214) tells the story of how Valerius Maximus brought back to Rome the city's first ever sundial, and that this was taken from Katana. This would seem to imply that the sundial was a war prize and that the city was taken by force and looted by the Romans.

As the march continued, an embassy arrived from Hieron offering peace and an alliance.[23]

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[21]D.S. XXIII. 3.

[22]D.S. XXIII. 4. 1, Plb. I. 16. 1, Zonar. VIII. 9.

[23]D.S. XXIII. 4. 1, Plb. I. 16. 5. See Eckstein 1987, p. 106-107, 182-183.

The decision of Hieron is not all that surprising, as his alliance with Carthage had been awkward from the start. The two powers did not seem to trust each other, as illustrated by their separate camps outside Messana. Added to this was the fact that Carthage, with its command of the sea, had sent no help to Syracuse during the siege of 264, and it looked as though Punic policy would not change in the following year. And after so many of the eastern cities that had gone over to Rome, Hieron may even have judged that the war had already been lost. For their part Valerius and Otacilius Crassus readily accepted the alliance as Polybios (I. 16. 5-7) tells us that due to the Punic control of the seas, the Roman army was suffering from a severe lack of supplies. The consuls saw that a quick alliance with the agriculturally rich city of Syracuse could readily fill this void and therefore jumped at this chance. Polybios' point is further emphasized by the fact that Hieron immediately furnished the Romans with supplies as part of the treaty (I. 16. 10). The king also had to release all Roman prisoners without ransom and pay an indemnity of one hundred talents, twenty-five were paid immediately and the remaining seventy-five were to be paid over an undisclosed amount of time. The king was to continue to rule an independent Syracuse, as well as the territories owned at the time of the treaty; these stretched north as far as Leontini, west to Akron, and south to the Heloron River. He also retained the important port city of Tauromenion, some one hundred kilometres north of Syracuse. In the 'too little too late' style that would typify the Carthaginian war efforts over the next twenty-two years, a Punic naval force arrived at Xiphona, just north of Syracuse, to aid Hieron during the anticipated Roman siege. When the admiral realised the Syracusans had switched sides, he quickly hauled anchor and sailed away.

Diodoros (XXIII. 4. 2, XXIII. 5) records Roman operations in the west of Sicily, as they probed into Carthaginian territory. Laying siege to the villages of Hadranon and Makella, they

were repulsed after several days of fighting and abandoned the effort.[24] These western operations did bear fruit however, as before the consuls left Sicily a major blow was inflicted on Carthage; Halikyai and Segesta, most likely following the example of Syracuse, jumped ship and threw their lot in with Rome. Both of these cities were less than forty kilometres from the Punic stronghold of Lilybaion and, while the Romans were probably not able to garrison them right away, they would have immediately become sources of great disturbance for the Carthaginians.[25]

The year 262 opened with the triumph of Valerius Maximus through the streets of Rome, as he assumed the *cognomen* of 'Messala' in recognition of his victory on Sicily. He erected a painting on the wall of the *Curia Hostilia* depicting his victories over Syracuse and Carthage.[26] In this same year the Carthaginians took the offensive. They sent an advance force under Hannibal Gisgo to garrison Agrigentum. This contingent was probably meant to link up with a main force that was to land at Lilybaion.[27] Probably because of the Punic mobilisation, Polybios (I. 17. 6) says the senate decided to send both consular armies into the field again this year.

The Romans landed at Messana in late May and immediately made for Agrigentum; this was a Greek city that was part of the Punic domain in Sicily, and was vital to the control of the southern coast. They arrived at Agrigentum in mid-June and immediately besieged the city. Polybius (I. 17. 9-13) relates how the Romans fought an early engagement where the Carthaginians ambushed a Roman foraging party. Although the Punic army was beaten back to the city, both sides suffered heavy casualties. The two armies resigned themselves to a lengthy

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[24]Not to be confused with the city of Hadranon in the east of the island. See below, p. 251-252.

[25]D.S. XXIII. 5, Zonar. VIII. 9.

[26]Plin. *Nat.* XXXV. 22. He was the sole *triumphator* as a fragment from Naevius ('The consul Marcus Valerius leads a part of his army on an expedition.' *Poen.* I. fr. 3B) shows that Valerius carried out the majority of the campaign alone, with Otacilius only arriving in September. For a fuller explanation of the fragment see Rowell 1947, p. 30-32. See also Caven 1980, p. 20, Lazenby 1996, p. 51-52, Walbank 1957, I, p. 66.

[27]D.S. XXIII. 8. 1, Zonar. VIII. 10.

siege, and the Romans took to constructing siege works around the city. They built two camps, one commanded by each consul, and linked them with a double ditch that Orosius (IV. 7. 4) says was covered, presumably on both sides, by a wall. Although the position of the camps is unknown, they must have been somewhere to the west of the city as Polybios (I. 18. 1-5), tells us that they blocked the road to Heraklea Minoa, a Punic controlled city about thirty-five kilometres up the coast.[28] That the Romans feared reinforcements from this city is shown by the fact that the second set of siege works along the trench faced outwards to guard against a relieving force. Between the trenches and each camp was set up a series of pickets and defensive works. Polybios also informs us that a town called Herbessos was chosen as the supply base; this lay up the coast between Heraklea and Agrigentum, and was somewhat over ten kilometres from the Roman lines. This base was controlled by Sicilian allied contingents including Syracusans.

For five months the two sides settled into a stalemate. By November 262 supplies within the overcrowded city were low and the Punic situation was desperate. Aid came when Carthage sent a large army, including fifty elephants, to Sicily under Hanno the Elder.[29] This relief army marched to Heraklea Minoa and then proceeded to capture the Roman supply depot at Herbessos. With their supplies cut off the Romans soon found themselves in a state similar to those within Agrigentum; had it not been for the supreme efforts of Hieron to sneak the most basic of supplies through, the siege may have failed. As if the situation was not desperate enough, disease then struck the Roman camp, the weakened soldiers making easy targets for infection. After a cavalry

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[28]D.S. XXIII. 8. 1. The first camp was located at the temple of Asklepios, two-thirds of a kilometre south of the city. Lazenby 1996, p. 56-57, places the second camp off the western walls, as Polybios (I. 18. 2) says it guarded the way to Heraklea Minoa. Lazenby appears to have mistakenly placed the road running west of the city as beginning from one of the western gates, that is Gate VII according to his map. In reality, the road to Heraklea Minoa originated from Gate IV at the southern end of the city, and it extended southward before it turned west and followed the coast. Furthermore, from personal observation I can attest to the fact that much of the area west of the city is far too narrow for a Roman camp, there being only one hundred and thirty-five metres between the wall and the River Hypsas (modern Drago). Therefore, I would place the second camp directly off the southwest corner of the city.

[29]Philinos *ap.* D.S. XXIII. 8. 1, Plb. I. 19. 2.

battle in which the Romans came off worse, Hanno occupied a hill called the Toros near the Roman siege works and the two sides then settled in for the winter, harassing each other with missile fire.[30]

Polybios (I. 19. 7) tells us that the year 261 brought little difference to the situation, as both sides were still very low on provisions and the Romans were suffering from disease. At last the Carthaginians determined to provoke a decisive battle, as the garrison of Agrigentum was nearing surrender. The Punic force atop the Toros hill lined up for battle and challenged the Romans to do the same. The ensuing struggle was long and difficult for both sides; however in the end it was Rome who prevailed by driving the Punic mercenaries back into their own elephants, thus sending the entire army into confusion.[31] Despite the defeat, Diodoros (XXIII. 8. 1, 9. 1) says that Hanno was still left with a substantial forces of about 49 000 men and nine elephants.

On the night following the battle, according to Polybios (I. 19. 12-15), the Punic garrison within Agrigentum took advantage of the Roman celebrations and exhaustion, and was able to evacuate the city by filling in the enemy trenches with baskets filled with straw. They escaped to join the main force without the knowledge of the Romans, and the entire army then retreated. In the morning, the Romans did pursue them, but only succeeded in mauling the rear guard. They then turned and savagely sacked the city, selling all 25 000 of its inhabitants into servitude.[32] In the aftermath, though it was a massive gain for Rome, Agrigentum must be seen as a pyrrhic victory because of the amount of men lost, 31 500 according to Diodoros (XXIII. 9. 1). This is borne out by the fact that neither of the consuls in command of the siege was awarded a triumph.

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[30]Plb. I. 18. 9-19. 6.

[31]Fron. *Str.* II. 1. 4, Plb. I. 19. 9-11, Zonar. VIII. 10.

[32]D.S. XXIII. 9. 1.

In spite of this, Polybios (I. 20. 1-2) makes the statement that now the Romans showed their more imperialist intentions, and it was at this moment that the senate began to take the seizure of the entire island as a possibility, and that this in turn led to the building of a fleet. Valerius Messala, consul from 263, may have been the main proponent of this policy, though the claim that Appius Claudius had been advocating this policy since his consular year of 264 because his name Caudex actually means 'dinghy' is completely unfounded.[33]

For the rest of 261 the campaign was again one of attrition as both sides avoided any major engagements. The Romans laid siege to an otherwise unknown site in central Sicily that Diodoros (XXIII. 9. 3) calls Mytistraton. The siege was long and difficult, and late in the year, after seven months, the Romans were forced to withdraw in their first significant failure of the war. The Carthaginians now began to raid the Italian coastline, apparently with some success.[34] These raids, coupled with the desire to conquer all of Sicily, convinced the senate that if the war was to be won a fleet must be built. One hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes were built, probably with the aid of shipwrights conscripted from the allied Italian cities who had strong naval traditions. While the construction was ongoing, the future crews of the ships were trained on dry

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[33]'Μάνιος δὲ Βαλέριος <ὁ> τὰς πρὸς Ἱέρωνα συνθήκας ποιησάμενος δοκεῖ καὶ βραχέως καὶ ἀληθῶς εἰπὼν προτρέψαι τὴν βουλὴν ἔχεσθαι τῶν ναυτικῶν, ὅτι περὶ νήσου καὶ ἐν νήσῳ μαχομένους οὐκ ἔστι τῷ παντὶ νικᾶν μὴ ναυκρατοῦντας.' The *Ineditum Vaticanum* is a collection of excepts on Roman history published in 1892 by H. von Arnim. The above quotation is from *Ineditum Vaticanum* 4, and is taken from Piso (*ap.* Plin. *Nat.* XVI. 192); it is usually referred to in conjuction with Diodoros, XXIII. 2. 1 (see Badian 1964, Hoyos 1998, p. 282, La Bua 1866, p. 35-37). It claims that Valerius Messala proposed and created a Roman fleet in 263. Arnim 1892, p. 130, suggests that the fragment originally comes from Fabius Pictor, while Cavallaro 1973-1974, suggests that it was authored by the first century Sicilian historian Kaikilios. The text also appears as *FGH* 839, where Jacoby concurs with the first century date. Gabba 1991, p. 46, has recently argued that the entire corpus is post-Augustan, due to its pro-Roman bias and the cultural slants of some of the passages. As there is no reference to the building of a fleet in 263 by Valerius in Polybios, the authenticity of the passage is dubious. Yet, as a senator in 260, it is perfectly plausible that Valerius could have proposed or supported the idea of constructing a fleet (see Lazenby 1996, p. 54, Thiel 1954, p. 70-73). According to Walbank 1957, I, p. 73, however, Polybios is mistaken to ascribe the fall of Agrigentum and Roman aspiration to expel the Carthaginians from all of Sicily as the motivation behind the building of a fleet. Instead, it was more likely to have been a defensive measure to combat Punic raids against Italy (see Oros. IV. 7. 7, Plb. I. 20. 7, Zonar. VIII. 10). But the Roman fleet totalled two hundred and twenty vessels (see Plb. I. 20. 9), and this seems too great a number to be merely for defence against small raiding parties. Furthermore, if the Romans were serious about conquering all of Sicily, then a fleet was essential. On Appius Claudius Caudex see Picard and Picard, 1968, p. 191. A *caudex* was a tree trunk, and it seems very likely that this *cognomen* was inherited, though even if it was not, it was probably in reference to his frame.

[34]Plb. I. 20. 7, Oros. IV. 7. 7, Zonar. VIII. 10.

land using rows of benches.[35] This was a common way of training crews in the ancient world. Its first documented use is by a Greek mercenary commander in Egypt in 360; it was used again by Scipio Africanus in 205, and by Agrippa in 37.[36] As a model, Polybios (I. 20. 15) says they used a captured Punic ship that ran aground during the original crossing to Sicily in 264. Florus (I. 18. 7), Orosius (IV. 7. 8), and Pliny (*Nat.* XVI. 192) all say that the task took sixty days; this seems a very short amount of time for a people unaccustomed to building ships, as it would mean they built two ships per day, and this includes no time for felling trees or shaping the wood. Yet it has recently been argued by Lazenby (1996, p. 64) that these authors are correct. He bases his argument on the Punic ship found off the west coast of Sicily in 1971, that has been dated to the first half of the third century. This warship has numbered planks, suggesting mass production, a method the Romans could have copied. Parker (1992, wreck no. 661, p. 262-264) has doubted the fact that this was even a warship, as so much ballast was found aboard; his opinion on the subject has only become more definite as of late, and he stated in a paper delivered in March, 2000 at Oxford University, that he now has no doubt that the vessel was used for cargo and had no military purpose. Therefore, there is no evidence to say that the Carthaginians mass produced their warships. Furthermore, these ships that the Romans built could not have been exact copies of Punic boats, as the ship of Hannibal the Rhodian was infinitely faster than these Roman vessels during the siege of Lilybaion in 250, and it continued to be a faster vessel even when manned by a Roman crew after its capture.[37] The Carthaginians simply built better ships, and this either refutes Polybios' story about the Romans copying a Punic boat, or implies that they did so badly.[38]

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[35]Plb. I. 20. 9-10, 21. 1-2.

[36]360: Polyain. III. 11. 7; 205: Enn. *Ann.* 297-299; 37: Dio XLVIII. 51. 5.

[37]Plb. I. 46. 4-6.

[38]Along with Parker, on the Marsala wreck see Frost *et al.* 1981, Purpura 1986, p. 151-152.

The consuls for 260 were Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, assigned to the newly created fleet as Rome's first ever admiral, and Gaius Duilius, who was to command the land forces on Sicily. The Roman fleet sailed out of Ostia as soon as it was seaworthy and, after a short period of training for the crews in the Mediterranean, sailed down the coast towards Sicily. Cornelius Scipio went ahead with seventeen boats in order to ensure supplies and to ready Messana for the fleet's arrival. Upon putting into Messana, the Roman admiral was informed of an offer to betray Lipara, a city in the Lipari islands to the northwest of Messana. Lipara had been friendly towards Rome before, but was now a Carthaginian naval base. Seeing the offer as genuine, Scipio immediately sailed to Lipara and put in at the city. But the Carthaginians received word of the situation and during the night a Punic fleet blockaded the Romans within the harbour. In the morning, Scipio was taken prisoner with his men.[39] Pliny (*Nat.* VIII. 169) says that for this debacle his senatorial comrades in Rome nicknamed him Asina or 'the she-ass'.

Nevertheless, the Romans were soon able to exact revenge by gaining their first victory at sea. As the main Roman fleet was sailing down the coast of Italy it encountered a Punic reconnoitring party at Cape Pelorias. Polybios (I. 21. 9-11) relates how the fleets came to blows, with the result that the Carthaginians lost most of their ships, their admiral, Hannibal, being lucky to escape alive.

The Roman fleet then reached Messana where Duilius took over as admiral for the captured Scipio.[40] While the army and navy at Messana were awaiting the consul's arrival, someone, and Polybios (I. 22. 2) does not say who, proposed the construction of gangplanks that could grapple one ship to another and allow the Romans to seize the Punic vessels by boarding, thus turning a sea battle into several small land battles, and allowing the Roman legionaries, acting

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[39]Plb. I. 21. 2-8. For the previous relations between Lipara and Rome see D.S. XIV. 93.

[40]Plb. I. 22. 1.

as marines, to fight in a style with which they were more accustomed. Frontinus (*Str.* II. 3. 4) claims that the device was invented by Duilius himself, but whoever suggested this certainly knew both their history and their naval tactics well. A century and a half previous, on both Athenian expeditions to Sicily (427-424 and 415-413) during the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians found it extremely difficult to deal with the Syracusans at sea, since the latter were much better at ramming, which at the time the only real tactic in naval engagements. The Athenians therefore redressed the balance by grappling the enemy ships and holding them steadfast, thus allowing their hoplite marines to board. For this purpose they constructed a devise with an iron spike at the end in order to hold the Syracusan vessels in position.[41] In 260 the Romans found themselves in an almost identical situation - they had somewhat better troops than the Carthaginians but were heavily outmatched when it came to manoeuvring and ramming. It may have even been a Syracusan at Messana who suggested the machine. As described by Polybios (I. 22. 3-11), the *corvus* or 'crow' was a gangplank that was held up at a high angle by a mast. A rope lead from the top of the gangplank, over the mast, and was secured to the boat. When in range of an enemy vessel, the rope would be released causing the boarding bridge to crash into the enemy's deck, an iron spike fitted to the bottom holding it fast. Then the Roman marines would attack over the *corvus*, thus seizing the Punic ship.

It quite likely took some time to outfit the Roman fleet with the new weapon, and this gave the Carthaginians a chance to go on the offensive. The aforementioned Hannibal took his fleet and set about ravaging the northern coast of Sicily. When he reached the peninsula at Mylai in the northeast the Romans put out to sea. Seeing the Romans approaching, Hannibal, assuming the inexperienced Romans would be easy prey, rushed forward and immediately had thirty of his

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[41]Thuc. IV. 25. 4, VII. 65. 1.

ships grappled, boarded, and captured. Veering off, some Punic ships tried to swing around the Romans and attack from behind. The Romans resisted this by simply turning around. This second attack repulsed, the Carthaginians then retired in disorder with the loss of fifty ships, including their flagship, a massive craft captured from Pyrrhos in 276. Hannibal managed to escape in a small boat as the Romans won the day.[42]

Duilius had left the land forces on Sicily under the command of Gaius Caecilius, one of his military tribunes. While at Therma on the north coast, Caecilius and his Sicilian allies had a falling out, and therefore the two armies bivouacked separately, which Polybios (I. 24. 3) implies was not standard practice.[43] The Carthaginians nearby in Panormos seized this chance and attacked at once, severely defeating the Sicilians before the Romans could come to their assistance. Polybios (I. 24. 4) says 4000 were killed, while Diodoros (XXIII. 9. 4) claims 6000, 'nearly the whole army'. Having stung the Roman forces for the moment, a Punic army boldly invaded eastern Sicily and took Kamarina and Enna by ruses made possible by pro-Carthaginian elements from within the cities. Segesta was then placed under siege. Polybios (I. 24. 2) says that the city was hard pressed, and a relief attempt by Caecilius was defeated. Duilius then landed at Himera and retook command of his army. He marched south and relieved Segesta, and took Mazara by assault, enslaving the captured population.[44] He triumphed in early 259 and erected a commemorative column in the Forum. From this was hung a laudatory inscription and the beaks of several captured Punic ships.[45]

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[42]*CIL* I. 2. 25, Dio XI. 16-17, D.S. XXIII. 10. 1, Eutrop. II. 20, Flor. I. 18. 7-11, Liv. *Per.* XVII, Oros. IV. 7. 7-10, Plb. I. 23, Val. Max. VII. 3. 7, Zonar. VIII. 10-11.

[43]Brisson 1973, p. 59 sees this as a prelude to a mutiny, cut short by the ensuing battle. See Eckstein 1987, p. 108-109.

[44]D.S. XXIII. 9. 4.

[45]*CIL* I. 2. 25, Steinby *Lexicon*, I, p. 309.

The War Outside Sicily (259-255)

Events in the next five years would take on a different tone for Sicily. Little would be accomplished there as the war moved off to new places, with the Romans trying to gain a decisive advantage by stiking at Carthaginian interests around the Mediterranean. Corsica, Sardinia, and Malta all saw action, though it is Regulus' expedition to Africa that has become the most famous non-Sicilian battleground of the First Punic War. Only two major engagements would be fought in Sicilian waters, while battles were still avoided on land. In the end it would be the sea itself that would prove the strongest force of the conflict thus far.

Almost nothing of note seems to have happened in 259 concerning the war, the Carthaginians were still apprehensive about facing the Romans in the open field and at sea were still reeling from the shock of Mylai. The Romans therefore contented themselves with attacks on Corsica and Sardinia.[46]

In 258 Zonaras (VIII. 11) says that the Romans decided to maintain a commander in the field by proroguing the consular *imperium* of Aquillius Florus, consul of 259. This was the first time such a proconsular command had been granted during the war, as it seems that the senate decided to retain a magistrate with *imperium* in Sicily over the winter, and therefore Aquillius' command had to be extended to allow the new consul, Aulus Atilius Caiatinus, to journey out to succeed him. The campaigns of 258 opened with an unsuccessful attempt to draw the Carthaginians at Panormos into a pitched battle. The Roman army then turned south, and again besieged Mytistraton, this time reducing it after an extended and difficult siege. It seems the Carthaginian garrison along with the citizens put up a stalwart defence, but when it looked as though all was lost the garrison slipped out by night, leaving the inhabitants to their fate. Seeing

[46]Liv. *Per.* XVII, Zonar. VIII. 11.

further resistance as futile, the people of Mytistraton sought to throw themselves at Rome's mercy by opening the gates the following morning. The Romans however, had spent an inordinate amount of time seizing this city and their casualties had been unusually heavy. Unrestrained, the legionaries broke into the town and slaughtered most of the inhabitants. Aquillius finally was able to reign them in and some civilians managed to escape death to be sold as slaves. Afterwards the city was raised and burnt to the ground.[47]

An attempt was then made to retake Kamarina, captured by Carthage two years previously. Nearing the city the Romans were ambushed and a fierce struggle ensued. They only escaped by the bravery of Marcus Calpurnius, a tribune, who acted as a diversion with three hundred men while the main body fled. Upon arriving at Kamarina the Romans attacked; when the city proved difficult to take, Hieron sent the Romans a siege train. To leave Kamarina in enemy hands would have been dangerous to Hieron's position at Syracuse, and therefore removing the Carthaginians from his borders would have been of the utmost importance to him. Finally, a breach was made and the city fell, with Rome exacting a harsh punishment as again all the inhabitants were sold as slaves. Returning to central Sicily, the city of Enna, taken by Carthage in 260 as well, was betrayed to the consul by the pro-Roman elements inside. Late in the summer, Kamikon and Herbessos were taken in the south near Agrigentum and some settlements along the Halycos River seem to have capitulated. Another attempt was made on Lipara but without success.[48]

Polybios (I. 25. 6) tells us that in 257 Atilius Caiatinus' command was renewed and he

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[47]D.S. XXIII. 9. 4, Plb. I. 24. 11, Zonar. VIII. 11. The plunder from Mytistraton was housed in the temple of Fides, dedicated by Caiatinus in 258. See Cic. *ND* II. 61, *Off.* III. 104. See also Pietilä-Castrén 1987, p. 36, 38, 40, 42, Ziolkowski 1992, p. 28-31.

[48]For the capture of Enna and Kamarina by Carthage in 260 see D.S. XXIII. 9. 1. For the other events see D.S. XXIII. 9. 5, Oros. IV. 8. 2, Plb. I. 24. 11-13, Zonar. VIII. 12. Frontinus (*Str.* I. 5. 15, IV. 5. 10) says the tribune Marcus Calpurnius was also known as Laberius, Quintus Caedicius, and Calpernius Flamma, though he does not say from whom or where these different names derived.

became the second proconsul of the war. No land fighting occurred this year, as Rome was busy planning an invasion of Africa; a move they hoped would break the deadlock in Sicily and end the war in their favour. At sea, the Romans decided to make a third attempt on the Lipari islands and the consul Gaius Regulus set sail there with his fleet. The Carthaginians received news of the plan and laid in wait for the Roman fleet near the northern city of Tyndaris. Regulus in turn was informed of the Carthaginian plan and therefore sent a diversion around the promontory of Tyndaris. The Punic commander, thinking that this was the entire Roman force, attacked, and was quickly caught in a pincer movement between the diversionary force and Regulus' fleet. The fighting was fierce, and eventually both sides withdrew and conceded a draw.[49]

In 256 the Romans were set to invade Africa. The senate decided that the best way to win Sicily was now to use the indirect approach - they would invade Africa and force the Carthaginians to abandon Sicily in order to defend their homeland. The consuls who were elected to lead this mission were Lucius Manlius Vulso Longus and Quintus Caedicius. Unfortunately Caedicius died shortly after taking office and therefore Marcus Atilius Regulus, brother of Gaius the consul from the previous year, was elected as *consul suffectus*. The two sailed to the southern coast of Sicily and put in at a small mountain called Ekonomos where they rendezvoused with their land forces. Meanwhile, the Carthaginians had set sail from Africa with their fleet and had put in at Heraklea Minoa about sixty kilometres from Ekonomos.[50] The Romans received news of the Carthaginian presence and therefore prepared to give battle.

The Punic admiral, Hamilcar, also launched his fleet. It appears as though he sent some quicker ships ahead to scout the coast for him. When he learnt of the dispositions of the Romans, he organised his ships in order to counter the enemy formation. The Romans divided themselves

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[49]Polyain. VIII. 20, Plb. I. 25. 1-5, Zonar. VIII. 12.

[50]Plb. I. 25. 7-9.

into four groups, with the first three aligned into a wedge. Hamilcar coordinated his fleet so that the battle would be a type of seaborne Cannae, as he would use the superior Punic seamanship to encircle the Roman formation with his boats on the wings. Being from a military family and having a father who fought in the First Punic War, it is quite possible that Hannibal was schooled in the recent military past of his native land. Hannibal would have studied Ekonomos just as as he would have studied the Punic tactics at Himera in 311 or Krimissos in 340. All undoubtedly served as influences to him, though evidently he took a special liking to Ekonomos.[51]

Ironically, it was the inferior skill of the Romans that eventually won them the day. As they moved forward, they were not experienced enough to keep their formation together, and as a result their lines became separated, thus spreading the fleet over a large area and preventing the Punic encirclement. Three completely separate battles now ensued: one between the Roman and Punic centres; one between the Roman second line and the Punic left; and one between the Punic right and the Roman third line.[52] All had gone wrong for Hamilcar and his forces; his plan to take the Roman second and third lines in the rear had failed because of the sluggishness of the Roman second line, labouring as they were with towing the transports. After some fierce fighting, Regulus executed a decisive move; he marshalled the warships that were undamaged from the first two lines and speedily came to the aid of his third line, who were on the brink of defeat. The Punic ships attacking the third line were surrounded and soon forced to withdraw into the open sea. In the fight between the Roman second line and the Punic left, it seems that a stalemate had ensued; Hamilcar had the Romans pinned up against the shore but could not finish them off for

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[51]For Hannibal's tactics at Cannae see Liv. XXII. 45-49, Plb. III. 113-116. Those in agreement with the influence of Ekonomos on Hannibal are Tarn 1930, p. 150, Thiel 1954, p. 120-121, Tipps 1985, p. 454, Walbank, 1957, I, p. 87. *Contra* Lazenby 1996, p. 94-95. It can also be argued that Hannibal was influenced by the Carthaginian land campaign against the Romans in Africa, conducted by the mercenary general Xanthippos. The Battle of Tunis in 255 (see Plb. I. 33-34. 11) was in many ways a parallel of Cannae, and both Hannibal and Xanthippos realised that the Punic strength on land lay in the use of cavalry.

[52]Plb. I. 27. 7-28. 3.

fear of the *corvi*. Manlius Vulso, the other consul, rushed to the aid of the trapped Romans and was soon joined by Regulus. Surrounded and hopelessly outnumbered, Hamilcar's squadron was crushed. A few ships, including his own, were able slip away, but the majority were either captured or sunk.[53] Rome had been victorious in the largest sea battle of the war.

Initially successful, the Roman expedition to Africa was, after a year, crushed by a Punic army under the command of a Spartan mercenary general named Xanthippos. The end came at the Battle of Tunis in 255, where, out of a double consular army of 40 000, only 2000 legionaries survived. While these were holding on in Africa, news reached Rome of the disaster and a fleet was dispatched to rescue the survivors. On its way this fleet was intercepted by the Carthaginians off Cape Hermaia on the African coast. In the ensuing battle, the Carthaginians had still not found a solution to the *corvus*, and as a result were again decisively defeated in a fourth consecutive naval victory for the Romans.[54] Once the fleet returned to Sicily though, the Roman navy met its match. The experienced Italian seamen who piloted the Roman ships warned the consuls that sailing along the southern coast of Sicily at this time of year was a bad idea, as storms were frequent and shelter scarce. Yet their warnings were not heeded as the consuls, who probably had no experience of nautical storms, and little idea of their ferocity, sought to pass by coastal cities and towns still loyal to Carthage and impress them into surrendering with the size of their fleet. Upon reaching Kamarina, a fierce storm arose and two hundred and eighty-four ships were either sunk or smashed against the rocks.[55] A single Roman helmet found off the coast of modern Camarina in 1990 is all that remains of the ships that went down and the soldiers and sailors who

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[53]Plb. I. 28. 6-13.

[54]D.S. XXIII. 18. 1, Naev. *Poen.* fr. 64B, Plb. I. 36. 10-11.

[55]D.S. XXIII. 18. 1, Eutrop. XXII. 3, Liv. *Per.* XVIII, Oros. IV. 9. 8, Plb. I. 37. 2, Zonar. VIII. 14.

died there in 255.[56]

The senate now realised that the only way to win Sicily would be on the island itself, and this meant another drawn out war of attrition as Carthage would still refuse the Roman legions in the field. Sicily would have to be won by campaigns reducing one major stronghold at a time until Carthage capitulated. Save for their recapture of Enna, the Romans had gained nothing of importance in the last five campaigns and were back to where they stood at the end of 260 - the same situation, except for one aspect. In the next phase of the war, Carthage would twice attempt to take the offensive, in 254 and 251, only to be stymied, both by Rome and by trouble with their subjects in Africa. Although Regulus' army was defeated, the Roman strategy of invading Africa was not a complete failure, as the presence of the Roman army encouraged many cities in Mauritania, Numidia, and the Carthaginian hinterland to revolt against Punic rule.[57] Furthermore, this would be a problem that would plague them intermittently until the end of the war, and would prevent the Carthaginians either from exploiting victories or from taking the offensive. This trouble would also allow the Romans to campaign freely, moving from city to city, eventually conquering all of Sicily and winning the war.

The Capture of Panormos and the Penultimate Stage of the War (254-250)

The survivors of the storm were sheltered by King Hieron at Syracuse. Carthage now took advantage of Rome's weakness and sent a new army to Sicily. While they were awaiting

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[56]The helmet has been dated by its excavators, Di Stefano and Russo 1991, p. 15, to the fourth century and they believed it to be 'Attic-Etruscan'; both the dating and the supposed origins of the piece have been adopted by the Camarina Museum. After personal inspection, I have little doubt that this is in fact a Montefortino type A Roman helmet, and should be dated to the mid-third century, in agreement with Wilson 1995-1996, p. 72. For the Montefortino helmet see Bishop and Coulston 1993, p. 60. I am grateful to both Prof. Wilson and to Dr Di Stefano of the Camarina Museum for allowing me to view the piece.

[57]Plb. I. 31. 2, 38. 2-3, Oros. IV. 9. 9, Zonar. VIII. 14.

these reinforcements, the Punic army already in Sicily took to the offensive. It appears as though Agrigentum had at least partially recovered from the Roman sack of 261; that there was a population there of some significance at this time is shown in its capture by Carthage in 254. When the city fell much of it was burnt to the ground as the place was sacked for a second time in seven years. As there was still a Roman consular army in Sicily, the Carthaginians determined that they could not hold the place, and thus they tore down all of the walls, leaving the city an exposed mass of ruble. The inhabitants however, were at least spared the fate they had endured under the Romans and the survivors of the siege were left in their place.[58] Although the new Punic army landed in Sicily and succeeded in rendezvousing with the force that had just plundered Agrigentum, much of the army was immediately recalled to quell a revolt in Africa. Carthage lost a major opportunity to seize the initiative and follow up on the victory at Agrigentum.

The Romans now sent another consular army to Sicily and took the offensive. At Kephalodion on the central north coast they were successful as the town was betrayed to them from the inside. They then made a strike at the Punic stronghold of Drepana on the west coast and laid siege to the place, but were soon made to withdraw by a Punic relieving force. It seems that the attack on Drepana was merely a throw of the dice, and was not their main objective for 254. Two Roman armies now came in a pincer movement towards Panormos. A newly constructed fleet blockaded the harbour while the army threw up siege works of palisades and trenches. Engines were brought up and the new (outer) town was assaulted. Eventually one of the coastal towers was toppled and a breach was made. The Romans poured into the city and the inhabitants fled into the old (inner) town. They realised that with the new town in Roman hands their fate was sealed, and they therefore opened negotiations with the consuls for surrender.[59]

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[58]D.S. XXIII. 18. 1-2, Plb. I. 38. 1-2.

[59]D.S. XXIII. 18. 3-4, Plb. I. 38. 8-10.

Zonaras (VIII. 14) however, claims that the Romans actually continued their assault but that they were repulsed at the walls of the old city. It was only when food ran out that the defenders sought to parley. Judging from the harsh punishment inflicted on the citizens, the siege is likely to have been longer than reported by Diodoros (XXIII. 18. 3-4) and Polybios (I. 38. 8-10), Zonaras, summarising Dio, is probably correct. 14 000 of the financially better off citizens were allowed to purchase their freedom, while the rest, amounting to13 000, were sold into slavery. This was Rome's largest land victory since the fall of Agrigentum in 261; it deprived the Carthaginians of a major urban centre and gave the Romans a base with which they could strike at the remaining enemy cities on the island - Drepana and Lilybaion. The prestige, or perhaps fear of, Rome now increased in Sicily, as several cities, including Tyndaris, joined the Romans.[60] At the beginning of 254 they had but one base for their fleets coming from Italy - Messana; by the year's end they had added Kephalodion, Panormos, and Tyndaris. This was a major victory for the Romans and put them within striking distance of conquering all of Sicily.[61]

Nevertheless, in order to achieve total victory the Romans had to emerge dominant on both land and sea, and in 253 this was rendered impossible by yet another naval disaster. After a surprise amphibious assault against Lilybaion proved unsuccessful, the Roman fleet sailed off to raid Africa. They returned safely, but on their way back to Italy they were devastated by a storm and one hundred and fifty of their ships went down.[62] Despite their victory at Panormos, the Romans had lost tens of thousands of men at sea over the last three years. Zonaras (VIII. 14) now tells us that the senate decided to abandon the effort at sea, and to retain only enough ships

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[60]D.S. XXIII. 18. 5.

[61]The victorious consul, Aulus Atilius Caiatinus, dedicated a temple to Spes in Rome in order to house his plunder. See Cic. *Leg.* II. 28, Tac. *Ann.* II. 49. 2. See also Ziolkowski 1992, p. 152-154.

[62]D.S. XXIII. 19. 1, Eutrop. II. 23, Oros. IV. 9. 10, Plb. I. 39. 2-6, Solin. XXVII. 40, Zonar. VIII. 14.

as was necessary for the defence of Italy itself. Polybios (I. 39. 7-8) goes into greater detail, as he implies that this decision was taken because the Romans simply did not have the men available to put another fleet to sea. As it would have been the Italian allies who supplied many of the rowers, it is quite possible that the construction of another fleet would have put them under too much strain and may have caused some to the allies to disobey Rome openly and cease to furnish their quota of soldiers or sailors, as occurred during the Second Punic War.[63] While the Romans were definitely in control, the allies were the backbone of their power, and this was doubly true at sea, where thousands of men were necessary to power the ships.

The year 252 saw little action. Neither side had a fleet to speak of, and the Carthaginians still refused to face the Romans on open ground. The only significant action occurred as the consul Aurelius Cotta sailed with an army to make a fourth attempt at taking the Lipari islands. These tiny islands between Sicily and Italy had become somewhat of an albatross around the neck of Rome, as attacks had failed in 260, 258, and 257. On this occasion, Rome's fleet was provided by Hieron in Syracuse's first military involvement in the war since 258. After an initial assault on the walls of Lipara proved unsuccessful, with the Romans suffering many casualties, the city was eventually taken and all the inhabitants were butchered in an act of revenge.[64] Of this attack, there remains several catapult balls, iron arrowheads, and lead shot. The finds of large amounts of debris attest to the destruction of the city and date the siege missiles to 252.[65] Amongst one of the hauls of debris was unearthed a hoard of sixty-eight coins, of which fifty were Carthaginian. It has recently been speculated that these confirm Lipari's importance as a Punic naval base for

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[63]Liv. XXVII. 8. 18-9. 7. See Thiel 1954, p. 252.

[64]D.S. XXIII. 20, Fron. *Str.* IV. 1. 22, Plb. I. 39. 13, Zonar. VIII. 14. Almost two centuries later, Gaius Aurelius Cotta's more famous descendant, Lucius Aurelius Cotta, consul of 65 and supporter of Julius Caesar, minted coins commemorating the victory of his ancestor over the Liparans; see *CRRBM* I, p. 200-202, *RRC* I, p. 322.

[65]Bernabò Brea and Cavalier 1993-1994, p. 989.

conducting raids against Italy.[66]

The Romans sought to maintain the status quo in the following year; there would be no offensive in the near future and at the end of the year they decided to withdraw one consular army from Sicily. For 250 they renewed the *imperium* of one of the previous consuls, Lucius Caecilius Metellus, and left him at Panormos with a force just large enough to maintain their previous conquests. Rome and Italy were obviously exhausted. Although the Carthaginians would soon act, they never sought to strike a decisive blow against the enemy, and so perhaps in this moment of Roman weakness they missed an opportunity to sue for peace in order to retain their substantial holdings in western Sicily, rather than risk them by continuing the war. Regardless, peace does not seem to have been on the mind of either side, and, on account of the reduced Roman presence on the island, Carthage now decided to risk a land engagement in order to win back Panormos. Taking 30 000 men and all of his one hundred and forty elephants, the Punic general Hasdrubal marched out from Lilybaion and encamped near Panormos with the intention of bringing Rome to battle. Metellus decided to allow Hasdrubal to ravage the land right up to the vicinity of Panormos. This gave the Carthaginian forces confidence and they surged forward, crossing the Orethos River that runs in front of the city. Metellus now sent his *rorarii* (skirmishers) to harass the elephants with missiles, retreating and taking shelter in a trench when the beasts charged. The townspeople then resupplied the troops, who would return to the fray when the elephants fell back. Reinforcements were constantly emerging from the city, and eventually Hasdrubal was forced to deploy his whole army. Finally the elephants, showered with missiles and panicking, turned and charged full on back into their own lines. Metellus then sortied from the city and attacked with all his forces. The Punic army was butchered as 20 000 of their numbers fell and

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[66]Wilson 1995-1996, p. 82.

all the elephants were captured.[67]

This was Rome's greatest land victory of the war; the superior tactics of Metellus combined with the versatility of the Italian legion to prove that, in infantry based land battles, the Romans had no equals. Carthage, so often criticised for their lack of boldness during the war, paid the ultimate price for their gamble on this occasion. Badly stung, they returned to their strategy of sheltering themselves behind the walls of their remaining Sicilian possessions. The return to this policy was also caused by affairs within the Punic government. It would appear that the landowners in Carthage were beginning to uproot the traditional power structure that was composed almost entirely of wealthy merchants and shippers. These landowners sought an end to the war in Sicily for the purpose of a full scale military effort in Africa, of which they would be the main beneficiaries. In 250 this party found a leader in the person of Hanno the Great, a young aristocrat who rose to fame in the political sphere. He greatly opposed the war in Sicily, speaking in favour of African expansion. He gradually grew more powerful, all the while dismissing proponents of the war with Rome and replacing them with political allies.[68] This new antiwar stance by many of the nobles at Carthage is illustrated by a peace mission made to Rome at this time.[69] The new policy of the Punic government, combined with intermittent rebellions in Africa, sealed the fate of the Carthaginians in Sicily, making it only a matter of time before the Romans expelled them. For the rest of the war, the government in Carthage gave only token support to their forces in Sicily.

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[67]Plb. I. 40. 2-15. Specifically on the Punic casualties see Eutrop. II. 24, Flor. II. 2. 9, Oros. IV. 9. 15, Plin. *Nat.* VIII. 16, Zonar. VIII. 14. One hundred and sixty years later Metullus' victory would be commemorated as his ancestors issued coins bearing his impression on the obverse and an elephant on the reverse; see *CRRBM* I, p. 182, *RRC* I, p. 287.

[68]App. *Hisp.* 4, D.S. XXIV. 10. 2, Plb. I. 72. 1-5, 74. 7. See also Ameling 1993, p. 259-274, Lancel 1995, p. 114-115, Picard and Picard 1968, p. 198-199, Serrati 1999a, p. 289-290, Walbank 1957, I, p. 118.

[69]Dio, II. 26, Eutrop. II. 25, Flor. II. 2. 23-26, Liv. *Per.* XVIII, Oros. IV. 10. 1, Zonar. VIII. 15.

The Fall of Punic Sicily (250-241)

The final phase of the war saw very little action, as the Carthaginians could not challenge the Romans on the battlefield, while the latter could not subdue Lilybaion and Drepana because they could not mount an effective sea blockade. Both sides settled into a stalemate of what was essentially trench warfare in front of the two remaining Sicilian Punic cities. This resulted in a long period of guerilla activity on Carthage's part as the government in Africa seemed to be slowly forgetting about the war. Rome did all it could to force the Punic forces out, and in the end succeeded.

Rome decided in 250 to consolidate the major victory at Panormos by constructing a fleet and laying siege by land and sea to Lilybaion.[70] They appear to have abandoned the *corvus*, as the machine is no longer mentioned. It was probably done away with in 253 after so much of the fleet was destroyed by a storm. The *corvus*, while exceptional for sea battles, made vessels top-heavy, and as a result they faired very poorly in bad weather.[71] This must have been a difficult decision for the Romans, as it returned the tactical advantage to the superior seamanship of the Carthaginians, yet the advantage the *corvus* gave them was in the end useless if the ships were merely sunk by storms. For now, the Romans had no answer to this dilemma.

Taking no chances, the Romans elected two experienced and decorated consuls to undertake the mission against Lilybaion; Lucius Manlius Vulso, consul of 256 and victor at Ekonomos, was partnered by Gaius Atilius Regulus, consul of 257 and the conqueror of Tyndaris. They began by erecting two camps on either side of the city and linking them by a palisade and a rampart with a trench in front. The entire work stretched about two kilometres in front of the entire city. Various *ballistae*, rams, and sheds were constructed on the spot, and miners, sappers,

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[70]D.S. XXIV. 1. 1, Plb. I. 39. 15.

[71]Caven 1980, p. 50, Lazenby 1996, p. 151, Scullard 1989, p. 562, Thiel 1954, p. 274, 278-279.

and rammers were employed. Fifteen light vessels were then loaded down with stones and sunk in order to hinder entrance into the harbour and give the slower Roman blockading ships less water to police. During this period a relief expedition came from Carthage and this reinforced the garrison inside the city.[72]

Except for the odd Roman assault and Punic sortie, the situation would remain much the same outside of Lilybaion for the next nine years. This was mainly due to the Punic navy and the city itself. Our first reference to Lilybaion comes from 580 when the Knidians failed in an attempt to place a colony there. Carthaginians were living on the sight by the middle of the fifth century, though it was apparently not a large settlement. The city was founded in 396 after the Syracusan destruction of Motya in the Aegates Islands. It was purpose-built as the main Punic base in Sicily, and therefore its defences were meticulously planned out; high stone walls were constructed with large towers placed at regular intervals, and a deep mote greeted any attacker before he could reach the walls. Recent excavations at modern Marsala have confirmed the strength of these defences. The harbour was also rocky and especially treacherous; Polybios (I. 42. 7) tells us that only the most experienced pilots could enter in safety. Cicero (*Verr.* V. 5. 10) called it 'the most splendid of cities' and it successfully resisted sieges by Dionysios of Syracuse in 368 and Pyrrhos in 276.[73]

The Roman assault now began. By missile fire, sapping, and ramming, they managed to quickly bring down the southwestern most tower of the city, and then moved on to topple the next six towers in succession. They continued with these tactics for several days, doing extensive damage. Inside the city the Carthaginians vigorously counter-built behind the fallen towers and

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[72]D.S. XXIV. 1. 1-2, Plb. I. 42. 8-11.

[73]Knidian colonisation attempt: D.S. IX. 9; mid-fifth century settlement: D.S. XI. 86. 2; foundation: D.S. XXII. 10. 4; walls, mote, and harbour: D.S. XXIV. 1. 2, Plb. I. 42. 7, 9; siege of 368: D.S. XV. 73. 2; siege of 276: D.S. XXII. 10. 4-7. See also Di Stefano 1984, p. 20-35, 1993, Schmiedt 1963, Stöquist 1973, p. 64, Wilson 1988, p. 158-167, 1990, p. 169.

countermined to prevent the enemy from damaging their foundations. They sortied daily and attacked the Roman breastworks, attempting to set the siege engines alight. This desperate fighting at times raged both day and night and the casualties were high on both sides during these first few months of the siege.[74]

The Romans now judged the time to be right for an attempt on the city itself. They began by filling in the moat and then staged a diversionary attack on the southwestern corner of the defences. As more and more Punic forces were diverted to the scene, the main Roman army surprised the defenders in the middle of the wall and managed to capture a section. The Carthaginians only managed to expel them with great difficulty as casualties were again high on both sides. Shortly afterwards, a Punic fleet ran the Roman blockade and dropped off 10 000 reinforcements in the city. With this new force, the Carthaginians sought to break the siege, and at first light they sortied and attempted to fire the Roman works. But the consuls had anticipated this offensive and were ready. Fighting was intense between the walls and the siege lines, as the battle descended into small pockets of combat. Eventually, the Punic army forced the Romans to retreat and destroyed several of their engines, however at the end of the day the superior skills of the legionaries won out and the Carthaginians were forced back inside the walls.[75]

Near the year's end the issue still lay largely undecided, as the Romans continued to work towards demolishing the walls so as to facilitate a successful assault. Their efforts were hampered when a strong gale arose that damaged many of the siege sheds and towers. Observing this, the Punic forces took advantage of the weather and sortied. They succeeded in firing many of the machines and towers, and then the gale spread the flames far and wide. The smoke was incredibly dense and those soldiers that did not fall from smoke inhalation were overcome by the

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[74]D.S. XXIV. 1. 1-2, Plb. I. 42. 8-13, Zonar. VIII. 15.

[75]D.S. XXIV. 1. 2-3, Plb. I. 44-46. 1.

Carthaginians. The Roman forces were now one confused mass; blinded by fire and unable to see the enemy, most of them could not even fight back. By the time the Carthaginians retired the destruction was nearly complete; the result was a complete Punic success as all the works, towers, and engines were destroyed.[76]

To make matters worse, the Roman camp was now struck by disease. Diodoros (XXIV. 1. 4) says that this came about because the Romans and their allies ate only meat, and therefore it is safe to assume that they were suffering from an outbreak of dysentery or some other parasitic disease. At about the same time, Zonaras (VIII. 15) says that the Carthaginians decided that their cavalry within Lilybaion were useless in a siege and so dispatched them to Drepana. These then took to harassing the enemy supply lines, thus making acute the Roman lack of provisions. It was only due to the persistence of King Hieron in getting supplies through that the Romans did not raise the siege. Still, large numbers of men continued to die from disease and so it was decided to send one consul with his army home for the winter. Polybios (I. 48. 10 and 11) closes out his account of this year with the remaining consul digging a trench around the city and constructing a new rampart. Both sides seemed content to settle into a siege of attrition.

At sea the Carthaginians went to great efforts to run the Roman blockade and it is out of these endeavours that Polybios (I. 46. 4-47. 10) relates one of the most famous stories of the war. The Carthaginian government sought to gain regular access to Lilybaion so that they might keep abreast of the situation inside the city. One of aristocracy came forth and offered his services as a privateer; he was Hannibal 'the Rhodian', who owned one of the fastest ships in Carthage. He would lie in wait at the Aegates Islands, and when a favourable wind came up he would streak across the harbour and into port. The Romans were powerless to catch him, even with their

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[76]D.S. XXIV. 1. 3 4, Plb. I. 48. 1-9.

fastest ships. At times he even stopped and mockingly challenged them.

Hannibal the Rhodian preformed these feats several more times and such was the swiftness of his craft and his ability as a captain that never once did the Romans even come close to catching him. His example served as an influence for some of the locals to venture out and do the same until the problem became uncontrollable for the Roman navy. Then, fortunately for them, an enemy *quadrareme* ran aground and was subsequently captured. The Romans then manned it with a picked crew and kept watch for new privateers, with a special eye for the Rhodian. Hannibal eventually showed up and was allowed to run the Roman blockade. As he weighed anchor and left Lilybaion he was surprised to see that he was actually being challenged by the Roman vessel, and it soon became apparent that he could not outrun his foe. The Romans grappled Hannibal's ship and the marines then poured over onto the deck and captured the craft. They installed a picked crew aboard Hannibal's *quinquereme* and, together with their captured *quadrareme*, managed to bring an end to all privateering at Lilybaion.

Despite the disasters of the previous year, the Romans persisted with the siege in 249. Because of a new series of raids on the Italian mainland, they now determined that they should attempt to defeat the Punic fleet operating out of Drepana and take full control of the seas. One of the new consuls, Publius Claudius Pulcher, son of Claudius Caudex, the consul of 264, was charged with the task. He sailed up the west coast and was attempting to catch the Punic fleet still in port, thus giving them little room to manoeuvre and nullifying their superior seamanship. His fleet however, was too slow and too disorganised, and this allowed the Carthaginians to quickly sail out of the harbour and make a long one hundred and eighty degree turn, putting them on the seaward (port) side of the enemy. Pulcher's plan had gone disastrously wrong; even with the element of surprise his ships were too slow and his crews too inexperienced to catch the Carthaginians in port as he had hoped. Much of the blame for this must be placed on Pulcher

himself, since the consul took the foolish step of placing himself at the rear of the Roman line, as he would have done in a land battle, instead of in the van as was normal procedure at sea. Thus the line became disorganised as the ships did not have a lead vessel by which to set their pace. When the two fleets engaged, the issue was even for a time, but eventually the superiority of the Carthaginians began to tell. If any of the Punic ships found themselves hard-pressed, they did not hesitate to withdraw and use the open sea behind them to outmanoeuvre the Romans. The Romans were crushed, losing half of their fleet.[77]

Sources, both ancient and modern, have not been very kind to Publius Claudius Pulcher. Diodoros (XXIV. 3) even goes so far as to call him 'mentally unstable' and 'a lunatic'. Modern commentators have referred to him as 'hotheaded, ruthless, tactless and insolent', and, 'an incredibly bad commander.'[78] The Romans appear to have considered him entirely culpable; Polybios (I. 52. 3) says they took the unusual step of bringing him to trial, where he was fined and only narrowly avoided execution. While Pulcher was certainly not a great general, he was probably not a simpleton. He carried out his orders from the senate that he was to make every effort at sea to relieve the pressure on Italy caused by the Punic raids. Moreover, Polybios (I. 49. 3-5) says that he consulted with his junior officers before making a final decision on the mission, and that they fully approved of his plan. His tactics were also quite sound; knowing he did not have the *corvus*, he sought to stymie the superior Punic manoeuvrability by giving battle within the confined harbour of Drepana. If he was lucky he would catch the enemy off guard and manage to sink some of their ships while still in port. The Carthaginian admiral, Adherbal, was

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[77]D.S. XXIV. 1. 5, Eutrop. II. 26. 1, Oros. IV. 10. 3, Plb. I. 49-51. For the Punic raids on Italy see Zonar. VIII. 15. Many authors record the tradition that Pulcher lost because he did not respect the divine portents before battle; while taking auspices with the sacred chickens aboard his ship, he saw that they had cast a bad omen over the mission by not eating. He therefore threw them overboard with the words, 'If they will not eat, let them drink!' (see Cic. *Div.* I. 29. 2, II. 20. 71, *ND.* 2. 7, Flor. II. 2. 29, Liv. *Per.* XIX, XXII. 42. 9, Serv. *A.* VI. 198, Suet. *Tib.* 2, Val. Max. I. 4. 3).

[78]Dorey and Dudley 1971, p. 9, Thiel 1954, p. 272.

also brilliantly swift in his response to the Roman threat and his battle plan was carried out flawlessly. Quite simply, the Romans had lost their advantage over the Carthaginians when they abandoned the *corvus*; without it, they were reduced to inexperienced sailors who were easily outmanoeuvred by their enemy.

After the battle, Dio (XXXVI. 34. 3), Livy (*Per.* XIX), and Zonaras (VIII. 15) relate how Pulcher was forced to abdicate and a dictator, Appius Atilius Caiatinus, consul of 258 and 254, was named in his stead. He was sent to take over the land forces in Sicily and became the first dictator in Roman history to command outside of Italy. The other consul, Lucius Iunius Pullus, sailed a fleet to Messana and there met up with the ships that had survived Drepana. From thence he sailed south to Syracuse where the fleet put in to collect supplies. On the way back to Lilybaion a Roman advance fleet encountered a Punic squadron, fresh from a damaging raid on the Roman positions at Lilybaion, at Phintias near the centre of the south coast. Outnumbered, outclassed, and fearing another defeat, the Romans decided to defend themselves on land. They set up various kinds of *ballistae* with which to meet a Punic landing. At first, the Carthaginians sought to blockade them, hoping that the threat of an attack would be enough to force the Romans to retreat, but when they saw that they were standing their ground, they assaulted the beached Roman ships. This is the only example from the ancient world outside of a siege where artillery was used from land positions in a battle against ships. The fighting was heavy and finally the Carthaginians broke off the assault having sunk a number of transports and *quinqueremes*. They journeyed west and put in at the Halykos where they planned to wait in ambush for the Romans. By now Pullus had met up with his advance fleet and together they continued towards Lilybaion. They were soon met by the Carthaginian fleet and the Romans turned and fled in the direction of Syracuse, pursued by the Carthaginians. They anchored off Kamarina with the Punic fleet waiting for them to make a move. Then some of the Punic captains warned their admiral that

a storm was fast approaching and as a result he took his fleet to safety around Cape Pachynos. The Romans had no such experience amongst their crews, and once again were ravaged by the weather.[79] Rome had lost a third fleet in just six years. Polybios (I. 55. 2) says that Italy now simply did not have enough adult males left alive to man a new fleet, and the Romans contented themselves with controlling the land only, which unfortunately rendered their siege of Lilybaion useless as the city was easily supplied by sea.

Being impotent at sea, the Romans decided to act on land and lay siege to Drepana as well. In early 248 Pullus seized Mount Eryx near the city and, leaving a 3000 man garrison, proceeded to fortify the adjacent hill of Aigithallos with eight hundred soldiers. Mount Eryx is a highly defensible position over six hundred metres in height with steep, and at times sheer, sides. The remains of Punic defences can still be seen around the modern town, and the site is now home to a Norman castle. This manoeuvre by the Romans effectively put Drepana under siege as well from the city's landward side. The Carthaginians took action immediately and staged an amphibious assault of the area. As a final insult to the sufferings of the Romans over the past two years, the garrison atop Aigithallos was not only routed but Iunius Pullus was captured as well.[80]

In this year trouble appears to have arisen again in Africa and this, combined with the governments declining interest in Sicilian affairs, made it impossible for the Carthaginians in Sicily to follow up their victories. For events happening after the new consuls took office our main sources of Diodoros and Polybios are silent, and the year's action is recorded only by Orosius (IV. 10. 4) and Zonaras (VIII. 16). In this year the treaty with Hieron of Syracuse, made in 263, had

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[79]D.S. XXIV. 1. 6-9, Plb. I. 53. 2-54. 8.

[80]D.S. XXIV. 10-11, Plb. I. 55. 5-7, 10, Zonar. VIII. 15.

now expired, and Rome decided to reward him for his loyalty and service by renewing it for life.[81] Rome also cancelled the rest of the tribute owed to them, as the king had been of invaluable service during this war and it could even be said that it may not have been won without his efforts to resupply them in front of Agrigentum and Lilybaion. The Carthaginians returned to their policy of carrying the war to Italy through damaging and far-reaching raids. In Sicily the Punic army faced a revolt from some of its mercenaries over the arrears of their pay, and many were marooned on deserted islands while the rest of the mutineers were sent to Africa to fight in the wars there.

Hanno the Great and his faction of Carthaginian landlords were now becoming very powerful within the Punic capital. At the beginning of 247 they scored a major victory by getting rid of one of their main political rivals: Hamilcar, leader of the Barca family.[82] There is little doubt that Hamilcar Barca favoured overseas expansion; his policies in Sicily and later in Spain that were passed down to his son-in-law Hasdrubal and to his son Hannibal speak for themselves. Hamilcar and Hanno would be bitter enemies after the war, and it was probably no different now. Hamilcar's appointment to the Sicilian command should not be seen as a promotion or commendation, but as a way of removing him from politics in Carthage. That Hanno continued to exercise power right until the end of the war is illustrated by the virtual abandonment of the Punic forces operating in Sicily. After seventeen years the war in Sicily must have been quite an expense for the Carthaginians, and one is given a strong sense that there was a significant proportion of the ruling class who incurred little or no benefit from the maintenance of the overseas empire. The government in Africa appears to have ceased caring about the First Punic

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[81]*Contra* Eckstein 1987, p. 128-129, who claims that after 248 only a state of *amicitia* existed between Rome and Syracuse, which was not formalised by a treaty.

[82]App. *Hisp.* 4, D.S. XXIV. 10. 2, Plb. I. 72. 1-5, 74. 7.

War, as demonstrated by Hamilcar's lack of reinforcements and the gradual diminishing of his fleet.

Upon Hamilicar's arrival in Sicily, many of the mercenaries were still in open rebellion. He ambushed the rebels at night and slaughtered many of them, ending the mutiny. He then continued his predecessors' policy of raiding Italy to divert forces from Drepana and Lilybaion, ravaging the territory of Bruttium and Locris in the toe of the peninsula. In Sicily he attacked Herkte on the northwest coast and succeeded in taking the place. This now became his main base of operations; he fortified a nearby hill that was easily defendable and gave him command of the surrounding country.[83] The ancient site of Herkte has been identified as Monte Pellegrino six kilometres north of Panormos. As Panormos was the base of operations for the Roman campaigns in the west, by seizing Herkte, Hamilcar struck at the very heart of Roman territory and severely restricted their movement and supply channels. The location of Herkte however, has recently been challenged; Lazenby (1996, p. 147-148) claims that the hill upon which sat Herkte was not Monte Pellegrino but, 'Monte Castellachio about six miles (ten kilometres) to the north.' He thinks that Monte Pellegrino is too small to have held a military base. Unfortunately, he is mistaken on several counts. Monte Castellachio, normally spelt Castellazzo, is not six miles to the north of Monte Pellegrino, but is in fact eight kilometres (five miles) to the west. Of the remains found on the two hills, Monte Castellazzo has yielded mostly native Elymian and imported Korinthian wares, where as on Monte Pellegrino an abundance of Punic material has been unearthed, leaving little doubt that the place was home to a Carthaginian settlement.[84] In his notes, Lazenby (1996, p. 190 n. 7, where he spells the name 'Castellaccio'), in agreement with Giustolisi (1975, p. 34), goes on to say that Herkte may also have been Monte Pecoraro, eleven

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[83]Plb. I. 56. 2-3, 6, 9.

[84]Monte Pellegrino: Wilson 1995-1996, p. 102; Monte Castellazzo: Calascibetta 1990, p. 19.

kilometres west of Monte Castellazzo, because of traces of a Punic camp that have been found there. Having toured the area with Dr Stefano Vasalo of the Palermo Museum and Prof. Roger Wilson, it seems that the Punic military had over time fortified just about all the high ground in the region between Panormos and Drepana, and traces of many camps are visible today. Yet no place in the area has yielded the amount of Punic wares that have been found at Monte Pellegrino, and this suggests that the hill was not just a campsite but was in fact a fortified town, something that can be claimed for no other place in the immediate vicinity. Therefore, I believe that there is strong evidence to suggest that Herkte, along with the base of Hamilcar, was located on Monte Pellegrino.[85]

In response to the raids in Italy, the government in Rome lent its unused warships to bands of privateers who wished to raid enemy territory. As with most privateering, the main initiative behind these raids was profit, specifically plunder. Zonaras (VIII. 16) relates how they made quite a successful raid on Hippo Acra on the African coast, starting a fire in the harbour and in the city. Zonaras also implies that this privateering went on right until 242, when Rome took to the sea again.

Outside Drepana, the Romans staged a night assault on the island of Pelias, less than half a kilometre from Drepana. They managed to take the place and massacre the garrison, thus, hemming in Drepana slightly more on the city's seaward side and compensating for their lack of a navy. Hamilcar reacted quickly; Zonaras (VIII. 16) relates how very next morning he went to Drepana and led a counterattack on Pelias. The Romans on the mainland, prevented from rescuing their comrades because of the Punic fleet, attacked the undermanned defences of Drepana, and eventually forced Hamilcar to withdraw to protect the city. At the end of the year,

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[85]Wilson 1995-1996, p. 102, claims that Monte Pellegrino was in fact Herkte, and his opinion is echoed by most archaeologists, including Dr Vasalo, currently working in Palermo Province.

Iunius Pullus, the captured consul of 249, returned to Rome through ransom or a prisoner exchange. Like Claudius Pulcher before him, the Roman people sought to put him on trial for ignoring the auspices, resulting in the loss of the fleet in the storm off Kamarina. Pullus committed suicide before proceedings could begin.[86]

On the events of 246 and 245, all our sources are silent save for Polybios (I. 56. 9-11, 57. 3-8), and even he is brief. It seems that the war had bogged down again into a stalemate with neither side being able to fully dislodge the other. Rome continued to besiege Lilybaion with a full landward blockade of trenches and palisades, while at Drepana, Rome controlled much of the surrounding country and this forced the population to remain within the city walls. Both cities however, were easily supplied by sea and this has much to do with their holding out for so long. Hamilcar from his base at Herkte staged a campaign of guerilla warfare on the Romans at Drepana and Lilybaion, but the enemy positions were too well fortified for him to do much damage. He continued his raids on Italy, even venturing as far as Cumae in Campania. The Romans hit back at Hamilcar by sallying out of Panormos and setting up a fortified camp less than two kilometers from Herkte. Engagements occurred sometimes on a daily basis along these three fronts of Herkte-Panormos, Drepana, and Lilybaion. A combination of raids, assaults, ambushes, and sorties were kept up by both sides constantly from the end of 247 until the beginning of 244. In that year, the twentieth year since the war began, Hamilcar decided to break the stalemate by striking at the Romans. Hoping to relieve Drepana, he staged an amphibious assault on Eryx by night. Leading the army himself, he first attacked the city at the base of the hill and succeeded in capturing the place. While fighting was still going on in the town, he made an attempt on the summit where the Romans had fortified a camp. This charge was slowed by the fact that some

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[86]Cic. *Div.* 1. 29, 2. 20, 71, *ND.* 2. 7, Minuc. Felix, 7. 4, 26. 2, Val. Max. I. 4. 3.

of his men had stopped to plunder. The Romans then attacked these soldiers and succeeded in killing many before the Carthaginians were rescued by a small band of cavalry. Hamilcar then returned, and a fragment of Diodoros (XXIV. 8) suggests that he massacred the remaining Romans. He then resumed his assault on the summit but was unable to dislodge the garrison. The Romans at Drepana then surrounded the hill and put Hamilcar himself under a state of siege. A fourth front was now created and for two years Hamilcar managed to maintain himself in between the two Roman forces.[87]

At last in early 242 Rome was again strong enough to attempt to break the deadlock. Strong enough, but not rich enough. Unable to make any headway on land, they knew that the issue had to be decided at sea, as both Lilybaion and Drepana were constantly being resupplied, mooting the effect of their landward blockades. Drepana had been under siege for six years, and Lilybaion for eight, and neither showed signs of giving in as long as their harbours were open. Twenty-one years of warfare had emptied the Roman coffers, and there was no money left to either build a fleet or pay for crews. Polybios (I. 59. 1-2) says that the situation was the same at Carthage. To remedy this, the Roman government struck a deal with some of the wealthier citizens to bankroll a new fleet. This money would be repaid after the war if Rome was victorious. A number of authors have suggested that this loan was not made out of patriotic spirit, as Polybios claims; it was either fully compulsory or the these men were firmly pressured to pay.[88] It seems likely however, that many of those paying would themselves have been in the senate, where this motion took shape, and therefore if it was unwanted, it could easily have been voted down. We need only look as far as the trierarchs of Athens for such a precedent of such

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[87]D.S. XXIV. 8-9. 1, Plb. I. 58. 2-4.

[88]Frank 1954, p. 691, de Sanctis 1923, p. 184 n. 87, Scullard 1989, p. 564, Thiel 1954, p. 302-303, Walbank 1957, I, p. 123-124. In agreement with Polybios are Caven 1980, p. 60, Dorey and Dudley 1971, p. 23, Lazenby 1996, p. 150.

patriotism. Furthermore, as previously argued (see above, p. 18-21), a group of powerful merchants at Rome may have started the war to eliminate their Punic trading rivals and gain access to closed ports in the western Mediterranean. Perhaps they appealed to the senate for a new fleet in 242, and their request was only granted if they financed the construction themselves.

Individuals or groups of two or three men came together to finance one boat, and enough money was raised to build, equip, and man a fleet of two hundred new *quinqueremes*, using the *quinquereme* of Hannibal the Rhodian as a model.[89] The fleet left Italy in the early summer of 242. As confirmed by Polybios (I. 59. 9), the Punic fleet in Sicily was now completely gone, and the new Roman fleet was therefore able to seize the harbours at both Drepana and Lilybaion in rapid succession. Although the ports had always been open to Punic supply runs, it would appear as though, in absence of the Roman blockade, the fleet had been withdrawn for service in Africa. Putting in at Eryx, the consul Gaius Lutatius Catulus built a full set of siege works at Drepana and completely surrounded the city on the landward side, as had been done at Lilybaion in 250. While this was going on, he trained his fresh crews on a daily basis in the waters around eastern Sicily. After several months, when all was prepared, he assaulted Drepana by sea and land and demolished a section of the wall. The city was on the verge of being breached when he was wounded in the thigh, causing the attack to collapse as the legionaries rushed to protect their fallen commander.[90]

As the situation in Sicily was now desperate, the Carthaginians sent out a new fleet to break the Roman blockade and resupply the garrisons on 9 March 241. The Carthaginians planned to copy the tactics of Hannibal the Rhodian; they would put in at the Aegates Islands and

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[89]Plb. I. 59. 6-8.

[90]D.S. XXIV. 11. 1, Eutrop. II. 27. 1, Naev. *Poen.* fr. 64B, Oros. IV. 10. 5, Plb. I. 59. 8-12, Val. Max. II. 8. 2, Zonar. VIII. 17.

await a favourable wind. They would then ride this wind into Eryx and there unload the supplies. Hamilcar Barca was then to break though the Roman siege lines so as to join the fleet and have his experienced troops serve as marines. When news reached him that a Carthaginian fleet was at the Aegates, Catulus positioned his navy overnight about sixteen kilometres from the Punic ships; he was determined to catch them in open waters before they could unload their supplies and take aboard marines. On the morning of 10 March a favourable wind was blowing for the Carthaginians, and they attempted their run.[91] Polybios (I. 61. 2, 4) says that now the situation was reversed as compared to the rest of the sea battles in the war. It was now the Romans who had the trained crews and the quick, well built boats, while the Carthaginians had hastily raised levies who were unskilled at manoeuvring. What is more, Carthage actually outnumbered Rome here, where as usually it was the other way around. Furthermore, it was the Punic plan to rely mainly on the strength of Barca's marines, while Rome would use ramming tactics; exactly the opposite of their previous encounters. The Roman fleet was too quick for the Carthaginians, and the latter were forced to turn and prepare for a fight.

The battle was hard fought but did not last very long. In a short span of time both sides lost nearly half of their forces. But eventually Roman mobility and ramming tactics left the Carthaginian fleet the worse for wear, and when the wind changed and blew towards Carthage, the Punic navy did not hesitate, they raised their sails and retreated home.[92] The Carthaginians, for so long masters of the western Mediterranean, had been humbled by superior seamanship.

It would appear that the reason for this defeat was that the Punic ships were both

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[91]Plb. I. 60. 3-61. 1.

[92]The main accounts of the battle come from D.S. XXIV. 11. 1-3, Plb. I. 61. 3-62. 8, Zonar. VIII. 17. For other accounts see Amp. 46. 3, Auct. *Vir. Ill.* 41. 1, Flor. II. 27. 33-37, Eutrop. II. 27, *Ined. Vat.* 5, Liv. *Per.* XIX, XXII. 14. 13, XXIII. 13. 3-4, XXVIII. 38. 9, 41. 3, XLV. 38. 4, Nep. *Ham.* 1. 3, Oros. IV. 10. 4-8, Naev. *Poen.* fr. 48, 50-51B, Sil. VI. 684-688, Val. Max. II. 8. 2, Var. *Hist. Urb. ap.* Non. 887L. Coins commemorating the battle show Catulus receiving the *Corona Civica*, see *RRC* I, p. 315.

inexperienced and undermanned. Polybios (I. 62. 6, 8) says that the Romans captured seventy ships and 10 000 men. As we know that the ships had few marines, if any, because they were not able to rendezvous with Hamilcar, this gives us an average of one hundred and forty-three men taken per ship; less than half the normal contingent of sailors aboard a *quinquereme*. This figure includes men who would have been captured from ships that had sunk, as Diodoros (XXIV. 11. 3) says many of these men were taken prisoner as well, thus making the average per ship even lower. There exists a strong possibility that this was an entirely new fleet, and the lack of rowers aboard each ship may have affected its manoeuvrability. The naval crews fighting for Carthage were normally recruited or conscripted from the subject states in Africa. At this point however, many of these were in revolt, forcing Carthage to take crews from its main citizen body, which was a rarity, and there may not have been enough citizens available to man the entire fleet. Therefore, Carthage decided to send out each ship undermanned rather than dispatch a small fully manned squadron.

Aftermath

Polybios (I. 62. 1-3) says the Carthaginians could no longer supply their forces on Sicily as the Romans now had supreme command of the sea, and upon learning of their defeat they decided to immediately sue for peace. The government in Africa therefore gave Hamilcar full plenipotentiary powers. While these events were going on in Carthage, Catulus resumed his offensive and scored a small victory over Hamilcar at Eryx, where the legionaries slew 2000 enemy soldiers in the final battle of the war.[93] Hamilcar sent Gesco, the commander at Lilybaion, to negotiate an armistice. The Carthaginians had to surrender money, grain, and hostages while

[93]Oros. IV. 10. 8.

these talks were taking place. On his part, Catulus was anxious to conclude a peace since his consulship was coming to an end and he did not want his thunder stolen by a successor. He was therefore inclined to be more lenient that usual towards Hamilcar and allowed him to evacuate Sicily without surrendering his arms or passing under the yoke. A sticking point was the return of deserters, which Hamilcar sought to keep, as they feared Roman reprisals. Unfortunately for them Rome considered the returning of deserters to be extremely important, and in the end they were handed over.[94] Eventually a treaty was made; its conditions however, were subject to ratification in Rome, and for this purpose ten commissioners were sent down to review the situation.[95] This delegation was headed by one of the new consuls for 241, Quintus Lutatius Cerco, Catulus' brother. Cerco was also to organise the new Roman territory of Sicily after the treaty was ratified. The commissioners were unsatisfied with the conditions hastily imposed on their enemy by Catulus, and they stiffened some of the clauses.[96] The indemnity was raised by 1000 talents, perhaps so the Roman government could begin to repay the loans it had taken out to finance the building of a fleet in the previous year.[97]

Hamilcar took his troops from Eryx to Lilybaion and surrendered his command to Gesco. Then all Punic soldiers were transferred from Herkte, Heraklea Minoa, Drepana, and Lilybaion to Carthage. They were sent in small groups so as to lessen the burden on the African population once they arrived. Their pay was also severely in arrears and it was the intention of Gesco to have

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[94]For Roman attitudes towards deserters see Liv. XXV. 28.

[95]For the treaty of 241 see Serrati forthcoming.

[96]Primarily see Plb. I. 62-63. 3, III. 21. 2-3, 29. 2, 30. 3, Zonar. VIII. 17. See also App. *Sic.* 2, Corn. Auct. *Vir. Ill.* 41. 1, Nep. *Ham.* 1. 5, Eutrop. 2. 27, Liv. *Per.* XIX, XXI. 18. 8-10, XXI. 19. 2, XXX. 22. 4, XXX. 44. 1, Naev. fr. 48, 60B, Oros. IV. 11. 1, Sil. Ital. 13. 729-31.

[97]Hoyos 1998, p. 120.

the Punic government pay them as they came in and then to dispatch them before more arrived.[98] Unfortunately, all did not go according to plan, and this eventually resulted in a large scale mercenary revolt known as the Truceless War (240-237) between the Carthaginians and their former mercenaries.[99] On Sicily, when the last Carthaginian ships left, the Romans took full control of the island, bringing the First Punic War to a close.

In the end, it was Carthage who had lost the war more than Rome had won it. One cannot take credit away from Rome however; the dogged determination of the government, the military, the Roman people, and the allies made victory possible, and arguably inevitable. The ability to bounce back from so many disasters reveals the sinews with which the Roman Empire was founded. They were never afraid to adopt the methods of their enemies when these proved superior; previously, they had adopted Gallic weapons and Samnite tactics when fighting these peoples, and in the First Punic War, a region known for the skill of its infantrymen took to the sea for the first time, not with reservation or hesitation, but with force. The war also saw the emergence of the legionary system as a fighting force of international repute, replacing the Greek phalanx as the premier infantry formation in the Mediterranean. At Panormos in 251, the Romans proved that, when handled properly, Italian heavy infantry had no equals. The war also saw the beginnings of the command system that would see the Republic through the dark days of the Second Punic War. Logistical realities now forced the legions to remain in the field for the entire year, and the army took a step towards professionalism as soldiers were no longer discharged at the end of a campaign season. Three consuls had their *imperium* prorogued as the government began to realise that commands of more permanency were necessary to win extended conflicts. In this we may see the origins of the system of extended commands and the appointment of *legati*

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[98]Plb. I. 66. 1-5, Zonar. VIII. 17.

[99]See D.S. XXV. 2-8, Plb. I. 66. 6-88. 7.

that emerged at the end of the third century. Yet still the senate provided the only truly consistent command base, and as a result the war caused senators to coalesce into a more homogeneous body, and this unity would again serve them well in the war with Hannibal. The economy of Italy was also forever changed by the mass enslavements from this war; it is at this time, not at the end of the Second Punic War, that we can see the beginnings of the massive slave economy which marked the late Republic and Empire periods.[100]

While the Roman army gained a vast amount of experience in this conflict by fighting diversified professional armies and by adopting some Hellenistic siege techniques, the greatest innovation for Roman from a military point of view came with its new found dominance of the sea. Previously, the Romans had maintained only a few warships for the purposes of coastal defence and for transporting ambassadors. In 311 the office of the *douviri navales* was created and Rome built its first squadron of twenty ships.[101] These ships were used in minor offensive roles, raiding enemy coastlines and blockading ports during sieges. By 260 it appears that the senate came to the realisation that in order to conquer an island from a naval power, then a proper fleet must be constructed. Inexperienced at sea, the Romans must have relied heavily upon the *socii navales* from the coastal cities of Italy. From their initial successes with the *corvus*, where they succeeded in turning sea battles into land battles, the navy underwent a series of major catastrophes, that saw them banished from the water for seven years. But by the time a new fleet was constructed in 242, the Romans appear to have gained a wealth of experience at sea. This they confirmed by crushing the Carthaginians at the Aegates Islands and winning the war.

Roman dominance of the sea from this point onwards is something that has been overlooked by nearly all military historians of the mid-Republic. It would seem that the modern

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[100]Cornell 1996, p. 98.

[101]Liv. IX. 30. 4. For the history of the early Roman navy see Thiel 1954, p. 1-9, 47-54.

fame of the legions has overshadowed the fact that, for the third century at least, the Romans were just as powerful, and just as feared, at sea as they were on land. The war in Sicily made Rome the masters of the western Mediterranean, and had established a reputation for themselves in the east as well. This would explain their supremacy in the Adriatic during the 220s, and the fact that in the Second Punic War Philip V of Macedonia preferred to burn his fleet and retreat by land rather than face the Roman navy.[102] For the latter conflict in particular, complete Roman dominance of the sea dictated the course of the war. Their shear presence in the west made Hannibal, and later his brother Hasdrubal, decide to invade Italy by land. Furthermore, the fleet kept them and the army in Sicily from being resupplied; it prevented Philip from entering the war in Italy; it allowed Rome to act with virtual impunity in the Aegean, especially impressive under the watchful eye of the Hellenistic navy of Pergamon; and in general went a long way towards giving the Romans victory in this war of attrition by permitting them to continuously supply their forces in Greece, Sicily, Spain, and Africa.[103] The seeds of all of this were sown in Sicily during the First Punic War.

During the war it was always the Romans who acted, and the Carthaginians who reacted. From the very beginning the Romans fought this war with the intention of winning, whereas the opposite was true with Carthage. They fought a defensive war, always dancing to the Roman tune. They only committed themselves so far as was necessary to protect their territory, and this was their undoing. They made a cardinal mistake in not fermenting the alliance with Syracuse, and allowed Rome to pounce on their error. They only attempted any real offensive operations in 260. It seems incredible that they did not accomplish more with their mastery of the sea between 264 and 260 and again from 249 to 245. They seemed content just to harass the

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[102]Liv. XXIV. 40. 17.

[103]See Rankov 1996.

Romans, perhaps hoping for a peace that would preserve the *status quo* and allow them to retain their trading empire. In Sicily, the Carthaginians had been fighting the Greeks for centuries, and the island was normally divided between the two powers. Only on a few occasions did one side nearly conquer the entire island, but in the end neither ever succeeded. This was the type of fighting to which the Punic government was accustomed, and it was this *status quo* that they fought to maintain.

In addition, the Carthaginians could never fully marshal their military capabilities because of the problems they were experiencing in Africa. Although the mission ended in defeat, the Roman invasion in 256 was not a total failure as it caused many of the Punic subject states to rise in revolt. These rebellions would plague Carthage on and off for the rest of the war, and serve to divert resources from the Sicilian theatre to the home front.

The First Punic War bled Rome as much as the more famous Hannibalic conflict; many modern commentators fail to realise that thousands of Italian men died in sea or land battles, storms, or by disease. The war tested the mettle of the Roman alliance system in Italy just as much as Hannibal, and it showed that the Romans had created a new style of empire, based not on monetary tribute but on contributions of manpower. This is what truly gave the Romans the overwhelming advantage. The war also tested the Roman resolve not to be defeated, and it illustrated the willingness of the populace to campaign year after year after so many of their predecessors had fallen. Many states would have sued for peace after the disasters of 255, 253, 249, and 248, but the Romans fought on until their goal was attained.

Relations between Rome and Carthage continued along the same vein as before the war. Between 241 and the outbreak of the Second Punic War in 218, the two powers largely mistrusted each other, and with the resurgence of Punic power a new war was on the horizon. Sicily would again play a role in the conflict, as Hieron supplied the Romans with provisions and

mercenaries. But when Syracuse switched sides upon the latter's death, the legions returned to the island, and delivered a death blow to the last remnants of an independent Sicily.

Chapter 5
The Second Punic War

In many ways the Second Punic War should be seen as a direct continuation of the first conflict. Rome had traditionally been the weaker of the two states, but in 241 it had emerged decisively victorious over Carthage. The First Punic War not only gave Rome Sicily, but also the dominance of the western Mediterranean Sea, as no one in the region had a fleet that could match the Roman navy. This is highly significant, as for the first time in centuries these waters were controlled by a non-Phoenician power. Military, Rome was now superior to Carthage in every aspect save one - generalship. Polybios (III. 9. 7-9) claimed that the origins of the second conflict between Rome and Carthage emerged from the first war and the events that directly followed. Hamilcar Barca felt that he had not been beaten, and that he could have held out longer in Sicily had his home government offered him better support. Immediately after the peace of 241 Hamilcar began to plot a war of revenge. Whether Polybios' 'wrath of the Barcids' is an accurate portrayal of the causes of the war does not concern us here, though one thing is certain: in 218 Hannibal and the Carthaginian government felt no qualms about beginning a new war with Rome; the swiftness of their reaction to the Roman declaration of hostilities strongly suggests that they had not only been planning for a war, but had actually sought open conflict. These immediate feelings against Rome may have stemmed from the seizure of Sardinia in 237, or the Roman interference in Spain throughout the 220s.

So after twenty-three years, only two years longer than the interim between the two world wars of modern times, Carthage was once again ready to challenge Rome, only this time it would be Rome who would fight for the defence of its own territory, choosing to remain within the cities and avoiding open battle. This time a new Barca, Hannibal son of Hamilcar, would carry the war to Italy and bring the Republic to its knees. For Sicily, the Second Punic War was significantly

different then its predecessor. Firstly, most of the conflict would take place on land, while previously the war between Rome and Carthage over Sicily was characterised by sea battles. The island was not the prize that it was in 264, as it was now merely a part of the growing Roman world. In the First Punic War, Sicily was a confined theatre of operations; it was the first time that the Romans had attempted to conquer an area outside of the Italian peninsula, and it was, militarily at least, a new and uncharted part of the Hellenistic world. But nearly half a century later the Romans practised imperialism on a grander scale; Sicily was no longer a separate entity to the Romans, but it was one of two provinces and only one of several areas where they held military, political, and economic interests. By 218, the Roman view of Sicily had become similar to the way the Carthaginians saw the island prior to 241 - it was a part, albeit an importance and lucrative one, of a larger empire that existed mainly for the purposes of exploitation.

The high water mark of the conflict on Sicily came between 215-211 with the defection, siege, and eventual fall of Syracuse. Although for these years the city was a Punic ally, unlike the first war there were relatively few Carthaginians present, and the combat was characterised by fighting between Romans and Sicilian Greeks. Prior to 215, Syracuse was not part of the Roman domain on Sicily; it was under the leadership of the staunchest of Roman allies, King Hieron II. Yet when the city defected to Carthage under the his grandson and successor, Hieronymos, it was seen as an act of rebellion. While Syracuse was technically independent and outside the *provincia* of the Roman praetor, it was still a place where Roman *autoritas* and *imperium* had to be respected, and any dissension would not be tolerated. The capture of Syracuse was the last act of Roman military imperialism in Sicily, and the island, although it would retain its Greek culture and language, was to remain exclusively in Roman hands for the next seven centuries.

The purpose of this chapter is to threefold. Firstly, it serves to illustrate the importance of Sicily in the Second Punic War, concentrating on why the security of the island was crucial for

a Roman victory; it will also relate the significance of the siege of Syracuse for Roman military history, as never before had the Roman army taken such an immense Hellenistic fortress by force; and finally the chapter seeks to examine the narrative for the years 218-216 and 210-191, something that has been ignored by almost all modern scholars, as they have sought to concentrate on Rome's struggles firstly in Italy then in Africa during these years. The brevity of the conflict on the island should not detract from the importance of Sicily during the Second Punic War. The island had always been the key to controlling the western Mediterranean, and therefore it was considered vital to both parties involved in the conflict. The main theatre of the war however, would be Italy from 218 until 205, as Hannibal sought to unravel the Roman system of alliances on the peninsula with quick offensive campaigning. In 204 Publius Cornelius Scipio invaded Africa and the main area of fighting shifted there until the war's end in 201. For most of the conflict, Sicily was a vital source of grain for the Roman armies serving around the Mediterranean, and was important as a base from which to patrol the seas and to launch raids on Africa.[1] Yet from 214 to 211 Carthage made a desperate bid to reconquer the island and for these years Sicily was the main focus of both governments. By retaking Sicily, Carthage would have not only relieved the pressure of the Roman raids on Africa, but, more importantly, would have been able to form a direct line between Carthage and Hannibal's position in southern Italy. Hannibal could have been easily resupplied and reinforced, thus changing the course, and possibly the outcome, of the entire war. While it would be an overstatement to say that Rome's final victory in Sicily won them the war, it is notable that this victory greatly helped seal Hannibal's fate in Italy. With the Roman possession of Sicily, a major supply route was closed to him, and all that remained was for Rome to find a way of striking a decisive blow. Sicily did indeed play a major

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[1]Raids on Africa were launched from Sicily in 217: Liv. XXII. 31. 1-7, Plb. III. 96. 8-14; possibly 216: Liv. XXII. 37. 9; 215: XXIII. 41. 8-9; 211: XXV. 31. 12-15; 210: XXVII. 5. 1, 8-15; 208: XXVII. 22. 8-9, 29. 7-8; 207: XXVIII. 4. 5-8; and 205: XXIX. 1. 14, 3. 6-5. 1.

role in the defeat of Hannibal. In 205 it served as the training ground for Scipio's troops and then in 204 it was the embarkation point for the invasion of Africa. The island was then the main link in Scipio's supply line.

Any examination of Sicily during this period would not be complete without first exploring the independent kingdom of Syracuse. King Hieron II, while very much a Roman client king, can be seen as acting in his own self-interest. His economic and foreign policy permitted Syracuse, under the protection of Rome, to experience a period of economic prosperity, and allowed him to act as an equal to the Hellenistic monarchs of the eastern Mediterranean.

The Kingdom of Hieron

Upon their arrival in Sicily in 264, the Romans found the island dominated by King Hieron II of Syracuse. He began his ascent to power with his election as a Syracusan general in 275. He sided with a popular faction and in 271 was made *strategos autokrator*, or general plenipotentiary, a position traditionally occupied by Syracusan strongmen before they became tyrants.[2] He then entered into the war with the Mamertines, as discussed in the previous chapter; defeated in 269, he won a resounding victory four years later, and was afterwards declared king. In the First Punic War he originally sided with Carthage, but Hieron received little aid from them, and, facing a Roman siege, switched sides and concluded a treaty with Rome in 263. He remained a steadfast ally to the Romans, and gave them aid and supplies on several occasions. As a sign of gratitude, his treaty was renewed for life in 248.

Hieron ruled Syracuse for the next three decades, although the latter part of his reign was not without dissent. In 218, when the consul Sempronius was crossing to Sicily with his army for

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[2]Davies 1993, p. 195, 249, Grimal 1968, p. 71, Hoyos 1998, p. 39, Karlsson 1993, p. 31.

the planned invasion of Africa, the Syracusan navy, under the king's personal supervision, ferried the Romans across the Straits of Messana. There, Hieron warned Sempronius that the cities of the west coast were ripe to declare for Carthage.[3] It has been suggested that here, Hieron actually meant that Syracuse itself was also ready to revolt and to forsake the Roman alliance.[4] There is evidence to show that there was strong anti-monarchial sentiment at Syracuse. Polybios (VII. 3. 5-8) claims that upon hearing a rumour about the death of Hieron, the praetor at Lilybaion despatched fifty ships to Syracuse since he was fearful of revolution, as the anti-royal sentiment among the people was well known. When the fleet reached Cape Pachynos however, they heard that the king was in fact still alive and they therefore returned to Lilybaion.[5] Furthermore, when the monarchy fell in 215 with the death of Hieronymos, Hieron's grandson, Livy (XXIV. 7. 7, 21. 3, 7-9) speaks of celebrations in both Leontini and Syracuse. Afterwards, the ruling council issued an order to hunt down and kill every last member of the former royal family. This decree was viciously carried out so that men, women, and children were all slaughtered with such brutality that apparently some of the councilors were even disgusted. This all points to strong anti-Hieronic sentiment at Syracuse. Hieron's tax on grain was levied directly on the farmers, not the landlords, and this could possibly have led to feelings of resentment towards the king from the masses. Perhaps worsening the situation, Hieron would at times use this grain to lavish gifts upon Rome and his contemporaries in the Greek East. The assassination of Hieronymos shows that there was also an anti-royal faction among the aristocracy, who probably saw themselves as

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[3]Liv. XXI. 50. 7-10.

[4]Berve 1959, p. 77, Goldsberry 1973, p. 159, 227.

[5]Polybios does not date this passage, however we know from Livy (XXI. 51. 7) that the Roman fleet at Lilybaion was not fifty strong until 218, and therefore this event took place sometime between the latter date and the king's actual death three years later.

excluded from the power and the profit of the Syracusan Empire.[6]

At some point during his reign, Hieron appointed his son Gelon as co-ruler.[7] According to Livy (XXIII. 30. 10-12), after the Battle of Cannae, Gelon sided against his father and espoused the Punic cause. Punic raids on the Syracusan coast in this year can be seen as a show of support for Gelon.[8] While the young co-ruler may have been bribed with promises of power by pro-Carthaginian forces within Syracuse, or by the Carthaginians themselves, the fact that he found backing from some of the lower classes illustrates a degree of discontent with the rule of Hieron. But the coup would come to nothing as Gelon died in mysterious circumstances within a short time. Polybios (VII. 8. 9) gives us the impression that Gelon sought to be neither wealthy nor powerful but only to honour his parents. Polybios probably took this idealised portrait of Gelon from Fabius Pictor, who would have attempted to hide any dissent in Syracuse and to show Rome's ally Hieron in the greatest possible light.[9] Livy (XXIII. 30. 10-12) paints a very different picture; when Gelon sided with Carthage, he went out into the streets to arm the people and win new allies. That he found immediate backing from the masses for his scheme clearly shows the level of popular discontent with Hieron's rule, though throughout the coming struggle with Rome a significant part of the populace did retain its desire for peace and alliance with the Romans. Perhaps the revolt failed since it found no support from the upper classes. Even the anti-royals among the aristocrats would have seen that Hieron was still too powerful and his mercenaries still too loyal for any coup to succeed. Of the two accounts of the life of Gelon, while Polybios had no reason to lie, we must believe Livy since this is the best way of explaining the pro-Carthaginian

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[6]See Liv. XXIV. 7. 2-6, 21. 4-7.

[7]D.S. XXVI. 15. 1. Coins from this period show Gelon with a diadem; see Caccamo Caltabiano *et al.* 1997, p. 77-82, pl. 24-30, Head 1911, p. 184.

[8]Liv. XXII. 56. 6-8.

[9]Walbank 1967, II, p. 41-42.

sentiments of his son Hieronymos. As for why Gelon rebelled, judging from the way the Carthaginians wooed Hieronymos to their side, in all likelihood Gelon would have been bribed.[10] The co-ruler had little reason to espouse the Punic cause on his own; Syracuse and Carthage were old enemies, and the royal family had very much prospered under the Roman alliance. Perhaps Gelon even made the first move, as he may have been frustrated by his father's inability to die, and thought that he should seize the throne before he became too old.[11] Rome would not have supported a coup against their most faithful ally and Gelon therefore had no choice but to side with Carthage.

A year after the coup of Gelon, Hieron was dead as well, and the Syracusan throne was left to Gelon's son, Hieronymos. The young king promptly allied himself with Carthage but was assassinated before coming to blows with Rome, thus bringing an end to the Hieronic dynasty.

During his reign, Hieron used both the Roman protection over his realm and the lengthy peace to bring Syracuse to unprecedented levels of prosperity. Varro (*R.* I. 1. 8) informs us of the king's interest in agriculture, an enterprise that he strongly encouraged in his domain and upon which he even authored a book. Excellent farming conditions and the royal tax on crops combined to allow Syracuse to export grain on an extraordinary scale. This point has been demonstrated by the discovery of two massive grain stores in the city of Morgantina. The site has been dated to the third century and there is little doubt that it lay within the realm of Hieron.[12] So great was the Syracusan kingdom's agricultural influence that even a year after its capture and

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[10]For Hieronymos' relations with Carthage see Liv. XXIV. 6. 7.

[11]Hieron was now into his nineties according to Polybios (VII. 8. 7). Lucian (*Macr.* 10) says he was ninety-two when he did die in 215, making him ninety-one this year. Livy (XXIV. 4. 4) and Valerius Maximus (VIII. 13. 1) put him at ninety upon death making him eighty-nine now. Gelon was born in 266 and therefore would have been fifty. See Walbank 1967, II, p. 42.

[12]Bell 1988, p. 316, 321-324, Deussen 1994, Sjöqvist 1960, p. 130-131. For the borders of Hieron's kingdom see Karlsson 1993, p. 41-45, Manganaro 1996, p. 132-133.

sack by Rome in 211, the Sicilian *medimnos* was still the standard measurement for grain in Italy.[13] Symbolic of his kingdom's wealth and prosperity, is an ear of grain from Syracuse, dated to his reign and made entirely of gold.[14]

Hieron tried his best to style himself as a benevolent Hellenistic monarch and to show that Sicily was indeed still very much part of the Greek world. When in 269, according to Polybios (I. 9. 8), Hieron was acclaimed king, it was, 'by all the allies'; this implies that, while Syracuse was the seat of his power, Hieron ruled a kingdom of which the city was merely a part. There are indications that Syracuse itself was not under his direct rule, but was run by a council who issued their own coins, like any other city in his hegemony.[15] This is further demonstrated by the coins that were minted in his name or in those of the royal family. All treaties were made with Hieron personally, not with the city of Syracuse, exactly on the style of an eastern Greek king. And when he died, according to Livy (XXIV. 6. 4) and Polybios (VII. 3. 1) Rome had to attempt to negotiate a new treaty with his successor, Hieronymos. The young king also sent a delegation to renew his predecessor's treaty with Egypt. These two incidents imply that the treaties concluded with his grandfather Hieron were now invalidated by latter's death.[16] Then in 214, the city of Leontini, part of the Hieronic hegemony, protested at being included in a treaty made with Rome by the city of Syracuse; they claimed that Syracuse by itself had no right to make a treaty

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[13]Plb. IX. 11a. 3.

[14]Wilson 1990, p. 19, 1997, p. 2.

[15]Liv. XXIV. 22. 6. Here, Livy uses the term *senatus* to describe the Syracusan government, though in all likelihood this would have been the more traditional Greek *boule* or council. On coins see Caccamo Caltabiano *et al.* (1997), p. 95-105, pl. 31-32.

[16]Berve 1959, p. 40-41, 57, Holleaux 1921, p. 49, n. 2. For coins see Caccamo Caltabiano *et al.* 1997, p. 46-53, pl. 49, Head 1911, p. 184-185, Holloway 1962, p. 17-19. *Contra* Walbank 1957, I, p. 57, 1967, II, p. 33, who argues that the monarchy of Hieron was in the, 'democratic Syracusan tradition...[and]...owed little to Hellenistic ideals.' For the Roman treaty with Hieron, dating from 248, see Zonar. VIII. 16.

for them.[17] This again would imply that Syracuse as a city had no power over others, while the king acted on behalf of his entire territory.[18] Yet Polybios (VII. 8) is explicit in his statements about how the king's authority was derived from the citizens, and that on several occasions, Hieron tried to step down, but was prevented from doing so by the people of Syracuse. There was a degree of anti-Hieronic sentiment at Syracuse, and this while Hieron's magnanimous attempts to step down are likely to be both an exaggeration and a literary *topos*, there may be some truth about to them, as many elements would have realised that he and his mercenary army kept Syracuse from returning to the dark days of *statis* that accompanied the death of Agathokles. As Pergamon was to the Attalid kings, so Syracuse, although by all appearances treated as any other part of Hieron's kingdom, was in fact the base and source of his power.[19]

Some sources refer to Hieron as the most powerful monarch in Sicily, or even by the title 'King of the Sicilians', and it has been argued that this was not an exaggeration, as Hieron not only controlled Syracusan territory but may have also had a general alliance (*symmachia*) with the free Greek states of the island.[20] If he did adopt the title King of Sicily, he would have been immersing himself in the political rhetoric of his predecessors. Gelon in 481 is called King of Sicily by Herodotos (VII. 157) and Dionysios is referred to as the '*archon Sikelias*' by three Athenian decrees from the first half of the fourth century.[21] Agathokles, Hieron's immediate forerunner, had assumed the royal title, and according to Diodoros (XX. 54. 1) this was in deliberate imitation of Alexander's Successors in the East. Even triumphal records from 263

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[17]Liv. XXIV. 29. 7-12.

[18]Karlsson 1993, p. 37, Prichard 1970, p. 368.

[19]For the relationship of the Attalids to Pergamon see *OGIS* 267 (Welles *RC*, 23), with Allen 1983, p. 166-167.

[20]Archimel. *ap.* Ath. V. 209e, Eutrop. III. 1, Val. Max. VIII. 13 ext. 1. For Hieron heading a *symmachia* of Sicilian cities see Karlsson 1993, p. 36.

[21]Harding 20, 70, Tod II, 108, 133, 136.

speak of Hieron as 'King of Sicily', though this may reflect Rome's perception of the political situation at the time.[22] Hieron's battles at the Kyamosauos (269) and the Longanos (265) show that the mercenary army of the kingdom was under his personal command, again in the style of a Hellenistic monarch.

As a final attestation to the Hellenistic nature of the monarchy, evidence exists that points to the beginnings of a royal cult at Syracuse.[23] The Syracusan *boule* bestowed honours upon him and his family, as was the custom in the East.[24] In 1949, a tiny altar was unearthed in Syracuse bearing the inscription, 'Διὸς Σωτῆρος Ἱέρωνος', or 'Zeus Soter (Saviour) Hieron'.[25] The words are all in the genitive, and could therefore mean one of three things: 'Altar of Zeus Soter of Hieron'; 'Altar of Zeus Soter [set up or commissioned by] Hieron'; or 'Altar of Zeus Soter Hieron'. The first two can immediately be dismissed since it is very unlikely that this was a work that belonged to or was commissioned by Hieron; the size of the piece and the amateur style of the lettering makes the inscription appear more like a graffito scratched on a private altar. It would therefore seem as though someone was associating King Hieron himself with Zeus Soter. This hypothesis is furthered by the fact that Soter was a common epithet among deified Hellenistic monarchs such as Demetrios of Athens, Antiochos I, Antiochos III, Eumenes II, Ptolemy I, and Seleukos III.[26] Moreover, when Cicero (*Verr.* II. 2. 154) describes how Verres sought to have

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[22]*Act. Tr.* Degrassi, p. 74-75, 547-548, App. *Sic.* 2. 2, Liv. XXII. 37. 10, Plut. *Marc.* 8. 6, Zonar. VIII. 10. See *MRR* I, p. 204. That the Carthaginians felt their treaty in 264 was directly with Hieron is reflected in D.S. XXII. 13. 9.

[23]See Serrati forthcoming.

[24]*SEG* XXXVII. 513, XLIII. 1209, with *SIG*^{3} I. 427.

[25]*BE* 1953, 282, Manganaro 1965, p. 174.

[26]Demetrios: Plut. *Demetr.* 10. 3; Antiochos I: *SEG* XL. 1116, 1279, XLI. 1003, 1053, 1870, XLII. 1767, XLIII. 1279, XXX. 1847, XXXV. 1521, 1832, Plut. *Demetr.* 10. 3; Antiochos III: *SEG* XXVI. 1307, XXXV. 1149 with Austin 151; Eumenes II: *SEG* XLIII. 891, XLIV. 1732ter, Allen 1983, app. 4. 7; Ptolemy I: *SEG* XXXVIII. 2005, XXXIX. 425, XLII. 98, 115, 745, XLIII. 1105, XLV. 2073, Theok. *Beren.* XVIII. 73-130; Seleukos III: *SEG* XXX. 1847, XXXV. 1521, 1832. See Allen 1983, p. 79, 145, Austin 1981, p. 334, 359, Nock 1972, I, 78-84, II, 720-735, Walbank 1992, p. 210-218.

himself deified at Syracuse, we are told that he adopted the epithet Soter.[27] After the deification of Marcellus in 210 by the Syracusans (see below, p.202-203, 211), Cicero (*Verr.* II. 4. 151) says that a festival known as the Marcellia was established in his honour. Plutarch (*Marc.* 23) adds that the Syracusans wore garlands and sacrificed to the name of Marcellus.[28] The games, sacrifices, and garlands were all common to the ruler cults of the Hellenistic East, and bore a particular resemblance to the Ptolemaieia at Alexandria, the Demetria at Athens, the Seleukeia at Erythrai, and the Antiocheia at Lykian Laodikea.[29] It is possible that the Marcellia and the epithet Soter are direct offshoots of the worship of Hieron, given to Marcellus after 210 and then adopted by Verres.

Finally, coinage exists showing Hieron's wife Philistis with a crown of grain, associating her with Demeter and Persephone. Her portraits on coinage also bare striking resemblances to some of the deified queens of the eastern Mediterranean. Hieron himself was often portrayed with a diadem along the lines of the Successor kings in the East, but there are also examples of him wearing a laurel crown, an object associated with divinity.[30] There are some examples from Syracuse were Hieron attaches the abbreviated form of his name, IE, to that of Herakles, with the

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[27]Cic. *Verr.* II. 2. 154. See Deniaux 1994, p. 250, Gelzer 1969, p. 87.

[28]See Liv. XXVI. 32. 8, Rives 1993, p. 33-35.

[29]Demetria: Plut. *Demetr.* 12. 2; Seleukeia: *SEG* XL. 1114, XLI. 1052-1053, 1870, XLIV. 981; Antiocheia: *SEG* XXVII. 1401, XXVIII. 1192, XXXIX. 1247, XLIV. 1689; Ptolemaieia: *SEG* XXXVIII. 2005, XXXIX. 425, XLII. 98, 115, 745, XLIII. 1105, XLV. 2073. See Austin 1981, p. 360-361, Nock 1972, I, p. 247-250, Price 1984, p. 29-30, Rives 1993, p. 33, Walbank 1992, p. 147, 210-218.

[30]See Caccamo Caltabiano *et al.* 1997, 53-57, 137, 139-140, pl. 7-9, 18, 22, 35, 37-38, Hill 1903, pl. 13, Rutter 1997, p. 178, Sjöqvist 1960a, p. 54-55. Eastern Hellenistic monarchs are portrayed almost exclusively with diadems; see Caccamo Caltabiano *et al.* 1997, p. 36, Head 1911, p. 230, 232, 758-761, 765, 848-851. Caccamo Caltabiano *et al.* 1997, p. 49-53, argues that the coins of Philistis were minted posthumously, and that she was not deified within her lifetime. There is no evidence to support this conclusion. We have no idea when Philistis died; if it was significantly before Hieron's death in 215, a cult in her honour could have been established relatively easily, and therefore this does nothing to the above argument. If she died shortly before or after her husband, this leaves precious little time for the establishment of a cult in her honour, as it is highly doubtful that coins of the royal family would have been minted after their fall in 214.

coins showing a club and a bull.[31] Thus Hieron can be seen as identifying himself with the divine Herakles, someone who transcended mortality within his lifetime. The bull was a particularly Sicilian reference, illustrating Herakles' search for the cattle of Geryon in the western Mediterranean. Herakles was also sacred to the Syracusans as the primogenitor of the Doric people. He was a popular deity amongst all Dorians and therefore was an obvious choice for Hieron in his attempts to further a royal cult. From this we may conclude that King Hieron did not want his contemporaries to perceive him as merely the political leader of Syracuse, as he made deliberate attempts to style himself as a great Greek king whose monarchy was on a par with the Successors in the eastern Mediterranean.

Furthering this policy, Hieron in particular sought friendly relations with Egypt, bestowing many gifts on the Ptolemies and donating grain in times of famine.[32] His benevolence may also serve as an attestation of the wealth the king generated for himself and his kingdom through the skilful use of his tithe system.[33] He also engaged in the competitive philanthropy that often characterised Greek diplomacy at this time, and made a point of sending offerings and aid to many of the cities of Greece, even competing in the Olympic games.[34] Although in essence Hieron was a Roman client king, that he could act in his own interests is demonstrated by the assistance he gave to Carthage during the Truceless War (240-237). The king knew full well that he was sandwiched between the empires of Rome and Carthage, and Polybios (I. 83. 2-4) claims that he gave aid to the latter with the express purpose of maintaining an equilibrium between the two. It was in his interest to keep both powers strong, and to maintain the belief, real or illusory, that

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[31]*CGCBMSic*, p. 219, Hill 1903, pl. 13. See also Tzouvara-Souli 1991, p. 100, 115.

[32]Mosch. *ap.* Ath. V. 209b.

[33]An example of his kingdom's wealth can be seen in the Morgantina silver hoard. See Slayman 1998, p. 40-41, Stille 1999, p. 58, 62-63.

[34]D.S. XXVI. 8, Plb. I. 16. 10, V. 88. 5-8, VII. 8. 6. See Loicq-Berger 1967, p. 254.

he could tip the balance of power, thus making alliance with Syracuse a valuable commodity.

Yet it does not follow that he was his own man; his existence was allowed, and guaranteed by, the Roman government. He may have acted in his own best interests, but he never overtly opposed Rome. In many ways he was the ideal client king, and, much to his advantage, he was unswerving in his loyalty to Rome; his praises were sung by the senate in 216 and by several ancient authors.[35] In 237 Hieron visited Rome for the first and only time so that he could view the games. There he donated 200 000 bushels of grain to the people of the city.[36] It is probable that he was invited for an official state visit in order to receive thanks for his support in the First Punic War. Years later, Diodoros (XXV. 14) tells us that during the Celtic War (225-222), Hieron gave aid to Rome again in the form of food and was later compensated for the donation. In 218 he greeted the Roman consul as he led his army to Sicily for the proposed African invasion, and he again gave Rome his full allegiance and promised help in the form of free clothing and food for the legions.[37] The following year Rome asked Hieron for aid and for the first time he sent actual military units. According to Polybios (III. 75. 7) these were five hundred Cretan archers and 1000 peltasts of unknown origin. In 216 Hieron came to the aid of the cash strapped and poorly supplied Sicilian legions by furnishing them with food and money for six months.[38] The Romans eventually sent a sum of money to Sicily with which to repay Hieron, but they quickly changed their minds and recommissioned the money to pay for a fleet. Hieron was not in the least

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[35]In Liv. XXII. 37. 10, the senate pays him several compliments. See Auct. *Vir. Ill.* 37. 5, Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 15, Liv. XXII. 37. 10, XXIII. 21. 5, XXV. 28. 8, 29. 7, XXVI. 30. 1, 32. 4, Mosch. *ap.* Ath. V. 206d, Plb. I. 16. 10, Sil. XIV. 83-84. On Hieron and client kingship in general see Braund 1984, p. 63, 146, 190 n. 7. On the legitimacy of Hieron's loyalty see Eckstein 1980b, p. 200.

[36]Eutrop. III. 1-2.

[37]Liv. XXI. 50. 10.

[38]Liv. XXIII. 21. 1-5, Val. Max. VII. 6. 1.

unsettled and even sent another enormous donation of wheat and barley to Rome.[39] So strong was the relationship between the two that it could almost have the appearance of being between equals, since the Romans could have simply demanded these provisions, yet they chose, in this instance at least, to pay Hieron for his help. The latter point would seem to refute the notion that Hieron's aid to Rome was given as part of some sort of formal treaty.[40] This argument would imply that in effect, the Romans were still exacting an indemnity from the king twenty-five years after his monetary payments were cancelled in 248.[41] In light of the Roman payment, the economic relationship between Rome and Hieron appears more one of merchant and consumer rather than of master and servant.

Lastly, at some point during this period, the king greatly strengthened the defences of his territory, especially those of Syracuse, and he also employed the mathematician Archimedes to build counter-siege engines.[42] These were applied in 213 much to the bewilderment of the attacking Romans.

From the moment they set foot in Sicily in 264, the Romans had to work around, and later with, King Hieron. Although reduced in status to that of an allied monarch, he was still a powerful force, and the Romans never underestimated his influence over the Sicilians and his ability to safeguard the eastern half of the island.

Carthage and Rome Between the Wars

In Africa, Carthage fought the Truceless War from 240-237 against its former

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[39]Liv. XXIII. 38. 12-13.

[40]As is argued by Dahlheim 1968, p. 135 n. 28, Roussel 1970, p. 130. *Contra* Eckstein 1980b, p. 193.

[41]Naev. *Poen.* VI. fr. 43B, Zonar. VIII. 16.

[42]Liv. XXIV. 34. 13, Plb. VIII. 7. 2, Plut. *Marc.* 14. 9. See Karlsson 1993, p. 38-41, 45, Loicq-Berger 1967, p. 254.

mercenaries, whom the city had refused pay, because, as Polybios (I. 66. 5) says, the treasury was bankrupt after the Sicilian debacle. The conflict was characterised by great acts of cruelty on both sides.[43] During the war Rome acted rather generously towards Carthage, perhaps remembering their own mercenary revolt at Rhegium some forty years before. They allowed Italian and Syracusan merchants to trade with Carthage, while lending aid to the mutineers was strictly forbidden. A delegation was even sent by Rome to act as arbitrators in Africa, though peace could not be achieved. In 239, Rome also refused a request for aid from Carthage's Sardinian mercenaries after they rebelled and invited Rome to seize the island.[44] Polybios (I. 83. 11) goes on to tell us that the senate then declined a request for protection from the African city of Utica.

Late in 238 however, the rebels on Sardinia lynched their officers and then persuaded another group of mercenaries, originally sent over to quell the mutiny, to join them in revolt. A wholesale slaughter of Carthaginian citizens on Sardinia followed, and eventually this aroused the ire of the native population and the mercenaries were forced out. They took refuge in Italy and then made a second appeal to Rome. This time, the senate accepted the offer and in early 237 they sent a consular expedition to seize Sardinia. Not enough source material - a problem particularly acute for these years - exists to gauge an explanation for the shift in Roman behaviour towards the Sardinian mercenaries between 239 and 238. Some have suggested that doves controlled the senate in the former year, and hawks the latter.[45] More likely, there is every chance that in 239 Rome was occupied fighting the Gallic wars that would engage them for the next two centuries. They definitely fought the Gauls in 238, but as the request and the subsequent

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[43]Account of the war: D.S. XXV. 2-8, Plb. I. 66. 6-88. 7.

[44]Revolt at Rhegium: Plb. I. 7. 8-12, Zonar. VIII. 6; rules for African trade during Truceless War: Plb. I. 83. 11; Rome as arbitrators: App. *Lib.* 5, *Sic.* 2. 3, Plb. I. 83. 7-10, Val. Max. V. 1. 1, Zonar. VIII. 17; refusal to Sardinian mercenaries: Plb. I. 79. 1-4.

[45]Feig-Vishnia 1996, p. 17, Harris, 1979, p. 191, Lazenby 1978, p. 21.

expedition took place over the winter, which is outside of the normal campaign season and when there is unlikely to have been fighting in the north, the Romans had the troops at hand with which to respond.[46] As well, perhaps Rome could not respond to the plea in 238 because it was still recovering from the First Punic War. Carthage vigorously protested the Roman actions, and, the Truceless War finally over, themselves outfitted a force to recover Sardinia. But the remonstrations fell on deaf ears and the senate presumed the Punic mobilisation to be an act of war. The Carthaginians were by now very weak and in no position to challenge Rome. Humiliated, they were forced to back down, cede Sardinia, and pay a further indemnity of 1200 talents.[47]

The Second Punic War in Sicily

(i) 218-216

Immediately upon the Roman declaration of war in 218, the Carthaginian government equipped a fleet to attempt to capture Lilybaion in order to establish a beachhead in Sicily. Livy (XXI. 49-50. 6) relates how Carthage at first sent a raiding party of twenty *quinqueremes* and 1000 men to the shores of Italy; the entire expedition was blown off course and seventeen of the ships ended up in the vicinity of the Liparai islands while the other three were blown as far as Messana, were they were spotted by King Hieron who quickly dispatched twelve ships to capture the enemy boats. Hieron was in Messana in order to ferry the army of the consul Titus Sempronius Longus across the Straits and onto Sicily for a planned invasion of the Carthaginian homeland. After interrogating the prisoners the king learnt that this smaller raiding party was actually being followed by an invasion force bound for Lilybaion with the intent of seizing the city

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[46]Gallic campaigns of 238: Liv. *Per.* XX, Oros. IV. 12. 1, Zonar. VIII. 18.

[47]Plb. I. 79. 1-5, 88. 8-12.

and stirring up old Punic loyalties on the western half of the island. This fleet however, had been struck by the same storm that had sent the raiding party astray, and they were now in the Aegates islands. At this, Hieron sent a message warning the Sicilian praetor, Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, of the impending attack. The latter immediately went into action and safeguarded Lilybaion, he also sent out his lieutenants to garrison the nearby settlements using citizen militias. He then ordered all the naval allies to send their full contingents to Lilybaion equipped with ten days worth of rations. Watch stations were also set up along the coast.

The Carthaginians at the Aegates islands set out for a night assault on Lilybaion, but the moonlight shining on their sails immediately alerted the Roman garrison and the surprise was lost. Aemilius put out to sea to await the Punic attack. The Carthaginians, though, knowing the odds were now against their smaller force, stayed put for the remainder of the night and in the morning sought to resolve the issue by a fight in open waters. By this they hoped to use their superior seamanship to outmanoeuvre the Romans and the Sicilians and win the day. It appears that they opted for this tactic because, as Livy (XXI. 50. 3) informs us, while the Carthaginians were up to strength in rowers, they lacked in marines. The Romans however, were not the amateur sailors that they were half a century previous, as the First Punic War had transformed them into experienced seamen, and Aemilius probably trusted in the number and fighting skills of his marines. Regardless, the fight does not seem to have been a long one as almost immediately seven enemy ships were grappled and captured by the Roman and Sicilian forces, causing the rest to lose heart and retreat. The Romans had suffered but one damaged ship.

On the other side of the island Hieron and his fleet met the consul Sempronius' force in the middle of the Straits of Messana in what seems to have been a ceremonial encounter between the two leaders. Upon hearing Hieron's news of the impending attack on west of the island (that had actually already happened), the Romans and Syracusans set out by sea for Lilybaion. Along

the way they learnt of the victory of Aemilius.[48] Polybios (III. 41. 2-4) relates that Sempronius arrived at Lilybaion and began to take in supplies from the surrounding countryside in preparation for his African expedition. He prepared a siege train and made the Greek naval contingents ready. He then seized the island of Melita (Malta) in order to clear the way to Africa, selling almost all of his 2000 captives into slavery, sparing only the officers. After this, he received a report of Punic activity at the island of Vulcan in the Liparai region and sailed there. He missed the Punic raiding party however, as they had already made for Italy and were by then plundering the coastline and threatening the Bruttian coast. When he returned to Lilybaion, a message reached him saying that Hannibal was now in Italy and that he and his army should head north to rendezvous with the forces of the consul Publius Cornelius Scipio.[49] He therefore dispatched his army and stayed behind to organise the defence of southern Italy and Sicily.

Sepronius and Scipio would be defeated by Hannibal at the Battle of the River Trebia before the close of the year. Before the end of the summer Hannibal invaded Campania and Rome was forced to appoint Quintus Fabius Maximus as dictator. The year 217 saw no action in Sicily, though it was used as a base for a raid on Africa.[50] In 216 Carthage made another attempt at an invasion of Sicily. The Punic plan was to first launch a diversionary raid against Syracuse that would induce the propraetor, Tiberius Otacilius Crassus, to come to Hieron's aid, thus leaving Lilybaion unguarded. But the praetor received news of the enemy fleet as it lay in wait at the Aegates and therefore ignored the calls for help from Hieron, who had to watch while parts of his kingdom were pillaged. The entire episode is not given many words by Livy, (XXII. 56. 6-8), yet if Otacilius felt that he could not divide his forces so as to help Syracuse, or even to venture out

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[48]Liv. XXI. 50. 11.

[49]Eutrop. III. 8, Liv. XXI. 51. 5, Zonar. VIII. 24.

[50]Liv. XXII. 31. 1-6, Plb. III. 96. 8-14.

with his full force to try and engage the enemy, then this leads to the conclusion that the ships at the Aegates were no mere flotilla, and would have been a full invasion force. Moreover, Hieron himself felt that he did not have enough naval muscle to rid himself of the Punic raiders, who, Livy implies, struck in more than one place. Livy also expressly says that the force at Lilybaion meant to seize that city, 'and the rest of the Roman province.' This would not have been possible with a small raiding party. When Otacilius would not take the bait, we hear no more of this event, and so the fleet at the Aegates presumably sailed away, as did the force ravaging the east coast. This action prompted the propraetor to send a message to Rome demanding a fleet that was capable of defending all Sicily, though apparently no action was taken by the senate this year, as their efforts were concentrated elsewhere and they could not spare the manpower.

In August of 216 Hannibal smashed a double consular army at the Battle of Cannae in Apulia; he was now in command of much of southern Italy and began to besiege those places, most notably Neapolis, still allied to Rome. His strategy of wrecking the Roman alliance system came to a head when the second city of Italy, Capua, revolted and threw in its lot with Hannibal. In Sicily, Otacilius sent another message to Rome urgently demanding supplies and money to pay the legionaries. Illustrating the desperate straits that the senate was now in, they refused this request on the grounds that there was nothing to send. Otacilius therefore petitioned Hieron for the much needed supplies, and the king furnished enough food for six months and gave Otacilius the money with which to pay his soldiers.[51]

So for nearly three years Sicily had been quiet compared with the other theatres of the war; on the island Rome had both a base from which to prevent the resupplying of Hannibal and a major source of food for the city and the military. While Sicily was important, it was very much

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[51]Liv. XXIII. 21. 1-5, Val. Max. VII. 6. 1.

in the background of the events happening on mainland Italy. The Romans were able to disregard Sicily to an extent because of Hieron. His navy, combined with the small Roman forces on the island, were enough to keep the island safe in the early years of the war. This situation however, would change drastically upon the death of King Hieron II in 215.

(ii) The Defection of Syracuse (215-213)

For 215 Appius Claudius Pulcher was elected praetor and assigned to Sicily.[52] His first duty was to transport the survivors of the Battle of Cannae to Sicily and then to supervise the return of the two Sicilian legions to Italy.[53] The senate saw the survivors of Cannae as disgraced, and therefore late in 216 condemned them to service in Sicily without hope of discharge until the end of the war. These men were banded together with the least desirable elements from the army of the dictator Marcus Iunius Pera, who were serving under the same conditions.[54] Together, these soldiers were formed into two legions known by modern scholars as the *legiones Cannenses*.

In the early summer of 215 King Hieron II died. With his demise, the scale of the conflict on Sicily, and as a result the island's importance to both sides, increased dramatically. According to Livy (XXIV. 4), Hieron had originally wanted to leave Syracuse a free city upon his death but was persuaded by his daughters to appoint his fifteen year old grandson (Gelon's son and a maternal grandson of Pyrrhos) Hieronymos, as his successor with their husbands as the boy's guardians. This story seems unlikely, and it has already been illustrated that both Livy and Polybios are free with their praise of the king, and write little about the dissent within his

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[52]Liv. XXIII. 30. 18.

[53]Liv. XXIII. 31. 4, 6.

[54]Liv. XXIII. 35. 7-8, Plut. *Marc.* 13. 3, 5.

kingdom. Hieron did his utmost to appear in every sense a Hellenistic monarch, and with the planned succession of Gelon and the deification of his family, his last wish is more likely to have been the establishment of a dynasty on a Ptolemaic or Selucid style. So it would appear more probable that the succession passed, as planned, to Hieronymos with a council of fifteen guardians.

This did not last long however, for soon Hieron's two son-in-laws, Adranodoros and Zoippos, along with another guardian named Thraso, dissolved the guardianship and allowed the young king to appear to be ruling on his own, while in reality keeping power to themselves. Adranodoros and Zoippos, perhaps bribed by the Carthaginians or because of Hannibal's strong position in Italy, favoured a new alliance with Carthage, while Thraso counselled remaining with Rome. Eventually, Thraso was falsely implicated in a coup against Hieronymos and then quickly executed along with others who had leanings towards Rome.[55]

Falling under the influence of his uncles, Hieronymos sent an embassy to Hannibal asking for an alliance. At present he also sent an embassy to Egypt to establish a new treaty with the Ptolemies and to reaffirm the strong ties they had with his grandfather. The answer from Alexandria is not known, but Hannibal replied by sending two Carthaginian brothers whose grandfather was a Syracusan exile. These were Hippokrates and Epykides, chosen for this task because of their connections with Sicily and because they spoke Greek. Just what functions they were performing with Hannibal in Italy is not known, Livy (XXIV. 23. 10, 24. 2) calls them *duces* and it is probable that they were Carthaginian military officers. They proceeded to negotiate an alliance with Syracuse.

It did not take long before the praetor Appius Claudius heard of these events and sent

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[55]Liv. XXIV. 5.

envoys to Syracuse to renew the treaty with Hieronymos. When the Romans were presented at court, in the presence of the Carthaginian negotiating party, the young king ridiculed them for their losses at Cannae and then informed them that he considered their launching of a naval expedition to Syracuse over the rumour of the death of his grandfather to be an act of aggression (see above, p.161). Thus rebuked, the Roman envoys warned him about the repercussions of siding with Carthage prior to departing.[56]

Hieronymos sent a group of ambassadors to Carthage to sign a formal treaty, while Hippokrates and Epykides remained in the king's court. According to Livy (XXIV. 6. 7) and Polybios (VII. 4. 1-9), the terms of the alliance were to be that Carthage should send both sea and land forces to assist the king in driving the Romans from Sicily, and then the island was to be divided between the two powers at the River Himera. While the embassy was away, Hippokrates and Epykides, who were working with the anti-royal faction that was quickly becoming one with the anti-Roman side, persuaded the king to demand the entire island from Carthage after victory was achieved. Therefore, Hieronymos sent a new delegation to Carthage with this demand, saying that in return he would aid their campaigns in Italy. The Punic government was not pleased, but they realised that ridding Sicily of the Romans was their prime objective, and therefore consented, though Polybios implies that from the start they had little intention of honouring this last promise. Why Hippokrates and Epykides, supposedly Carthaginian ambassadors, did something that may have sabotaged the negotiations is difficult to explain, though in the coming years it would be made obvious that the loyalty of the brothers to their own interests ran much deeper than anything they felt for Carthage or Syracuse.

Those Syracusan aristocrats who favoured Rome took little time informing Appius

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[56]Liv. XXIV. 6. 1-6, Plb. VII. 2-3.

Claudius of these events, and envoys were again sent from Lilybaion to the court of Hieronymos. The king, perhaps experiencing a moment's hesitation, called a meeting of his advisors, but Adranodoros, who had pro-Carthaginian leanings, had no trouble carrying the decision. Hieronymos then told the Romans that their treaty could now only be renewed if they repaid all the gold they had received from Hieron, returned all gifts and grain sent by him, and ceded to Syracuse all of eastern Sicily. This was of course impossible and from this point forward, a state of war existed between Rome and Syracuse.[57]

In about June, 214 Hieronymos set out on a campaign against the Roman held cities in the east. He sent Hippokrates and Epykides ahead with 4000 men while he went to Leontini with 15 000. The city however, appears to have had strong anti-monarchial and anti-Syracusan sentiments, and Hieronymos was assassinated by a plot as he made his was through the streets. The masses of Leontini rejoiced at the king's death, but the army had to be calmed with promises of better generals and a reward from the royal treasury. Some of the conspirators rode to Syracuse to win over the royal advisors. Adranodoros heard of these events and immediately garrisoned the Ortygia, an island fortress linked to Syracuse by a causeway, but the conspirators managed to sneak inside the city by night and then rode through the streets, 'calling the people both to freedom and to arms.'[58] Soon the city was flooded with a mob and the temple of Zeus was looted of its large cache of Gallic and Illyrian arms that had been presented to Hieron after the Roman victories of 222 and 219.[59] Many of the mercenaries joined the crowd, and the public granaries were seized. By daylight, most of the city belonged to the people. They gathered at the steps of the council chamber and it was decided that a delegation would be sent to Adranodoros

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[57]Plb. VII. 5.

[58]Liv. XXIV. 21. 7.

[59]222: Plb. II. 34-35, Plut. *Marc.* 6-8; 219: Plb. III. 16. 7, 18-19.

and those still holding out on the Ortygia. It instructed him to surrender and sternly warned him against any attempt to reestablish the monarchy. Seeing his position as hopeless, he surrendered peacefully the next morning and by this act seems not only to have avoided the wrath of the crowd, but also gained the people's trust. The following day free elections were held and Adranodoros was elected to the new council along with most of the anti-royal conspirators.[60]

News of the revolution had not escaped Roman ears, and Appius Claudius quickly informed the senate that Syracuse had defected. The government in Rome treated this as a serious breach of security and ordered the praetor to take his two legions across Sicily and concentrate them on the border of Syracusan territory. The highly decorated consul, Marcus Claudius Marcellus, was assigned Sicily as the province of his jurisdiction. Otacilius Crassus was elected to a second praetorship and was reassigned to the Sicilian fleet. He was to sail with one hundred new ships directly to the east coast of the island. Unfortunately, the ships could not be manned as most likely all the rowers were serving in the land forces. Therefore the senate took, according to Livy (XXIV. 11. 9), the unprecedented step of demanding that all the citizens of Rome who had property of a certain value (based on the census of 220) furnish, depending on how much their holdings were valued at, between one slave to serve as a sailor with six months pay and eight slaves to serve with a year's pay.[61] It is probable that these sailors, like the *volones* (volunteers) serving in the legions, were promised manumission upon the completion of the war.[62]

Still out in the field, Hippokrates and Epykides made their way back to Syracuse when

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[60]Liv. XXIV. 4-7. 7, 21. 2-24. 4, Plb. VII. 7. Liv. places some of these events in 215, though when he continues them the following year his language strongly suggests that there was in fact no break in the narrative. Polybios puts everything in perspective when he says that Hieronymos reigned for thirteen months, placing all the preceding events firmly in the summer of 214. Sources such as Diodoros (XXVI. 15. 1) and Livy (XXIV. 5. 1-6), have not been very kind to the young Hieronymos, accusing him of every sort of vice. While he does seem to have lacked in experience, Polybios (VII. 7) claims that his immoralities were greatly exaggerated.

[61]Liv. XXIV. 7. 8-9, 11. 5-9, 21. 1.

[62]On the *volones* see Liv. XXV. 6. 22.

they received news of the king's death; with the demise of their paymaster, their army deserted. They knew that the key to holding power in Syracuse lay with the army, and accordingly they began to mingle with the troops and to spread rumours through the ranks that the new council meant to turn the city over to the Romans and to reestablish the former alliance.[63] This did not sit well with the large contingent of deserters at Syracuse; these men knew they would be treated severely by the senate if the city were surrendered. According to Livy (XXIV. 23. 10), the deserters mostly came from the *socii navales*, perhaps from the Sicilian naval contingents. Some of these may not have wanted to serve and they feared Roman reprisals in their home cities, and they fled therefore to Syracuse. Others may have been from western Sicily and still been in support of the Punic cause, going over to Syracuse when they heard that the city had switched sides. Regardless, seeing the discord within the army, Livy (XXIV. 24) writes that Adranodoros, still a pro-royal, formed a plot with Gelon's son-in-law Themistos, and a group of African and Iberian mercenaries. Together they would massacre the council and then refortify the Ortygia, taking the royal treasury in the process. The lands of the dead council members would then be used to pay the mercenaries. But the conspiracy was betrayed to the council and when Adranodoros and Themistos entered the chamber they were quickly surrounded and cut down. The council now seems to have been rid of its pro-Carthaginian elements and an embassy was dispatched to Appius Claudius, now a legate of the consul Marcellus (who was still in Italy), asking for a ten day grace period so that a new treaty could be negotiated. This request was granted and negotiators were sent out from Syracuse.[64]

Elections were now called at Syracuse to replace the conspirators on the council. When proceedings began Hippokrates and Epykides were immediately nominated by the large numbers

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[63]Liv. XXIV. 23. 5-11.

[64]D.S. XXVI. 15. 2, Liv. XXIV. 25-26, 27. 4.

of soldiers and deserters who were present. Fearing violence, the council had no choice but to declare the brothers as legally elected councillors. By this time it was about December and, after recovering from an illness in Italy, Marcus Claudius Marcellus arrived on the scene, probably accompanied by one legion.[65] Appius Claudius immediately sent the Syracusan negotiators to him and, after giving them an audience, himself sent Roman envoys to Syracuse to sign a new treaty. Hippokrates and Epykides however, were not prepared to surrender the city to the Romans. They spread a rumour that a Punic fleet, coming to the city's aid, was off Cape Pachynos and that the council was consorting with the Romans against the deserters. Seeing the confusion within the city, Appius took control of Otacilius' fleet and moved it from Megara Hyblea on the east coast of Sicily into the harbour of Syracuse.[66] By this move he meant to encourage the pro-Roman side, but instead it had the effect of frightening the people so they rushed to the shore to repel what they thought was a Roman invasion. A general assembly was called and a large debate ensued. After much deliberation it was decided that the best course of action was to side with Rome, since any other choice would lead to immediate hostilities with Marcellus.[67]

Livy compresses much of the siege of Syracuse into the year 214, though it seems hostilities did not begin until at least March, 213. It would have been impossible for Marcellus

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[65]Elections: Liv. XXIV. 27. 1-4; arrival of Marcellus: Liv. XXIV. 27. 6, Plut. *Marc.* 13. 1, Sil. Ital. XIV. 110-111; on Marcellus' illness see Liv. XXIV. 20. 7.

[66]Livy (XXIV. 27. 5) actually calls the place at which the fleet was anchored 'Murgantia'; the site of this town has not been identified, but when dealing with the passage, authors (such as Caven 1980, p. 165, Lazenby 1978, p. 108, 292 n. 29) sometimes amend the name to Morgantina. This ignores the fact that Morgantina was about sixty kilometres inland, and therefore an impossible place for the Roman fleet to have anchored. But throughout his narrative, Livy never mentions Morgantina, and only refers to Murgantia. If the latter did exist, it would appear that it was neither large nor significant. *RE* XVI, 299-301 suggests amending the name to Megara Hyblea, a coastal city twenty kilometres north of Syracuse. This would appear to be the best possible solution. Later, Livy (XXIV. 36. 10) says that Murgantia was a Roman supply depot, and for this we should probably read Morgantina, a site, eighty-five kilometres northwest of Syracuse, known for its grain production and massive storehouses. On the latter see Bell 1988, p. 316, 321-324, Sjöqvist 1960, p. 130-131.

[67]Liv. XXIV. 27. 6-28. 9.

to accomplish what he did in the one or two months since he had arrived. What is more, Livy (XXIV. 39. 12) himself says that in late 214 Appius Claudius left Marcellus to stand for the consulship, but Appius Claudius was not elected consul until late in 213 and he served in the consular year 212/11. Since he was definitely absent for the last two years of the siege (212 and 211), we should assume that Livy placed the events a year earlier for stylistic reasons, something that is a common occurrence in his narrative.[68] Therefore events from this point on shall be related as occurring in 213.

At this time a delegation arrived at Syracuse from Leontini, asking for a garrison. It seems that Leontini had been going through the same *stasis* as Syracuse, and the assassination of Hieronymos had led to fighting between pro- and anti-royal factions. In an effort to rid Syracuse of one of the troublesome Carthaginian brothers, Hippokrates was ordered to lead 4000 men to Leontini. He carried out the order, but after reaching the town took matters into his own hands, and quickly roused the anti-Roman segment of the populace. He then determined that if the Syracusans would not fight Rome, then he would, and so took his force from the city and began to make raids on Roman territory, burning crops and plundering land. Appius Claudius took immediate action and sent patrols out to guard the local farms. When Hippokrates ambushed one of these patrols, inflicting severe casualties, Marcellus sent an urgent message to Syracuse declaring that there would be open hostilities unless both Hippokrates and Epykides were expelled from Sicily. Epykides therefore left Syracuse before the council could convene upon the matter. Joining his brother at Leontini, the two incited the population both against Rome and against Syracuse. They spoke to an assembly of Leontinians, saying that if Syracuse was free from the tyrannical rule of the king, then they should be free of the rule of Syracuse.[69] It is evident that

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[68]ex. XXV. 23. 1, 32-39. See Broughton *MRR* I, p. 262 n. 6, Mellor 1999, p. 53-60, Walbank 1967, II, p. 3.

[69]Liv. XXIV. 29. 1-9.

these feelings did not need much stirring up, as Livy (XXIV. 29. 10) himself admits that, 'the multitude were easily persuaded.' A statement by Plutarch (*Marc.* 14. 1) may indicate that these speeches were followed by a slaughter of all Roman citizens within the city.

When Syracusan ambassadors arrived to demand restitution for the attack on the Roman patrol and to demand that Hippokrates and Epykides leave Sicily, they were curtly informed that Leontini was no longer subject to the will of the Syracusans. The council back in Syracuse quickly informed Marcellus of these events and even invited him to seize the town; they would provide help in exchange for the return of Leontini to their authority. Marcellus appears to have lost patience with the Syracusans and declined the offer. His troops in fact needed little help - roused by the ambush of their comrades, his three legions took the town on the first assault.[70] Hippokrates and Epykides took refuge in the citadel, and then escaped that night to Herbessos. The brothers sent a messenger to meet a force of 8000 Syracusan soldiers on their way to aid the Romans, giving them a false report of Roman atrocities at Leontini, thus enraging the army. Both Livy (XXIV. 30. 8) and Plutarch (*Marc.* 14. 1) claim that the Romans treated the Leontinians very gently, and it was only the captured deserters who were executed. As demonstrated in chapter 2, both of these sources intentionally ennoble Marcellus, and considering the ire of the legionaries over the attack on their comrades and the slaughter of Roman citizens at Leontini, it is not improbable that some revenge was reaped upon the common citizenry.

After the report had circulated amongst the army, the Syracusan generals in charge feared a mutiny, and therefore led them to Megara Hyblea, a town less than fifteen kilometres north of Syracuse. Upon being informed of the whereabouts of the Carthaginian siblings, the generals first attempted to gain entry to Herbessos by ruse and then moved their entire force there to besiege

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[70]Liv. XXIV. 29. 10-30. 1, Plut. *Marc.* 14. 1, Sil. XIV. 125.

the city. Hippokrates and Epykides immediately came forth from the town towards the army. It was now that the time they took fraternising with the soldiery in Syracuse would bear fruit; they were immediately recognized by the Kretan archers at the head of the column. These men had been part of the force sent by Hieron to aid Rome in 217; they were captured at Lake Trasimene and then released along with the other non-Roman prisoners. They welcomed the pair and soon the whole army was pleased when they heard that the brothers were back amongst them. Again fearing a rebellion, the Syracusan generals ordered a retreat back to Megara Hyblea. Hippokrates then read a forged letter aloud, claiming that it had been intercepted from Syracuse on its way to Marcellus. It exonerated the Romans for their supposed actions at Leontini, and asked them to rid the area of all mercenaries, especially those at Megara Hyblea. At this the generals rode away to Syracuse. The mercenary soldiers turned on the Syracusan detachments within their army, and only the intervention of Hippokrates and Epykides saved their lives. The brothers then sent a messenger to Syracuse to report on the Roman atrocities at Leontini in order to fire up the people against Rome.[71]

Fearing attack from Rome and from their own soldiers outside, the gates of Syracuse were closed. Hippokrates and Epykides arrived with their force at the Hexapylon Gate near the northernmost part of the city. They used the Syracusan soldiers they had with them as hostages, demanding from their families the opening of the gate, lest their relatives should be killed. The gate was soon opened, but as the army was filing in, a group of Syracusan generals intervened with force, attempting to shut the gate and expel the brothers. The fighting was intense, but the generals and the young noblemen fighting with them were no match for the trained mercenaries, and soon almost the entire party was put to the sword, with a few managing to escape to the camp

[71]Liv. XXIV. 31. 14-32. 2, Plut. *Marc.* 14. 2.

of Marcellus at Leontini.[72]

On the following day the people elected Hippokrates and Epykides as their *strategoi* and proceeded to manumit all prisoners and slaves. Appius Claudius sent envoys to the city, but their advance ship was captured upon entering one of the harbours and the vessel carrying the legates barely escaped the same fate. In April, 213 Marcellus moved his army to a place called the Olympion, less than five kilometres south of Syracuse.[73] The Olympion was used as the main base for the Athenian siege from 415-413 and the Punic siege in 387, and Marcellus probably would not have occupied this position unless he thought that all hope of diplomacy was lost.[74] He did make one last attempt at a settlement however, and sent a delegation to the city; the Romans were met by the brothers and their retinue just outside the Temenites Gate at the southern end of the city. They demanded that the Syracusan noblemen in their protection should be restored to their positions and that all those responsible for the current state of affairs be surrendered. The brothers quickly refused, thus effectively placing Syracuse under a Roman siege.[75]

The *stasis* at Syracuse that accompanied the years 215-214 appears to have been largely caused by rival factions of the aristocracy who were vying for power. Because of King Hieron's strong attachment to the Roman cause, over time, anti-Hieronic sentiment became, in effect, anti-Roman sentiment. Judging by the fact that the people themselves eventually took to the streets, this discontent with the royal family was far-reaching, perhaps due to Hieron's harsh tax system (see above, p. 161-163). The death of Hieron left a power vacuum in the city, with groups of aristocrats attempting to seize, and hold onto, power. Those who favoured Rome were in the

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[72]Liv. XXIV. 32. 3-9, 33. 6, Plut. *Marc.* 14. 2.

[73]Liv. XXIV. 32. 9-33. 3.

[74]Athenians: D.S. XIII. 6. 2-4, 7. 5; Carthaginians: XX. 29. 3.

[75]Liv. XXIV. 33. 4-8, Plut. *Marc.* 14. 2.

strongest position; the Romans controlled the rest of the island and had military forces on Sicily who could be used to guarantee that the alliance continued. The faction who opposed siding with Rome knew that Syracuse could not stand alone against the might of the legions, and therefore they were forced to turn to the only power in the area that had the strength to oppose Rome and back their aspirations for power in Syracuse - Carthage.

(iii) The Siege of Syracuse (213-211)

Prior to exploring the siege itself, the dates for the action must first be examined. Livy (XXV. 23. 1) places the end of the siege of Syracuse in the autumn of 212, though he says (XXV. 31. 5, XXXI. 31. 8) that the siege lasted into a third year, which would imply that it ended in 211. The argument for 212 rests on two points. Firstly, Livy (XXV. 23. 1) claims that the fall of Syracuse and the final encirclement by Roman forces of Capua, the latter happening in 212, were simultaneous events. Secondly, to claim the siege ended in 211 is believe that events described by Livy from XXV. 23 until 31 took place over a period of about eight or nine months.[76] Concerning the latter point, Livy never summarises, as it was his intent to relate history with the greatest possible detail.[77] Furthermore, it has been argued that Livy sought to draw a contrast between the victory of Marcellus and the defeat of the brothers Scipio in Spain (XXV. 32-39), and therefore intentionally placed the fall of Syracuse in the year 212, so it could be complete in an unbroken narrative before he dealt with the Scipios. If he broke his account up, as he should have, it would not have had the same effect upon his readers and listeners.[78] That Livy

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[76]Briscoe 1989, p. 61, Brisson 1973, p. 231-232, Finley 1968, p. 118.

[77]Walbank 1967, II, p. 6-8.

[78]Hallward 1954, p. 68-69, Caven 1980, p. 177, Errington 1971, p. 78, Dorey and Dudley 1971, p. 131-132,, Picard and Picard 1969, p. 259, Scullard 1961, p. 204, Thiel 1946, p. 86, Warmington 1960, p. 182. Both dates are given within one volume of *CAH*, with Briscoe 1989, p. 61 accepting 212 and Rawson 1989, p. 432 accepting 211.

intentionally misdated the end of the siege should not come as a surprise, as to him style, impact, and message were all more important than strict historical accuracy. The contrasting of two great events or of two great men was one of Livy's favourite literary devices.[79] It has also been argued that the death of the Scipios is similarly misdated, and should as well be placed in 211.[80] Livy wrote his history in groups of either five or ten books, known by modern scholars as pentads and decades respectively. His reasoning behind this chronological adjustment is that his fifth pentad of course, ended at book XXV; this he saw as the halfway point of the war, and therefore he considered it important to end his narrative of the first half of the war with two major events, where the glory of the Roman victory at Syracuse is contrasted with, and tempered by, the disaster in Spain.[81] Thus illustrating that any hard fought victory, be it military, political or moral, did not come without a price. That these events had to be pushed back one year for him to deliver his message and to achieve his stylistic aim would have been of little consequence. Yet still we are left with the fact that it is more than likely that some of the following events took place the year after Livy relates them, and therefore, his words that the siege lasted into a third year will be trusted more than his dating, and the end of the siege will be placed in 211.

The city of Syracuse, Cicero's 'loveliest of all cities' (*Verr.* II. 4. 117), was founded in 734 on a site where Herakles had supposedly stopped to worship Demeter and Kore.[82] The excellent location gave the city access to the lucrative markets of Africa, Egypt, Greece, Illyria, the Ionian Sea, and Italy, making it one of the most important embarkation points for goods from all over the Mediterranean. Fertile soil in and around the site made farming prosperous and food plentiful.

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[79]The fall of Syracuse is contrasted with the fall of Tarentum in 210 (XXIV. 19. 9-10, XXVII. 16. 7), and previously, Hannibal had been contrasted with the elder Scipio (XXI. 41-44). See Gruen 1992, p. 95, 100-101.

[80]Broughton *MRR* I, p. 269, 273-274, De Sanctis 1967-1968, III. 2, p. 331-334.

[81]Luce 1977, p. 3-9, Mellor 1999, p. 53-60, Walsh 1982, p. 1070.

[82]Foundation: D.S. XIV. 42. 2, Strab. VI. 2. 4, Thuc. VI. 8. 2. Herakles myth: D.S. IV. 23. 4.

Over the centuries, Syracuse, through this combination of trade and agriculture, became one of the wealthiest cities in the Greek world; in 415 Thucydides (VI. 20. 1-4) has the Athenian Nikias claim it was the only city equal in wealth to Athens. It was by far the most influential city in all of Sicily, and on many occasions it had controlled much of the island. Some of the most celebrated (and often most hated) tyrants in Greek history came out of Syracuse, these include Gelon (485-478), Hieron I (478-466), Dionysios I (406-367), Timoleon (345-337), Agathokles (317-289), and of course Hieron II (269-215). The wealth and culture of the city also attracted some of the greatest minds from the Greek world such as Pindar, Simonides, Pythagoras, Philistos, Plato, Theokritos, and Archimedes. The city endured many sieges in its time, but had never fallen to an invader. Carthage tried three times in 396, periodically from 310 to 307, and again in 278, but by far the most famous moment in Syracusan military history came with the defeat of the Athenian expedition in 413 after a two year struggle.[83]

Syracuse was to be Rome's most significant siege to date. Up until this point, they had never come across a Hellenistic city that was so heavily fortified. Strabo (VI. 2. 4) called Syracuse, 'a city of five towns', since it was, as today, made up of five distinctive districts. The Ortygia (Quail Island) was originally a separate land mass that was inhabited by native Sikels in the tenth century.[84] The first site of the Greek colony was here, but before 700 the Ortygia had been joined to the mainland by a causeway, and a new mainland district called the Achradina began to be inhabited. A wall eventually enclosed this area, and five centuries later these two districts were still separated from the rest of the city by this fortification. The *polis* remained this way until the Athenian siege, when a buffer zone was created for security and the walls were

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[83]Carthaginian: D.S. XIV. 62-75, XX. 5-62 *passim*, XXII. 8 respectively. Athenian: D.S. XIII. 1-19, Thuc. VI. 64-VII. 85.

[84]Leighton 1999, p. 154, 187, 191, Wilson 1995-1996, p. 67.

expanded outwards. Over time these new areas came to be heavily inhabited and were called the Neapolis and the Tyche. Finally, the tyrant Dionysios I decided to turn Syracuse into a massive fortress; he fortified the Ortygia with a double wall and extended the outer defences over the old Athenian siege lines on a plateau known as the Epipolai, the fifth of Strabo's towns. This more than doubled the size of the city, but archaeological evidence has shown that about a two thirds of the Epipolai was never settled, and remained a buffer zone.[85] Hence, Cicero (*Verr.* II. 4. 118) discounted the Epipolai, and claimed the city only had four parts. Diodoros (XXVI. 19), who must have known Syracuse well, also says the city was only made-up of four parts. Therefore we have reason to believe that Strabo was mistaken, and the Epipolai was never considered a district in the ancient world. The Epipolai plateau was however, the main line of defence, with a large wall, towers, and fortified gates extending along the edge. The works came to a point at the eastern most part of the city where Dionysios built the impressive Eurylaos fort. Outside the walls was a network of trenches that served to hamper assaults. These were connected with the city and each other by an extensive series of tunnels, that allowed the defenders to sortie with celerity and either burn or remove any siege works the attackers had placed there. Hieron II and Archimedes again updated and strengthened the defences in the third century, but no significant extensions were constructed.[86] This siege would be a great learning process for the Roman army, as it was here that they truly began to assimilate Hellenistic siege weaponry into their arsenal. As in the First Punic War at Lilybaion and Drepana, prior to this they were unable to take a Hellenistic city save by ruse or attrition. By the time Syracuse had fallen, the Romans had gone a long way to perfecting the means by which they would conquer the great fortified cities of the

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[85]Caven 1990, p. 88-89, Fabricius 1932, p. 20-30, Guido 1967, p. 164-165, Haverfield 1889, p. 110-111, Wilson 1990, p. 160, 162.

[86]The network of tunnels and trenches can still be explored by the modern visitor. The remains of the Eurylaos fortress are few, and do not serve to illustrate its once great stature among Hellenistic defensive fortifications. For the best reconstruction of the fort, see Connolly 1998, p. 286-287. See also Holloway 1991, p. 145-147, Mertens 1990, p. 476.

eastern Mediterranean.

Marcellus divided his forces in two and devised a double assault on the city from both land and sea. He was to command the sea attack while Appius Claudius was in charge on land. For five days the Romans prepared, constructing various types of engines. At sea Marcellus took eight ships and removed the oars from one side of each, he then lashed them together in pairs. At the front of their decks were placed rams and small towers that housed artillery, then on the main deck there were covered ladders known as *sambucae* (harps). These engines were large scaling ladders covered with wood and hide and operated by a series of weights (that, when dangling on their ropes, resembled the strings of a harp). The land and sea attacks began simultaneously. Marcellus first had his troops shower the walls of the Archradina with missiles and so clear it of defenders. Then the four pairs of lashed galleys began to move slowly towards the wall. The Romans were confident that Syracuse would fall on the first assault, but they had not anticipated the stalwartly defences of the city. These had been overseen by the great scientist, mathematician, and astronomer Archimedes, who now proved himself to be one of the ancient world's masters of siege warfare. All over the walls Archimedes had placed eyelets that allowed its defenders to fire *ballistae* at the attackers while they themselves remained relatively safe. When the *sambucae* approached the walls they were met with a hail of stones, arrows, and bolts. Undeterred, the ships kept moving, thinking that they would eventually come too close to the walls for these long rang engines to do any more damage, but as they kept going, Archimedes had his troops substitute the long range engines for medium and finally short range devices. Unable to withstand the intense fire, the sea attack was broken off.

On land, Appius Claudius faired little better. His men attacked a section of the wall close to the Hexapylon Gate on the northern wall of the Epipolai. All the huts, ladders, and rams were brought up but most did not even reach the wall. Here again Archimedes had placed his eyelets,

and these, combined with the soldiers on top of the wall and the *ballistae* behind it, devastated the legions as they approached. Polybios (VIII. 7. 1-4) claims that those sheds that did reach the wall were met by a worse machine: the *ferrea manus* or 'iron hand'. This was an engine that was, like the *sambuca*, operated by a series of weights and pulleys. A long pole was outstretched over the wall and then ropes were let down, at the bottom of which was one or several large hooks. These picked up the sheds and hoisted them vertically into the air, and once they were at a ceratin height, they released the hooks and let the sheds fall, shattering on the ground and inflicting severe damage or death on those inside.[87] Whether or not this machine existed is difficult to say, but one thing is certain, the Romans suffered heavy losses before the walls of Syracuse, and the land forces were quickly forced to retreat.

Marcellus awaited nightfall and then determined to make another assault by sea. He again moved up four pair of ships and they were able to get much closer to the wall before being spotted. This time, they beat the missiles and made it to the wall relatively unscathed. But as they were about to raise the *sambucae*, Archimedes revealed yet another engine. Long arms now outstretched over the walls to drop huge boulders onto the ships, doing much damage and destroying some of the *sambucae*. Then larger versions of the iron hand came out and these grappled the ships underwater (probably by their rams) and raised them vertically into the air. Then, just as before, the hooks released, sending the ships crashing into the water with such force

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[87]Plb. at VIII. 7. 4 says that the machine lifted up individual men, not sheds, though this does not seem likely. He also writes (VIII. 6. 1-4) about another attack by sea, where the iron hands lifted entire ships. It would appear that he never fully understood the function of the iron hand or how it worked. Nothing like this device has ever been seen again, and Polybios' sources are likely to have been the writings of Archimedes himself, and Fabius Pictor, who, at best, took his account from Roman eyewitnesses who never actually saw the inner workings of the iron hand. As a result, we, like Polybios, have little idea about how the machine operated. In April 1999, a BBC television crew attempted to reconstruct the iron hand for the series *Secrets of the Ancients*. Although I was one of the consultants on the show, and was pleased at the attention given to Archimedes, I could not see how the iron hand could be duplicated using the words of Polybios. As a result, the producers were forced to turn to an engineer for the construction. An iron hand was made, and small boats were indeed lifted, but the device did not at all adhere to the words of Polybios, and therefore was not the machine of Archimedes. Although Archimedes undoubtedly had some fantastic machines, having discussed both this passage and the construction of ancient warships with engineers myself, I remain highly sceptical that such a device existed at all.

that, even if they landed upright, they still became waterlogged. At last the retreat was sounded, but few ships seem to have escaped. The mighty army of Rome had been humiliated. Marcellus called Appius and his subordinates to a war council and it was decided to continue the siege by attrition only.[88]

Meanwhile on the rest of the island, several small cities and towns had followed the example of Syracuse and declared for Carthage. Marcellus therefore decided to split his forces and take one legion on campaign with him while leaving the other two at the Olympion outside Syracuse. Marcellus first sought to secure the perimeter around Syracuse and therefore marched in an arch around the city. Starting in the south near Cape Pachynos he first took Heloros without striking a blow, and then swung inland to accept the surrender of Herbessos. He went back to the east coast and assaulted the town of Megara Hyblea to the north of Syracuse. The attack does not seem to have been a difficult one, but the fact that the Romans had to take the place by force caused Marcellus to make an example of the Megarians, looting their town.[89]

From Italy, Hannibal now sent a message to the government at Carthage, saying that the time was right to open a second front in Sicily. A Punic army, including twelve elephants, soon landed at Heraklea Minoa on the south coast. Marcellus therefore sought to secure the nearby city of Agrigentum before it could be seized by the enemy. But he arrived too late; the Punic commander Himilco had no trouble in persuading the once Carthaginian city to rebel from Rome. The situation was now grave - cities and towns all over the island were joining Carthage and Punic armies had footholds in two of Sicily's major cities. Making matters worse, Hippokrates

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[88]D.S..XXVI. 18, Liv. XXIV. 33. 9-34. 16, Plut. *Marc.* 14. 3, 15. 1-17. 3, Plb. VIII. 3-7. 10, Tz. *H.* II. 103-149, Zonar. IX. 4. The story that appears in Diodoros and Zonaras, that Archimedes used a giant mirror to burn the sails of the Roman ships, may be discounted. The circular and amateurish arguments of R. Temple's *The Crystal Sun*, (London, 2000), p. 196-238, concerning what he calls Archimedes' 'death ray', remain wholly unconvincing. Though some would disagree - the story of Archimedes' burning mirror was proudly related to me by the owner of the Hotel Archimedes in modern Siracusa!

[89]Liv. XXIV. 35. 1-2, Plut. *Marc.* 18. 1, Plb. VIII. 7. 11-12, Sil. XIV. 192-257, Zonar. IX. 4.

had slipped out of Syracuse with 10 500 men and was on his way to rendezvous with Himilco; once united this force of over 38 000 would be unstoppable, outnumbering the Roman and allied forces on the island by over two to one. Marcellus beat a hasty retreat from Agrigentum, and in a short time he reached Akrillai about forty kilometres west of Syracuse. There, much to his surprise, he found Hippokrates and his men pitching camp. Marcellus probably did not even know that this force had taken the field. The Roman general immediately gave the order for attack, and the Syracusan troops did not even have time to organise themselves into battle formation. This coup for Marcellus resulted in the annihilation of a force double his size, with only Hippokrates, and just over 2000 others making good their escape. These fled to nearby Akrai and awaited Himilco.[90] Although the engagement was small and quick, the Battle of Akrillai must be seen as a crucial victory for the Romans in the Sicilian theatre. Marcellus was here outnumbered two to one, but chose to attack and in doing so eliminated over 8000 men from a force that, once linked with that of Himilco, could have relieved Syracuse and possibly destroyed the Roman forces in Sicily.

Marcellus now proceeded back to Syracuse, pursued by Himilco, who met up with Hippokrates and the two encamped at the Anapos River about thirteen kilometres from the Roman position. Carthage had also sent a fleet of fifty-five ships into action and these now appeared on the scene and surprised Otacilius Crassus, who was unable to put out his fleet out to meet them. Unopposed, they entered the Great Harbour of Syracuse and resupplied the populace. At the same time the senate, probably at the request of Marcellus, had sent an extra legion to Sicily along with thirty new *quinqueremes*.[91] Livy (XXIV. 36. 4-6) says that the legion disembarked at Panormos and that Himilco, upon hearing of the reinforcements, proceeded inland

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[90]Liv. XXIV. 35. 3-36. 1, Plut. *Marc.* 18. 1, Zonar. IX. 4.

[91]Liv. XXIV. 36. 2-4, Zonar. IX. 4.

with a part of his army in an attempt to catch the legion on its way to Syracuse. Divining this, the legion's commanders had it march along the coast escorted by the fleet; it arrived at Cape Pachynos where the entire force was met by Appius Claudius, and thus Himilco was avoided. However, if the Romans marched along the coast so that they reached Cape Pachynos, that would mean going west from Panormos and marching all the way around the island and past Heraklea Minoa and Agrigentum, both of which were held by Carthage. It has been suggested that here Livy is in error, and for Pachynos he should have wrote that Appius Claudius met them at Cape Peloras, the northeastern tip of Sicily near Roman held Messana.[92] This, the most plausible solution, means that they marched east from Panormos, rounded Cape Peloras, and then proceeded directly south to Syracuse. Why the legion landed at Panormus is a mystery; they were already on board ships and it would have been much easier to transport them to Messana or Tauomenion, or even directly to Syracuse. Perhaps they had to pick up supplies in Panormos, that the ships would have taken on after disembarking the men.

Himilco, realising that he could neither bring Marcellus to battle nor relieve the siege, set out to aid those cities who wished to expel their Roman garrisons and declare for Carthage. This immediately produced results as Morgantina, the nearby Roman supply base, rebelled when Himilco came into the area, and Rome not only suffered the massacre of one of its garrisons, but also the loss of a tremendous cache of food, clothing, armour, weapons, and possibly even money. Morgantina was one of great agricultural centres of Hieron's former empire. As a result, it was probably taxed heavily under the king's grain tithe. Considering the fact that Rome was the guarantor of Hieron's power, it is not surprising therefore, that this city rebelled and joined Carthage. Other cities followed suit and their Roman occupiers were either driven out or killed.

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[92]Moore in the Loeb edition of Livy, p. 291 n. 3.

The Romans now began to feel great hostility towards the Sicilian population; fear and paranoia ran high among the Roman garrisons around the island. The situation became so grave that the garrison commander at Enna, Lucius Pinarius, was determined to save himself and his garrison and hold the city for Rome at any cost. When Himilco approached the city, the Ennensian council demanded from Pinarius the keys to all the gates of the city and the citadel, that he had locked. The prefect refused and asked them to hold a citizen assembly to decide the issue. When this was done, Pinarius addressed them, saying that his authority to hold the city came not from them but from Marcellus, and that he had previously asked the council to send a deputation to the proconsul, but they had refused. His speech was to no avail, and soon the crowds demands turned to threats; at that, the prefect gave a signal with his *toga* and the entire assembly was ambushed by the Roman troops who were in hiding nearby. The slaughter went on for hours and almost the entire adult male population of Enna was put to the sword. Upon hearing of the massacre, Marcellus not only condoned it, but as an example to other wavering cities, even gave the troops the right to pillage.[93] Seeing that the city of Enna was now useless to Carthage, Himilco returned to Agrigentum and ordered Hippokrates to garrison Morgantina. Marcellus established a new supply depot at Leontini, this time with a sizable garrison. He then took one legion from the Olympion and constructed a winter camp eight kilometres north of Syracuse at a place called Leon.[94]

The *imperium* of Marcellus was renewed for the year 212, with Hieron's former kingdom as his *provincia*. The rest of Sicily had been governed by the praetor Publius Cornelius Lentulus

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[93]*CIL* I. 2. 608, Liv. XXIV. 36. 3-39. 9.

[94]Liv. XXIV. 39. 10-13.

since the year 214, and his *imperium* was renewed for a second time.[95] By springtime Marcellus was frustrated with his inability to starve Syracuse into submission; the large Roman fleet proved ineffective and city was easily supplied by sea. As assault was still out of the question, the general decided on treachery. He had the Syracusan exiles in his camp, those who had escaped the blood letting of 214, make contact with members of their families and factions inside this city. Livy (XXV. 23. 2-7) says that this plan bore fruit and soon the conspirators inside Syracuse were eighty men strong, but in the end this proved too large. The plot was revealed just before application and the saboteurs were rounded up and tortured to death.

After this debacle the Roman fleet succeeded in capturing a Spartan named Damippos, on his way to the Macedonian court as a Syracusan envoy. Epykides immediately sent word that he wished to ransom Damippos. Marcellus accepted the offer to negotiate for the Spartan's release, since at this time Rome was courting the alliance of the Aitolian League, who were Spartan allies. So it was agreed that negotiations would take place just outside the city walls at the tiny Trogili Harbour, northeast of the Hexapylon Gate.[96] During the talks, one of the Romans counted the courses of stonework in the Syracusan wall and determined that it was lower than had originally been thought, and in fact it could be reached by normal scaling ladders. But for this very reason the sight was always under heavy guard, and a large tower was nearby.[97] So the matter was forgotten until later when a deserter informed Marcellus that the spring rite of Artemis was approaching and that the city would be celebrating for three days. By this time there was a food shortage within Syracuse, and to ease the growing discontent, Epykides had issued mass

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[95]All dispositions come from Livy. Marcellus: XXV. 3. 6; Lentulus: (214) XXIV. 10. 5; (213) 44. 4; (212) XXV. 3. 6; Otacilius: XXV. 3. 6; Crispinus: XXV. 26. 4.

[96]Parke 1944, p. 100-102.

[97]Livy (XXV. 23. 10) calls it the Galeagra Tower, and only fortifications of large proportion would have been given names.

quantities of free wine to everyone. Marcellus at last saw his chance. Very late on one of the feast nights, one hundred and sixty men crept silently along the walls to the Trogili Harbour; there they positioned ladders and awaited the arrival of the raiding force. Soon 1000 picked legionaries came up behind them and climbed onto the wall undetected. They advanced west along the wall, killing those few guards they found in two towers. Upon reaching the Hexapylon Gate they abandoned their stealth and smashed into the gatehouse. The gate was opened and a signal was given to Marcellus. He brought up all four of his legions and all the allies and together they burst into the city. The Romans fought their way west along the wall, encountering little, though seemingly determined, resistance. By daybreak the defences around the Hexapylon Gate had finally fallen, and the entire northern wall from the Trogili Harbour to the Epipolai Gate was in Roman hands.[98] After a year of frustration, the Roman army had finally set foot in Syracuse.

After a failed sortie led by Epykides from the Achradina, Marcellus tried to gain the surrender of the Achradina and the Ortygia by sending some Syracusan exiles to negotiate. The deserters in the Syracusan army however, knowing their fate would be death if they surrendered, would not even allow the exiles to approach the walls. Envoys were now sent to the Eurylaos fort asking for its surrender. The garrison at first delayed giving a straight answer for several days, hoping that Himilco and Hippokrates would arrive on the scene.[99] Meanwhile, Livy (XXV. 25. 5) says that the Romans pitched camp between the distracts of Neapolis and Tyche, using bricks and stones from the local houses for the construction. By this time, Marcellus and his officers were experiencing increasing difficulties in restraining the soldiers, who had demanded their right to pillage the city that had kept them at bay for a year. The inhabitants from the captured quarters

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[98]Liv. XXV. 23. 8-24. 7, Plut. *Marc.* 18. 2-4, Plb. VIII. 37. 1-13. See also Auct. *Vir. Ill.* 45. 5, August. *CD* 1. 6, 3. 14, Eutrop. III. 14. 3, Flor. I. 22. 33-34, Fron. *Str.* III. 3. 2, Jerome, *Chr.* ad ann. 213, p. 134H, Oros. IV. 17. 1, Polyain. VIII. 11, Vell. II. 38. 2, Zonar. IX. 5.

[99]Liv. XXV. 24. 14-25. 4.

came to Marcellus bearing the traditional trappings of supplicants and they begged the general to spare their lives and their houses. To this Marcellus consented, and then unleashed his soldiers onto the city, allowing them to claim all movable property, including slaves, as booty. Finally, the garrison at the Eurylaos fort, seeing that they would not be relieved, struck a bargain with Marcellus in which they would surrender the fort in exchange for safe passage to the Achradina. Marcellus accepted and safeguarded the rear of his position.[100]

The Romans now set up three siege camps outside the walls of the Achradina, perhaps demolishing many houses in the process. There they sat until July. Outside the walls, unbeknownst to Marcellus, Himilco and Hippokrates had established a camp by the Great Harbour, within eight to ten kilometres of the Olympion. Coordinating an attack with his brother, Hippokrates struck at the Olympion, that was under the command of the legate Quinctius Crispinus. At the same time Epykides made a mass sortie. The fighting inside the city was intense, and Marcellus sought to send aid to Crispinus, however, at that moment, a Punic fleet beached itself on the shore southeast of the plain between Syracuse and the Olympion. The ships disembarked their marines, thus preventing Marcellus from assisting his outer camp. In the end Crispinus and his force did not require help in dispersing and even pursuing the troops of Hippokrates. Eventually Epykides was forced back into the Achradina and the Roman position was safeguarded.[101]

The three armies faced each other for the next several months. Then in about October or November, a vicious plague began to sweep through the entire region, owing to the unusually hot weather. Plague had saved Syracuse twice before - in 413 Diodoros (XIII. 12. 1, 4, 6) describes how it effected the Athenians outside the walls, and in 396 (XIV. 63. 2, 70. 4-71. 4) it decimated

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[100]D.S. XXVI. 20. 1-2, Liv. XXV. 25. 5-10, Plut. *Marc.* 19. 1-2, Sil. XIV. 665-675, Zonar. IX. 5.

[101]Liv. XXV. 25. 11-26. 6.

an entire Carthaginian army. Diodoros claimed that the disease in 396 was caused by unusually hot weather, as with the case in 212. Added to this was the cold air at night, the multitude packed together in one place, and the main factor of marshy ground of the Anapos River nearby, that was a breeding ground for a wide variety of disease carrying insects and parasites. We may presume the same conditions in 212, as Livy (XXV. 26. 7-15) says the pestilence was caused by excessively hot weather and the nature of the region around Syracuse. Livy adds that the water too was infected. This gives us the impression that the lands outside the city were well known as breeding grounds for disease, and the swift reaction of the Sicilians within Himilco's army hints that they knew what was coming - at the first sign of the plague, they deserted back to their native cities. The Syracusans were not affected because over the years they had developed an immunity. It struck the Carthaginians, outside the walls and closer to the marshes, much harder than the Romans, who had been around Syracuse for over a year and had become somewhat used to the water and climate. Marcellus brought all his forces into the city and abandoned the Olympion camp, occupying the higher, healthier ground on the Epipolai plateau. Still, over the next six months into about April, 211, many of the Romans were killed. The Carthaginian army however, was devastated, almost to a man, with both Hippokrates and Himilco among the victims.

At this point, a Punic fleet arrived and this combined with the existing Syracusan navy in an attempt to break the siege by sea. Marcellus sailed out to meet this new threat and the two fleets sat opposing each other at Cape Pachynos for several days, each being afraid to haul anchor because of a strong wind. When the gale subsided, the Punic admiral was the first to reach the Cape, but once there he saw the ships of Marcellus bearing down on him in battle array. At this he made for the open sea, raised his sails, and then turned north for Italy, never striking a blow.[102]

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[102]Liv. XXV. 27. 1-12.

Rome and Carthage had not engaged in a full scale sea battle for three decades, and the reaction of the Carthaginian commander may show that the naval reputation won by Rome in the First Punic War was still intact. The notion that the Romans were still unaccustomed to the sea does not appear to have been true, and they still possessed one of the best navies in the Mediterranean, with battle hardened and experienced captains, who would have been junior officers thirty years before. By contrast, the Carthaginians had not been victorious at sea for nearly four decades, and it is possible that the Roman victory at Cape Pachynos in 211 was achieved on reputation alone.

With this victory, the fate of Syracuse, and indirectly all of Sicily, was sealed. Even if a Punic relief army was sent, Marcellus could receive supplies by sea while starving those in the Achradina and on the Ortygia into submission. As an indication that the waters around Sicily were considered safe, Livy (XXVI. 1. 12) claims that the senate now recalled thirty ships from the Sicilian fleet back to Rome.

Epykides, who had been out at sea with the Syracusan fleet, knew all hope was lost, and did not bother to return to the city, sailing for Agrigentum instead. By now a Sicilian army had gathered in a camp near Syracuse, and it was not long before they heard of the failure of the naval expedition. They decided that their best course was to send a delegation to Marcellus in order to begin the process for the surrender of Syracuse. By this course of action they hoped to ensure the most merciful treatment towards the city on behalf of the Roman general. Marcellus granted freedom to all the Syracusans and allowed them to retain their laws and customs; in return all that had once belonged to the royal family was now to be turned over to the senate and the people of Rome. This was agreed upon, and the Sicilians were allowed to send a delegation into Syracuse to persuade the citizens there to accept these terms. The members of the delegation had strong ties within the city, and upon arrival they called a meeting between their relatives and friends, and the three men Epykides had left in charge. It did not take much to turn their audience against

Epykides and his subordinates, as they were now blamed for the ruinous state of the city. At that Epykides' three subordinates were killed and a general assembly was called. The crowd approved of the terms, a new council was elected, and envoys were sent to Marcellus to ratify the surrender.[103]

In the speech of the Syracusan embassy towards Marcellus, the ambassadors blamed Hieronymos, Hippokrates, Epykides, and their three subordinates for the hostilities with Rome. Livy (XXV. 29. 2-7) claims that the envoys tried to persuade Marcellus to become the city's patron and to accept the people as his clients. Livy however, is probably being ethnocentric here, taking the Roman ideal of the client-patron relationship and grafting it onto the Greek world. It is more likely that the Greeks came to Marcellus as supplicants; a practise more in tune with Greek custom. It was common in the Hellenistic world for cities to honour their conquerors, and Syracuse would merely have been following an established tradition.[104] Yet it has been suggested that this is the first indication of the Greeks following a Roman practice, and the fact that they offered themselves as clients to Marcellus and all his descendants is more a trait of the Roman system than the Greek.[105] While it may be true that, after the Romans had been present for thirty years on the island, the Sicilians had learnt their customs, but this would appear to be a relationship not between Syracuse and Rome, but between Syracuse and Marcellus as an individual. This is in accordance with Hellenistic practice at the time, that was more accustomed to dealing with kings and strongmen than state governments. Nevertheless it would appear that this argument is moot, as the entire episode come too early in Livy's narrative. In Plutarch (*Marc.* 23), Marcellus would be deified by the Syracusans in a later incident from 210, and this is

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[103]Liv. XXV. 28-29. 1.

[104]Gruen 1984, p. 163, 166.

[105]Badian 1958, p. 7, 157.

perfectly in line with how the Greeks would have then paid homage to a conqueror. Again, Livy (XXVI. 26. 5-11) as well as Valerius Maximus (IV. 1. 7) see the latter story in terms of client and patron, but Plutarch should be trusted since his account is reinforced by Cicero (*Verr.* II. 4. 151), who mentions the establishment of games to honour Marcellus and his descendants. The establishment of games to honour a conqueror was a distinct feature of Hellenistic Greek religion and would not make its way to Rome until the first century, and even then it was not fully embedded until the later imperial cults.[106] But supplication to Marcellus in 210 proves that the Syracusans could not have offered their city to Marcellus as their patron in the surrender negotiations of 211, since he was obviously not their patron a year later.

Marcellus agreed to the conditions previously set out by the Sicilian delegation. While this was going on however, the deserters in Syracuse decided that they were not going to surrender to the Romans and go peacefully to their own deaths. They therefore succeeded in convincing the mercenaries serving alongside them that the same fate awaited the entire army once the city was handed over. Incited, together the deserters and mercenaries stormed the council chamber and murdered the newly elected councilmen. They then turned their swords on the city itself, slaughtering many of the citizens and looting the Achradina and the Ortygia. When the violence subsided they elected six prefects from their own military officers.[107] The Roman siege resumed.

When the Syracusan delegation that had been with Marcellus returned, they succeeded in gaining access to the city and talked with many of the mercenaries. They explained that the Romans had no quarrel with them and that they would be treated mercifully along with the citizens; it was only the deserters who were to be punished with death. They convinced many of the mercenaries and then talked a Spaniard into attempting to turn his commander to their cause.

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[106]Rives 1993, p. 33-34.

[107]Liv. XXV. 29. 8-10.

The Spaniard, Belligenes, went to his commander Moericus, who was one of the prefects in the Achradina quarter. Belligenes told Moericus that all of Iberia was in Roman hands (an untruth) and that if he aided the Romans he could return to Spain as chief of his tribe, or even serve as an auxiliary commander in the Roman army. Moericus was convinced; he sent his brother with Belligenes to the camp of Marcellus and a plan was conceived. Moericus had himself assigned to command the section of the Ortygia from the Fountain of Arethusa to the very tip of the island on the northeast corner of the Great Harbour. Before light one morning a *quadrireme* towed a transport full of legionaries to one of the sea gates of the Ortygia.[108] Once the gate was opened, Moericus concealed the Roman soldiers inside the city until daybreak. At first light Marcellus launched a massive diversionary assault on the Achradina, drawing troops away from the Ortygia. After enough men had been diverted, light ships made their way up to the walls and began to attack the poorly defended Ortygia. At that moment Moericus unleased the Roman troops inside the city and allowed more though the gate under his charge. His own Spanish mercenaries also joined with the Romans in seizing the Ortygia and pressing towards Achradina. The deserters in the Achradina put up stout resistance. After a period of intense fighting the Ortygia was in Roman hands, but only one section of Achradina had been captured. At that point Marcellus, knowing there was now no doubt of the city's fall, broke off the attack so as to prevent his soldiers from pillaging the royal treasuries.[109]

Livy (XXV. 31. 1) implies that the Syracusans now aided the deserters in sneaking out of the city to safety. They are not mentioned again, and this in part could explain both the end of hostilities and the new found anger of Marcellus towards Syracuse. The people now willfully

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[108]Livy (XXV. 30. 8) actually says that the ship put in at a gate leading to the Achradina, yet the Fountain of Arethusa is on the Ortygia. See Wilson 1990, p. 162-163.

[109]Liv. XXV. 30. On the name of Belligenes see XXVI. 21. 13.

opened all the gates of the Achradina and sent a delegation to Marcellus asking for nothing more than their lives.[110] After more than two bitter years, the siege of Syracuse was over.

Upon accepting the surrender of the Syracusans, Marcellus also strongly chastised them, saying they could have done more to aid him in his attempts to rid the city of Hippokrates, Epykides, and the deserters. In other words, Syracuse had left no doubt as to where they stood between the Romans and the Carthaginians. While in the end it was the people who had opened Achradina to him, he did not consider this strong enough action to exonerate them from the hardships they had made the Romans endure over the past two years. Therefore, their lives would be spared, but their city would be given over to his army. At that he posted guards over the treasury stores and in front of houses of the Syracusans who had been exiles in the Roman camp. The Achradina and Ortygia quarters were then given over to the Roman soldiers to loot as they wished. This booty, as well as the royal treasuries, eventually made its way to Rome. And the haul was extraordinary: precious statuary, paintings, fine and rare fabrics, silverware, bronzeware, weapons, the siege machines of Archimedes, gold in abundance, a tremendous load of coins, and probably about 40 000 slaves. Nothing was inviolate; temples, public building, and private houses were all plundered, sometimes being left bare. Many of these treasures were set up in the temples of Honos and Virtus, both of which were erected by Marcellus upon his return to Rome.[111] Livy (XXVII. 16. 8) describes in detail an incredibly large spoil taken from the city of Tarentum in 209, and then says that this yield only came close to the plunder of Syracuse (see above, p. 49, for Livy's treatment of the Syracusan plunder and the moral decline of Rome). Polybios (IX. 10)

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[110]Liv. XXV. 31. 2, Plut. *Marc.* 19. 3. For other accounts of the end of the siege see Auct. *Vir. Ill.* 45. 5, Cic. *Verr.* II. 2. 4, Eutrop. III. 14. 3, Flor. I. 22. 33-34, Oros. IV. 17. 1, Plin. *Nat.* 7. 125, Sil. XIV. 675-678, Val. Max. V. 1. 4, 8. 7, Vell. II. 38. 2.

[111]*CIL* 1. 2. 609, Cic. *Rep.* 1. 21, *ND* II. 61, *Verr.* II. 4. 120-123, Liv. XXV. 40. 1-3, XXVI. 21. 7-8, 30. 6, XXVII. 16. 8, XXXIV. 4. 4, Plut. *Marc.* 21. 1-33, Val. Max. I. 1. 8. See Ziolkowski 1992, p. 58-60.

chastises Rome for the amount of booty taken, not because it was wrong, but because it corrupted the once simple people of Rome. Regardless of Marcellus' order that the Syracusans were not to be harmed, the citizens did suffer casualties during the anarchy, and the scientist Archimedes in particular was struck down.[112] The fact that in 210 the Syracusans sent a delegation to Rome to complain about the conduct of Marcellus is enough to illustrate that the sacking of Syracuse was brutal and brought with it much loss of life.

Final Pacification (211-210)

Immediately after the looting, Marcellus ordered Otacilius Crassus to take eighty-five ships from his navy and to obtain supplies for the citizens, who had been without decent food for awhile. Otacilius first sailed to Lilybaion and then made a pre-dawn raid on Utica in north Africa. He captured many cargo ships filled with grain, and sent one hundred and thirty transports filled with food to Syracuse.[113]

Meanwhile at Syracuse, Marcellus began to receive delegations from cities all over Sicily. Livy (XXV. 40. 4) tells us that he dealt with each case individually; those cities who had remained faithful to the Roman alliance throughout the siege were given the status of allies, and this was also granted to those cities that had returned to the Roman alliance prior to the fall of Syracuse. Livy unfortunately does not say how the cities that only now surrendered to Marcellus were treated, only commenting that they were given terms by the victor to the vanquished. Most likely this meant that they were subjects of Rome, rather than allies. Appian (*Sic.* 5) tells us that Marcellus gave special conditions to Tauromenion, one of the most important port cities in

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[112]There are four accounts of the death of Archimedes. These appear in Cic. *Fin.* 5. 50, Plut. *Marc.* 19. 4-6, Tz. *H.* II. 136-149, Val. Max. VIII. 7. 7, Zonar. IX. 9.

[113]Liv. XXV. 31. 12-15.

Hieron's old empire and since 214 a faithful ally of Rome. The Tauromenians were rewarded with an oath that their city would never be garrisoned and they would no longer be asked to provide troops.

Yet the war in Sicily was far from over in 211, as a new Carthaginian army had landed at Agrigentum under the joint command of Hanno and Epykides. In addition, Hannibal sent a man of mixed Libyan and Carthaginian stock named Muttones to command a crack unit of Numidian cavalry. Muttones immediately took his band of Numidian horse and conducted a highly successful raid into enemy territory. Along the way he devastated and plundered Roman lands and succeeded in convincing some settlements to declare or re-declare for Carthage. Upon his return, the whole army marched out of Agrigentum along the south coast towards Syracuse. When Marcellus heard of these events he mustered his forces and set out to intercept the Carthaginians. The two armies met at the old Sicilian battleground on the River Himera, and they encamped six and a half kilometres away from each other, with Marcellus placing his army in two camps. The Carthaginians were the first to strike, with Muttones staging a cavalry attack on the Roman positions. The next day he attacked the Romans as they were apparently forming up for battle, and succeeded in driving them back to their forts.[114]

Despite their successes, all was not right with the Numidian cavalry. For now three hundred of them rebelled, broke camp, and made for Heraklea Minoa. Muttones placed the rest of his cavalry under Hanno and Epykides and set out in pursuit, leaving instructions that no attack was to take place in his absence. This order from a non-Carthaginian apparently insulted Hanno, and he therefore marched out to meet Marcellus, determined to win the glory for himself. Marcellus accepted the challenge and formed up his army, whereupon a delegation of Numidians

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[114]Liv. XXV. 40. 5-11, Plb. IX. 22. 4. Livy actually calls the Libyphoenician commander by the name Muttines, while according to Polybios he was Myttonos (see Ehrenberg *RE*, XVI. 1428-1430, Walbank 1967, II, p. 150). A contemporary Delphic inscription (*SEG* XLV. 183) refers to him as Muttones, and therefore this is the form adopted here.

came to Romans to say that because of the mutiny of three hundred of their number and on account of Hanno's slander of their commander Muttones, they planned to remain idle in the coming battle. Marcellus seized his chance and attacked the Carthaginians. Both sides charged at each other and, to the astonishment of Hanno and Epykides, the Numidians stayed put as they had promised. The fight was quickly decided and the Punic force scattered, suffering most of its several thousand casualties on the retreat to Agrigentum. The Numidians would not face the prospect of either reprisal or a Roman siege, and therefore took refuge at different settlements in the outlying area. Muttones rejoined the main Punic force.[115]

Towards the end of the summer in 211, Marcellus turned his authority over to the praetor Marcus Cornelius Cethegus and then he and Otacilius Crassus returned to Italy to canvas for the consulship. A special meeting of the senate was called to discuss the issue of a triumph for the conqueror of Syracuse. One party argued that his victory was definitely great enough to deserve a triumph, and that all his soldiers should finally be brought home. However, the political opponents of Marcellus claimed that he was unworthy of such an honour since the war in Sicily was still on, and because of this his army was still required there. Moreover, the *legiones Cannenses* had not as yet served out their full punishment. A compromise was reached - his army stayed in Sicily while he entered the city in a smaller version of a triumph known as an *ovatio*. He would actually receive two of these, one outside Rome, and then one upon entering the city. Taking part were Moericus and Sosis, the Spaniards who had aided Marcellus in taking Syracuse. Both were given citizenship and five hundred *iugera* (two hundred hectares) of land. The land of Sosis was to be in the vicinity of Syracuse and was to be taken from that which had once belonged to either Hieron or an enemy of Rome. He was also given a house of his choosing in

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[115]Liv. XXV. 40. 11-41. 7.

Syracuse, again taken from a an aristocratic who sided with Carthage. Moericus was allowed to choose any land he wanted in all of Sicily, and in addition he and his men were to choose any city that had rebelled from Rome for them to jointly rule. They eventually chose Morgantina. In this area Belligenes, the man who had convinced Moericus to switch sides, was given four hundred *iugera* (one hundred and sixty hectares).[116]

In Rome, Marcellus and Marcus Valerius Laevinus, recent hero of the Macedonian front, had taken office as the new consuls for 210. The senate considered it important to resume the war on all fronts and therefore began conducting the business assigning and renewing the commands. Marcellus, the sole consul in the city, for Laevinus was still in Greece, brought a halt to these proceedings, saying that the business of the state would not continue until his colleague should return to the city. Since at this time a delegation of Syracusans were making their way to Rome to protest over the conduct of Marcellus after his capture of Syracuse. Marcellus claimed that no official business would be conducted until Laevinus returned and the charges of the Syracusans were heard before the senate. The Syracusans had now taken up residence outside of Rome on the estates of Marcellus' political opponents, whom Livy (XXVI. 26. 6-7) implies were numerous. When Laevinus landed in Italy he was immediately approached by the Syracusan delegation and they followed his entourage to Rome. Once inside the city, the state business at last resumed. It was determined that the two consular provinces should be Italy and Sicily, to be decided between the consuls by the traditional drawing of lots. Laevinus drew Italy as his province, and Marcellus drew Sicily. This was too much for the Syracusans to bear, and they went along in mourning garb to the houses of various senators to complain of the allotment. They claimed that Marcellus knew of their purpose in Rome, and that he would extract a heady

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[116]Auct. *Vir. Ill.* 45. 6, Liv. XXVI. 21. 1-13, 17, 22. 2-23. 2, Plut. *Marc.* 21. 1, 22. 1, Val. Max. II. 8. 5.

vengeance from their city if he were to return. The issue was finally raised in the senate, and Marcellus, who appeared to want the matter over as quickly as possible, agreed to an exchange of provinces.

The Syracusans were now admitted to the senate, and they gave a lengthy speech on how Marcellus had shamelessly pillaged Leontini, and how he then condemned the members of a coup against Hippokrates and Epykides to death by not bringing his army to Syracuse quickly enough. When he did come, he refused the offers of the leading men to open the gates, instead wishing to take the place by assault and therefore have an excuse to plunder. And when the city was sacked, it was done in a most insolent manner, with even temples raped of all their treasure. Finally, far too much property was taken outside the city as *ager publicus*. Marcellus denied these charges, basing his argument on the fact that at the time Syracuse was at war with Rome, and therefore any action he took was justified. He demanded that they name anyone who had approached him about handing over the city. They could not, or possibly would not out of fear. Both parties therefore withdrew and the senate deliberated the issue. A strong group wished to condone the actions of Marcellus up to the fall of Syracuse, but then to condemn him for the city's sack. Yet it was always very unlikely that the senate would ever condemn the actions of one of their own, especially since no Roman citizens were injured. Besides, punishing Marcellus would send a clear message to all their generals in the field that they no longer had full freedom of action. Therefore, the *acta* of Marcellus were fully ratified and he was acquitted. Whether or not the all claims of the Syracusans were true is irrelevant, they at least succeeded in accomplishing one of their aims in that Marcellus would not be returning to Sicily. They could have held little hope that Marcellus would have been punished, as no Roman general had ever been admonished or tried for sacking a captured city, and most of their other charges were largely unverifiable. At best they could expect him to not be reassigned to Sicily and that there be a reassessment of the *ager publicus*.

To their credit, the senate did order Laevinus to conduct this reassessment upon his arrival in his province.[117]

After the acquittal, the Syracusans, fearing for their lives, prostrated themselves in front of Marcellus and begged him to accept their city as its patron, promising to sacrifice and conduct religious ceremonies every time he or one of his decedents came to Sicily. In essence, they had offered him deification, in accordance with the contemporary Hellenistic practice of deifying conquerors (see above, p. 202-203).[118] Marcellus quietly accepted and the matter was dropped. The festivals for Marcellus and his decedents were still practised over a century and a half later.[119]

The government in Carthage was determined to make one last stab at Sicily and sent a force of 11 000 to Agrigentum. Several cities again revolted, the most important of which Livy (XXVI. 21. 14) says were Megara Hyblea and Morgantina. Eutropius (IV. 14. 4) claims forty sites in total went over to Carthage. What is more, Muttones now seems to have reconciled with his Numidian cavalry and they were on a terror campaign throughout the open country. The new praetor Cornelius Cethegus was in a tight bind, facing a large scale insurrection in his new province and an army devoid of morale with which to suppress it, as his soldiers were angry at not being sent back to Italy to celebrate their victory with Marcellus. Cethegus managed to talk them down from the brink of mutiny and then proceeded over the summer to recover all the lost cities and towns. Twenty-six out of the forty were taken by assault, though apparently without much difficulty. The rest went over without a fight.[120]

Laevinus arrived in Sicily in the autumn of 210 and, after quickly resolving matters at

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[117]Liv. XXVI. 23. 6.

[118]See n. 29.

[119]Cic. *Verr.* II. 4. 151, Dio, XV. fr. 46a, , Liv. XXVI. 26. 5-11, 27. 16, 28. 3, 29-32, Plut. *Marc.* 23, Val. Max. IV. 1. 7, Zonar. IX. 6.

[120]Eutrop. IV. 14. 3, Liv. XXVI. 21. 14-17, Zonar. IX. 6.

Syracuse, took his four legions into the field against the new army of Hanno. He marched to Agrigentum and discovered that Muttones and the Numidian cavalry were freely riding in and out of the city, raiding the country side, and causing still more towns to declare for Carthage. Although again all was not perfect between Hanno, Muttones, and the Numidians. The Numidian horsemen had rebelled several more times over the summer, and there had even been fighting in the streets of Agrigentum. There was also a power struggle going on between Hanno and Muttones, with the latter taking free reign to come and go with his cavalry as he pleased. Finally, Hanno stripped Muttones of his command and replaced him with his own son. Muttones considered this an unforgivable insult, and he took his Numidians over to Laevinus and promptly switched sides.

Muttones even went so far as to undertake the first assault of the Punic city. He and his cavalry approached Agrigentum from the south, and the guards did not sound the alarm since they thought that it was their cavalry returning from another raid. Quickly Muttones went on the attack and seized one of the southern gates. He then gave a signal to Laevinus and the Romans charged at the city. The legionaries poured through the open gate and flooded into the streets. Hanno did not react swiftly as he thought that it was only the Numidians gone on a rampage again, and by the time he and his army finally mustered on the scene it was too late. He fled to the north of the city and succeeded in rounding up some of his officers, including Epykides. They managed to make it to the shore in safety, where they boarded the nearest boat and made for Africa. The Carthaginian army and their Sicilian allies within Agrigentum were eventually surrounded by the superior Roman force and fought to their deaths on the city streets. They made their final stand in the north of the city where most of them were cut down.[121]

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[121]Liv. XXVI. 40. 1-13.

For the third time in fifty-two years, Agrigentum was sacked. Laevinus had the city council executed and the rest of the citizen body, probably between ten and 15 000 people, were sold into slavery. He then set out and quickly captured several places by assault, rouse, or surrender before the end of the year. At this, after nearly four years, the final pacification of Sicily was at last complete.

Peace (209-204)

The battle over Sicily had been won, but the Second Punic War would require another eight years before Rome would emerge as the victor. As the legions had to be fed in Italy, Greece, Spain, and Sardinia, it was essential that the transition from a war time military economy to a peace time agricultural economy be a swift one for Sicily, as the island and its grain tithe were now intended to act as the breadbasket for the Roman military. Laevinus began the process of returning the farms around the island to full production. He also took to policing the lawlessness that had broken out in parts of Sicily during the last few years. A particularly rough area was Agathyrna on the northeast coast, that appears to have become a haven for criminals. There he rounded up 4000 of the worst offenders and shipped them to Rhegium to serve as mercenaries. In Rome Laevinus gave the senate a final report on Sicily and stated firmly that the war was over in that theatre. He rewarded the Numidians in front of the senate and they voted to bestow citizenship upon Muttones.[122]

From Punic prisoners taken on an African raid, the senate learnt that Carthage was planning a new invasion of Sicily. Laevinus therefore returned to the island, but the Punic attack never came, and eventually the Romans stood down. The senate attempted to give Sicily a stable

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[122]Liv. XXVI. 40. 13-18, XXVII. 5. 6-7, Plb. IX. 27. 10-11.

government by renewing the authority of Laevinus three times down to the end of 207. Cincius Alimentus, the future Roman historian, had his propraetorian *imperium* prorogued for 209 in Hieron's former kingdom.

One of the biggest changes in Sicily brought on by the fall of Syracuse was the transferral of the Roman administrative centre for the island. It is possible that it was during this three year period of Laevinus' proconsulship, when the praetor of Sicily only had power in Hieron's old domain, that the residence of the Sicilian praetor was formally moved from Lilybaion to Syracuse, where it would remain.[123] If the centre of administration did shift at this time, it appears that a quaestor was kept on at Lilybaion, most likely to serve Laevinus and to administer the tithe on the western half of the island. Cincius Alimentus would have also had his own quaestor at Syracuse, and the dual quaestorship of Cicero's time may have its origins in these years, when the inland was divided between proconsular and praetorian areas.[124]

Quintus Fabius Maximus, the son of the Cunctator, was sent to Sicily in March or April of 209 to collect thirty ships and two legions from Laevinus for service in Italy. So as not to leave the territory undermanned, he brought with him the survivors of the defeat at Second Herdonea in Italy to supplement the *legiones Cannenses*, who were to remain on the island. Laevinus, though, still felt that the island needed the protection of a full consular army, and therefore recruited auxiliaries from the ex-soldiers in the civilian population. He banded these together with his Punic prisoners to form the equivalent of two new legions, attaching this *ad hoc* force to the *legiones Cannenses*.[125] These troops aided the transition to a peace time economy in that they

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[123]Diodoros (XXXVI. 3. 3) is the first to mention a praetor residing at Syracuse in 104. The city's status as a provincial capital is not confirmed until Cicero (*Verr.* II. 4. 118, 5. 30, 80).

[124]Cic. *Planc.* 65, *Verr.* II. 2. 11, 22. On the African raid see Liv. XXVII. 5. 1, 8-15.

[125]Liv. XXVII. 7. 9, 15, 8. 13-17.

served as a police force throughout Sicily, helping to curb the banditry that had taken over the place during the war years. This facilitated trade as merchants and goods, and more importantly, food and supplies, could now be transported with relative safety.

Laevinus also enlisted Muttones and the Numidian cavalry as his personal bodyguard. Along with them he toured the countryside, visiting farms and estates so as to ensure full and efficient production. He rewarded owners who were doing well and admonished those who were not, and he tried to have every piece of arable land brought under cultivation. By this type of diligence he was able to send a large crop of grain to Italy in 209 and again in 207. In the intervening year, the senate sent Lucius Manlius Acidinus as a legate to the Olympic games to invite back all of the Greek exiles from Sicily, promising that the Romans would restore their former lands.[126] This move was probably designed to further increase production, to gain popularity among locals, and to appear benevolent in front of the peoples of Greece.

In 208 it was rumoured that two hundred Punic ships were being prepared for a Sicilian invasion. Although this rumour would again prove false, Laevinus decided on a pre-emptive strike and took his fleet of one hundred ships and sailed to Africa. He landed near Clupea about one hundred and thirty-five kilometres east of Carthage. For a time he plundered the open country unopposed, but when he received word that a Punic fleet was on its way, he set sail for Sicily. It was not long before he encountered an enemy fleet of eighty-three ships. In the largest sea battle of the Second Punic War, Laevinus routed the Carthaginians and managed to capture eighteen vessels without losing any of his own, as again the Romans showed themselves to be accomplished sailors.[127]

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[126]Tour of Laevinus and shipment of 209: Liv. XXVII. 8. 18-9. 7; shipment of 207: XXVIII. 4. 7; embassy to Olympia: XXVII. 35. 3-4.

[127]Liv. XXVII. 22. 8-9, 29. 7-8.

The Roman navy continued to use Sicily as base for African raids, and in 207 inflicted another naval defeat upon Carthage. Laevinus commanded the raid, where he ravaged the territory around Carthage and even approached the walls of Utica. On the voyage home he encountered a seventy vessel Punic fleet. The two sides did battle, and the superior Roman numbers carried the day. Seventeen enemy ships were captured and four sunk, and again the Romans escaped unscathed.[128] Livy (XXVIII. 4. 7) comments that this success broke the Punic naval effort and Carthage was no longer a threat at sea, thus increasing seaborne supply shipments between Sicily and Italy. Moreover, indirectly, the two victories of Laevinus over the Carthaginian navy gave Scipio a safe passage to Africa for his invasion three years later.

In 206 proconsular authority was removed from Sicily, as Laevinus was ordered to return to Rome. In the following year the new consul, Scipio, was given Sicily as his *provincia* and, after much haranguing with the senate, was permitted to invade Africa. He first recruited a volunteer army of 7000 in Italy and then set out for Sicily with thirty newly constructed *quinqueremes*. Once there he probably split his recruits into two legions and banded them together with the two *legiones Cannenses*. These two disgraced legions would now form a core of veterans in Scipio's new model army, and would finally get their chance to redeem themselves for Cannae and Second Herdonea. Scipio quartered his troops upon the civilian population and exacted grain from the people to feed his army. He then commanded three hundred of the island's young aristocrats to rendezvous at an appointed spot with horses and full armour. There they were told that they were to serve as his cavalry in Africa. When they protested, he quickly produced substitutes, striking a bargain with them that they would not have to serve if they would billet, equip, and train one of the Italian substitutes. Eventually, all three hundred of the natives

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[128]Liv. XXVIII. 4. 5-7.

were replaced with troops willing to fight, at no cost to Rome.[129]

During this time the consul also went to Syracuse, as the city was unhappy about the land reassessments undertaken by Laevinus in 210. The locals were embittered by the fact that Italians resident at Syracuse were forcibly holding on to lands they claimed as their own, that the Italians said was *ager publicus*. Land that was designated as *ager publicus* was in theory leased by censors at Rome, but at times conquering generals doled out the land as they saw fit, and Marcellus in 211 may have already apportioned some Syracusan land before the original reassessments of Laevinus took place.[130] Prior to the restoration of Sicilian exiles in 208, the lands meted by Marcellus most likely went to Italians who had come to Sicily as carpetbaggers, seeking a profit off of the war.[131]

Scipio held a series of hearings and enquiries into the cases and made judgements. Livy (XXIX. 1. 15-18) claims that the majority of litigants were satisfied, thus increasing Scipio's reputation, but the evidence may show the opposite. In 206, before Scipio's hearings, Italians on the peninsula were becoming embittered over the fact that their government was concentrating on Sicilian agriculture while so many Italian farms had yet to recover from the depredations of a dozen years of warfare.[132] Furthermore, a dedicatory inscription of 193 illustrates that the Italians of southeastern Sicily considered Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiagenes to have been their benefactor, protecting their interests against the native Sicilians.[133] Scipio Asiagenes, the brother of Scipio Africanus, was the governor in 193, but was also present in 205 as a *legatus*, and the

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[129]App. *Lib.* 8, Liv. XXVIII. 46. 1, XXIX. 1. 1-15, 3. 7-15, 4. 7-5. 1, Val. Max. III. 6. 1, VII. 3. 3, Zonar. IX. 11.

[130]In 210 Quintus Fulvius Flaccus leased out the lands of Capua, the city he had recently conquered. See Liv. XXVII. 3. 1. For the original reassessments of Laevinus see Liv. XXVI. 40. 1.

[131]Nicolet 1974, p. 294, Verbrugghe 1972, p. 542. For the restoration of the exiles see Liv. XXVII. 35. 3-4.

[132]Liv. XXVIII. 11. 8.

[133]*CIL* I. 2. 612.

fact that the Italians of Syracuse saw him as a protector may lead to the conclusion that he played a role in his brother's land reassessments.[134] The role of Italian landowners in Sicily would only increase during the second century (see below, p. 284-286), and so it is probable that the Syracusan land question was never resolved to the satisfaction of the locals. Although our sources highlight acts of Roman magnanimity towards conquered peoples, this example illustrates that provincials were largely at the mercy of Italian citizens, who could exploit them almost as they pleased, safe in the knowledge that they were supported by the ruling power.

Livy (XXIX. 4. 4) and Zonaras (IX. 11) inform us that in this year the Carthaginian government, in an act of desperation that would have served them better six or seven years before, offered Philip V of Macedonia two hundred silver talents to open a new front and invade Sicily. The response of Philip is unknown, though he obviously declined as he was about to withdraw from the war and sign the Peace of Phoinike.

When Scipio was ready to cross over to Africa, he ordered of all his legions and forty of his *quinqueremes* to muster at Lilybaion. He also commanded all the merchant ships from the west coast to be pressed into service for his crossing and supply, and a total of four hundred were commandeered. The praetor Pomponius Matho was in charge of supply and placed forty-five days worth of food and water aboard each transport, with one third of the food being pre-cooked.[135] The dispositions given by Livy (XXIX. 24. 10-26. 2) illustrate that this was a huge armada, and he compares it to the large armies and fleets that set sail for Africa in the First Punic War. He also claims that Lilybaion was at pains to accommodate such a large contingent, and that the city was so overcrowded that the sailors were forced to sleep aboard their ships. The strain on the civilian populace must therefore have been immense. After a speech and a sacrifice, the

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[134]205: Liv. XXIX. 7. 2; 193: XXXIV. 55. 6.

[135]Fron. *Str.* II. 7. 4, Liv. XXIX. 24. 1-10.

armada hauled anchor and departed from the Sicilian shores.[136]

The Roman Province of Sicily (203-191)

The amount of grain produced every year on Sicily was an invaluable asset to Scipio, and in the final three years of the war the island's main function was to serve as a supply base and training ground for the army in Africa. In turn, Sicily served as the storage centre for all the booty taken in Africa, as two boat loads of plunder were received in 204. In the same year, Scipio received two shipments of supplies, including siege engines, from Sicily. The governor, Pomponius Matho, had his *imperium* prorogued and brought 3000 new recruits to the island to train and to bolster the garrison. They supervised the transport of large quantities of arms, food, and clothing to the legions in Africa.[137] This implies that an exchange system had been put in place, whereby ships would come to Africa with supplies, unload, and then return to Sicily with plunder. Sicilian grain was also being sent in large quantities to Italy, as Livy (XXX. 38. 5) tells us that in 202 the Italian markets became flooded, resulting in a drastic fall in grain prices at Rome.

In Africa, Hannibal met Scipio at Zama about one hundred and thirty kilometres southwest of Carthage. There, Scipio emerged victorious after a bitter struggle, with Rome's discarded and disgraced soldiers, the *legiones Cannenses* forming the core of the triumphant army. After this point, there is no attestation of the military dispositions in Sicily until Livy (XXXV. 23. 6-8) writes of the island in the context of a possible invasion by Antiochos III of Syria in 192. Unfortunately, Livy's language is somewhat obscure, for he says that Sicily already had a standing Roman army (*exercitus*) at that time with which to defend itself. Therefore it is likely that the

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[136]App. *Lib.* 13, Liv. XXIX. 26. 7-27. 6, Zonar. IX. 12.

[137]Plunder to Sicily: Liv. XXIX. 29. 3, 35. 1; supplies to Africa: XXIX. 35. 8, 36. 1, XXX. 2. 1-3, 3. 2.

force in the province was greater than simply a garrison. As with the end of the First Punic War, due to Sicily's importance and its proximity to Carthage, it is probable that the two legions left behind by Scipio in 204 were retained, though the actual legionaries from the Second Punic War were retired and given land grants in 199.[138] These troops could have acted as the governing praetor's bodyguard, a rudimentary police force, and as garrisons for the larger cities. The two legions that had been raised from non-Roman troops in the province (by Laevinus in 209) were in all likelihood disbanded at the conclusion of hostilities with Carthage. Although the treaty to end the Second Punic War, as related by Polybios (XV. 18), does not call for Punic prisoners to be released by Rome, only the opposite, it seems probable that the Carthaginians in the aforementioned Sicilian legions would have been freed at the end of hostilities or soon afterwards. There was definitely no non-Roman troops in the province in 192, since Livy, in the above passage, also speaks of raising brand new militia forces.

In the years after the Second Punic War the senate realised the importance of its wealthiest province, and took steps revitalise and repopulate the areas of Sicily that had been devastated by the war. In particular, it is possible that the veterans from the two Sicilian legions who were given land grants in 199 were settled in various underpopulated areas, such as Agrigentum.[139] The senate would have had enough *ager publicus* to allot to any soldiers who wished to settle. Furthermore, in 193, the Spainish praetor Gaius Flaminius was sent to Sicily in 193 to recruit at least one legion, and in the following year the senate asked the Sicilian praetor, to raise a force

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[138]Liv. XXXII. 1. 6. For the legions left behind in 204 see XXIX. 26. 8.

[139]*Contra* Brunt 1971, p. 219, who argues that the Sicily did not require garrisons in times of peace, and that the prevalence of Greek culture makes it doubtful that veterans were settled there. On the first point, the importance of garrisoning Sicily because of the island's position will be dealt with below (see p. 233, 248-249). Concerning the latter point, a settlement of two legions in an existing Greek area would not alter the cultural or linguistic nature of the district in any drastic fashion.

of 16 000 militia to protect the island.[140] In order to enroll such large forces so quickly it is possible that these officials would have been able to call upon retired veterans settled within the province.

Furthering the resettlement program, in 197 or 195, the senate ordered the praetor Lucius or Gnaeus (depending on the year) Manlius Vulso to resettle Agrigentum with people from towns around Sicily. It is possible that these people came from places that were devastated by the war. However, there was friction between these settlers and the original inhabitants, as the new residents were gradually pushing the older inhabitants out of the local government. The praetor, Scipio Asiagenes, was forced to intervene. He made two classes of citizens and guaranteed the original townspeople a certain amount of places on the city council.[141]

Sicily continued to export grain to Rome and its armies with frequentcy. In 198 Livy (XXXII. 27. 3) relates how large amounts of food and clothing were sent to the Roman army in Greece and in 196 (XXXIII. 42. 8) an incredible one million *modii* of Sicilian grain was distributed in Rome.[142] The island had always been able to work at a high capacity (and continued to do so until the 1940s) but now production soared for two main reasons. First and foremost, the large amount of *ager publicus* taken by Rome was sold to private citizens in both Italy and Sicily and a new class of wealthy men emerged on the island at this time. Additionally their large

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[140]193: Valerius Antias *ap.* Liv. XXXV. 2. 8-9; 192: XXXII. 1. 6.

[141]Cic. *Verr.* II. 2. 123. Cicero actually calls the praetor Titus Manlius, yet no Sicilian praetor ever existed with that name. The problem with this passage is connecting the proper Manlius with the proper Scipio. Broughton *MRR* I, p. 333-335, n. 2, takes the approach that Cicero's Titus is actually Lucius Manlius Vulso, praetor of 197, but it could equally be Gnaeus Manlius Vulso of 195. Broughton also identifies the Scipio as Scipio Africanus, from the general's stay in Sicily in 205 and 204. This cannot be correct since the Scipionic laws were made when the colonists were already at Agrigentum, and therefore must post-date the resettlement. Münzer (*RE* XIV. 1216, 1223) has suggested that Cicero's Titus is actually Gaius Mamilius Atellus, praetor of Sicily in 207. This would allow Africanus to fit into the picture, but there is no evidence for this theory. The most plausible solution could be that of Goldsberry 1973, p. 274 n. 100, who identifies the Scipio mentioned as Asiagenes, who could have finished off the programme of his predecessor during his praetorship of 193 in Sicily. This would mean that the original reforms would have been carried out by one of two Manlii, but which one must remain uncertain.

[142]See Deniaux 1994, p. 248.

farms were laboured over by the great numbers of captives taken in the Second Punic War and sold into slavery (see below, p. 285).

Conclusion

Sicily, now militarily secured by Rome, continued to be one of the most important places in the Mediterranean. The island, while not the main theatre of the Second Punic War, was nevertheless one of the conflict's most significant battlefields, as the possession of Sicily meant victory or defeat for either side. Rome's victory on the island came not of the fact that it was militarily superior to Carthage, but from Rome appreciating the strategic position of Sicily. As Hannibal mainly operated in southern Italy, Sicily could have easily acted as his main supply base, giving him infinite access to food and men, which was the role that it played for Rome once they invaded Africa. Knowing they could not defeat Hannibal in Italy, the Romans elected to seal him in; they controlled the north, the Illyrian coast, the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, Sardinia, and eventually all of Sicily. If a crack had been made in even one of these centres, the Punic army in Italy could have been resupplied indefinitely. Sicily, with its proximity to Africa, was arguably the most important link in this chain. Hannibal, who more than once sent parts of his shrinking forces to the Sicilian theatre, understood the Roman strategy; the Punic failure came in the fact that the Carthaginian government did not.

Both Punic wars had devastated the island of Sicily, and looted it of some of its most precious material wealth. Archaeological evidence has confirmed that the number of urban centres in Sicily dropped by over approximately thirty-five percent in the third century. A number of these disappearances can be dated to the depredations of Agathokles and his battles with Carthage, others, most notably Gela, destroyed in 280 by the Agrigentine tyrant Phintias, were

victims of wars fought amongst the Greeks.[143] Yet the majority cease to exist after the Roman invasion of 264, leading to the conclusion that a significant number of sites perished at the hands of the Romans or the Carthaginians, never to be repopulated.[144] This however, does not appear to be the explanation for the demise of many of the urban centres, especially those situated upon hilltops. New studies have shown that the decline in hilltop cities during the third, and continuing into the second centuries, cannot be attributed to the violence of war, but merely represent a shift in demographics (see below, p. 277-279).

The Second Punic War in many ways signified the culmination of Roman military imperialism on Sicily. The majority of the island had been seized in the previous conflict, and as such it represented the Roman dominion outside Italy in its entirety. By the late third century, Sicily had become only one aspect of Roman imperialism in the Mediterranean, and the Romans viewed the place as merely a part of their empire, rather than the extent of it. The Second Punic War in Sicily centred on the siege of Syracuse; when the latter turned against Rome, the senate viewed the disloyalty as an act of rebellion, and set about conquering King Hieron's former kingdom, and in the process securing the whole island. Although this was the major conflict in Sicily during the Hannibalic war, there was fighting, at times heavy, outside of these years and outside of Syracuse. The numerous invasions or attempted Carthaginian invasions illustrate Sicily's pivotal role concerning the entire war, and therefore it has been the secondary purpose of this chapter to highlight the years that are rarely covered in works on the Second Punic War, specifically the years 218-216 and 210-191. Although there was little or no fighting during these periods, they are nevertheless vitally important to this work as an illustration of how the Romans, as with they had done in 241, shifted their efforts from military to administrative imperialism.

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[143]For the destruction of Phintias see D.S. XXII. 2. 2.

[144]Adamesteanu 1960, p. 214, 1963, p. 265, Giustolisi, 1976, p. 61-62, Wilson 1985, p. 316-319.

In the end, it was only a matter of time before either Rome or Carthage seized all of Sicily in the third century. The land's natural wealth and strategic position in the middle of the western Mediterranean meant that it always belonged to the strongest power in the area, who usually shed much blood and expended a tremendous effort to secure their growing empires. In this way the Greeks had come and subjugated the natives, then Carthage expanded into the area at the expense of the Greeks. And now Rome had taken its turn.

Chapter 6
Roman Imperialism in Sicily: Conclusions

Thus far, this work has attempted to illustrate the nature of imperialism in mid-Republican Rome, and how it was applied in an aggressive manner towards the Sicilians in both 264 and again in 214. Scholarship has traditionally viewed this process as a necessity on the part of the Romans; in order to maintain their empire, they had to conquer all those who might threaten its stability, and they therefore expanded mainly for defensive reasons.[1] Chapter 1 has described how this view, influenced by the fact that its main proponents were themselves writing at times when the empires of their native lands were expanding, is now largely outmoded. More recent years have seen a trend towards viewing the Romans as aggressive imperialists - deliberately instigating wars and planning their conquests.[2] This definition was certainly more suited to a society that found itself at war in foreign territories on a yearly basis, and one that prized victory in battle above all else. Yet still this theory was, like its predecessor, too general in scope, and the most contemporary theses on the nature of Roman imperialism have tended to view the Romans as an aggressive people who were at times forced to conquer for defensive reasons (see above p. 10-12).[3]

Although an adherent of the purely aggressive school of thought might argue that if Rome was not so busy belligerently crushing its neighbours, then most of the defensive wars would not have been necessary. However, this line of argument cannot be applied to Sicily. There is little doubt that Rome acted aggressively when it occupied Messana in 264; evidence would appear to show that this occupation was in direct violation of a treaty signed with Carthage in 306 and

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[1]Badian 1968a, p. 6, Eckstein 1985, p. 265-282, 1987, p. 77-91, Errington 1971, p. 3, 34, Frank 1914, p. 90-91, Hoyos 1998, p. 19-22, 30, 54, 271-274, Sherwin-White 1980, p. 178-179.

[2]Harris 1971, p. 1371-1385, 1984, p. 13-58, 1984a, p. 89-113.

[3]Hermon 1983, p. 177-184, 1984, p. 259-267, 1989, p. 407-416, North 1981, p. 1-9, Rich 1993, p. 38-68, 1996, p. 1-37.

renewed in 279 or 278, that specifically barred either the Carthaginians from Italy and, more importantly, the Romans from Sicily (see above, p. 82-95). Even if this was not the case, they were blatantly interfering in a foreign war in order to suit their own purposes of territorial expansion, and it seems doubtful that they had any intention of ever leaving Messana once they had taken the place. Yet despite these aggressive moves, a more moderate approach to this act of Roman imperialism may be taken because the Punic threat to Roman Italy was in fact real. Carthage too, was an expansionist power, and if Rome allowed one half of the Straits of Messana to fall into Punic hands, then it would not be far fetched to hypothesise that Carthaginian interests would soon draw them into conflict with one of the coastal cities of southwestern Italy. As proof of this, one needs to only look as far as the reverse scenario, which did in fact happen - once Rome was in full control of Rhegium by 270, then it was only six years before one of their armies landed in Sicily.

The Carthaginian thalassocracy also practised a largely closed trading policy, and greatly restricted foreigners from ports under its control. If this empire were allowed to expand into eastern Sicily, then this might mean the loss of highly lucrative trading rights with that part of the island for Italian merchants. Therefore it may be that the Roman decision to invade Sicily was influenced by these same traders, some of whom would have been from the coastal city of Capua, and would have held seats in the senate.[4] This is not without parallel in Roman history, as the senate was not afraid to declare war on any foreign power that threatened the interests of Roman or Italian traders.[5]

A particular problem faced by all historians of Rome whose research focuses on the period before the second century is an acute lack of surviving sources. Polybios is the closest we have

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[4]Liv. VIII. 14. 10. See Corsaro 1982, p. 1006-1007, Hoyos 1998, p. 20-21.

[5]App. *Ill.* 7, Cic. *Man.* 11, Plb. II. 8. See Feig Vishnia 1996, p. 20.

to a contemporary, but even he lived up to a century after the events in question. On the whole one of the most trustworthy sources from the ancient world, he was an eye-witness to some of the events he relates, and conducted research, including interviews and archival work, into eras that preceded him. As a soldier and a statesman, he presents a keen understanding of military and political affairs. Yet he is not above suspicion. Like every historian, Polybios had his biases, and although he does not exonerate the Romans for their more blatant acts of imperialism, he is willing to give Rome the benefit of the doubt concerning the commencement of wars. Furthermore, in spite of his military background he at times made mistakes when dealing with warfare and the army of the third century.[6]

Livy is our other main source for this time period. He relied extensively upon Polybios and therefore can often be used, with caution, where the latter's history has not survived. Livy has been accused of exaggerated detail and of being a mere Polybian copyist, but there exists no serious evidence that should make us doubt him on the basic factuality of the events he relates.[7] While it is true that he cared more for style than historical accuracy, as with his falsifying the date for the fall of Syracuse (XXV. 23. 1) so as to parallel it with the defeat of the Scipios in Spain (XXV. 32-39), he remains credible when we have other sources to use in comparison, and he cites other authors, often Polybios, whom we also know to be trustworthy.[8] Livy's writing was coloured by his Stoic views that placed Rome in a moral decline, but nevertheless, perhaps because of the watchful eyes of Augustus, he did view the past as a validation of Rome's present greatness.[9] In the end however, a certain amount of accuracy must be assigned to Livy, for

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[6]See above, p. 112, 113, 119 n. 33, 120, 131, 192 n. 87. See also Rawson 1991, p. 35-57.

[7]Lazenby 1978, p. 259-260 levels both the criticism and the defence.

[8]For the date of the fall of Syracuse see De Sanctis 1967-1968, III. 2, p. 331-334, Mellor 1999, p. 53-60. See also Broughton *MRR*, I, p. 269, 273-274.

[9]Mellor 1999, p. 57, 69-70.

without him, any history of the late third and early second centuries would be impossible.

Outside the realm of history, our most important source is the lawyer and orator Marcus Tullius Cicero, specifically his *In Verrem* or *Verrine Orations*. In these speeches we are told, in an indirect fashion, about the government of Sicily and the legal status of its cities in the first century. The *Verrines* themselves are not historical documents, and in fact are hardly legal ones either; although they relate the proceedings of the trial of Verres from 70, most were written after the defence in the case had been abandoned, and as such were never delivered. Cicero could therefore feel free to take as much license as he pleased, for there was no one to provide a retort. In the end they remain works of rhetoric, designed more to show off a speaker's talents than to relate matters factually. As such we must exercise extreme caution with these pieces. But it is still possible to sift through the material and come up with a relatively accurate picture of Sicilian agriculture in the third century, since, despite all their drawbacks, the *Verrines* contain a wealth of information, and in many ways they allow us to examine the province of Sicily as we could no other. Furthermore, the information contained within the speeches is on the whole considered accurate.[10] As we shall see in Chapter 8, detailed records existed for every level of the *lex Hieronica*; these took the form of both official state records and private books kept but the *publicani* who worked within the system.[11] This is one of the rare occasions where we have an extensive account of the legal framework that was used to govern a Roman possession, and as such this gives us a very special insight into Republican Sicily, an insight that we have for few other provinces until the Imperial period.

Chapters 4 and 5 have attempted to deal with the narrative of Roman imperialism in third century Sicily. These chapters are necessary both because, in terms of Sicily, they have never

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[10]Brunt 1980, p. 286.

[11]Cic. *Verr.* II. 2. 171. See Nicolet 1996, p. 5-24.

been adequately written, and because they show how Roman power developed to the point where the western Mediterranean could be conquered. This process was a lengthy one, for although Sicily was pacified by the end of the First Punic War in 241, the island was not fully brought under Roman control until 210. In between these years the Romans had been, unknowingly and largely through *ad hoc* measures and maintaining systems already in place, constructing what would become the first regularised *provincia*.

The first half of this work has attempted to illustrate the process by which the Romans came to dominate much of the western Mediterranean by the end of the third century. Part I has largely been constructed around the writings of Polybios. While he was not pro-Roman, he has been shown to be willing to give the Romans the benefit of the doubt when dealing with controversial subjects or contradictory sources. This is especially evident in his treatment of the treaties between Rome and Carthage. Here, he argues against the existence of the treaty of Philinos from 306, a concordat that specifically barred the Romans from interfering in Sicily. A variety of other sources would appear to place Polybios in the wrong, but the strongest piece of evidence comes from the historian himself, who says that the 279/8 treaty was a direct renewal of the previous agreement, which Polybios dates to 348. Yet the latter treaty was made at a time when Rome was still struggling for control of central Italy, and as a result, it allowed for Carthaginian intervention in Latium. It is inconceivable that the treaty of 279/8 would have permitted Punic intervention in Latium at this time in Roman history, and therefore it makes sense if this was the renewal, not of the 348 pact as Polybios states, but of an overlooked treaty from 306.

Sicily is used as a microcosm for Roman imperialism in the west, as through Sicily and the first two Punic wars we may explore from what sources - military, political, and cultural - the Romans derived their power to conquer other peoples and to survive wars of attrition. This

background work has given us the basis from which to focus specifically on how the process of Roman imperialism was implemented upon the Sicilians once the island was subdued. Sicily was vital to the Romans as a point of supply, as a centre for controlling the western Mediterranean, and for keeping a close watch on Carthage. Grain was Sicily's most important commodity, and from 241 Sicilian grain went to feeding Roman armies abroad. For these reasons, the senate was relatively swift in taking measures to safeguard this newly won territory. Part II of this work will explore how in the decades following the First Punic War, a garrison was imposed upon the island, and an administration was put in place both to oversee these troops and to run the grain supply. As the importance of Sicily expanded, so did the Roman control over the place, until the point where the senate took the decision to implement an *imperium* holding magistrate permanently on the island.[12] The more the Roman war efforts on foreign soil came to rely upon its grain, the more the government of Rome sought to control the economic and military fortunes of Sicily. The common view among scholars is that Roman imperialism towards Sicily largely ended in 241. Part II will demonstrate that the process of imperialism was much longer, and it took several decades before Sicily could be considered a place where Roman *imperium* was fully recognised and respected at every level. In fact, it might be stated that in 241, the process of conquest had just begun.

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[12]Liv. *Per.* XX, Sol. V. 1. See Broughton *MRR*, I, p. 229.

Part II
Mechanisms of Roman Imperialism

Chapter 7
The Military Presence

Roman practice involved individual cities being left to govern themselves, but the foremost purpose of the conquest of Sicily and the installation of a bureaucracy to run the island was for security; Sicily represented a bridge between Carthage and Italy, and its control was vital for both states. Therefore, based on the fact that Sicily was a recently conquered land, and that the island was meant to serve as a major source of grain for the Romans, it is unlikely that there would have been no Roman supervision. In the context of Sicily, both security and grain supply were interrelated; the primary purpose of the latter was to feed the Roman garrisons on the island, and in the second century to feed Roman armies overseas. Roman government structure appeared on Sicily not as a result, but as a by-product of this process. It cannot be overstated that Sicily was the very first extra-Italian possession, and in 241 the senate had no model upon which to base any kind of lasting settlement. Administration and taxation of conquered lands in the third century therefore either continued native practices already in place, or, 'developed in response to conditions on the spot, rather than being imposed from the centre.'[1] Accordingly, many institutions that modern scholars associate with provincial governments - tithes, tributes, large bureaucracies, and such - evolved out of a series of *ad hoc* measures designed to meet immediate needs.

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the process by which the Romans fulfilled the first of these needs, security. Once Sicily was secured, only then could they exploit the resources of the island to satisfy their military need for grain, an aspect that will be covered in the next chapter. The earlier military and administrative structures on Sicily are obscure, and while we

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[1]Richardson 1976a, p. 151. In general see p. 147-151. Richardson's work has chronicled this process in Spain. He has demonstrated convincingly the lack of provincial structure in the Roman world well into the second century. See also Lintott 1993, p. 72-76, Richardson 1986, *passim*, especially p. 1-10, 57-58, 75-94, 109-123, 1989, p. 580-589, 593-598.

have no direct evidence that there was any official Roman presence at all before 227, the fact that it was so close to Carthage and still harboured a sizable Punic population in the west makes it unlikely that the senate did not take at least some measures to safeguard the place. It would consequently appear likely that the island was home to a garrison that could protect Sicily from Punic attacks, discourage subversive activities among the Punic population, and maintain general order necessary for the collection of taxes and the facilitation of trade. The first evidence of a Roman garrison comes from the year 225. It will be demonstrated that there was little reason to install troops at this time, and so it is likely that they were put in place at some earlier juncture, with 241 being the most obvious date. The presence of troops would demand the presence of an *imperium*-holding magistrate to command them in the years before an extra praetor was elected to take charge of Sicily in 227.

The administrative and command structure of the island under Roman control will first be explored. It will be postulated that an *imperium*-holding magistrate was indeed present from 241 onwards, therefore making Sicily was a zone of military control from the end of the First Punic War until 227. Even afterwards, the island, analogous with other early *proviniae*, always maintained a level of military structure within the provincial government.

Sicily as a Roman Provincia

The Roman concept of a *provincia* developed in tandem with government structures on Sicily. A *provincia* could be a number of different things to the Romans, and judging by the fact that before 241 they had not conquered any place outside of Italy, the late Republican concept of a province as delineating an area of Roman military and administrative control, often within fixed borders, is not likely to have been among the word's mid-third century definitions. From the works of Plautus we can see that the word was in common use in the third century, and it referred

to any area of responsibility or control, be it personal, military, or governmental.[2] In this sense, the city of Rome was considered the *provincia urbana*, under the charge of one of the praetors, and from 214 until 211 Marcus Claudius Marcellus was assigned the Syracusan kingdom as his *provincia*, even though the place was not yet in Roman hands.[3] The definition of a *provincia* in its late Republican territorial sense developed alongside Roman imperialism.

For our purposes, the military definition of *provincia* was simply 'command'. In the third century, this normally took the form of a campaign to which a magistrate was assigned. He was permitted to fight the enemy wherever the war might take him, yet the *provincia* in which he was operating might at the same time have natural boundaries in which he could exercise his *imperium*. As a result, a *provincia* in the strictest sense did not have to be an area that had been conquered by Rome, it was rather a region or campaign in which a magistrate was in sole command. A *provincia* was usually allotted to a general by senate, one of the assemblies, or by lot, and was for a fixed period of time. A commander could not operate legally outside of his province without the permission of the government in Rome. Thus when Marcellus was assigned Syracuse as his *provincia* in 214, his allotted task was to carry on the war against the city, and he was permitted to fight the Syracusans and their allies all over Sicily. Yet he held no extra powers beyond this campaign, and the administration the *provincia* of Sicily was left up to the annually elected praetor, in this case Publius Cornelius Lentulus. In this campaign Marcellus fought in the south of the island and strayed far from Syracuse.[4] When his *imperium* was prorogued in 213 however, his instructions became more specific. The words of Livy are explicit, 'For M. Claudius, Sicily, to the extent of Hieron's kingdom.' ('M. Claudio Sicilia finibus eis quibus regnum Hieronis

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[2]*Capt.* 474, *Mil.* 1159, *Ps.* 158, *Trin.* 190. See Bertrand 1989, p. 191-215.

[3]*Praetor urbanus*: Liv. VI. 42. 11; Marcellus: Liv. XXV. 3. 6.

[4]Marcellus' assignment: Liv. XXIV. 21. 1; Lentulus: 10. 5; campaigns in the south: 35-39, XXV. 6. 20.

fuisset.') (XXIV. 44. 4). With this order, Marcellus ceased all military activities outside of this assigned area. He did not exercise his *imperium* outside of this boundary until his orders were changed in 211, when Livy tells us that, 'The command of M. Marcellus, as proconsul in Sicily, was prorogued, that he and his army should finish the war there.' ('Prorogatum et M. Marcello, ut pro consule in Sicilia reliqua belli perficeret eo exercitu quem haberet.') (XXVI. I. 6). At this point we see Marcellus begins to operate throughout Sicily once again.[5]

The primary reason behind the assignment of a *provincia* in the third century was military, for the sole purpose of fighting a war. But over the decades, as Rome began to occupy more places, the definition of a *provincia* changed to accommodate the administrative, as well as the military role. Later provinces were seen as defined areas of control that had been assigned to a magistrate with *imperium*, who oversaw both the military and the administrative functioning of the region. This shift took place when the Romans decided to occupy, and rule, an area in the long term, and is characterised by the word *provincia* losing some of its military meaning and gaining new geographical definitions. The difference between these two concepts, a military theatre and a zone of control, may be obvious to us with hindsight, but the Romans maintained no distinction, and continued to refer to both as *provinciae*. J.S. Richardson distinguishes between the two by referring to the military commands as *provinciae*, while calling the more permanent fixed areas of Roman control, with annually elected *imperium*-holding magistrates in charge, bureaucracies, and perhaps garrisons, 'regularised *provinciae*'.[6] As the English term 'province' comes with a number of modern definitions, Richardson's terminology has been adopted throughout this thesis.

It should be noted, however, that in theory, *provinciae* in the Republic always maintained

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[5]Liv. XXV. 40. 4-41. 7.

[6]Richardson pers. comm.

their military origins, and the definition of 'command' was continually valid as these places remained areas that were under military control, regardless of whether or not they were garrisoned. This concept is reinforced by Cicero's speech of 56 concerning the allotment of *provinciae*, the *De Provinciis Consularibus*. Here, Cicero reinforces the notion that a *provincia* was in essence a temporary military command for either a campaign or over a designated area.[7] As a result, he is explicit in saying that two magistrates cannot be assigned the same *provincia*, only one man had the right to command at one time. Thus in 44, Decimus Iunius Brutus Albinus refused to surrender the Gallic territories to Mark Antony since they had been assigned to him as his *provinciae*, and Antony was only now claiming them as his own.[8] And he was correct, as Cicero (*Phil.* IV. 9) points out that Antony could not legally exercise his *imperium* within the areas in question.[9] This is not to say that two generals, both with *imperium*, could not operate in the same area, only that they would be given separate missions or allotted campaigns against different enemies, and hence their *provinciae*, or campaign objectives, would have differed. Cicero (*Prov.* 37) also makes clear that if a *provincia* was not assigned an *imperium*-holding magistrate, then it would cease to be a *provincia*, but would revert back to an area of Roman control and influence, rather than direct government. This would have taken place had Mark Antony succeeded in his plans for Krete in 44. Held as a *provincia* by his enemy Marcus Iunius Brutus, assassin of Caesar and relative of Brutus Albinus, Antony planned, unsuccessfully, to strip the island of its provincial status by refusing to send out magistrates with *imperium* at the end of Brutus' proconsulship.[10] Thus with no *imperium*-holding representative of the government in

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[7]Cic. *Prov.* 37.

[8]App. *BC*, II. 124, III. 2, 6, 16, 73, Cic. *Fam.* XI. 1, Dio XLIV. 14. 4, Suet. *Aug.* 10. 2.

[9]Lintott 1993, p. 114, 214 n. 20.

[10]Cic. *Phil.* II. 97, Dio, XLV. 32. 4, XLVI. 23. 3.

Rome, Krete would have ceased to be a *provincia*.

When the Romans conquered Sicily after the First Punic War, the island became a centre of Roman responsibility and a place where Roman *imperium* was recognised and obeyed. In this sense the kingdom of Hieron, in theory independent, was very much within the Roman sphere of influence on Sicily. This is further demonstrated by the war against Syracuse during the Hannibalic conflict, that was regarded by the Romans as a rebellion, since the city had to be brought back into Roman control. Modern scholarship has sought to define when an area under Roman control evolved from being a *provincia* in which the Romans exercised their authority, to a regularised *provincia* with definitive governmental, administrative, and tax structures.[11] One major step in this direction came with the *Lex Porcia* of 101, which stated that under normal circumstances, provincial governors were not to leave their assigned areas; this law helped to give *provinciae* greater geographical structure.[12] But it is irrelevant to speak of borders when dealing with an island, and therefore we should look to the assignment of a *lex provinciae*, a provincial constitution, as one of the major points in the transition of Sicily from an area of Roman administration and control to a province in the late Republican and Imperial sense. This came about with the imposition of the *Lex Rupilia* in 131.[13] But this does not mean that we should discount the settlement of 241 altogether. In 131 the *Lex Rupilia* was put together with the help of a senatorial commission, just as in 241 Polybios (I. 63. 1-3) informs us that such a commission was present for the island's first settlement. Similarly, the decisions to occupy Sicily with a military force, to allot special status to some cities, to continue any existing tithes, and to impose a rudimentary amount of Roman bureaucracy must be seen as the beginnings of a regularised

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[11]For the arguments see Lintott 1981, p. 54-61, 1993, p. 22-32.

[12]Lintott 1981, p. 54, 1993, p. 23. See Cic. *Pis.* 50.

[13]Cic. *Verr.* II. 2. 32-44, 59, 90, 125, Broughton *MRR*, I, p. 498.

provincia in every sense of the word, regardless of the fact that the process was begun unconsciously, and in order to equip the Romans with the means to wage war. Accordingly, the structure of the Roman *provincia* of Sicily should not be seen as something that came about through any one specific event, but as an evolving process, from the first structures of 241 to final the settlement of 131.

Administration

There is no evidence whatsoever for any Roman activity on Sicily for the years 241-227. It is unlikely however, that Rome would have been content to abandon Sicily, an island they it fought twenty-three years to conquer, that possessed a wealth of agricultural resources, and that was the closest point in Europe to their enemy, Carthage. The primary purpose for the war in Sicily was the security of Roman territory in Italy from Punic hands, or at least such was the stated purpose in 264.[14] Afterwards, the security of Sicily was of the utmost importance in order to protect the island from Carthage and the Punic population still resident in the west, and to maintain order so as to exploit Sicily's capacity for growing grain to feed the legions. Bearing in mind all of these factors, it simply does not make sense that the Romans would have abandoned Sicily at the conclusion of the war in 241. It is more likely that they maintained both a military and an administrative presence on the island, in order to realise their dual aim of security and supply.[15]

This rudimentary government could have taken on various forms, yet one thing is certain, if the island was garrisoned, as will be argued, then the presence of an *imperium*-holding magistrate was a necessity. In the late third and early second centuries, the Romans developed

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[14]Plb. I. 10. 9.

[15]Shipley 2000, p. 396.

two systems by which they exerted control over a particular area or people. Direct military conquest leading to the creation of regularised *provinciae* was the hallmark of their campaigning in the west, while control and irregular economic exploitation were characteristic of their eastern wars. In the western Mediterranean, specifically Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, the Romans first established military control over these areas, and in the process they began a system of economic exploitation. In Sicily and Sardinia, this took the form of the grain tithes that went to feed the legions, while Spain was exploited for its agricultural and mineral resources. As with the Sicilian grain tithe being in place from 241, Sardinia and Spain were both exploited before they became regularised *provinciae* in 227 and 197 respectively.[16] Assigning an elected praetor to these *provinciae* was both necessary and beneficial towards Rome. In all of these places, security was essential either because of external threats from Carthage or internal rebellions by the natives. The creation of regularised *provinciae* brought a degree of military and economic stability that allowed for the more efficient collection of taxes. As Sicily is discussed at length elsewhere and little is known about Sardinia, Spain will be used as an example.

Like Sicily, Spain was taxed before becoming a regularised *provincia*. Florus (I. 33. 7) tells us that Scipio Africanus began charging the natives a tax as early as 206. As with the *lex Hieronica*, this tax was of a military nature and went directly to the maintenance of the legions, as illustrated by its name, the *stipendium*, the same word used for a soldier's state pay.[17] At first, this may have been a form of tribute exacted from defeated Spanish tribes, as Livy often calls such payments *stipendia*.[18] After a time however, there is little doubt that these became a common

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[16]Sardinia: Liv. XXIII. 24. 4, Solin. V. 1, Zonar. VIII. 19; Spain: Liv. XXXII. 28. 2.

[17]Clemente 1988, p. 105, 110.

[18]Liv. XXI. 1. 5, 40. 5, 41. 9, XXX. 37. 5, XXXII. 2. 1, XXXIII. 46. 8-9, XXXVI. 4. 7. See Richardson 1976, p. 148.

form of Roman taxation upon the local populace, and they appear to have been regularised by Cato the Elder. Their use for the legions remained until at least the collections of Quintus Fulvius Flaccus in 180, after which they appear to have been transferred to the senate. Spain's abundant mineral resources were also brought under Roman control almost immediately after the occupation began, and this exploitation was also regularised by Cato on 195 in the form of *vectigalia* paid to the state.[19] Spanish agriculture was subjected to requisitions by the Romans, and these as well eventually became regularised in a tithe, though this occurred somewhat later than the cash *stipendium* and the mineral *vectigal*, most likely during the praetorship of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus in 180.[20]

The exploitation of Spain, like that of Sicily, took place at a time of Roman control, but before the area had been turned into a regularised *provincia*. The creation of such regularised *provinciae* fit the western Mediterranean well, as an annually elected magistrate was able to bring these taxes under greater Roman control and institute a policy of regularity, as is most notable with the actions of Cato in Spain. This was combined with the need for defence, security, and a commander with *imperium* for taking charge of the garrisons, as these western *provinciae* were constantly under internal or external threat in the late third and early second centuries.

Still, another model of Roman control existed, and this was applied in the eastern Mediterranean. Here the Romans conquered but did not occupy, they exploited the locals but never turned any of their taxes into regular exactions. In the east, specifically Illyria, Macedonia, and Greece, Rome sought mostly to subdue and exploit without committing any permanent forces or magistrates to the area. Yet the Romans campaigned many times in the in between the opening

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[19]Regularisation of *stipendia*: Liv. XXXIV. 46. 2; transferral to senate: XL. 35. 4; *vectigalia*: XXXIV. 21. 7, Plb. XXXIV. 9. 8-11. See Badian, 1972, p. 32, Brunt 1962, p. 105, Richardson 1976, p. 92, 141-144.

[20]Richardson 1986, p. 115.

of the First Macedonian War in 215 and the creation of the regularised *provincia* of Macedonia in 146, and each time they eventually pulled out and created anarchy either by disbanding leagues and turning states against each other, or by breaking up larger states and installing puppet governments. So at least in theory, these states remained free.[21]

It has been argued that this attitude stemmed from a Roman reluctance to conquer, and that the senate was content to see the Macedonians and as clients rather than as a people under their direct rule.[22] It is likely, however, that the riches of Greece in the second century had just as much to do with the fact that the Romans did not immediately occupy. The region's movable wealth combined with the relative weakness of its armies made the place ideal for the triumph hunting and plunder hungry generals who characterised mid-Republican politics. Furthermore, regardless of why the Romans did not occupy, scholars agree that much of the eastern Mediterranean was anything but free for the first half of the second century.[23] Illyria, Macedonia, and Greece were *de facto* Roman territories by the early second century, and Rome's policy towards the east was an illustration of their growing imperialism, 'an example of the Romans' increasing tendency to regard other people's business as their own, seeing events in areas bordering on their sphere of influence as events upon which they were entitled to voice an opinion.'[24] This is to put it mildly, for in the third and second centuries, the Romans often voiced their opinions at the point of a sword.

Rome's third extra-Italian conquest came with the First Illyian War of 229, yet upon the conclusion of hostilities, unlike in Sicily, they did not occupy. Instead, they established a

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[21]Macedonia was assigned as a *provincia* in 200-194, 191-187, 171-167, 149-146. For full references see Broughton *MRR*, I, Brunt 1971, p. 423-429.

[22]Badian 1958, p. 85-88.

[23]Alcock 1993, p. 13, Larsen 1935.

[24]Shipley 2000, p. 376.

protectorate in the area, and commissioned Demetrios of Pharos to guarantee the peace.[25] While this might at first appear odd, that the Romans did not exploit their victory by occupying Illyria and incorporating its people into their empire, it makes perfect sense if one considers what the area had that would have been advantageous to Rome, and what protection it needed. In 229 Rome had gone to war to protect its traders from Illyrian piracy, and once that threat was eliminated, there was no need to conquer. The waters were policed by Demetrios and Illyria, unlike Sicily and Sardinia, had little to offer Rome. Therefore, any occupation of the area would have brought them little benefit.

The most significant effect of the First and Second Illyian wars (the Second coming in 219) was that the Roman sphere of influence now came into contact with the expanding territory of Phillip V of Macedonia, who from the outset resented the new foreign presence on his northwestern border.[26] The Romans made it clear that the arrangement with Demetrios was only temporary - perhaps a premonition of future hostility in the area.[27] From the end of the Second Macedonian War in 196, Macedonia and Greece were under the control of Rome, and although the Romans did perennially assign Macedonia as a *provincia* during times of war and for the settlements that immediately followed, they never occupied with any permanency, and therefore no regularised *provincia* was formed in this region. Nevertheless, exploitation of the territory began to occur almost immediately.

From the start, it is likely that the Roman armies in Greece during the years 196-146 periodically requested grain from the local populace. The powers contained within a consul's

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[25]App. *Ill.* 8, Plb. II. 11. 17.

[26]Fine 1936, p. 24, 29-30.

[27]App. *Ill.* 8.

imperium gave him the right to make demands from civilians at any time.[28] A large amount of grain was demanded from the Epirotes in 169, and an inscription from c. 150 records a requisition by the senate for grain from the people of Thessaly, to be transported by the farmers themselves to a local harbour for collection.[29] Such requisitions were not uncharacteristic of Roman occupations and fifty years of this must have been a terrible strain on the local populace.[30] Even when Rome had withdrawn, their influence in Greece was heavily felt. Rome practised a brand of political manipulation whereby it attempted to turn states upon one another in order to foster division, thus keeping Greece disunited and lessening the chances that cities would combine forces. Even friends were not immune; in 168 and 167, King Eumenes II of Pergamon, one of Rome's staunchest allies in the east, was treated with disdain, as he was given no aid to bolster his claims to the throne and he was blocked whenever he attempted to expand his territory. In 168, over twenty years before the creation of a regularised *provincia*, some of the cities of northwestern Macedonia and Illyria were ordered to begin to pay taxes to Rome. The following year, Rome demanded that the Macedonians pay to them half of the tax they had formerly paid to their kings; iron and copper mines were taxed at the same rate. The Romans now took control of all reserve stocks of grain and oil in Greece; these they either seized for themselves or distributed to loyal cities as they saw fit. Rome also began to control trade, regulating the sale of salt. In 158, the Romans reopened the Macedonian silver mines and began to exploit them for their own profits. Finally, after his sacking of Korinth in 146, Lucius Mummius imposed taxes upon all of Greece in a blanket policy of exploitation, regardless of the fact that many of the

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[28]Sal. *BC* 29. 3.

[29]Epiros: Liv. XLIV. 16. 2; inscription: *SEG* XXXIV. 558. See Garnsey *et al.* 1984, p. 36-39, 42, Garnsey and Rathbone 1985, p. 20-25.

[30]Rostovtzeff 1941, II, p. 606.

Greek states were still technically free, and some were even allies.[31] On all of these occasions, the senate continued to claim that the Greeks and Macedonians were in fact free, however that they paid taxes to Rome suggests that they should be regarded as Roman subjects, regardless of the fact that they were not within the boundaries of a regularised *provincia*.

It has been argued that these taxes were not imposed with any regularity or within any scope of a larger imperial plan. The Romans had no long-term design to conquer Greece and they mostly went through the first half of the second century making *ad hoc* measures to meet certain situations. Uniformity of purpose and regularity of taxation was only established in 27 under Augustus.[32] The sheer volume and indiscriminate nature of the Roman exploitation would appear to illustrate the opposite however, and points towards a programme carried out by Rome with the express purpose of impoverishing the population and preventing an economic revival, and with the objective of establishing direct and unquestioned control with the minimal use of the legions.[33] This is further demonstrated by the tremendous economic benefit that Rome incurred, both from these taxes, but more than anything else from the overwhelming amount of movable plunder taken from Greece over a half century. These benefits meant that it was actually more advantageous for Rome not to turn Macedonia and Greece into regularised *provinciae*. Only when the places were utterly despoiled and defeated, meaning there was nothing left to gain and no one left to fight, did the Romans assume full control through permanent military occupation.

Several scholars have postulated over the reasons for the Roman policy, or lack thereof, in east at this time. It has been claimed that the eastern wars and the lack of conquest illustrate

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[31]Eumenes: Liv. XLV. 19-20. 3, Plb. XXX. 1-3; taxes upon Illyria and northwest Macedonia: D.S. XXXI. 8. 5, Liv. XLV. 18. 7, 26. 1-2, 11-15; taxes upon Macedonia: D.S. XXXI. 8. 9, Liv. XLV. 18. 1-7; grain reserves: Liv. XLV. 33. 3-4, Plut. *Aem.* 28. 2-3; salt: Liv. XLV. 29. 12-13; mines: Cassiod. *Chron.* II. 130; taxes upon Greece: Paus. VII. 16. 9. See Alcock 1993, p. 20, Hammond and Walbank 1988, III, p. 520, Will 1967, II, 236, 326, 334.

[32]Gruen 1984, II, p. 525-526. See Shipley 2000, p. 397.

[33]Hammond and Walbank 1988, III, p. 567-569.

the Roman practice of defensive imperialism and their general reluctance to conquer.[34] Against this it has been argued that Rome's eastern affairs show the exact opposite, that Rome was actually a fiercely aggressive power who possessed a long term plan to win easy victories and triumphs while pillaging Greece.[35] Another explanation however, points to a middle ground where the Romans were not unaware of any sort of continual policy in the east, but at the same time had no overall grand scheme. As with their conquests in the west, in Illyria, Macedonia, and Greece they also sought to strike a balance between security and state profit.[36] In the case of all mid-Republican conquests, their own personal security and the most profitable forms of exploitation for their new territories were first and foremost in the minds of the Romans. Rome had fought tooth and nail for the conquest of Sicily, and it continued to fight for the domination of Spain. Sicily was too close to Carthage and could be used as a bridge to Italy, while Spain was in a constant state of rebellion, and therefore full annexation, the maintenance of troops, and therefore the assignment of an *imperium*-holding magistrate, were all necessary steps to ensure defence. Over time it stands to reason that these places became the first regularised *provinciae*. Moreover, the regularisation of commands in these places was necessary to ensure that proper state benefit was acquired from the natural, mineral, and agricultural resources of the areas in question.

In the east, Illyria, Macedonia, and Greece were relatively easy to defeat in decisive battles, and their armies presented no real threat to Italy. This is in marked contrast to the campaigns in the western Mediterranean, where Rome's enemies tended to shield themselves within heavily fortified cities or rely on guerilla tactics, both techniques making for long and

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[34]Badian 1958, p. 98-106, Sherwin-White 1984, p. 11-14.

[35]Harris 1979, p. 137-144.

[36]Shipley 2000, p. 396.

bloody wars. In addition, the wealth of the east was often in a more movable form, and aside from the *ad hoc* network of Roman taxation and the somewhat irregular requestions for supplies, profit from Rome's eastern exploits came in the form of plunder and the triumphs that accompanied the military victories. Therefore it was to the Romans' benefit not to turn the territories of the east into regularised *proviniciae*. Rather, cloaking the political reality with rhetoric that resurrected the Greek concept of freedom for individual states, they accrued much greater advantages in Illyria, Macedonia, and Greece, while in reality reaping the benefits that came with conquest and control, with a minimal military obligation.[37]

The above evidence illustrates why the Romans chose to occupy their conquests in the western Mediterranean, while practising a more subversive form of control in the east. In the case of Sicily, direct control of the territory served as a better model for the purposes of security against Carthage and profit from the island's agricultural resources. As already stated, for the period 241-227, we have little idea of how the territory was controlled and to what extent the Romans took a direct hand in the administration of their possession. In the absence of the narratives of both Polybios and Livy, it is impossible to say one way or the other the system by which Sicily was governed before 227. It is unsound to say that Sicily was left on its own before this date, because even if there was a Roman government on the island at this time, we would not necessarily know, as it is a case of non-existent, rather than silent, sources. Taking into account the primary issues of security and exploitation, and using the Spanish model however, it is possible to hypothesise as to what steps the Romans took to establish their control over Sicily in the years after the First Punic War.

There must have been at least some government structure in place at Lilybaion to oversee

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[37]For Flaminius' declaration of freedom to the Greeks at the Isthmian Games in 196 see Plb. XVIII. 46. 5-11.

the garrison and to supervise taxes. Military tribunes could command the Roman troops in their camps, but a magistrate with *imperium* was necessary to lead them in combat. It is perfectly possible, and considering the Spanish model, even likely, that the Romans maintained a proconsul in the *provincia*, commanding troops and administering to the territory, by renewing his command ever year. In Spain, Gaius Cornelius Cethegus remained as proconsul for the years 201-200, while Gnaeus Cornelius Blasio fulfilled the same function in the years 199-198. All of this came when the Second Punic War in Spain was over but before the place was converted into a regularised *provincia* with an annually elected praetor in 197.[38] It is quite possible that this was the model adopted for Sicily in 241, whereby proconsular magistrates remained in the *provincia* until the senate either decided to pull out or permanently occupy. The brothers Gaius Lutatius Catulus and Quintus Lutatius Cerco controlled Sicily in 241, and were given the mandate of organising the island into a Roman territory.[39] Cerco re-emerges as censor in 236 while Catulus is never heard from again.[40] One or both could have been given proconsular *imperium* with the responsibility of commanding Sicily and its troops. And their commands could have been followed up by other proconsuls who had their *imperium* renewed annually. As we have a parallel for this arrangement in Spain, and because it appears doubtful that the Romans would have simply abandoned Sicily in 241 after twenty-three years of war and a continuous threat from Carthage, this would seem to be a logical solution for the senate to adopt, in light of the fact that Sicily was their first overseas possession and they had no ready-made system of administration to send into new territories as would develop in the late Republic. Instead, they may have chosen this *ad hoc*

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[38]Cethegus: Liv. XXX. 41, 4-5, XXXI. 49. 7; Blasio: XXXI. 50. 11; creation of regularised *provincia*: XXXII. 27. 6. See Feig Vishnia 1996, p. 85-86, Richardson 1986, p. 68-73, 75-77.

[39]Plb. I. 62-64, Val. Max. I. 3. 1, Zonar. VIII. 17.

[40]For Cerco see Broughton *MRR*, I, p. 222.

measure, renewing a command from year to year until the future plans for the security and exploitation of Sicily became clearer.[41]

Military Forces on the Island

(i) Garrisoning the Province

The Roman settlement of Sicily began many years before the actual war with Carthage was won. The construction of a road between Panormos and Agrigentum by the consul Gaius Aurelius Cotta in 252 suggests that the Romans intended to incorporate the island permanently into their authority.[42] The route was designed originally to serve a military function and it would have consolidated Rome's holdings in central and eastern Sicily. The construction of roads was a well used Roman method of control, and had been practised in Italy since the construction of the Via Appia in 312.[43]

There is evidence to suggest that Roman troops were installed in Sicily immediately after the First Punic War. According to Polybios (II. 23. 9), when Italy was invaded by Gallic tribes in 225 the senate demanded lists of men ready for service from their allied and subject towns, and at the same time taking stock of their own forces.[44] Later in the same book we learn that, 'In

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[41]I have recently argued (Serrati forthcoming) that the creation of a *praetor peregrinus* in 242 fulfilled the requirement of an *imperium*-holding magistrate in Sicily (for the creation of the office see Liv. *Per.* XIX). Badian has written that this praetor was indirectly responsible for the Sicilian theatre, which would fit well since it was his responsibility to deal with foreigners (see Badian's entry under '*provincia*/province' in the *OCD*³, p. 1265. On the appointment of provincial praetors and *imperium*, see Richardson 1991, p. 5). He was certainly not a provincial governor, since the sources are explicit that this office only came into being in 227 (Liv. *Per.* XX, Sol. V. 1; see Broughton *MRR*, I, p. 229). The *praetor peregrinus* does not appear to have resided in the *provincia*, and his sole function, in relation to Sicily, may have been to travel down from Rome only when his *imperium* was required for military purposes. While I do recognise this as one line of argument, I now believe that the presence of proconsuls would have been a more realistic solution.

[42]*AE* (1960), 39. See Verbrugghe 1976, p. 11-16. Wiseman 1987, p. 144 n. 150 suggests that the road was constructed during Cotta's second consulship of 248, but in that year he operated only in western Sicily, the interior having been secured by then. Regardless of the exact date, the First Punic War context is secure.

[43]See Erdkamp, 1998, p. 71, who argues that the primary function of all Roman roads was military.

[44]On this passage see Baronowski 1993.

Sicily and Tarentum, two legions were held in reserve (στρατόπεδα δύο παρεφήδρευεν), each consisting of about 4200 infantry and two hundred cavalry.' Sicily had now been at peace for more than a decade, and there is no reason why the Romans would have put in a garrison at this point; their military energies were now focussed on north Italy while those of Carthage were concentrated in Spain. The troops must have been positioned in Sicily at an earlier time.

The garrison remained in place after 225, as we are aware from Livy (XXI. 49. 6-7) that during the failed Carthaginian attempt at Sicily in 218, the governor already had troops at his disposal to guard the Roman possessions on Sicily. That these were legionaries is certain, since in 217 we know that legionaries were transported from Sicily to Italy.[45] As there is no attestation of troops assigned to Sicily from 218 to 215, this must have been the Sicilian garrison which was in place all along.[46]

As to the whereabouts of the garrison, several potential locations emerge. It is likely that the troops were split between several sites, the main body being at Lilybaion while smaller contingents manned various hilltop forts in the western half of Sicily. As the Romans were relatively new to Sicily, it would make sense for them to continue to control the island as the Carthaginians had, and to occupy the various strongholds built by their predecessors in the west. This would also allow them to patrol more territory and to exert greater control over the interior, that was on the whole devoid of urban centres in which garrisons were often quartered.

It was common Republican military practice to quarter at least part of a province's garrison in a city.[47] The speed with which the praetor was able to safeguard Lilybaion in 218, especially with a Punic fleet nearby, might suggest that the Sicilian legion was based there. The

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[45]Liv. XXIII. 31. 4, 32. 2, 16.

[46]Brunt 1971, p. 417-420, Clark 1994, Marchetti 1972, p. 5.

[47]Cic. *Man.* 38. 15.

city was certainly used to quarter troops during the Roman occupation of the Second Punic War.[48] The old Carthaginian city would have served a multiple purpose. Because of its geographic location, it was the most probable landing point for an invasion from Africa. If the Punic government was expelled along with the military, then the establishment of a garrison at Lilybaion, the former Carthaginian capital of Sicily, would have served to fill any administrative void left behind. This would be especially important if the Carthaginian grain tithe remained in place, as I believe it did. Furthermore, the city was the probable home to a Roman quaestor. The place also had an excellent harbour that the Roman or allied navy could have used as a base, with the legionaries of the garrison as marines. Finally, besides being less likely to revolt, the eastern half of Sicily could easily have been policed by Rome's ally Hieron.[49]

Based on the evidence of Polybios I. 56-58. 2, it has been argued that the Romans established a permanent camp around 247 at the foot of Mount Heirkte, near the city of Drepana, upon which sat the main Carthaginian force under Hamilcar Barca.[50] It is possible that this housed part of the Roman garrison after the war was over, but the location seems to be one more of necessity. The camp in question was purpose built for the siege, and as such does not provide much command of the countryside beyond the surrounding area. Another site in western Sicily however, appears as a likely candidate for a division of the Roman garrison in the inter-war years. Situated approximately seventy kilometres west of Lilybaion is the hilltop fortress of Monte Adranone. In what Thucydides (VI. 2. 3) described as the Elymian area of western Sicily, the site was characterised by Greek and Punic architecture in the sixth century and appears to have been under the direct control of Carthage by the 400s. Archaeological remains show that the place was

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[48]Liv. XXIX. 24. 10.

[49]The navy of Hieron was used to police the eastern shores of Sicily. See Liv. XXI. 49. 3.

[50]Pottino 1994, p. 5-16.

heavily fortified, and a building close to the south gate has been identified as a block of Punic barracks.[51]

Diodoros (XXIII. 4. 1-2) mentions that two places called Hadranon were assaulted by the Romans in 263, and only the first met with success. This has been passed off as an error on the part of Diodoros, but it may be correct.[52] First, at XXIII. 4. 1 he calls the place 'city of the Hadranites' (Ἀδρανιτῶν πόλιν), while in the following passage he says the 'village of Hadranon' (Ἀδράνωνα κώμην). The former is the city of Adranon founded by Dionysios I in 400 near Mount Etna in the east of Sicily; called Ἄδρανον by Diodoros at XIV. 37. 5.[53] This would make sense as the Romans were campaigning vigorously in this part of Sicily in 263. As for the latter village of Hadranon, this should be identified with Monte Adranone in the west of the island. Diodoros made no mistake in distinguishing the two, as he has the Romans attack both the village of Hadranon and a place called Makella, the latter being equated with the modern Macellaro, approximately twenty-five kilometres north of Monte Adranone.[54] Furthermore, Makella is mentioned as an enemy of Rome on the *columna rostrata* of Duilius commemorating his victory at Mylae in 260.[55] By this time the Romans controlled the eastern half of Sicily, and therefore it is highly unlikely that Makella, and by association the village of Hadranon, could have been in the east and still under the control of Carthage. This still leaves the question of what the Romans were doing so deep in Punic territory so early in the war. Diodoros perhaps provides an answer when he tells us at XXIII. 5 that Segesta at this time came over to the Romans. It is possible that

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[51]For the archaeology of Monte Adranone see Fiorentini 1995. For the barrack blocks see Serrati forthcoming.

[52]The two names as an error of D.S.: Lazenby 1996, p. 52-53.

[53]For the archaeology of the eastern city of Adranon see Wilson 1990, p. 146-147.

[54]*RE* XIV. 772-773.

[55]*CIL* I. 2. 25.

a small force was sent to garrison the latter city and on the way made attempts at both Makella and the village of Hadranon.

At Monte Adranone a destruction layer characterised by burning and the presence of lead missiles has been dated to the mid-third century.[56] Therefore it is likely that the place was violently taken by the Romans when they started their western campaigns in 250. The fortress continued to be occupied afterwards, only this time the inhabitants were Roman. This is attested by a Roman *denarius* found in the destruction layer, indicating that the site had at least some residents in the late third century.[57] The place is an ideal location for a garrison; it is a high point marked by steep sides that has a commanding view of much of the surrounding territory. It is little wonder the Carthaginians fortified the site. The presence of a Punic garrison in such a strong position meant that the taking of Monte Adranone was crucial if the Romans wished to campaign in and eventually occupy the western half of Sicily. It would be logical to assume that once the Romans had taken the place, they would have left a garrison to exercise control over the area just as the Carthaginians had done. After the war was over, a number of garrisons would have been placed in the west for reasons already stated. Monte Adranone presented itself as an ideal spot, already fortified by Carthage. The Romans could simply have taken over the place around 250 and set up more temporary structures on top of the Punic buildings that had been destroyed. The *denarius* makes it likely that Romans were present in the late third century; although the site could have been re-occupied by Rome during the Second Punic War, it is more likely that Monte Adranone served as the home of at least part of the Roman garrison left behind in the settlement of 241.

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[56]Fiorentini 1988-1989, p. 18.

[57]De Miro and Fiorentini 1976-1977, p. 455, pl. 49. See Manganaro 1981. De Miro dates the coin to the destruction layer, claiming this confirms the high date of Plin. *Nat.* XXXIII. 42-46 for the introduction of the *denarius*.

The legion may indeed have been subdivided further, but the absence of Roman remains precludes any firm conclusions about any place outside the village of Hadranon. On the basis of the evidence it would be reasonable to conclude that there was indeed a Roman garrison placed in the western half of Sicily. In accordance with the Roman practice of quartering garrisons in cities, the most logical location for the bulk of this garrison would have been in Lilybaion; this was the former Punic capital, home of a Roman quaestor, and the most likely point of invasion from Carthage in the event of another Punic war. However, if the Romans wanted to control the interior more directly, this would necessitate the sending out of smaller detachments to exercise their authority. This system would allow for military supervision of both the coastline and the interior of the former Punic west.[58]

(ii) The Sicilian Allies

Sicilians themselves served in the Roman navy. During the initial Carthaginian attack on Sicily in 218, the Sicilian cities were ordered to produce their full contingents of ships and crews, with ten days rations. Livy (XXI. 49. 7-8) refers to these states as *socii navales* which means that, as in Italy, these were places bound by treaty obligations to furnish Rome with military support. These *socii navales* had to bear the cost of paying for the ships, provisions, and crews, including marines.[59] This system could originate with the settlement of Sicily in 241. While the Romans used a similar system of alliances in Italy and Sicily, it is worth noting that the Sicilians

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[58]Evidence for Punic garrisons exists at several sites in the western half of Sicily (see above, p. 145); any number of these could have been taken over by Rome at the end of the First Punic War. These places, like Monte Adranone, contained ready made barrack blocks and defensive fortifications. Since the Carthaginians used these forts to control the surrounding countryside, it would not be farfetched to conjecture that the Romans employed them in a similar manner. Other Roman garrisons may have been stationed at Montagna dei Cavalli, Portelle Imbriaci, and Monte Pellegrino. For the latter site see Bonanno 1973, p. 55-62, Falsone 1995, p. 683, Gandolfo, 1997, p. 22-24, Garofano 1997, p. 11-22. For the former two see Castiglione 1997, p. 307-314, Falsone 1995, p. 684, Gandolfo 1997a, p. 315-336, Giordano 1997, p. 337-348, Vassallo 1991, p. 114-136, 1997, p. 275-306.

[59]Cic. *Verr.* II. 5. 43, 51, 60, 88, 99. See Brunt 1971, p. 65, Lintott 1993, p. 94, Scramuzza 1954, p. 288. On *socii navales* see Badian 1958, p. 28-30, Brunt 1971, p. 666-670, Thiel 1954, p. 77.

were not treated in the same manner as the majority of the allies in Italy, since a *socius navalis* was seen as a lower status of ally in comparison to those who served on land.[60] Perhaps we might infer that, from the island's incorporation into the Roman sphere, Sicily was still not seen as forming part of greater Italy, and therefore the Sicilians themselves did not merit the status of full *socii*. Yet at the same time, the geographical nature of Sicily cannot be discounted, and the status of *socii navales* reflects the island's strong naval traditions.

Individual treaties were signed with states outlining their relationship with Rome and their duties towards the Roman military. We are aware that it was through one of these treaties that Messana had to furnish one ship, while Tauromenion had the special right of being exempt from service altogether.[61] The fact that we know of no other place with such a privilege suggests that Tauromenion was the exception. As governor of Sicily in the first century, Verres called out allied naval contingents from twelve different Sicilian cities.[62] This service is further attested by an inscription that shows the Sicilian cities of Halaisa, Kaleakte, Herbita, and Amestratos all serving in a sea battle under the command of an otherwise unknown Roman named Caninius Niger.[63] The date of the stone is unclear, yet it illustrates that Sicilians did provide ships for the Roman navy. Significantly, it should be noted that Herbita and Amestratos, as well as three of the twelve cities called into service by Verres, are all inland sites, which may lead to the conclusion that all cities, regardless of their geographical position, still had to furnish a naval contingent. The allied fleet would usually have been under the command of the praetor, or perhaps his quaestor, although Cicero (*Verr.* II. 5. 82-83) does tell us that at times an allied

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[60]Badian 1958, p. 292, Thiel 1954, p. 32-36.

[61]App. *Sic.* 5.

[62]Cic. *Verr.* II. 5. 49-50, 76, 83-84, 90, 133.

[63]*AE* (1973), 265. See Scibona 1971, p. 5-9, pl. 2.

Sicilian admiral could command. Furthermore, Cicero (*Verr.* II. 4. 21, 5. 51) tells us that certain cities were also bound to furnish both garrisons and marines. The only place he names specifically is Messana, and it seems likely that the garrisons supplied by the allied cities were for local defence only, when called away from home it would only be for service aboard one of their native vessels. During the Carthaginian attack in 218, the praetor did arrange for individual cities in the west to be garrisoned, and we should perhaps assume that this entailed a call up of local soldiers under treaty obligations.

(iii) The Venerii

These were a corps of slaves who formed a two hundred man guard at the temple of Venus Erycina. The Roman settlement of 241 included the adoption of the temple of as an official Roman cult, for the goddess was closely associated with Aeneas.[64] To maintain the temple, the Romans charged seventeen cities a tax in gold; the names of these cities are not preserved, but in his description of these events, Diodoros (IV. 83. 4-7) does tell us that they were all places that had been loyal to Rome. This tax paid for the *Venerii*. Epigraphic evidence shows that they were under the command of a *tribunus militum*, who in all known cases was a native Sicilian.[65] Although their primary duty was to guard the temple, at some stage, perhaps with the implementation of a governor in 227, they appear to have become a police force for use by the Roman provincial government. They acted as the praetor's personal bodyguard and enforced his orders, and we also find them making arrests, seizing goods that were to be confiscated, acting as bodyguards to members of the praetor's staff, collecting the temple tax and any offerings to

[64]Galinsky 1969, p. 63-64, Gruen 1992, p. 46-47.

[65]*CIL* X. 7258, *SEG* XLI. 824, XLIII. 1208.

the goddess, and carrying out the general orders of the governor.[66]

On the basis of the above evidence, it is possible that Sicily had a significant military presence in the years between the First and Second Punic Wars. There is testimony of a Roman garrison on the island, that should be seen as an aspect of the settlement of 241. This settlement established a system of alliances by which the Sicilians themselves maintained garrisons as well as a reserve navy.

Conclusion

In 241 Sicily was organised as the first Roman overseas territory. Many of the structures that come to be associated with late Republican regularised *provinciae* were first experimented with in Sicily. Upon taking the island, the Romans decided to leave the existing institutions in place, while at the same time adding elements of Roman rule - conscription for the Roman navy and an administration that was perhaps headed by a proconsul. They may have installed a garrison and signed treaties with individual Sicilian states, granting some special privileges. The major institution they left in place was the Punic agricultural tithe in the western half of the island. Through this the Romans saw a way by which to compensate themselves financially for the twenty-three year war they had just fought over the island.

Upon conquering an area, the Romans sought to strike a balance between security and exploitation. In the mid-Republic, two distinct methods of control emerged, either consciously or unconsciously, from the Roman conquests. In the eastern Mediterranean, specifically in Illyria, Macedonia, and Greece, the Romans chose to conquer but not to occupy. They exercised political and economic control over these areas, but did not commit troops or an administration

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[66]Cic. *Verr.* II. 2. 92, 3. 55, 61 (arrests); 4. 104 (confiscation); 3. 65 (bodyguards); 2. 92-93 (collecting temple tax); 3. 105, 4. 32 (carrying out orders).

with any permanency because the areas were neither a threat to Italy, nor was there a significant profit to be made from any of the natural resources, the Macedonian mines aside. In the western Mediterranean territories of Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, the Romans adopted a different model; here they were constantly under threat, either from local rebellion or foreign invasion, and therefore security was of the utmost importance and legions came to occupy the lands. Furthermore, they all had significant mineral or agricultural resources that could be exploited. In order to supervise taxation and tithes, and to command the troops, a proconsul was first assigned the territories as his *provincia*. This was the case for Spain and, due to the similarity of the situation, is likely to have been applied in Sicily as well. After a time, when the Romans decided to permanently occupy, these places were converted into regularised *provinciae* under the command of an annually elected praetor. Although the early Roman management of Sicily is characterised by a lack of source material, experimentation, temporary offices, and *ad hoc* measures, at the same time the conquerors often found it useful to continue using existing systems of government and administration. The best example of this can be found in the maintenance of the old grain tithes, to which we shall now turn.

Chapter 8
The Grain Supply

As described in the previous chapter, Roman bureaucracy in Sicily increased as the island steadily became more important to the legions as a source of grain. The system of military and political administration that was put into place gave Sicily the security and stability that was necessary for the agricultural resources to be exploited. This chapter will explore the exploitation of grain from Sicily in the years 241-191, from the end of the First Punic War, through the creation of the regularised *provincia*, the conquest of Syracuse, the repercussions of the Second Punic War, the Roman peace, and implementation of double tithes.

The preceding chapter also illustrated that the safeguarding of Sicily was foremost in the minds of the Romans when they conquered the island in 241. The proximity of the island to Carthage and the abundant Punic population of the west made the implementation of a proconsul and a garrison a necessity to maintain security. It is doubtful that the Romans conquered Sicily with the specific long-term intentions of making a profit from a grain tithe. Upon occupying the island however, they would have found that such a tithe already existed in the old Punic west, and also that their ally Hieron was making a substantial yield with such a scheme in the east. It therefore would appear likely that the Romans adopted their grain tithe from the older taxation systems that existed on Sicily in the years before 241.

In 241, evidence would suggest that the Romans sent a quaestor to Sicily, and this office remained on the island after it had been converted to a regularised *provincia* with the dispatching of an annually elected praetor in 227. The latter event signalled a major change in the Roman stance towards Sicily; never controlling a territory outside Italy before, the Romans were largely unsure about what should be done with Sicily, and their governing of the place previously had been of an *ad hoc* nature. The implementation of the regular praetor meant that the senate had at last decided to permanently occupy Sicily. Furthermore, as the western Mediterranean was at

peace in this period, and the island was relatively secure with a garrison, the only possible benefit that the Romans could incur from a new, more permanent, system of administration on Sicily, was the expansion of and extended control over the existing grain tithe. The tithe was known as the *lex Hieronica*, after King Hieron of Syracuse, its supposed originator. It involved a percentage of a farmer's yield being transported to a port for inspection and collection by the Romans. Once there, it was transported from Sicily for distribution either to the city of Rome, or more often to the legions in the field. Yet it is unknown as to how exactly the grain was transported. Some scholars would contend for a state transportation system that made use of large sea vessels; this chapter will put forth the argument that the Romans in fact subcontracted groups of *societates publicanorum* to convey the grain, and that they largely used multiple smaller crafts.

Additionally, the obstacles encountered when writing about third century Sicily and the *lex Hieronica* should be noted. Our main source for the *lex Hieronica* are the *Verrines* of Cicero. These speeches pose a number of problems for the historian of mid-Republican Sicily. They were composed one hundred and forty years after the final Roman conquest of Sicily, and very often it is impossible to say with any certainty which facts indeed go back as far as the third century. Furthermore, there is little doubt that the *Lex Rupilia* of 131, a settlement for the entire island that codified existing laws and introduced new ones, radically altered the structure of the *provincia*.[1] This settlement came out of the First Slave Revolt of 135-132, but did not preclude another occurring in 104-100, and both of these conflicts affected much of the island and its agricultural life.

An inscription has appeared recently that may parallel the process of change that may have taken place over time with the *lex Hieronica*. The *Monumentum Ephesenum*, that outlines the

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[1]On the *Lex Rupilia* see Cic. *Verr.* II. 2. 32-44, 59, 90, 125, Broughton *MRR*, I, p. 498.

portorium, or customs dues from Ephesos in the province of Asia, is the best example, along with the *lex Hieronica*, that we have of the Romans taking over an existing Hellenistic tax structure and altering it to suit their own purposes.[2] The inscription comes from AD 62 but illustrates the history of the customs laws of Asia. It is clear that the original law was that of Nikomedes IV of Bithynia, and when he died in 75 he bequeathed his kingdom to the Rome.[3] Upon taking over the territory the Romans adopted his existing customs structure. They appear to have left the law largely intact, but did make a few immediate changes. Further changes were made in 72, 17, 12, 7, 2, AD 5, 8 or 12, 19, 37, and 62. Most of the changes are minor, involving exemptions from tax for goods being transported on behalf of the Roman people, the army, the praetor, or exported from local *ager publicus*. Other minor changes also take into account shifts in the political geography of the area over almost one hundred and forty years. Nevertheless we are left with a fine example of a Hellenistic tax system. But more importantly for our purposes is the fact that the Romans did make changes. They added to the law on average of about once every fourteen years, and this should serve as an example of just how much a native law could have been altered by the Romans over time.

Cicero (*Verr*. II. 3. 12-13, 15) states that when the Romans conquered Sicily, they made no changes to any existing legal structures. This may be true in the initial sense. It has been demonstrated in the previous chapter that the Romans in 241 had no existing administrative systems with which to govern conquered territories outside Italy; instead they preferred to leave existing arrangements in place. But over time there can be little doubt that the *lex Hieronica*, like the Asian *portorium*, would have indeed been changed, with provisoes added to govern things like

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[2]*SEG* XXXIX. 1180. For discussions see Dreher 1997, p. 79-96, Eck 1990, p. 139-145, Engelmann and Knibbe 1989, p. 1-195, Heil 1991, p. 9-18, McGing 1995, p. 283-288, Merola 1996, p. 263-297, Nicolet 1990, p. 675-698, 1991, p. 465-480, 1993, p. 929-959.

[3]On the year of the death of Nikomedes and the *terminus post quem* of the inscription, see McGing 1995, p. 283-287.

Roman garrisons, the praetor and his staff, or changes in a cities legal status. Unfortunately, before we reach the *Verrines* it is impossible to discern any of these alterations. Therefore, it should be stated outright that what is presented here is the *lex Hieronica* as it appeared in the first century. Every effort has been made to provide third century links where possible, but at times we must rely solely upon Cicero because his is quite simply the only available evidence.

In the First Punic War, the Romans for the first time had to confront the problem of long-distance supply. In the final section, it will be postulated that Sicily and the *lex Hieronica* were crucial in the development of Roman military supply throughout the empire. Their supply methods came of age during the latter half of the third century, and Sicilian grain, combined with the experiences of long distance supply developed on the First Punic War, were major factors in both the defeat of Hannibal, and the subsequent conquests of the eastern and western Mediterranean.

Roman Provincial Administration and the Imposition of the Lex Hieronica

The standard view concerning the implementation of a tax or tithe on crops in Sicily is that it was instituted across the entire island by Valerius Laevinus in 210.[4] At this point in the Hannibalic war, Rome was desperate for grain to feed both its population and its massive army. We are aware that the war in Italy was strongly affecting grain production in some areas. Laevinus, the proconsul of Sicily in 210, gave great encouragement to the Sicilians, many of whom had been driven from their land by the war, to restart their farms so that their grain could come to the aid of the Romans in Italy.[5] The scholars who date the imposition of the *lex*

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[4]See Caven 1980, p. 190, Hallward 1954, p. 114, Lintott 1993, p. 30, Rickman 1980, p. 37.

[5]Liv. XXVI. 40. 15-16. See Cornell 1996, p. 97-117.

Hieronica to 210 propose that the fall of Syracuse brought Rome into contact with the tithe scheme of Hieron, and that the Romans decided to implement his rules all over the island. Evidence may point in another direction.

First, Appian (*Sic.* 2. 2) claims that in the settlement of Sicily in 241 the Sicilians, under Roman authority, were charged an agricultural tithe. Although the passage also says that a praetor was installed in this year, a statement we know to be false, as other sources clearly state that a praetor was not present until 227, that does not mean Appian should be discounted entirely.[6] Some form of war tithe may have already been in place as early as 250; in that year Polybios (I. 40. 1) says that the Romans left the proconsul Metellus at Panormos in order to protect the grain of their allies (τῶν συμμάχων) as it was brought into the city after being harvested. Presumably here he means Rome's Sicilian allies during the First Punic War, and although this may not have been a regular tithe, it is still evident that the Romans were cooperating in the exaction of grain from their newly conquered Sicilian subjects. As the Romans operated in the area of Panormos for thirteen years before the war ended, there remains the possibility that this did become regularised, or it may have been a direct continuation of the Punic tithe that existed in the area prior to the Roman conquest of 254.[7] Livy (XXIII. 48. 7) states that prior to the Second Punic War, the Sicilians had paid taxes to Rome in kind. Furthermore, upon becoming a *civitas foederata* in 213, Tauromenion was given a treaty which contained a clause that forced them to sell grain to the Romans.[8] Taken as a whole, the evidence strongly suggests that an agricultural tithe did indeed exist in Sicily in between the Punic Wars.

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[6]Creation of Sicilian praetorship: Liv. *Per.* XX, Sol. V. 1. See Broughton *MRR*, I, p. 229.

[7]For the capture of Panormos see D.S. XXIII. 18. 3-4, Plb. I. 38. 8-10, Zonar. VIII. 14.

[8]Tauromenian alliance with Rome: App. *Sic.* 5; treaty with grain clause: Cic. *Verr.* II. 5. 56. There is no evidence for a any changes to the treaty between the Second Punic War and Cicero's time.

The treaties signed with individual states after the First Punic War also provide a clue. Shortly after 241, Segesta, one of the four cities declared to be free and immune from taxes, began to mint coins which depicted Aeneas and Anchises in order to further their claim of kinship with Rome.[9] As Cicero says they were treated specially because of this, we can conclude that their privileged position goes back to 241. Therefore, a tax had to have been in place in at least some parts of Sicily between the wars, since it would have been superfluous to declare a city free from a tax which did not exist.

We know that for centuries the Carthaginians had been charging their subjects in Sicily an agricultural tithe.[10] Agricultural tithes were a source of immense revenue from the ancient world, and many such tithe systems continued to be profitable well into medieval times.[11] Surely, when the Romans conquered the western half of the island they would have left this tithe in place. At the end of the First Punic War, Polybios (I. 58. 9) relates how Rome had been left exhausted, both physically and financially; if the senate could have recouped part of their losses by means of an existing agricultural tithe, then it seems likely that they would have done so.[12] What is more, Cicero (*Verr.* II. 3. 12-13, 15) states that when the Romans conquered Sicily, they made no changes to the existing local structures. While this is certainly an exaggeration, it does indicate that taxes were probably not changed, since if the Romans had removed any financial burdens from the Sicilians, Cicero would have made use of this as an example of Roman magnanimity.[13]

The farmers of western Sicily continued to pay a tithe as they always had, only now it

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[9]Gardner 1876, p. 137, Hill 1903, p. 213.

[10]D.S. XIII. 59. 3, 114. 1, XIV. 65. 2. See Clemente 1988, p. 106-107, Serrati forthcoming.

[11]On the return of medieval tithes see Duby 1968, p. 213, 252, 1974, p. 223.

[12]Scramuzza 1959, p. 231.

[13]Badian 1972, p. 28.

went to Rome. The question still remains however, as to whether this tithe did in fact follow the rules of Hieron. It is widely assumed that the Hieronic taxation system was based upon those of the Hellenistic monarchies of the eastern Mediterranean, and especially on the tax structure of Ptolemaic Egypt. Yet several fundamental differences exist between the two. In the east, the king was in theory the owner of all the land, while in Syracuse the system was put in place very late in the area's history, and there are numerous examples of private land tenure.[14] Nearly every aspect of the tithe was under royal control in Egypt, but as will be explored below, most of responsibilities in Sicily lay with private contractors. And the greatest difference was that the Ptolemaic tithe was a fixed sum, while the *lex Hieronica* was a percentage.[15] Furthermore, it cannot be proven that the *lex Hieronica*, or any Sicilian tithe, evolved as a carbon copy of the Ptolemaic system. In fact it has recently been argued that the tithe was one of the main characteristics of power relationships between groups in the ancient and medieval worlds.[16] Many tithes throughout the ancient and medieval worlds had certain basic structures in common. Specifically, Hieron's tithe took a tenth of the annual harvest, and this was the standard measurement for most Greek tithes, both classical and Hellenistic.[17] This is reflected in the Greek word for tithe: 'δεκάτευμα', literally 'one-tenth'. But the reckoning of tithes in tenths was neither begun by nor exclusive to the Greeks. Near Eastern tithes also took one tenth of the produce; shown by the Hebrew ma'ăśēr that, like the Latin *decuma* and the Medieval French *dîme*, again

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[14]Witness the wealthy Syracusan landholders who took refuge in the camp of Marcellus from 214 until 211 (Liv. XXV. 31. 8). After the city fell, the Romans appropriated land from private holders (Liv. XXVI. 21. 11), and restored some of it in the following year (Liv. XXVI. 32. 6).

[15]See Lintott 1993, p. 75 n. 29, Prichard 1970, p. 365-368, Walbank 1992, p. 107, 209. See Bowman 1996, 71-113, Thompson (Crawford) 1983, p. 64-75 for the Egyptian tithe.

[16]Faith 1997, p. 1-5.

[17]Classical: Hdt. I. 89; see Ste Croix 1981, p. 114; Hellenistic: Kall. *Epigr.* 40, *OGIS* 55, 229 (Welles *RC*, 41, 48, 51), *SEG* XXXIX. 1180; see Poll. I. 169, Lintott 1993, p. 75 n. 29.

meant both tithe and tenth.[18] The high degree of organisation within the *lex Hieronica* may reflect the Ptolemaic or Selucid tithes, but in turn these systems owe their methods to the Persian bureaucracy that preceded them.[19] Transport methods and the use of large grains stores for tithes, common in the Syracusan kingdom, can be traced back to the Near East of the fourteenth century.[20] Therefore it is likely that the Carthage was influenced to some extent by the governments of the eastern monarchies, and it was heavily involved in trade with the eastern Mediterranean. The same was true of Hieron, and it is possible that both were influenced by Ptolemaic practices. But who is to say that the reverse is not true? The lucrative gifts Hieron bestowed upon Egypt would have given the Ptolemies a sense of how profitable the Syracusan tithe was, and perhaps it was they who adopted some of Hieron's methods. It cannot be denied that the Sicilian tithes shared features with those of the Successor states in the east, and while some may have been directly copied, others were no doubt features that were common to most tithe systems of the ancient and medieval worlds.

At some point the Romans adopted a system of taxation that had been in place in the domain of Hieron, and they proceeded to spread its use to the whole of Sicily. This system was effective and it suited their purposes. We cannot say with confidence when Hieron's tithe structure was either adopted by the Romans, or applied to the whole of the island, but we can suggest that the system of Hieron as used by the Romans, the *lex Hieronica*, although probably more efficient than anything which had preceded it on Sicily, may have shared similar features to the Greek or Punic system it replaced.

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[18]Near Eastern tithes: Ps. Arist. II. 2. 4, Gen. 14. 20, 28. 22, Num. 18. 25-32, Deut. 14. 22-23, I Sam. 8. 15, Neh. 10. 37-39. For medieval tithes see Duby 1968, p. 56.

[19]Briant 1996, I, p. 405, 453, 763.

[20]Heltzer 1975, p. 124-128, Kuhrt 1995, p. 363, 377.

The question of how the formerly free part of Sicily that lay in between the Syracusan kingdom and the old Punic west was affected by the settlement of 241 must also be addressed. This area had changed hands several times, usually coming under the hegemony of either Syracuse or Carthage, but in 264 the area just east of the River Himera was held by neither side, and therefore would not have paid any type of tithe to an overlord. Conceivably, the purpose of instituting a praetor in 227 was to expand the tithe system to the rest of Roman territory on Sicily. There seems to be little other reason for this; as we have seen Sicily was not threatened by invasion, since the military energies of Carthage were concentrated in Spain while those of Rome were focussed on northern Italy. However, something changed between the wars; Livy claimed that before 218, all Sicily paid a tithe, and of the four cities declared to be free of tax, only Halikyai and Segesta lay within the former Punic territory. The other two, Halaisa and Kenturipa, lay between the Syracusan and Carthaginian domains, and would therefore have no need of a special exemption. The occupation of Sicily, being the first overseas possession of the Romans, had been up until 227 characterised by *ad hoc* measures, whereby it has been argued that, not being sure what to do with the island but knowing that it had to be protected, the Romans sent out a proconsul every year (see above, p. 246-248). In 227, with the imposition of a regular praetorship to govern Sicily, the senate was strengthening its grip on Sicily by giving the island a more lasting Roman structure, and we should see this as a conscious decision by the Romans that they were now permanent occupiers. As well, with the imposition of a praetor, Rome may have sought to increase its grain supply and therefore took the decision to implement the tithe system in the central part of the island. They therefore instituted an annually elected *imperium*-holding magistrate to oversee the operation, since now the tithe may have been too large for the quaestor to handle. It would be at this point that Halaisa and Kenturipa were declared tax free zones.

Several sources attest to the fact that in the later Republic there was indeed a quaestor in Lilybaion, and this office was most likely in place prior to 227.[21] A quaestor was best suited for this purpose since not only did he have the financial powers necessary to run the territory, but could also on occasion command a fleet.[22] Finally, it has also been convincingly argued that Rome actually increased the number of quaestorships to accommodate Sicily and later Sardinia after the First Punic War.[23] Although this line of argument places their creation in 227, accompanying the new praetor, it would make more sense if a quaestor was sent to the *provincia* from 241 onwards, in order to assist the proconsul and oversee the new grain tithe. The Roman taxation system in Sicily could not be operated without at least some supervision, and a quaestor is the most logical choice to regulate the scheme.

While it is not possible to determine exactly when the *lex Hieronica* was adopted, it is possible to conclude that some sort of tithe existed in the western half of the island. And this agricultural tax probably shared basic principles with the tax structure of Hieron. The Roman tithe may have been spread to the interior in 227, the year of the implementation of a praetor to govern Sicily, and he may have brought an expanded bureaucracy with him. It is certain that by 218 the Sicilians were paying a tithe to Rome, and this demonstrates that the Romans did exploit the resources of Sicily in the inter-war years. The exploitation of these agricultural resources was designed, consciously or unconsciously, to tighten the Roman grip on Sicily, and the aforementioned state structure appeared in order to further this goal. As a result, the primary purpose of the grain tithe would have been to feed the Romans upon whom the security of the

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[21]Asc. *Div.* 2, Cic. *Planc.* 65, *Verr.* II. 2. 22. Pareti 1953, p. 185 and Thiel 1954, p. 33 n. 90 believe that a *quaestor classicus* was stationed at Lilybaion. Harris 1976, p. 102 has correctly pointed out that this is sheer speculation.

[22]Plb. I. 52. 7.

[23]Harris 1976, p. 104. It should be noted that Harris favours 227 for the installation of the quaestor at Lilybaion.

island against Carthage depended.

The Status of Cities in Roman Sicily

During the Roman settlement of Sicily in the third and early second centuries, cities within the province were at some point assigned to one of four categories. Three cities held the status of full allies, *civitates foederatae*, while four others were considered to be free and immune from the tithe, these were the *civitates sine foedere immunes ac liberae*. The rest were mostly *civitates decumanae*, cities subject to the tithe. Finally, there were literally a few ('*perpaucae*') cities that were controlled directly by Rome and whose land was *ager publicus*; these were the *civitates censoriae*.[24] All of these categories will be examined in the following sections.

These sections work on the basis of the arguments put forward previously; that the tithe was instituted in the west after the First Punic War in 241, in central Sicily with the appointing of a praetor to administer the province in 227, and in the east with the fall of Syracuse in 211; and that in the late third and early second centuries there were only four cites, excluding allies, that were immune from the tithe: Halaisa, Halikyai, Kenturipa, and Segesta. According to Cicero (*Verr.* II. 3. 13), Panormos was also granted this status, but because it had done nothing in the third century but oppose Rome in 254, we may assume that this status was conferred at some point during the second or first centuries.

(i) *Civitates Foederatae*

At the time of the *Verrines*, there were three *civitates foederatae* in Sicily - Messana, Neton, and Tauromenion.[25] The treaty between Rome and Messana undoubtedly dates back to

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[24]Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 13.

[25]Cic. *Verr.*, Messana and Tauromenion: II. 3. 13; Neton: II. 5. 56, 133.

the First Punic War, since the latter became a Roman protectorate in 264, and was the instigator behind Roman intervention in Sicily.[26] Both Neton and Tauromenion remained part of Hieron's independent kingdom after the First Punic War, and therefore could not have had treaties with Rome until at least 214, the year Roman operations in the area began. Tauromenion, while not geographically attached to the main body of the Syracusan kingdom, nevertheless was a major port controlled by Hieron.[27] Its defection to Rome was of great strategic importance, and can be seen as a blow to the enemy supply network, reducing the number of places by which grain could be shipped into the besieged city of Syracuse. It could also be used as a supply base for the Roman army camped outside Syracuse as it was closer to the action than Messana. We are told about the alliance between Rome and Tauromenion in a fragment of Appian (*Sic.* 5) that is unfortunately undatable. Livy (XXV. 40. 4) relates how after the fall of Syracuse in 211 many states throughout Sicily surrendered to Marcellus, and to those who had remained loyal he granted the status of allies. Here however, he uses the term *socii*, which means they may have been under Roman authority and may have had to continue supplying troops. This was distinct from a *civitas foederata* in that the latter relationship was subject to a formal treaty, while the former was governed only by Roman beneficence.[28] It is possible that both Tauromenion and Neton received their treaties at this point. Tauromenion joined Marcellus voluntarily and Neton is not mentioned as one of the places that rebelled. This would be the latest that these places were conferred with their special statuses, but the Appian fragment may point to an earlier date for Tauromenion. It states that, at the time the treaty was made, Marcellus had a poor reputation

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[26]Plb. I. 10.

[27]Karlsson 1993, p. 41-44.

[28]Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 13, 5. 56, 133 specifically mentions that Messana, Neton, and Tauromenion all enjoyed special treaties with Rome.

amongst the Sicilians. While it is possible that this was after the sack of Syracuse in 211, it is more likely to be an allusion to the alleged slaughter of people at Leontini in 213, that supposedly horrified many of the Sicily's inhabitants.[29] This early embrace of the Roman cause would be consistent with the special treatment received by Tauromenion, and Neton also may have joined Marcellus at the initial stages of his campaign

These three cities enjoyed sovereignty over their own lands, including complete immunity from the *lex Hieronica*, as anyone, regardless of their citizenship, who raised crops on these lands did not have to pay.[30] Notwithstanding, there seems to have been a clause within Tauromenion's treaty that required the city to sell grain to the Romans upon demand.[31] Although Messana and Neton are known to have sold grain to Rome when requested, they were at times excluded from this policy. This is demonstrated by an incident where Rome demanded grain from Neton and Tauromenion, prompting a protest from the Netini, who pointed out that their treaty, like Messana's, did not contain a clause forcing them to sell their produce to Rome upon government order.[32] These purchases would have been undertaken during the years in which Rome demanded a second tithe, to be discussed below. A part of this second tithe, that was paid for by Rome, was to be exacted from all grain growing cities of Sicily, regardless of status. Yet it has been pointed out that Rome could offer fair prices for the second tithe, and therefore the Netan protest may have been an anomaly as federate cities may have been happy to sell grain to Rome for competitive rates on most occasions.[33] Still, there may have been other years when Rome simply

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[29]Liv. XXIV. 30. 8, 31. 14-32. 2, Plut. *Marc.* 14. 1.

[30]Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 13, 91-93.

[31]Cic. *Verr.* II. 5. 56.

[32]Cic. *Verr.* II. 5. 56. Messanians selling grain to Rome: II. 4. 20, 5. 55; Sicilians in general being forced to sell to Rome: II. 5. 52.

[33]Goldsberry 1973, p. 332. Competitive Roman grain prices: Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 174.

forced the federate cities to sell them grain, regardless of a good or bad yield, and this reinforces the notion that federate cities were seen as having a moral obligation to Rome as a price to be paid for their advanced status, and therefore on occasion had to render extraordinary service. As with the cities of Greece after they were declared free in 196, we can see that grants of freedom were dispensed, and therefore subject to regulation by, the senate and the people of Rome. Failure to adhere to these rules would see one's freedom severely curtailed.[34]

If we can apply Appian's fragment on the treaty with Tauromenion to Messana and Neton, we might say that these places could not be subject to Roman garrisons. Certainly the treaty with Tauromenion freed the city from military service, but we know this was not the case Messana; that Neton is not mentioned as specifically being exempt perhaps points in the direction that, like all the other cities in Sicily, it too provided naval and marine contingents.[35]

(ii) *Civitates sine Foedere Immunes ac Liberae*

Four cities, Halaisa, Halikyai, Kenturipa, and Segesta, were most probably granted this designation during or immediately after the First Punic War. Halaisa was the very first city in Sicily outside Messana to go over to Rome in the later conflict, and the year of their defection is also significant; in 263, the Romans controlled only a tiny portion of the island and were desperate for allies. Therefore it would be logical to conclude that their privileged status goes back to this period. Furthermore, that they had a favourable position in Sicily may be illustrated by their

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[34]Badian 1958, p. 84-89. See Cic. *Pis.* 37, *Prov.* 7. For the declaration of 196 see Plb. XVIII. 46.

[35]Tauromenion's exemption: App. *Sic.* 5; Messanian service: Cic. *Verr.* II. 5. 43, 51. See Lintott 1993, p. 94, Scramuzza 1959, p. 288. It has also been argued that the tale of Publius Gavius, who fled to Messana pursued by Verres, is proof that Messana, and perhaps the other *civitates foederatae*, had the right to harbour and protect exiles. Cicero never states that Messana had this right, merely that the city, 'had special privileges.' Gavius did not flee to Messana because the laws of the city could protect him, he fled there because he was attempting to cross to Italy and escape Sicily altogether. The fact that he was arrested by Verres in Messana serves to bolster the claim the city was not a legal sanctuary for anyone on the run.

unwavering support of the Roman cause over the years.[36] In 263 Segesta rebelled against Carthage and declared allegiance to Rome. The basis of this defection, or so the Segestans claimed, was a joint kinship with Rome based on the Trojan bloodline.[37] Shortly after 241, Segesta began to mint coins that depicted Aeneas and Anchises in order to further this claim of kinship.[38] A late Republican inscription from Kenturipa shows that this city too claimed a common Trojan lineage with both Rome and the Latin town of Lanuvium.[39] Therefore, it appears likely that the privileged positions of these cities goes back to the settlement of 241. That they claimed Trojan ancestry strengthened their favour with Rome. Yet, other cities in Sicily could make this claim but did not receive privileged status. Akesta, Entella, and Haluntion all claimed Trojan descent at one time or another, yet according to Cicero all of these places were subject to the tithe, making them at least *civitates decumanae*.[40] It would appear however, that both Kenturipa and Segesta had more to offer Rome than just common heritage. In the case of Segesta, the fact that they joined Rome in 263 by massacring all Carthaginians within their city surely bolstered their standing. The Romans must have been enthused at the prospect of winning over a city so deep within Punic territory, and as a result granted the Segestans not only immunity from tax but also extensive tracts of fertile land.[41] The same reasons would apply in the case of Halikyai; they were granted special status because they were a western city that defected to Rome

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[36]Rome desperate for allies: D.S. XXIII. 4. 1; Halaisan support: Cic. *Verr.* II. 2. 122, D.S. XIV. 16. 3.

[37]Cic. *Verr.* II. 4. 72, D.S. XXIII. 5, Zonar. VIII. 9.

[38]*CGCBMSic*, p. 137, Hill 1903, p. 213. See Cic. *Verr.* II. 4. 72, 5. 83, Serrati forthcoming.

[39]*SEG* XLII. 837. See *BE* 1965, 499, Cébeillac Gervasoni 1989, p. 103-114, Wilson 1988, p. 97 n. 24.

[40]Akesta: Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 83; Entella: II. 3. 200-201; Haluntion: II. 3. 103. Trojan ancestry: Akesta: Sil. XIV. 220; Entella: Serv. *A.* V. 73, Sil. XIV. 204; Haluntion: D.H. I. 52. 2.

[41]Massacre: Zonar. VIII. 9; land grant: Cic. *Verr.* II. 5. 125.

in 263.[42]

Kenturipa could have been very strategically important to Rome, as the city would be a key point on the supply route from Messana. This is highlighted by the remains of a first century AD Roman bridge across the Symaithos River near the city, indicating the existence of a Roman trunk route nearby. This would have been an older Greek road, as it was not Roman practice to build new roads but merely to strengthen older routes.[43] The road would have been vital to Roman supply in that Messana, in the opening phases of the First Punic War, was the only major port controlled by Rome. In 263, with the Roman army operating in the southeast against Syracuse, the logical route for supplies to follow would have been down the east coast, yet this way was blocked by Tauromenion, which was still under Hieron. Therefore, any overland supply route would have had to turn inland. After rounding Mount Etna, the first city encountered by a supply train would have been the city of Hadranon, only we know from Diodoros (XXIII. 4. 1) that this place was antagonistic towards Rome and had to be taken by storm in 263. Immediately southwest of Hadranon lies Kenturipa, a hilltop city in a natural defensive position, able to control all of the Symaithos valley and perfect for a supply depot.[44] Although in the same passage Diodoros says that Kenturipa as well was under a Roman siege, he never states that the city had to be taken storm, and so it is possible the place surrendered straightaway. It is therefore plausible that Kenturipa received favourable treatment at the end of the war because it was used as a friendly supply base in anticipation of a long conflict against Syracuse in 263; and it may have been used again in the campaign against Agrigentum in 262-261, when supplies and reinforcements would still have to be coming from Italy via Messana and then overland.

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[42]D.S. XXIII. 5.

[43]Wilson 1984, p. 319, 1990, p. 14-16 for both the bridge and the argument that the route was originally Greek.

[44]For the qualities the Romans sought in a good supply depot see Erdkamp 1998, p. 47.

Therefore Kenturipa, like Segesta, was allotted a better standing both on the merit of their Trojan pedigree and on the fact that they brought a military advantage to Rome; the former in the realm of supply, and the latter by means of its strategic location so deep inside Punic territory. Also, perhaps the declarations of Trojan heritage were made earlier than in Akesta, Entella, and Haluntion; it is very possible that both the Kenturipans and the Segestans used the Aeneas myth to sell themselves to the Romans, thus giving them advantaged positions; the aforementioned numismatic practices at Segesta, minting coins depicting Aeneas only after submission to Rome, would support such a conclusion.

Halaisa, Halikyai, and Segesta were all made *civitates sine foedere immunes ac liberae* during the year in which they yielded to Rome, 263. This would also be the logical year to place the submission of Kenturipa, as in 263 the Romans were active in the city's vicinity and conquered its nearest neighbour. Therefore, it is plausible that all cities of importance that joined Rome voluntarily in the year 263, in other words at their first opportunity, as the Romans did not break out of Messana in 264, were later rewarded with exemptions from the tithe.[45]

Diodoros (XXIII. 4. 1) relates how several cities in fact went over to Rome during the campaigns of 263, and from this it has been argued that there were many *civitates sine foedere immunes ac liberae* after the First Punic War, though the majority lost this privileged status as a result of rebellions within the course of the Hannibalic War.[46] This argument is based on Livy, XXV. 40. 4, which states that after the fall of Syracuse in 211,

> Embassies from almost all the cities in Sicily kept coming to [Marcellus]. As their pleas were differed, so too did their status. Those who had not rebelled or who had returned to friendly relations before the capture of Syracuse were received and honoured as faithful allies (*socii fideles*). Those who through fear surrendered

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[45]Eckstein 1987, p. 106-107 also sees 263 as a key date for the creation of immune cities, but argues that they were accorded this status because the Romans, early on in the war, were not seeking territorial expansion.

[46]Badian 1958, p. 37, Eckstein 1987, p. 106-107.

> after the capture of Syracuse, as the vanquished they received terms from the victor.

It could not be that Marcellus made, or even had the power to make, all cities in Sicily which had remained loyal into *civitates sine foedere immunes ac liberae*, and thus drastically reduce the amount that the Romans took in from the annual tithes on the island. This would not make sense. We must allow for the proposition that being 'honoured as faithful allies' did not necessarily mean being given immunity from the tithe. Perhaps in this passage we can see the origins of the group of seventeen cities that Cicero (*Verr.* II. 5. 124) tells us were given the honorific title 'most loyal', as they were places that had never wavered from Roman alliance. The duties of this group involved paying a liturgical tithe to Venus at Eryx and maintaining a force of two hundred to guard her temple.[47] If there were more than four free and immune cities, one would expect that they would come from this group. A number of cities may have been degraded after the Second Punic War as both Marcellus and Laevinus did punish insolent places during their settlements of Sicily in 211 and 210.[48] Henna is a perfect example, as the city defected to Rome in 258 but then revolted in 213 and was a tithe paying centre in Cicero's time.[49] One city that was certainly included in the seventeen most loyal was Tyndaris, a place that could claim unyielding support of the Roman cause dating back to 254.[50] If being made free and immune of the tithe was a privileged status granted to many cities who showed exceptional loyalty during the Second Punic War, one would assume that Tyndaris would be one of the foremost in a favoured class. Furthermore, because they could boast of a long affiliation with Rome and membership of an honorary group of seventeen most loyal cities, it is difficult to see how they could have lost any

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[47]D.S. IV. 83. 4-7.

[48]Liv. XXV. 40. 4, XXVI. 40. 15.

[49]258: D.S. XXIII. 9. 5, Plb. I. 24. 12; 213: Liv. XXIV. 37. 6; Cic.'s time: *Verr.* II. 3. 100.

[50]Cic. *Verr.* II. 5. 124, D.S. XXIII. 18. 5.

benefits accorded to them in the past. Yet it is clear from the *Verrines* (II. 3. 103) that Tyndaris was a *civitas decumana*. Therefore, it does not seem likely that there could have been very many more *civitates sine foedere immunes ac liberae* than the four mentioned above. The grant of freedom and immunity from the tithe seems to have been given only to those cities which sided with Rome early on in the first war with Carthage, and we may perhaps see the date of 263 for the defection to Rome as something all the cities had in common. Obviously, because Panormos would later join the four cities in this class, being declared free of the tithe was not something that was exclusive, and it is possible that cities were granted, and later lost, this status, but for the third century the only evidence we have points to only Halaisa, Halikyai, Kenturipa, and Segesta as being *civitates sine foedere immunes ac liberae*.

The main privileges of these cities were political freedom and immunity from the *lex Hieronica*. As different from the total immunity enjoyed by the *civitates foederatae*, this grant meant that all farmers working the land of an immune city were exempt from the tithe provided they were citizens of the privileged community; all non-citizens were forced to pay.[51]

The grant of immunity did not render a city invulnerable to Roman political interference. The Romans favoured oligarchic constitutions in places under their domination, as this kept the government in the hands of a wealthy class which owed their position to Rome. As a result Rome usually drew its greatest support from the upper classes; such was the case in Syracuse when several aristocrats sought refuge with the Romans against the coup of 214.[52] Therefore, in order to maintain these oligarchies, Rome felt free to meddle in a city's politics to bring about a government that was to their liking. This was done at Halaisa in 95, when the senate in Rome, at the behest of the Halaisans, drew up a set of rules governing the appointment of magistrates

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[51]Cic. *Verr.* II. 2. 166, 3. 13, 91-93, 5. 53.

[52]Liv. XXV. 31. 8. See Goldsberry 1973, p. 379 n. 74.

to the local oligarchic council.[53] This example, although late, can be seen as a Sicilian parallel to examples of such internal interference that come to us from early second century Greece.[54] In the same period, the Romans intervened in the administration of Agrigentum, a tithe paying city that will be dealt with below. But suffice to say a grant of immunity gave citizens of a Sicilian city exemption from the tithe alone, but in all other areas they appear to have had the same status as any other non-treatied city in the province.

(iii) *Civitates Decumanae*

There is precious little we know about most *civitates decumanae*, save for the fact that the vast majority of cities in the province fell into this category. Cicero (*Verr.* II. 133, 137-138) relates the details of a census taken in Sicily in order to collect a special tax. Each city on the island was commanded to produce two officials for this purpose, and there were one hundred and thirty men appointed. This gives a total of sixty-five for the number of cities in Sicily during the first century. As for the third century, Eutropius (II. 19. 1) says that fifty-two cities surrendered to Rome in 263, while Diodoros (XXIII. 14. 1), referring to the same instance, puts the number at sixty-seven. In 210, Livy (XXVI. 40. 14) says that sixty-six towns came into Roman hands during the mopping up operations that ended the Second Punic War. The total number of cities in all cases must be higher than those given; for 263 Diodoros and Eutropius are only referring to those places that surrendered, while in 210 much of the island was already occupied by Rome, and consequently Livy does not include in his total those places taken in the campaigns of the four previous years. His number of sixty-six has been combined with Cicero's aforementioned seventeen 'most loyal' cites (*Verr.* II. 5. 124), as these places could not have been included on any

[53]Cic. *Verr.* II. 2. 122.

[54]Ste Croix 1981, p. 522-523. For Greek examples see Liv. XXXIV. 48. 2, Plb. XVIII. 47. 5-13.

list of rebellious states, to produce an estimate of nearly ninety cities in third century Sicily.[55]

While the number may be slightly high, archaeological surveys have born out its accuracy. These have revealed an urban decline in Sicily from the late third century onwards. This has led some scholars to assume that Sicily had been in a state of urban decay due to the pillages of the two Punic wars and the subsequent hardships that accompanied the Roman taxation system. It has been argued that these aspects combined to impoverish the Sicilians, thus leading to a decline in the number of cities.[56] Yet it would make no sense for the Romans to allow this to happen in Sicily. In 210 they had Laevinus go to great efforts in order to bolster agriculture on the island, and it remains doubtful that they would have permitted any significant dip in the economy of their main source of grain.[57] In the *Verrines*, Cicero would of course like to attribute any urban decay to the rapacious governorship of Verres, but in reality this was a much more drawn out process that should be see as merely a trend, not a decline. Specifically, it was not urban centres on the whole which were being depopulated, only hilltop cities. The date of the opening phase of this trend is very significant; as the late third century saw Sicily fully amalgamated into the Roman Empire, and for the next century and a half down to Cicero's time, the island would live in relative peace and stability - save for the two second century slave revolts which did not match the scale of either Punic war. As a result, these hilltop centres were no longer required for their defensive positions, and people began migrating into the unprotected and once unsafe valleys. Here, they were closer to their fields and did not have to transport produce up steep inclines. Moreover, agriculture in the valleys did not require terracing, as it did on hillsides. Eventually, these hilltop

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[55]Prichard 1975, p. 37-41. His arguments, while sound, are at times difficult to reconstruct. As evidence for his number he cities D.S. IV. 8, yet this passage contains nothing on Sicilian cities whatsoever. While this may be a misprint, it is significant that the exhaustive note of Scramuzza on the subject, 1959, p. 328 n. 2, contains just D.S. XXIII. 14. 1. See Eckstein 1987, p. 105, 182-183.

[56]Coarelli 1981, p. 2-6, Loicq-Berger 1967, p. 261-262, Manganaro 1980, p. 415-422.

[57]Laevinus: Liv. XXVI. 40. 16-17. See Clemente 1988, p. 110.

centres would fall into abandonment, but again this does not represent a decline, merely the establishment of peaceful conditions resulting in increased human mobility.[58]

Thus we can say that between the late third century and Cicero's time, the cities of Sicily declined in number from about eighty-five to sixty-five, due to the abandonment of hilltop sites formerly needed for defence. To arrive at the total number of *civitates decumanae*, we must subtract the three *civitates foederatae*, the four *civitates sine foedere immunes ac liberae*, and the three *civitates censoriae* (see below). If we were to follow the latter hypothesis of nearly ninety cities for third century Sicily, then it could be said that between seventy-five and eighty centres paid the *lex Hieronica* out of the produce from all their lands.

(iv) *Civitates Censoriae*

In describing these cities, Cicero (*Verr.* II. 3. 13) states, 'Perpaucae Siciliae civitates sunt bello a maioribus nostris subactae; quarum ager cum esset publicus populi Romani factus, tamen illis est redditus; is ager a censoribus locari solet' ('A very few of these cities our forefathers vanquished in war; although their lands became the property of the Roman people, it was restored, and is now subject to regular leasing by the censors'). The *civitates censoriae* were cities whose lands had been seized by Rome and were considered *ager publicus*. All farmers were charged the regular tithe plus rent for their use of the land. The collection of rents would have been auctioned off by the censors in Rome, as was the normal practice with public land.[59] In this category of city, more than any other, we stand on firm ground in regards to the third century, as Cicero directly states that all censorial cities had been vanquished by the force of Roman arms,

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[58]Wilson 1985, p. 314-321, forthcoming. Significantly, one of the only hilltop centres not in decline by the first century was Kenturipa, that Cicero (*Verr.* II. 4. 50) describes as very prosperous. This should be seen as an indication of its privileged status as an immune city.

[59]Plb. VI. 17. 2-4 . See Walbank 1957, I, p. 693. See also Drummond 1989, p. 197, Jolowicz and Nicholas 1972, p. 38-39, 51-54, Suolahti 1963, p. 58-60. On *ager publicus* see Crawford 1989, p. 179-189, Frank 1927, p. 141-161.

meaning their status must go back to either the First or Second Punic Wars. One theory about the statement that the land of these cities was restored (*redditus*) has been taken in its literal sense, as meaning that the actual ownership of the land was given back. They were therefore not *ager publicus* but merely paid a special rent.[60] More plausibly, it was the use, not the ownership, of the land that was restored after an original confiscation. Therefore the farmers paid rent to the Romans as landlords.[61] It is also significant that Cicero does not say exactly how many cities fell into this category, describing them merely as '*perpaucae*', very few.

The only places that we know for certain were *civitates censoriae* are Amestratos and Leontini.[62] A strong case can also be made to say that Thermai was included in this category.[63] This is based on a statement of Cicero (*Verr.* II. 2. 90) where he says the lands and rights of the people of Thermai were restored by the Romans in the *Lex Rupilia* of 131, implying that before this date the Romans administered both. These three would fit nicely with Cicero's statement that censorial cities were very few in number, but scholars have long argued that there were more than this, and for the identification of the others, the parameters laid out by the words of Cicero, that the censorial cities were small in number and all had clashed with Rome, narrows the field. The main problem arrises from the fact that we know censorial cities paid both rent and tithe.[64] Therefore, mention of a place as paying the *decuma* does not rule it out of the censorial class *a priori*. The classic example would be Syracuse, which put up more military resistence to Rome than any other city in the third century, yet in 210 the senate ordered Laevunus to safeguard the

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[60]Carcopino 1914, p. 228.

[61]Calderone 1960, p. 13-14, 1964-1965, p. 71-72, Scramuzza 1959, p. 329-330.

[62]Cic. Amestratos: *Verr.* II. 3. 89; Leontini: *Phil.* II. 43, 101, III. 22.

[63]Frank 1927, p. 142, Goldsberry 1973, p. 313.

[64]Cic. *Verr.* Amestratos: II. 3. 88, 101; Leontini: II. 3. 97, 109-117, 147-150; Thermai: II. 3. 99, 172.

private property around the city from further Roman confiscations.[65] The existence of such private property is firm evidence that the lands of Syracuse were not *ager publicus*. Thermai was taken with difficulty in 252, but it was a relatively small operation compared with others in the First Punic War.[66] Leontini did not put up substantially more defiance than other places of similar size during the Second Punic War, and in actuality the place was taken on the first assault.[67] Even more striking is the case of Amestratos, a small city in northern central Sicily that is not known to have fought either with or against Rome in the third century. If it is the latter, then the capture of the place was so insignificant so as not even to gain a mention in the sources. That Amestratos, Leontini, and Thermai became *agri publici* while Syracuse, and presumably most other places that resisted, did not, points to the possibility that farmlands were seized for the senate and people of Rome for reasons other than punishment. With the statement of Cicero (*Verr.* II. 3. 104) in mind that Leontini was one of the richest and most fertile areas of Sicily, we must consider the possibility that places were made *civitates censoriae* not for retribution, but for economic gain.

Scholars have long debated the exact identification of the *civitates censoriae*, but all start off with the hypothesis that a city was given this distinction as a punishment for defiance to Roman rule.[68] If the sole criterion for having your land seized was resistance, then we should

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[65]Liv. XXVI. 32. 6.

[66]D.S. XXIII. 19-20, Plb. I. 39. 13, Zonar. VIII. 14. However, the Romans did suffer a defeat at the hands of a Punic army at Thermai in 259 (see D.S. XXIII. 9. 4, Plb. I. 24. 3-4).

[67]Liv. XXIV. 30. 1-2, Plut. *Marc.* 14. 1.

[68]Calderone 1964-1965, p. 67-68 sees the censorial cities as the six holdouts that had to be taken by storm in 210 (Liv. XXVI. 40. 14). He identifies these six cities as the city of Hadranon, Hippana, Kamarina, Makella, Megara, and Mytistratos; all had resisted Rome in one or the other Punic war. Aside from being very random, this of course leaves out the one place that we know was a censorial city, Leontini. Carcopino 1914, p. 242-250 argues that Leontini was the only *civitas censoria*, because he sees the entire city as formerly royal land owned by Hieron, and it was seized by the Romans specifically for this reason. But this would go directly against Cicero's statement that there were 'very few' censorial cities, definitely meaning more than one. Similarly, Carcopino argues that all royal land was appropriated this way, and as a result, *ager publicus* mostly came in small parcels, spread around the southeast of the island. Eckstein 1987, p. 163-164 asserts a similar thesis, having Marcellus and then Laevinus seize the lands of all anti-Roman aristocrats, again making *ager publicus* a patchwork of small holdings spread across Sicily. Furthermore, Carcopino, on p. 236-237, claims that statements about *ager publicus* in Sicily simply refer to the Roman theory that all provincial land belonged to them. That

expect to find places like Lilybaion, Panormos, and certainly Syracuse paying rents and well as the tithe, yet there is nothing in the sources to indicate this. As was the rule for the third century, Roman imperialism was characterised by temporary administrative systems and *ad hoc* measures. In light of the lack of evidence, we may only establish a handful of facts. Amestratos, Leontini, and up until 132 Thermai are all described as belonging to the senate and people of Rome, and were therefore *civitates censoriae*; lands that paid both tithe and rent, the latter being administered by the censors in Rome. Cicero says that the censorial cities of Sicily were very few in number, and because Thermai was no longer in this class in the first century, there is likely to have been at least one more *civitates censoria* besides Leontini and Amestratos. The distinction of *civitas censoriae* perhaps existed prior to Laevinus' settlement of Sicily in 210 in the cases of Amestratos and Thermai, but as Leontini was still part of Hieron's kingdom until 214, its lands could only have been seized after this date. As Cicero says all *civitates censoriae* were captured by Roman arms, all three must have resisted, though none did so fiercely. And finally, places that did put up formidable resistence were not punished with land appropriation. Based on this information, and the fact that Leontini was one of the most fertile regions in all of Sicily, it is difficult to argue that cities were made *civitates censoriae* strictly on the basis of their antagonism

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the third century is about four hundred years too early for this Roman idea has been clearly demonstrated by Frank 1927, p. 141-161. Scramuzza 1959, p. 330-333 makes an interesting contention that the *civitates censoriae* were the cities mentioned by Livy (XXVI. 21. 10-14, 17) as being seized and granted to the Spanish mercenaries who aided Marcellus in the capture of Syracuse. These were Ergetion, Hybla, Makella, Morgantina, 'and some smaller ones'. These were being punished because they were the last holdouts on the island in 210. According to Scramuzza, some of these lands were given to the Spanish, while the rest became censorial. The case of Morgantina would go directly against Livy (XXVI. 21. 17), who says that Morgantina was given over to the Spaniards, in no way implying that it was divided between the latter and the Roman people. Scramuzza also includes Henna, because of an attempted revolt in 214 (Liv. XXIV. 37. 1-39. 8), and Agrigentum because it was the last major city in Sicily to fall (Liv. XXVI. 40. 1-13). But Henna was depopulated by a Roman massacre in prevention of the revolt, and Agrigentum had its citizens sold into slavery. The city may have been resettled with veterans in 199 (Liv. XXXII. 1. 6), and was certainly repopulated with refugees from the Second Punic War in 197 or 195. After tensions between old and new citizens, Agrigentum was given a political settlement by Rome in 193 (Cic. *Verr.* II. 2. 123). The presence of so many new inhabitants, perhaps even Roman citizens, makes it unlikely that Agrigentum would have been thrown in with a group of cities that were made censorial on the basis of their opposition to Rome. Goldsberry 1973, p. 301-314, while excluding Morgantina, mainly follows Scramuzza and includes one or two other unknown cities that resisted Rome in the third century. But none of these explanations can fully explain why Amestratos, Leontini, and Thermai were *civitates censoriae*.

with Rome. However, while lack of evidence precludes any firm hypotheses, we must accept the possibility that places were made into *civitates censoriae* strictly for economic gain on the part of Rome, in order to reap the full benefits of some of Sicily's most fertile lands. That these places did resist militarily provided Rome with further cause for this confiscation.

The Tithe

By the late Republic, the *lex Hieronica* was what the Romans called their agricultural tax on Sicily. It is important to note that it was not a *lex* in the sense usually adopted in modern scholarship, as it was not a decree passed by one of the people's assemblies at Rome. Instead, it appears to be the term used to describe the Sicilian tax structure, named after Hieron, upon whose principles the system operated. The earliest recorded use of the nomenclature was by Cicero in his *Verrines*, but the fact that the orator assumes a familiarity with the term on the part of his audience should lead us to the conclusion that it was in common usage by the first century. It is best if we understand the word 'system' instead of law for the Latin *lex*, or perhaps we should see the latter as referring literally to a 'law of Hieron', and therefore not a Roman but an older Syracusan statute.

(i) Auctioning the Tithe

The *lex Hieronica* was a tithe that took in one tenth of the annual Sicilian harvest. It was a tax on grain, oil, wine, fruit, and beans.[69] The tithe on grain was auctioned off to the highest bidder by the praetor at Syracuse, while the others were auctioned by the quaestors stationed at

[69]Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 14-15, 18-19, 149. See Lintott 1993, p. 75. Carcopino 1914, p. 78-80, argues that the term *fruges minutae* used by Cicero to describe fruits would have included beans, as these are mentioned in the financial inscriptions of Tauomenion. See *IG* XIV. 423–425 (=*SEG* XLVI. 1247).

Syracuse and Lilybaion.[70] Each governor issued an edict stating the rules under which he would conduct the auction, what Nicolet calls the *lex decumis vendundis*.[71] It is likely that this was published as part of the praetor's *lex provinciae*, that put forth the rules each new governor laid down for his province.[72] Traditionally, these edicts were based those of one's predecessors, going back to the original *lex provinciae* of Rupilius from 131. Whether or not the *lex decumis vendundis* was issued before this date it is impossible to say, but it is likely that each new governor published either a promise to conduct the auction according to the laws of Hieron or a list of any minor amendments he chose to make.

Unlike tax-collectors in later provinces, the tithe-collectors, or *decumani*, of Sicily were on the whole not Roman. One would normally expect to find members of the *societates publicanorum* farming the taxes for Rome during the Republic, but this does not appear to have been the case in Sicily. Of all the people whom we know to have bid for the right to collect the tithe, we have an abundance of Greek names, but only ten Latin.[73] This was not for a lack of Italians living in Sicily; evidence exists to show that, at least by the mid-second century, Italians, though it appears often not Romans, were a substantial presence on the island.[74] And by the first century Italians made up a small but significant percentage of the business and landowning classes (*Verrines* II. 5. 10-16 enumerates six landlords, only one of them Roman).[75] Most of these appear

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[70]Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 77-78. See also Lintott 1993, p. 70-72, Rickman 1980, p. 38-42, Scramuzza 1959, p. 268.

[71]Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 49, 70, 88, 121, Nicolet 1996, p. 16.

[72]Lintott 1981, p. 58-61, 1993, 28-31, Richardson 1986, p. 165.

[73]Cic. *Verr.* II. 2. 182, 3. 22-24, 75, 89, 99, 102, 132, 135, 148, 161, 5. 108. See Frank 1935, p. 61 and Brunt 1971, p. 209.

[74]For references to individual and groups of Italians living and owning land in Sicily see *CIL* I. 2. 638, D.S. XXXV. 2. 3, 27, 32, XXXVI. 4. 1, Liv. XXIX. 1. 15-18. See also Verbrugghe 1972, p. 542.

[75]Cic. *Verr.* II. 1. 123, 2. 31, 71, 3. 36, 55, 60-65, 93, 97, 185, 4. 37, 46, 5. 15, 147. Frank 1935, p. 61 has rightly pointed out that those Italian *equites* who testified against Verres would most likely have been residents of Sicily; see Cic. *Verr.* II. 1. 128, 2. 119, 5. 73, 156, 163. For those Italians who had business interests in Sicily see Cic. *Fam.* 13.

to have been the owners of large estates, perhaps obtained by profiteering from the economic chaos in Sicily that followed the Second Punic War.[76] This kind of immigration for exploitative purposes is not without parallel, as during this same time period Italians also emigrated to Delos in search of profits.[77]

After the Second Punic War, a substantial portion of lands from Hieron's former domain, excluding Syracuse, became *ager publicus*, and this may have been apportioned to Italians on the spot by Marcellus himself, as was a conquering general's prerogative. And nothing was done to rectify this situation until 208, when the Romans restored refugees and exiles to their former lands; into this breech stepped the Italians.[78] Livy (XXIX. 1. 16) is explicit in telling us that, even before the war in Sicily was over, Italians had migrated there with the specific purpose of acquiring land, much to the detriment of the Sicilian Greeks. Much of the land in the former kingdom of Hieron would have been stripped bare by the Roman, Sicilian, and Punic armies who operated there between 215 and 211. Furthermore, inscriptions suggest that this presence only grow stronger in the years following the war, and Italians made dedications to powerful Roman political figures who protected their interests against the protests of the native population.[79] And the power of the transplanted Italians would only grow, as it was not long before they were exerting their influence with the courts and with the governor.[80] Even before this, complaints on

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33, *Verr.* II. 2. 69, 3. 148, 4. 42, 63, 5. 161, 168. See also Verbrugghe 1972, p. 543.

[76]For the hypothesis regarding the territorial ambitions of the Roman populace see Harris 1979, p. 64.

[77]Plb. XXX. 20. 2-9, 31. 10, Strab. X. 5. 4, XIV. 5. 2.

[78]Distribution of land by a general: Liv. XXVII. 3. 1; restoration of exiles: XXVII. 35. 3-4. See Nicolet 1974, p. 294.

[79]*CIL* I. 2. 612 records the dedication of a statue by a group of Italians in Sicily to Lucius Cornelius Scipio Asiagenes, their benefactor and the governor of 193.

[80]D.S. XXXV. 2. 3 claims that in the mid-second century the Roman provincial government in Sicily was unable to prevent Roman landowners using their slaves as highwaymen.

behalf of the Sicilians were not likely to be well received by the Romans, as Livy (XXVIII. 11. 8) claims that many in Rome were tired of the efforts their government was putting into Sicilian agriculture in the late third century, and wanted them to start concentrating on Italy.

These majority of Italian estates in Sicily appear to have centred on animal husbandry, conceivably because the grain growing market was already cornered by the Sicilian Greeks. One should not get the impression however, that because of these Italian and Sicilian landowners, that Sicily was made-up of large estates alone. Although there are a notable number of such estates, archaeological survey work strongly points to the conclusion that the majority of farms that provided the tithe were small holdings.[81]

Some of the aforementioned Italians may have been Greeks from southern Italy who were now operating in Sicily, and therefore would have possessed Greek names. By the same token, Italic names do not necessarily denote Italian origin. Many, like Sextus Clodius, a teacher of rhetoric, were most likely freedmen.[82] Others could easily have been of Mamertine descent, that would mean they bore Campanian names, and the fact that Mamertines have been found in other parts of Sicily besides Messana only confounds matters.[83] Nonetheless, we must assume citizenship for most Italians in Sicily since the majority of references in the *Verrines* refer specifically to *equites*. As this was the class which made up the majority of the *publicani*, it seems doubly strange that the tax farming companies of Rome would not have used these connections to put in bids for the Sicilian tithe.

Precious little is known about the *publicani* prior to the mid-second century when

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[81]*SEG* XXX. 428, XLI. 774 mention a number of small farmers at Akrai and Halaisa respectively. See Cic. *Scaur.* 24, *Verr.* II. 3. 27. See also Scramuzza 1959, p. 318.

[82]Cic. *Phil.* 2. 43, Suet. *Rhet.* 5.

[83]Entella Tablets, V. 27-28. See Corsaro 1982, 993-1032, Daux 1984, 391-396, Dubois 1989, Gallo 1982, p. 917-944, Giustolisi 1985, p. 12-25, Hoyos 1988, p. 30-43, Knoepfler 1987, p. 262-287, Lejeune 1982, p. 787-799, Loomis 1994, p. 127-161, Nenci 1982, p. 1071-1072, 1993, p. 42.

Polybios (VI. 17. 2-3) states that,

> Numerous contracts, too many to calculate, are awarded by the censors for the construction and repair of public buildings throughout Italy; and there are many things that are farmed, such as navigable rivers, harbours, gardens, mines, lands, in fact all that is the property of the Roman people. All these are administered by the people (πλήθους), and everyone (πάντας) is involved in these contracts and the business they generate.

Immediately, two problems arise with this passage. Firstly, Polybios is most likely mistaken when he assigns public contracts to all Romans.[84] Furthermore, Polybios purports to be describing the situation in Italy on the eve of the Second Punic War, yet there is little doubt he is being anachronistic.[85] Large scale public contracts are relatively unknown until the second century, and the first overseas contract does not appear until the Spanish mines were let out in 195 at the earliest, and the presence of the *publicani* in the provinces cannot be proven before 167, when Livy (XLV. 18. 3-4) states that the leasing of mines and lands in Macedonia was to discontinue because of the abuses of the *publicani*.[86] Prior to the early second century, and perhaps even later, the *publicani* had been conspicuously absent from the provinces. It has been suggested that a special law existed which barred the *publicani* from auctions for provincial contracts.[87] Unfortunately, there is no evidence to prove such a point, and the sources tell a different story. It was not that the *publicani* were banned from taking part specifically in the farming of the Sicilian tithe, it was that they were, so Cicero tells us (*Agr.* 1. 7, 2. 55), restricted to bidding only upon those taxes, regardless of the province, that were auctioned off at Rome. As will be

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[84]Badian 1972, p. 45, Toynbee 1965, II, p. 343, Walbank 1957, I, p. 692. Cimma 1981, p. 53-55, identifies this class as the *equites*, which seems both too narrow and too early for the mid-second century.

[85]Badian 1972, p. 45, Walbank 1957, I, p. 692

[86]195: Plb. XXXIV. 9. 8-11, Badian 1972, p. 32-34, Brunt 1962, p. 105. On the basis of Liv. XL. 51. 8, Frank 1933, p. 154 and Walbank 1957, I, p. 693 argue for a publican presence in Spain in 179. *Contra* to all of the above is Richardson 1976, p. 140-147, 1986, p. 91, who argues that the *publicani* were not present in much of provincial finance.

[87]Carcopino 1914, p. 94-96, Frank 1935, p. 61. See Cimma 1981, p. 76-78.

demonstrated below, the *publicani* did indeed bid for and collect other Sicilian taxes, but these were auctioned off at Rome. The most likely explanation for this exclusion is that when the first few provinces were created, the *publicani* were not yet strong enough to muscle in on the bidding or to demand that it take place at Rome.[88] Furthermore, the land revenues that they did farm in Italy have been shown to have been only minimally profitable, and so there is a strong possibility that in the third and early second centuries the *publicani* were simply not interested in tax farming anywhere in the Roman dominion.[89] As Sicily was the first *provincia*, it is likely that the role of the *publicani* as large scale tax farmers had yet to come into being. Only in 75 did the *publicani* feel confident enough to press for the bidding to be moved to Rome, but even then they had to accept a compromise, with only the tithes on oil, wine, fruit, and beans being transferred.[90]

So it remained for the tithe to be bid upon by Sicilians, with individual Romans taking part on occasion. Tithes were auctioned by city, and at times, entire cities could also enter into the bidding for the tithes of their own territories. The occasions on which this took place arose out of a desire to protect their people from a *decumanus*, or tithe collector, whom they suspected as being dishonest, and farmers were known to have allowed their grain to rot rather than deal with these men.[91] Bids for the tithe were made in kind, with the farmer turning over the amount he bid to the government and presumably selling the rest for profit. There are two instances in the *Verrines* (II. 3. 72, 90) where monetary equivalents for bids are given, but these random occurrences were more likely to have been taken from the professions of the *decumani* that they

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[88]Badian 1972, p. 23-24, Rickman 1980, p. 40, Scramuzza 1959, p. 238. *Contra* Cimma 1981, p. 13-14, who cites no primary sources for her argument.

[89]Frank 1933, p. 150, Walbank 1957, I, p. 693.

[90]Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 18.

[91]Cic. *Verr.* cities bidding: II. 3. 72, 77, 99; grain allowed to rot: II. 3. 37.

could make up the amount of grain in cash if the harvest fell short.[92] Added to this is the fact that we hear of no exploitation on the part of the governors over the amounts bid; Cicero, as prosecutor in the *Verrines*, would have been keen to point out such occurrences, and his silence furthers the argument that bids were not rendered in cash.[93] Upon the conclusion of the auction, all sales were recorded and annual records were kept in the archives of the praetor.[94]

(ii) Collection

Having purchased the tithe of a certain area, the *decumanus* first made the rounds to individual farmers in order to conclude an initial agreement; it should be noted that according to the *lex Hieronica*, it was the farmer, not the owner of the land who was liable for payment, and thus large landowners, for which Sicily became so famous during the Slave Revolts, were heavily favoured. In order to aid the *decumanus* in his task, annual records were kept in local archives of the number of farms around each city.[95] Cicero (*Verr.* II. 3. 38) claims that this was taken further by Verres who demanded that farmers report yearly what kind of crops they had planted and the number of *iugera* they had under seed. This has rightly been seen as a mere device by the prosecutor to implicate the defendant. In reality, this was a common feature of many tithes and was a prerequisite to a harmonious structure, and therefore in all likelihood the practice went back to the original law in the kingdom of Syracuse.[96] It would be the only way for an individual to estimate how much he could bid and still make a comfortable profit, and, once his bid secured the

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[92]Lintott 1993, p. 75. For bids in kind see Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 72, 75, 113.

[93]Rickman 1980, p. 40-41.

[94]Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 117.

[95]Initial agreement: Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 36-37, 112; farmers liable: II. 3. 53, 55; records kept: II. 3. 102, 120.

[96]Goldsberry 1973, p. 135, Nicolet 1996, p. 16.

collection of the tithe, accurate annual records of the number of farmers in an area gave him a starting point from which he could journey to individual farms and conclude agreements. According to Cicero (*Verr.* II. 3. 112), estimation of the yield could sometimes be very easy, since there were occasions when it was tenfold, and therefore the tithe would be the same as the amount of seed sown, with one *iugerum* producing one *medimnos.*

A farmer and the *decumanus* were ideally supposed to come to an initial agreement before the crop, or crops if the latter had won more than one tithe, was harvested; hopefully the farmer could calculate his yield within reasonable certainty, and if this was satisfactory to the *decumanus*, the accord was concluded. More often than not however, no agreement was reached at this instance and the collector had to return at the end of the season. At this point a pact would be concluded once all the grain was on the threshing floor, this way, both parties could see the entire harvest and then decide how much of it constituted the tithe of ten percent. The grain then had to be transported to the nearest port to be made ready for long distance shipment by 1 August.[97] Again, much of this Cicero claims was instituted by Verres to swindle the Sicilian farmers, but it would be difficult to see how the system could have functioned without these mechanisms in place. None of these rules would point to this being anything other than a normal, albeit highly regulated, tithe structure, and would probably date back to the original third century tithe.[98]

Transport

(i) Methods

The Romans used fleets of merchantmen to transport grain to either the city of Rome or to the army in the field. Due to the sheer volume of the cargo involved, there is a strong chance

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[97]Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 36-37.

[98]Pritchard 1970, p. 358.

that ships of very large capacities were at least in part used for this purpose. Underwater archaeology has revealed ships with capacities of between three hundred and fifty and one thousand tonnes.[99] The Romans did have the capability of building such vessels, and on major routes their use would have been economical and perhaps even necessary.[100] With the *lex Hieronica* in place for nearly fifty years by the early second century, the grain route from Sicily to Rome would have been long established. Therefore it is likely that freighters of large capacity were used on this and perhaps some other routes leading away from Sicily.[101] However, these large vessels do not appear to have been the norm outside of the major sea lanes. Firstly, they were tremendously expensive to build and required vast investments of capital. This meant that the risk they took while sailing was immense; if they sunk in a storm or were seized by pirates then the destruction of both vessel and cargo would have represented a very significant loss to the owners. Moreover, they were vastly limited in the number of ports into which they could dock, making them useful only on major routes. But even when in a well used sea lane, if they were blown off course by a storm there were few places where they could shelter.[102]

Further underwater excavations and comparative studies have illustrated that, while vessels of large tonnage were in use, most cargo ships in the ancient Mediterranean were small, with a carrying capacity of under one hundred tonnes.[103] These were relatively easy and inexpensive to build and could fit into any port. Furthermore, the risk of loss was greatly reduced because the load was spread over a great many vessels. Their numbers provided some security

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[99]Casson 1971, p. 171-172, Houston 1987, p. 444-450, Zevi 1994, p. 63.

[100]For the construction of large vessels see Landels 1978, p. 164, Zevi, p. 61-64.

[101]Hopkins 1983, p. 84, 96-98.

[102]Hopkins 1983, p. 98-100, 1988, p. 766-767, Rickman 1991, p. 104-105.

[103]Hopkins 1983, p. 98-100, 1988, p. 766-767, Houston 1988, p. 553-564, Pompey and Tchernia 1978, p. 233-235, Rickman 1985, p. 108, 1991, p. 104-105, Roth 1999, p. 192.

against piracy and, if fleet was hit by a storm, they were not as heavy as larger vessels; even if a few were lost, the loss to the owner or owners would not be as great. These small vessels appear to have been much more ubiquitous in the Mediterranean economy, and we can therefore conclude that, while large ships were in use, and would certainly have been sailed on such a major route as between Sicily and Rome, the vast majority of vessels, on this or any other route, would have been small in size. So both the city of Rome and the army were on the whole supplied by large fleets of small ships. The supply expedition of Pullus in 249, involving eight hundred freighters, is a testament to this method of supply.[104]

(ii) The Role of the *Publicani*

Once a firm agreement was made between the farmer and the *decumanus* then it was put into writing and copies were given to both parties, with an extra one being placed among the public records. The tenth was then transported to the nearest port where it would be inspected one last time by the *decumanus*, in order to make sure the farmer had not skimmed anything off the top between the threshing floor and the port.[105] Unfortunately, we are given no indication as to how this grain was transported to the nearest port. It has been argued that transport by sea in the ancient world was cheaper and faster, and therefore grain would be transported overland for as short a distance as possible.[106] While this may be true, it would be wrong to assume that land and sea transport were diametrically opposed, and most transport methods used the two in tandem

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[104]Plb. I. 52. 6.

[105]Records: Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 102, 112; examination at port: II. 3. 73, 171-172. See Carcopino 1914, p. 13-14, Pritchard 1970, p. 360, Rickman 1980, p. 38, Scramuzza 1959, p. 237.

[106]On sea versus land transport see Laurence 1999, p. 98-99, 100-101, 107-108, Morley 1996, p. 63-66, Rickman 1991, p. 118. It should be noted that the Ptolemaic grain tithe was without question transported down the Nile; see Thompson (Crawford) 1983, p. 64-75.

out of necessity.[107] Although sea transport was on the whole more efficient, Cicero (*Verr.* II. 3. 192) does state that moving goods by any means within Sicily presented few problems to the individual. So it seems logical to assume that, unless the area in question was near a major port, the tithe was first transported to the nearest navigable river, and from there it would have been taken by water to a granary at a major port.

Cicero's speeches are unclear as to whose responsibility it was to undertake the initial transport of the tithe overland to the closest port. In one instance (*Verr.* II. 3. 37) it appears as though it was the farmer's responsibility. In another (*Verr.* II. 3. 190-192) he states that in regards to the personal supplies of the praetor, requisitioned as the need arose, the farmers had to take the grain to a specified location. As for the regular tithe, it has been pointed out that, as Verres did not profiteer from this transport, it is more likely that the onus lay with the tithe collectors.[108] However, it was the norm in other tithe systems for the producer to undertake the initial transport of goods.[109] The evidence would seem to support the conclusion that both farmer and tithe collector hauled the produce at different times. In another passage (*Verr.* II. 3. 101) we are told that it was the farmers' obligation to present his tithe at a central point within the region of the nearest city. This central point would have been a granary where all farmers in the region gathered to deliver their tenths. Cicero (*Verr.* II. 3. 171-172, 181) says nothing else except for the statement that the grain was then officially examined and detailed records were kept of the findings in relation to the quality and quantity of grain about to be shipped. He does not say who undertook this inspection, though it was presumably a Roman or local magistrate. It is reasonable to assume that copies of these records went to Rome along with the shipment. This would avoid

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[107]Rickman 1991, p. 109-110.

[108]Lintott 1993, p. 76.

[109]Deut. 26. 1-15. For farmers transporting medieval tithes see Lomas 1984, p. 322-323.

infringements during transport and would also allow the senate to gauge a year's harvest if they needed to demand a second tithe.[110] If all the grain from a given area had been gathered together in a central granary and had been officially inspected, individual farmers would have been eliminated from transportation responsibilities to locations beyond this juncture.

In certain locations, such as the hinterlands of large cities, grain would only have to be transported a short distance by the farmers, but it must have been a different matter for landlocked cities. In these, the *decumani* probably took charge of the grain at the point that the farmers had dropped it off. They then would have had to convey it overland to the nearest navigable river, and then by sea to the closest major port, to be made ready for long distance haulage.

Although it was the obligation of the *decumanus* to get the grain to its final destination in Sicily, it does not follow that he actually transported it. Certainly, some of the more established collectors, or even conglomerates of them, could have owned small ships for river transport. As for the rest, it is more than likely that they subcontracted this work. It is doubtful that the *publicani* would have been involved in ventures so small and so far from Rome. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that, for the transportation of the tithes from inland granaries to major ports, a class of small shippers existed. There almost certainly would have been merchants already in place, shipping goods by river within the island simply for the purposes of trade, and the same would apply to overland haulage to landlocked cities. So it is not improbable that these merchants or shippers were simply subcontracted by the *decumani* to transfer their collected tithes to a major port. These men would have been of Sicilian origin, and probably from the local area where their business took place, making their livelihoods out of being a regular ferry for goods going to and from the major coastal cities. Thus, if the collection point for the farmers was not already a large

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[110]Nicolet 1996, p. 17.

port city, the grain would have arrived at its major seaward embarkation point by means of this small class of Sicilian subcontracted merchants.[111]

As for transport from Sicily to the grain's final destination, it is known that the *publicani* did at times engage in transport and army supply, but unfortunately no source says that this was the norm. Polybios (VI. 17), in his discussion of the *publicani*, names several areas in which they won public contracts, but transport and army supply are not among them. However, there is strong evidence to suggest that the *societates publicanorum* regularly transported grain to both Rome and to the army under state contracts.

First and foremost, there is the infamous story of the fraudulent contractors from Livy (XXIII. 48. 4-49. 4, XXV. 3. 8-5. 1). In 215, the brothers Scipio, commanding the legions in Spain, sent an urgent message to the senate asking for supplies. As the government at Rome lacked the resources to carry out such a mission, they appealed to the *publicani* to transport the necessary goods. Eventually, three *societas publicanorum*, totalling nineteen men, came forward and agreed to ferry the provisions, on the conditions that they, and presumably their employees, would be exempt from military service and that the state would insure all ships and cargo against weather and enemy attack. We hear nothing more until 212, when one of the *publicani* involved was charged with fraud for intentionally sinking valueless ships and then pocketing the insurance money for the vessel and the non-existent supplies aboard. The senate was disinclined to prosecute the individual in fear of offending the *publicani* as a whole. But then when two tribunes did begin prosecution, the *publicani* rallied together and attempted to obstruct justice. At this point the senate was finally prodded into action and took firm measures against the offenders.

This story would appear to demonstrate two things - that the *publicani* did engage in

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[111]On river transport see Casson 1965, p. 31-39, Greene 1986, p. 30-32, Rickman 1980, p. 19-20, 1988, p. 259.

public contracts for army supply, and that the Roman state did not have the capacity to transport goods on a large scale.[112] It has been pointed out that the latter part of the episode is somewhat anachronistic; Livy is ascribing too much cohesiveness and political power to the *publicani* in the third century, as they would not emerge as a significant political force for another hundred years.[113] While this is surely correct, the anachronistic element has caused some to reject the entire episode as outright fabrication.[114] There is no reason to do so; most of the events are believable and there is more evidence to reinforce Livy in terms of the *publicani* and state contracts.

In 195, Cato the Elder, in command of Roman forces in Spain, dismissed the *publicani* from his camp, deciding instead to fund his campaigns from local grain. The passage of Livy (XXXIV. 9. 12) refers to the *publicani* as '*redemptores*', and leaves little doubt that the purpose of the latter was to supply the army. Therefore, *redemptores* has been translated by most scholars as contractors, which is the most common meaning of the word.[115] It has been suggested that *redemptor* means supplier, but this is an obscure translation for which there is no evidence.[116] Additionally, Livy uses the word in several other places, but on all occasions it means either one who paid ransom to free captives, or (XXIII. 48. 10, XLII. 3. 11) to signify people who had undertaken state contracts. In the *Verrines*, Cicero uses the word *mancipes* to describe those who transported the grain away from Sicily. Again this word has been translated as contractor

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[112]Badian 1972, p. 16-18, Garnsey 1994, p. 32.

[113]Badian 1972, p. 45, Brunt 1962, p. 86. See Rickman 1980, p. 40.

[114]Erdkamp 1995, p. 169, 1998, p. 116-118.

[115]Badian 1972, p. 28, Briscoe 1981, p. 70, Richardson 1976, p. 150-151, 1986, p. 93. For other examples of *redemtor* as contractor see Cato, *Agr.* 107, Cic. *Div.* 2. 47, *Inv.* 2. 96.

[116]Suggested by Erdkamp 1995, p. 170-171, 1998, p. 118.

or private dealer, in accordance with its use by other authors.[117] Varro (*L.* V. 40) does use it in terms of a state official, however this use is exceptional. In all other cases, even when *mancipes* does not refer specifically to a contractor, it means a private wholesaler or dealer of some kind.[118] Once the grain had reached Rome, Cicero (*Dom.* 11) says that it was sold by *venditores*, implying that it went into private hands upon reaching Ostia or Puteoli, and so it would make little sense for grain to go from private hands in Sicily, into state control for transport, only to return to the private sector once in Italy.[119] With this is mind it is difficult to see the *redemptores* charged with supplying Cato or the *mancipes* transporting the produce of the *lex Hieronica* as anything but *publicani* or their agents.

One of the firmest pieces of evidence for the *publicani* undertaking state transport contracts comes from the Thessaly inscription of c. 150, that details a Roman requisition of grain from the region to be shipped to the capital.[120] It states, 'as regards the shipment of the grain to Rome:...that Quintus be responsible for contracting it out.'[121] This leaves no doubt; the grain was to be transported to Rome under state contract, and anyone who undertook such a contract was a *publicanus*. As most amounts of grain to be conveyed were on a large scale, it would be normal for an entire publican society to undertake the contract. What emerges most clearly from the evidence cited thus far, is that the *publicani*, regardless of what Polybios does not say about them, had the capacity to and in fact did engage in long distance grain transport.

Our sources do speak a certain amount about the transport of grain. On many occasions,

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[117]Nep. *Att.* 6. 3, Plin. *Nat.* XXXIII. 164, Suet. *Ves.* 1. 4. Also Cic. *Dom.* 48, *OLD*, p. 1589.

[118]Pl. *Cur.* 515: 'pimp'; Plin. *Nat.* X. 122: 'shopkeeper'.

[119]Rickman 1971, p. 309.

[120]*SEG* XXXIV. 558. See Garnsey *et al.* 1984, p. 36-39, 42, Garnsey and Rathbone 1985, p. 20-25.

[121]As translated by Garnsey *et al.* 1984, p. 37.

we hear of grain conveyed from one place to the next, often as a gift from one government to the Roman people, as a symbol of respect.[122] Yet in none of these passages are we told about those who transported the cargoes. Two of these occurrences are worth noting however. In 191, Livy (XXXVI. 4. 5) tells us that the Carthaginians promised the Romans a gift of five hundred thousand *modii* of wheat and barley. Significantly, they said they would equip a fleet and transport half of it themselves. Similarly, at XLIII. 6. 12-13, the Carthaginians are again delivering a quantity of grain for the Romans. These two passages suggest that the state making the gift normally did not also transport it, that was up to the Romans. Since we know that the *publicani* transported grain bound for Rome, as with the Thessaly inscription cited above, it would be logical to assume that it was they who were undertaking the haulage in these passages as well.

The fact that we do have instances of state transport should not be overlooked. We have four examples, yet only two are from the mid-Republic, and all of them can be explained as being logistical anomalies. The first episode is the supply of Tarentum in 210 and 209.[123] While the supply of the Roman garrison in the city was indeed undertaken by the military, these were highly extenuating circumstances. The supply fleet was actually sailing into a war zone, as the city was in Carthaginian hands and the Romans only held the citadel. Livy is quite clear in stating that the entire supply fleet was therefore made up of warships, and there were no transports involved. Consequently it is easy to see why the *publicani*, who operated exclusively in merchantmen, were not engaged here. The second instance again also comes from Livy (XXVI. 47. 9). Scipio Africanus, having just taken Carthago Nova, commandeered sixty-three freighters from the harbour of the city to use as supply ships. Although these may later have seen Roman service,

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[122]App. *Hann.* 34, Liv. XXII. 37. 1, XXIII. 38. 13, XXXI. 19. 2-4, XXXIII. 42. 8.

[123]210: Liv. XXVI. 39. 1-5; 209: App. *Hann.* 34, Liv. XXVII. 18. 8

they were either Punic or Spanish ships that were captured so the Romans could loot their cargoes, and therefore this does not qualify as an instance of state supply.[124]

Our two other examples come from the very late Republic. By then the army was semi-professional and was a significantly different force from its third century predecessor. Supply was certainly less extemporaneous in nature. The merchant vessels used by Caesar's army in 46 were confiscated merchantmen, and thus not originally part of his navy. In 34 Octavian did have freighters built on the Danube, but he was operating deep inside Illyrian territory, and using private transport was probably not an option open to him. Moreover, the ships he built would have been river boats; crafts of a very different nature to the open see cargo vessels with which this chapter is concerned.[125]

While it remains true that the Roman government did run the grain supply from the highest levels, it is also clear that there is no evidence for the Roman government owning and operating a 'large number of state freighters' as has recently been argued by Erdkamp (1998, p. 61).[126] Government officials were at the top of the chain and gave the orders regarding the supply of armies or the capital, then let out the contracts for collection and transport, and then either set or subsidised the price at which the grain could be sold, however the role of the state appears to have ceased at this juncture, at least until the requested grain came in for inspection. *Frumentatores*, might be sent to an area to purchase grain in the name of the state, but there is no evidence to show that this was a government post, and it appears that these men were clerks, representing private companies, contracted to purchase, collect, transport, store, and finally distribute grain to the capital or to the military. No evidence exists to show that the state had a system of storing

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[124]*Contra* Erdkamp 1998, p. 59 n. 50, who uses this to bolster his argument for a state supply.

[125]Caesar: Caes. *BAfr.* 34; Octavian: App. *Ill.* 22.

[126]See 1995, p. 168-191, 1998, p. 58-61, 84-94, 112, 116-121.

grain over the winter months, yet we do know that private companies owned grain storehouses in both Puteoli and Rome, and it also remains unlikely that the state had any mechanisms by which they could distribute the produce, and therefore it is probable that these too remained in private hands.[127] The state could move goods to the army on certain occasions, as we have observed that the military might take charge of supply in dangerous situations, where merchantmen might be vulnerable to enemy attack. Yet in these cases, supply seems to have been handled using warships alone, thus making private cargo vessels unnecessary. The military might also commandeer ships for its own use, but this should be seen as purely an *ad hoc* measure that deviated from the norm. Besides, the fact that the Roman navy did seize enemy craft does not bolster the argument for a state run supply system. In fact, if such a system existed, then it should not have been necessary to use enemy ships in such a capacity. It appears that the Roman government had no mechanisms in place with which it could supply its army. Transporting food on such a massive scale was beyond the capabilities of most ancient governments.[128] Yet there is abundant evidence to show that there was a group of people in Italy who did have the capacity to undertake long distance and large scale, transport and supply - the *publicani*. They undertook the tasks of supplying both the army and the city of Rome on various occasions, and therefore it would be reasonable to conclude that, in the absence of any other means to supply and transport, the *publicani* undertook the state contracts for overseas shipping on nearly all occasions. By the late third century, with armies across the Mediterranean, the *lex Hieronica* in full use, and with foreign grain coming into Rome on an unprecedented scale, the *publicani* now played the most important role in the logistics of the Roman army and the city of Rome. From port to camp or port to market, it is evident that

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[127]*Frumentatores*: Sen. *Brev. Vit.* 18. 3. See Pavis D'Escurac 1976, p. 22-40, Rickman 1980a, p. 268-269, who remarks, 'The fact is that not only did Rome not possess a state-owned merchant marine, it never developed more than the barest state machinery of any kind for dealing with [the grain supply].' On private storage and distribution see Rickman 1971, p. 170-173, 1980a, 269-270.

[128]Badian 1972, p. 16-18.

state grain in mid-Republican Rome remained almost exclusively in private hands.

(iii) Embarkation Points

When the grain was ready to be transported by the *publicani* away from Sicily, the transport ships would have put out to sea from one of the island's major embarkation points. A total of twenty-two ports have been identified in Republican Sicily, but several of these are minor harbours that, although still vital for overseas trade, most likely could not accommodate the large vessels necessary for overseas transport.[129] Moreover, many of these harbours may merely have been natural points where vessels stopped or paused on longer journeys, not actually government sanctioned ports. Rickman (1988, p. 260-261) makes the distinction that a harbour could be any place where a vessel could conveniently stop, whereas a port was somewhere that ships had the legal right to dock and unload their cargo. Cicero (*Verr.* II. 2. 185) perhaps provides a clue when he lists eight ports that were the most lucrative in export taxes: Agrigentum, Halaisa, Katana, Lilybaion, Messana, Panormos, Syracuse, and Thermai Himeraiai. Phintia on the southeast coast is also mentioned as a place to which farmers took their grain, but here Cicero (*Verr.* II. 3. 192) is speaking of crops levied for the consumption of the governor, not of the regular tithe. In still another passage (*Verr.* II. 3. 167) referring to harbour dues, we are told that one company of *publicani* farmed the revenues of six '*publica*'. The exact meaning of *publica* is unknown, but it has been argued that these were six tax districts into which Sicily was divided, or that the *publica* in question were the harbours that were farmed by a single company, and did not constitute any legal entities by themselves.[130] It is unlikely that Cicero meant ports for *publica*,

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[129]Scramuzza 1959, p. 293-297. For the importance of small harbours see Chevallier 1967, p. 228, Rickman 1988, p. 257.

[130]Carcopino 1914, p, 94, Frank 1933, p. 151, 255 for the former argument; Goldsberry 1973, p. 324 for the latter.

since everywhere else he is quite clear in his use of *portus*. It has recently been demonstrated, in relation to Asia, that taxation districts could exist within a province or could be independent of a provinces geographical boundaries.[131] It is possible that Sicily was divided up into administrative districts, yet the mention of six does not preclude the existence of others. Cicero speaks of eight harbours as being the main tax points of the province, which might suggest that there were eight such districts.[132] So the taxation of these districts would be farmed individually by a number of publican societies. In addition it is quite feasible that these were not just tax districts, and, as they were centred around ports, were the divisions of the island in relation to the *lex Hieronica*. The tithes of Sicily had to be transported to one of eight main harbours, each harbour had a hinterland assigned to it, and where the *decumanus* had to bring his grain depended upon within which district he operated. It would make sense to give the independent *decumani* as much guidance as possible in relation to where their collected produce should end up, and a system of districts would be the only way to ensure efficient organisation in terms of tithe transport.

And so the journey of the grain involved in the *lex Hieronica* was thus - the farmer would transport his grain overland to the nearest city, if this city were landlocked the *decumanus* would subcontract a small overland shipper to haul it to the nearest port, if the nearest port was not a major harbour then the grain was taken by river, again with a subcontractor, to one of eight major coastal cities, there the *publicani*, under contract from Rome, took the grain by sea to Ostia or to a Roman army somewhere in the Mediterranean.

Transgressions of the Lex Hieronica

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[131]Heil 1991, p. 13, Nicolet 1993, p. 930, 944, 953.

[132]Scramuzza 1959, p. 340-341.

The smooth running of the *lex Hieronica* depended upon the honesty of all parties involved. As already noted, farmers had their grain inspected upon delivery to make sure they were not trying to cheat the *decumanus*. Of course, there would always have been discrepancies; these could have ranged from simple disagreements over the original tithe, thus leading to a failure to reach a consensus, all the way to one party reneging on the pact and either failing to offer up enough grain or, on the part of the collector, demanding too much. Many of the legal measures used to combat these offences dated back to Hieron's original laws.[133] In cases where the farmer and the *decumanus* simply could not reach an agreement as to the amount of grain that constituted a tenth, then someone, referred to by Cicero (*Verr.* II. 3. 25-34) only as 'the Sicilian magistrate', was called in to arbitrate. These men are otherwise unknown, and their identity remains a mystery. They were undoubtably Sicilian, as Cicero would most likely have mentioned if this were a Roman office. As we know the tithe was auctioned off on a city by city basis, it would make sense for these magistrates to be local officials, perhaps with titles that varied from place to place, and hence Cicero's use of such a generic term. They may have been a local judge or someone who held an office outlined within the *lex Hieronica* who dealt specifically with disputes between the parties.[134] It would make sense for him to have been a local official, since for someone to cover an area larger than the land surrounding a city, such as one of the eight divisions of the island, would have been difficult. Moreover, having a magistrate in place in every city gave the farmer and collector a single person with whom to file grievances. Therefore, while their exact identity remains obscure, it is probable that these Sicilian magistrates were native (*ie* non-Roman) officials of their local governments who were assigned the task of arbitration in disputes from the threshing floor.

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[133]Cic. *Verr.* II. 2. 32, 34.

[134]Carcopino 1914, p. 33, Pritchard 1970, p. 361-362.

They appear to have been consigned with the power to force the two sides to come to terms, making the farmer pay what the *decumanus* claimed or instructing the latter to demand less. In order for this system to be effective, the magistrate's decisions should have had the force of law behind them. If a party was not satisfied with the magistrate's judgement, then he had recourse the special courts that dealt with the *lex Hieronica*.

The primary purpose of these courts appears to have been to try offenders who had broken the original agreement at the beginning of the season or on the threshing floor, either by the farmer being accused of delivering too little, or the collector being denounced for demanding too much. If found guilty of handing in less grain than originally agreed upon, the farmer was liable to pay the *decumanus* four times the amount he had withheld, while if the tithe collector was judged to have falsely tried to exact more from the farmer, he was forced to pay eight times the extra amount he had demanded.[135] Cicero makes the claim that these charges were invented by Verres in order to further his corruption, but the charge of eightfold restitution against the *decumani* is incongruous with his other policies of exacting as much as possible from the farmers themselves by working in conjunction with corrupt collectors.[136] Furthermore, it would be highly irregular for Hieron to set up a court system without penalties of this sort to punish offenders, and it would make sense for the higher cost of cheating to lie with the collectors, as they were in business for a profit, while the farmer was simply paying tax, and therefore was the one giving something away without receiving anything tangible in return.

The courts were made up of *recuperatores*, boards of three Roman citizens. They were Roman institutions whose mid-Republican existence is well attested.[137] In Sicily they were chosen

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[135]Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 26-34.

[136]Carcopino 1914, p. 38-41, Pritchard 1970, p. 363-364, Rickman 1980, p. 38, Scramuzza 1959, p. 238.

[137]Liv. XXVI. 48. 8, XLIII. 2. 3, Pl. *Bac.* 270, *Rud.* 1282.

by the praetor from among the local businessmen.[138] Often these men sat on the Roman citizen councils that probably existed in every city with a substantial citizen population.[139] However, it is not unfeasible that *conventi* existed on a district level, with Sicily having one for each of the eight possible administrative districts. It is also possible that councils designed to protect the rights and business interests of citizens, to hold hearings and trials between citizens, and conceivably between citizens and non-citizens, existed on both urban and district levels. There is direct evidence to show that a judge could be chosen from several cities within one administrative district, thus leading to the conclusion that *recuperatores* were at least part of the time chosen at a district level.[140]

The entire system seems to have functioned on a district level, as trials took place in the area where the defendant had been accused. This is directly attested by Cicero (*Verr.* 3. 38) who points out that Verres' practice of summoning defendants to courts outside their area was strictly against the *lex Hieronica*. The first step in a trial was for the praetor to draw up a list of prospective judges from the local area. The plaintiff had the right to scrutinise this list, and to challenge the governor on any name with which he disagreed. In describing this process, Cicero (*Verr.* II. 3. 28) does not mention if the defendant had any such right, but here he is speaking specifically of a farmer suing a *decumanus*, and the episode is told from the farmer's perspective. The point Cicero is trying to make is that selection of the *recuperatores* was biassed towards the collectors, and therefore the latter would have no need of inspecting the list of possible judges. But in order for the system to operate fairly, and equity was the supposed hallmark of the *lex Hieronica*, we must assume that both plaintiff and defendant had the right to inspect the list of

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[138]Cic. *Verr.* II. 2. 34, 3. 28, 30, 32, 35.

[139]Cic. *Verr.* II. 2. 34, 3. 28. See Carcopino 1914, p. 148-154.

[140]Cic. *Verr.* II. 2. 38.

possible judges; the possibilities for prejudice and corruption would be measureless if only one party scrutinised the list.[141]

It appears that the purpose of the *recuperatores* was threefold. First and foremost, they tried those accused of violating the agreement made either at the beginning of the season or on the threshing floor. They would also have judged cases where an arbitrator, known only as the Sicilian magistrate, who was called in if an original agreement could not be made, was accused of being biassed towards one party. Finally, though it is not attested, it would seem likely that they also tried farmers who were charged with making incorrect professions of their land under seed for the public records.[142] These records were of vital importance to the prospective *decumani* when they undertook to make their bids, and they were also used when agreement for the tenth was initially proposed at the commencement of the season. Making fraudulent claims about the amount of land under seed could severely hamper the tithe collector in making his return, and was therefore likely to have been treated seriously. As the courts were organised on a local level, it is plausible that a further duty of the Sicilian magistrate was to enforce the decisions of the *recuperatores* and to collect any fines.[143]

Other Taxes

Besides the official tithe of the *lex Hieronica*, the other main tax in Republican Sicily was what modern scholarship refers to as the second or double tithe, exacted in years where extra supply was needed for the army or the city of Rome. First demanded in 191, this was the same as the original tithe only this time the farmers were paid for their produce by the Roman

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[141]On the supposed fairness of the *lex Hieronica* see Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 20.

[142]Goldsberry 1973, p. 140.

[143]Scramuzza 1959, p. 238.

government.[144] Although the cities were forced to make this sale, Cicero (*Verr.* II. 3. 174) indicates that, in his time at least, the prices offered by the Roman government were fair, and farmers may have been happy to have a fixed price and a guaranteed buyer for their produce. The second tithe consisted of two separate purchases by the governor. The first was a straightforward doubling of the amount handed over in the original tithe of that year. The second was to total 800 000 *modii* (133 333 Sicilian *medimnoi*) and be spread fairly among all the grain growing cities of the island, regardless of their status. In the first century, the amount each community contributed to the second purchase was fixed, and thus the Romans could always count on their 800 000 *modii*.[145] But the latter aspect more likely belongs to the days after the second tithe was made permanent in 73 with the *Lex Terentia Cassia frumentaria*, after which cities began making sales to Rome annually.[146] In the early second century, double tithes were infrequent, and it would therefore have been impractical to fix the contribution of each city, as average yields could vary widely given the number of years between some double tithes.

The double tithe purchased both wheat and barley, the latter at half the price of the former. As the grain went directly to the Romans, the praetor of Sicily delegated a team of officials under one of his quaestors to inspect all incoming produce before it was shipped from the island.[147] If these found the grain of any given community to be inadequate, then the praetor would use the money allocated to him by the senate for the second tithe to make up this loss by purchasing from

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[144]Liv. XXXVI. 2. 12. Double tithes were also exacted in 190: Liv. XXXVII. 2. 12; 189: Liv. XXXVII. 50. 9; and 171: Liv. XLII. 31. 8. Payment for the second tithe: Cic. *Planc.* 64, *Verr.* II. 3. 119, 182, 215-216, 5. 55, Plut. *Cic.* 6. 1.

[145]Cic. *Verr.* II. 4. 20.

[146]On the law see Cic. *Sest.* 55, *Verr.* II. 3. 72, 163, 5. 52, Sal. *Hist.* III. 34. 19Mc. On Sallust see McGushin 1994, II, *ad loc.* See also Broughton *MRR*, II, p. 109.

[147]It was common in the ancient world for grain to be checked at several points before reaching its final destination, which further illustrates its importance to the economy. See Rickman 1980a, p. 262.

another city.[148] In this locale, if the price Rome was willing to pay was lower than the going rate, then the city that had supplied the unsatisfactory grain in the first place would presumably have to make up the difference, so the community supplying the acceptable produce would not be shortchanged.[149] Although it has been noted that the prices set by the senate for the second tithe could be fair, the market value of grain fluctuated from place to place in Sicily, and there must have been times when an area was forced to sell their yields at a loss.

The Sicilians were also required to sell grain to the Romans for the maintenance of the praetor, his staff, and perhaps any legions stationed on the island. It is unfortunately unknown if this burden, like the double tithe, was spread amongst all the Sicilian communities, or if only regular tithe paying centres were forced to pay. The price was fixed by the senate and, if the going rate was lower, the praetor would pocket the difference. As is to be expected, Cicero (*Verr.* II. 3. 172-173) charges Verres with this offence, but we should assume that all but the most scrupulous of officials would have taken advantage of this easy income. The grain was to be taken by the individual farmers to a port specified by the governor for transportation. Usually, this port would be close by, but sometimes governors would intentionally specify ports at impossible distances, and this would force the vast majority of farmers to ask to pay their share in cash rather than kind. Thus, areas that had high grain prices might be treated this way so Roman officials could purchase their personal grain at cheaper markets and make a better profit for themselves. Places that had high grain prices might even volunteer to make a cash payment, so as to keep their grain and sell it at market value, rather than take a loss to the Roman government. This was a practice that goes back to at least the early second century, if not before,

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[148]Barley at half the price of wheat: Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 188; inspection of grain by praetor and his staff: *Div. Caec.* 32, *Verr.* II. 3. 172, 175-176, 180, 182, 225; purchase of grain from another city: *Verr.* II. 3. 173.

[149]Carcopino 1914, p. 191-192.

as we see its use in Spain in171.[150] In these cases a city would ask the governor to make an estimate of the value of their produce, and thus to set a fixed rate at which he would accept cash payments in lieu of grain. The farmers would then pay the difference between the estimate and the amount the senate had authorised for the purchase. This top up allowed the farmers to sell their grain on regular markets at higher value and allowed the praetor to either pocket the extra funds or to make the purchase in a cheaper area.[151]

Other taxes included various surcharges levelled on farmers during transactions with tithe collectors. In the first century the *decumani* exacted small fees for inspection of the tithe grain, a scribal fee, a clerical fee for bookkeeping, and an exchange fee if it was necessary to change native currency into Roman. Cicero (*Verr.* II. 3. 181-184) claims these were invented by Verres, and it is possible that he gave these measures the force of law or brought them under Roman control, but things such as exchange fees, whether custom or law, were known in the Greek world a century before Cicero's time, as is born out by two inscriptions from the first half of the second century.[152] Both mention the exaction of commission, a κόλλυβος, for exchanging currency. This would lead to the conclusion that what Cicero calls a *collybus*, was actually an exchange fee that was merely taken over by the Romans when they adopted *lex Hieronica* from Greek Sicily.

More second century evidence helps us date a system of charges known as *accessiones*; these were amounts added on by the governor to the bids of the tithe collectors. In turn the *decumani* exacted a small amount per *modus* of grain collected from the farmers in order to

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[150]Liv. XLIII. 2. 12. See Richardson 1976, p. 149-151, who argues that it originated in 179.

[151]Maintenance of the praetor and the pocketing of surplus funds: Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 188, 195-197, 214, 225; transport and requests to make payments in cash: II. 3. 189-192; the estimate process and cash payments: II. 3. 189, 191, 194, 214-216.

[152]*SEG* XIII. 359, XXXVIII. 781.

recoup their loss.[153] Cicero (*Verr.* II. 3. 116-118) claims these *accessiones* were introduced by Verres in his outrageous lust for cash, but other sources would lead us to believe that such taxes were regular forms of revenue in the Roman provinces. Cato the Elder (*Agr.* 144) speaks of *accessiones* from the first half of the second century, and such an early example at least illustrates that these taxes could have been around in Sicily during the third century. Later in his career, Cicero (*Rab. Post.* 30) himself mentions *asccessiones* as being regular supplements taken by tax collectors.[154]

Another tax that appears in the *Verrines* and for which we have earlier evidence is the *scriptura*; a tax on *ager publicus* that was used as pasture, and Pliny (*Nat.* XVIII. 11) says that this was one of the oldest taxes charged by the Romans. This was auctioned by the censors at Rome and collected by the *publicani*. Its presence in Sicily is attested by Cicero (*Verr.* II. 3. 167), who speaks of a *magister scripturae* - a magistrate whose role was to supervise the collection of the *scriptura*.

The Romans charged harbour taxes, customs dues, and general tariffs at ports in Sicily. These were administered by the *publicani* who had purchased the right of collection at Rome. In the first century, the charge on exports from Syracuse was five percent.[155] It known that the Carthaginians levelled these charges and therefore it is likely that the Romans merely continued this practice.[156] That the Romans adopted such laws is clear from the aforementioned example of Asian *portorium* (see above, p. 259-260), where an existing Hellenistic customs law was taken over in the first century directly from the Hellenistic kingdom of Nikomedes IV. The exaction of

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[153]Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 76, 83, 116, 118.

[154]See Carcopino 1914, p. 111, Goldsberry 1973, p. 319-320.

[155]Cic. *Verr.* II. 2. 185. See II. 2. 171, 3. 167.

[156]Liv. XXXIII. 47. 1 on Punic harbour dues.

these taxes was common at ancient ports, and with the control of both Syracuse and Lilybaion the government in Rome stood to make a not inconsequential sum from maritime activity around the *provincia*.

An unofficial fee exacted by the tithe collectors was the *lucrum*. This was a charge paid in either money or grain by cities that wished to subcontract the tithe collection from the *decumanus* who had purchased it.[157] This might be done in cases where a city realised after the auction of the tithes that there would be a bumper crop in its territory. An example from the *Verrines* (II. 3. 100) shows a city paying a *lucrum* to a dishonest collector who had successfully bid for their tithe, as they chose to pay him this lump sum and undertake the collection themselves. While no evidence exists to illustrate how far back this practice went, dishonest tax collectors would have been common in any such system, and therefore there is every possibility that things such as *lucra* existed at many times and in many taxation schemes.

It has been demonstrated that the Romans came to Sicily with little idea of what should be done with an overseas territory of which they were now the rulers. In some areas they continued the political traditions they had established during the conquest of Italy, while in other realms they were content to continue with long established traditions and laws on the island, and into this category falls the grain tithe, what the Romans called the *lex Hieronica*. These sections have attempted to show the mechanisms of this system as it was adopted by the Romans after the First Punic War, and later brought into line with the laws of Hieron after his kingdom fell in 211. While the first war with Carthage introduced Rome to the logistics of long distance supply, the adoption of the Sicilian grain tithe gave the Romans the supplies and long distance transport capabilities they needed to undertake their conquest of both the eastern and the western

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[157]Cic. *Verr.* II. 3. 67-68, 72, 76, 84, 99-100.

Mediterranean.

Sicily and the Roman Grain Supply

Sicily and the history of Roman military logistics are intrinsically linked. It was during the First Punic War that the Romans were, for the first time, forced to deal with a problem which dogs armies even to this day - that of long distance supply. Previously, the legions had operated only within the Italian peninsula, and remained annual musters of the citizen body that would disband at the end of every campaign season. Therefore supply was usually not a problem, as they often operated close to Rome or could easily carry with them the few provisions they needed. But with the opening of the war for Sicily in 264, supply became a different matter. The first aspect of their military to be affected was their annual rotation, and this is evident in the very first year of the war; when Claudius Caudex left Sicily at the end of the campaign season in 264, he left a garrison behind to protect Messana, and thus for the first time in recorded history, Roman legionaries did not return home with their commander at the end of a campaign to be discharged, but stayed in the field throughout the winter. In 259-258 Aquillius Florus campaigned in Sicily throughout the winter, and then had his consular *imperium* from the previous year prorogued in the March. In 258-257 Atilius Caiatinus did the same and also had his *imperium* renewed, while Caecilius Metullus was made proconsul in 250 with the object of protecting the army's grain supply. The same year saw an outbreak of disease in the Roman camp in front of Lilybaion, and thus one consul and his army were recalled to reduce the danger, while the other army was maintained in Sicily throughout the winter.[158] These examples illustrate that Roman armies were now being maintained in the field throughout the year, as they now could not afford to send an

[158]Winter of 264-263: Zonar. VIII. 9; Florus: Zonar. VIII. 11; Caiatinus: Plb. I. 25. 6; Metellus: Plb. I. 40. 1, Walbank 1957, I, p. 101-102; winter of 250-249: Zonar. VIII. 15. A Roman army was kept in the field for the winter of 280-279, but this was a punishment for troops who were defeated by Pyrrhos. See Fron. *Str.* IV. 1. 24.

entirely new army into the field every spring, since the fighting with Carthage was constant and the distances would have been too great.[159] From this point onwards, legions remained in the field indefinitely, and were only topped up by annual reinforcements to replace the casualties and those who rotated back to Italy. This also meant that the army had to be supplied during the winter, and then again for the new campaign season. By use of waterborne transport and supply depots, the First Punic War therefore helped the Romans to develop the logistical system that became one of the hallmarks of their army from the third century onwards.

For an aspect that played such a large part in the success of the Roman army, there is precious little known about supply. Without it, armies, ancient and modern, would be unable to operate very far beyond their home territory. But the sources seem to have taken it for granted, seeing fit to mention supply only when something went wrong. And this is not a problem confined to the ancient historian - speaking in the context of World War I, George Thorpe remarked that, 'Strategy is to war what the plot is to a play; logistics furnishes the stage...accessories and maintenance. The audience, thrilled by the action of the play...overlooks all of the cleverly hidden details of stage management.'[160] Still, our knowledge of Roman transport methods, combined with the mention of supply, even in the negative sense, within the sources is enough to construct a picture of the mid-Republican logistical system and the impact that Sicily had upon it.

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[159]Serrati forthcoming. See Krasilnikoff 1996, p. 11, who documents this process in the Greek world. The first time the Greeks appear to have maintained troops in the field over a winter was during the Second Peloponnesian War (431-404); he establishes a link between this phenomenon and the rise in long term sieges that accompanied this war of attrition. This pattern holds true for the First Punic War as well, as it too was a conflict involving extended sieges and attrition.

[160]Thorpe 1917, p. 4.

Maintenance of the Army in Sicily

(i) Provisions

Polybios VI. 39 tells us that Roman soldiers received two thirds of a *medimnos* of wheat per month, while the cavalry received two *medimnoi* of wheat and seven of barley for their horses. Allied soldiers were given the same as legionaries while the allied cavalry were allotted one and one third *medimnoi* of wheat and five of barley. Cavalry, at this point still drawn largely from the aristocracy, received more in general because they usually had one or more servants. The Roman cavalry, as opposed to their allies, perhaps received more because they were responsible for feeding the baggage animals.[161] The army ate a wide variety of foods, including beans, cheese, fish, fruit, lentils, mutton, pork, and vegetables. They were also issued with rations of oil, wine, and vinegar.[162] Beef was a large part of the Roman soldier's diet, and cattle usually travelled with the army to be slaughtered throughout a campaign.[163] But by far their staple and most plentiful food was grain, or more specifically wheat. Barley was on the whole for horses, and soldiers were only forced to eat it as a punishment or in times of emergency.[164] Grain had a high nutritional value and was relatively easy to transport and store for long periods. It was distributed unmilled, and the was then made into either porridge or bread.[165]

The senate usually took charge of the army's supply and pay. A general may have been

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[161]Erdkamp 1998, servants: p. 28; baggage animals: p. 38-39.

[162]Beans, cheese, and vegetables: Caes. *BAfr.* 67, *BC*, III. 47; fruit: Gel. XVI. 4. 2; lentils: Plut. *Cras.* 19. 5; pork: Plb. II. 15. 2-3, VI. 31. 12, Fron. *Str.* V. 1. 12. Fish and mutton were consumed by the late Roman army and Erdkamp 1998, p. 34, believes that the Republican army would have done the same. Oil and vinegar: App. *Iber.* 54; wine: App. *Iber.* 54, Fron. *Str.* IV. 3. 1, Liv. XXXVII. 27. 2-3, Plb. IV. 56. 2, Plut. *Ant.* 45, *Caes.* 41, *Cat. Ma.* 1. 7.

[163]Plb. I. 18. Also App. *BC*, 3. 49, *Iber.* 85, Caes. *BG*, VII. 17, Fron. *Str.* IV. 1. 2, Plut. *Cat. Ma.* 4. 3. Cattle travelling with army: Polyain. III. 9. 41, Plb. VI. 31, XI. 32. 2-3, XXXI. 13, Sal. *BJ*, 91. 1. Much of the meat would have been sacrificial; see Plut. *Aem.* 36. 3, *Brut.* 39. 1. See Davies 1989, p. 203, Erdkamp 1998, p. 31-32, Goldsworthy 1996, p. 292, Labisch 1975, p. 38, Roth 1999, p. 31, 214.

[164]Punishment: App. *Ill.* 26, Fron. *Str.* IV. 1. 25, 37, Liv. 27. 13. 9, Polyain. VIII. 24. 2, Plb. VI. 38, Plut *Ant.* 39. 7; emergency: App. *Iber.* 54, Caes. *BAfr.* 67, *BC*, III. 47. 6, Dio, IL. 26. 5.

[165]White 1995, p. 39.

given a budget to purchase extra supplies, and often a consul arranged his own supply for the opening of a campaign.[166] In the campaign's subsequent years however, the government at Rome preferred to have this aspect of the military under its direct control.[167] The Romans had no equivalent of the modern military commissariat and the logistical systems from both the middle and the late Republic appear to have been largely *ad hoc*. Occasionally, the senate could appoint an official to oversee a general's supply. In 249 consul Lucius Iunius Pullus was given eight hundred transports and one hundred and twenty warships and assigned the task of supplying the army besieging Lilybaion. During the next war with Carthage in 210, the Prefect Decimus Quinctius was given command of the waterborne supply lines that allowed the garrison of Tarentum to hold out against a Punic siege.[168] Yet these appear to have been exceptional measures; in 249 the fleet was extremely large and therefore very valuable. While in 210 the maintaining of a supply line was an emergency measure taken to save a trapped garrison.

When the senate was unable to supply an army adequately, the commander could requisition further provisions from the local populace, as was his right as a holder of *imperium*.[169] Although these were sometimes paid for, one would assume that the people had little choice in these matters and had to provide the Romans with as much as they demanded. Payment, when promised, was probably not always forthcoming.[170] Again in 249 Pullus requestioned food from the Sicilian allies to feed the legions at Lilybaion; in 205 and 203 the Spanish were forced to

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[166]Commander purchases food with money from senate: Liv. XXVII. 3. 9, XXXVI. 2. 12-13, 3. 1, XXXVII. 50. 9-10, XLII. 27. 8, 31. 8; consul arranges his supplies: Plb. III. 106. 7.

[167]Liv. XLIII. 17. 2, Plb. VI. 15. 4-5.

[168]249: Plb. I. 52. 5; 210: Liv. XXVI. 39. 1-5, Broughton *MRR*, I, p. 281, 284. Sicily also supplied grain to the garrison at Tarentum in 209; see App. *Hann.* 34, Liv. XXVII. 8. 18.

[169]Sal. *BC* 29. 3.

[170]Requisitions paid for: Liv. XXXVI. 4. 9, XLV. 13. 15. See Erdkamp 1998, p. 15.

supply the Romans with not only grain but clothing as well; and from 205 onwards, the Sicilians supplied the army of Scipio Africanus, both on the island and after he left for Africa, with food, clothing, and arms.[171] The allies from whom these provisions were taken may also have been forced to transport them, as Livy (XXIX. 24. 9) relates how Scipio Africanus demanded that every merchant vessel from the west coast of Sicily be made available to transport supplies to his army in Africa. In addition, in times of grave urgency, the senate or a commander could purchase grain on the open market.[172]

In the absence of government supply and local requestions, or even to top these up, Roman armies were forced to forage. Regular supply tended to come infrequently and in bulk, and so foraging was very often a regular necessity. This took place habitually, both to obtain supplies for one's own army and to deprive them to the enemy. Often, foraging determined the route of march or the progress of a campaign, as armies intentionally went to places where they could find provisions. Despite its frequency, foraging was usually undertaken only when necessary and in large numbers. This was due to the danger involved as the foragers were exposed to enemy attacks and harassment while in the open field. They at times had no option of retreat as food might have to be sought out at a great distance from the camp.[173]

During the winter months, foraging would concentrate on raiding storehouses filled with grain, and here we see another way in which the Roman soldier might provide himself with sustenance - pillage. The Roman army lived as much as possible off the land, and, especially when in enemy territory, soldiers on foraging duty would seize whatever food or material goods they

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[171]249: Plb. I. 52. 8; Spain: Liv. XXIX. 3. 5, XXX. 3. 2; Scipio's army: Liv. XXIX. 1. 14, 35. 8, 36. 1, XXX. 2. 1-3, 3. 2.

[172]Liv. XXXVI. 3. 1.

[173]Caesar (*BAfr.* 65) was once forced to send a foraging party sixteen kilometres from his camp.

could carry from the local populace. This process probably served to vary their diet by providing them with various food items that the government did not regularly supply or requisition.[174]

Finally, a Roman soldier would supplement his diet by the purchase of food from merchants who followed the army. By this means he might obtain food items that were much more sumptuous that his monthly provisions. Undoubtably, the soldiers would have also obtained alcohol from these merchants. Commanders often saw these followers as a nuisance as they made the army's train larger and were perceived as being a contributing factor in the slackening of discipline.[175]

(ii) External Supply

As stated, on a normal campaign the bulk of a soldier's rations would have come from external supply runs. An army tried to carry as much as possible with them in the baggage train. These were at times enormous in size; between donkeys, mules, oxen, wagons, and servants an army could increase in size by as much as twenty percent, adding several extra kilometres onto the train.[176] It has been calculated that an army could march for between ten and fifteen days before it needed to be resupplied.[177] This would have been a relatively easy process while the army was in Italy, but once the legions went abroad, a proper logistical system had to be devised. Nevertheless, it is again important to express the *ad hoc* nature of the Roman supply system, as, like their administration of *provinciae*, it developed more from on the spot necessity rather than from a grand scheme.

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[174]On foraging and pillaging see Erdkamp 1998, p. 122-140.

[175]Merchants as camp followers: Liv. XXV. 13. 10, Sal. *BJ*, 47. 1. See Middleton 1983, p. 79-80.

[176]Engels 1978, p. 12-13, 18, Shean 1996, p. 169, 171.

[177]Erdkamp 1998, p. 41-42, 75, 77.

This process began to take shape as soon as Appius Claudius Caudex landed his troops on Sicily in 264. After defeating the Carthaginians and the Syracusans, he set out to besiege Syracuse, thus forcing the Romans into their first encounter with long distance supply. What the city of Rome had been to the army before 264, the city of Messana became to the forces operating in Sicily. Messana was now the operational base of the army, functioning as the main rear line. The city would have housed all of the major provisions that had accompanied the army and were too burdensome to bring on the march to Syracuse. Later operational bases housed such things as grain stores, the army's treasury, arms, armour, remounts, the siege train, the commander's baggage, hostages, and military records.[178] Thus we see the first use of such a base outside the Italian peninsula. But unfortunately, although this secured the supply in the rear of the army, it was virtually useless without a proper supply line leading to the front, and in the end Caudex was outdone by his lack of planning. He had stretched his supply lines too long, and was forced to turn back because, as Polybios (I. 15. 8) informs us, his army, 'had run very short of provisions.'

In the following year, the two consuls jointly marched on Syracuse. This time they were more thorough; they wound their way down the east coast, conquering as they went. Thus they established a firmly controlled supply line for themselves; this began at Messana, that was still their base of operations and main point of collection should a resupply mission be necessary. They also conquered the city of Kenturipa, and, as has already been postulated, perhaps planned to use the place as a supply depot, acting as an intermediate point between Messana and the army that was about to besiege Syracuse. The fact that Kenturipa may have surrendered with relatively little violence, its proximity to Syracuse, and its highly defendable position would mark it out as an ideal site for such a depot. Added to this is the fact that it won privileges for itself after the

[178]Caes. *BG*, VI. 5. 6, 32. 5, VII. 10. 55, Liv. XXVI. 43. 8.

First Punic War, and therefore must have done something to deserve such rights. So here we have all the facets of the later Roman supply system in place in primitive forms; operating in far off lands, the Romans first established a main operational base, from there they set up a supply line along their route of march, and on this supply line they would set up various supply depots. Moreover, these supply depots were especially important when the army was going to be encamped at one location for an extended period of time, as was the case with a siege.[179]

This process became more defined in subsequent years. From 262-261 the Romans laid siege to Agrigentum. After setting-up their siege works, they at first thought that they could get by with foraging alone, again illustrating the makeshift nature that characterised Roman logistics in this period. They quickly discovered that this was inadequate, and therefore established a supply depot at Herbesos, fifteen kilometres west of Agrigentum.[180] This is the first attested use of a logistical depot by the Roman army, and it was most likely in use because the supplies in question had to cover such a long distance. The importance of this base is demonstrated by the fact that when it was captured, Polybios (I. 18. 10) says that the Romans felt, 'at the same time like the besiegers and the besieged.'

Later on in the war, Syracuse appears to have become the main operations base for all of Sicily. More than once over the course of the war King Hieron supplied the Romans with provisions from his lands.[181] In 249, the aforementioned Iunius Pullus used the city to coordinate his efforts to resupply the Roman armies besieging Drepana and Lilybaion. From Syracuse he gathered various Roman fleets together and also procured provisions from the Sicilian allies. This

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[179]Roman supply process and the use of operation bases and depots: Goldsworthy 1996, p. 288, Middleton 1983, p. 78, Roth 1999, p. 169-177, 187. On the campaigns of 263 see D.S. XXIII. 4, Plb. I. 16. 3.

[180]D.S. XXIII. 8. 1, Plb. I. 16-18.

[181]D.S. XXIV. 1. 4, Plb. I. 18. 10-11, Zonar. VIII. 15.

must have been a massive undertaking, for if we are to believe Polybios (I. 52. 6), it took eight hundred transports to ferry the supplies to the west coast. In the fifteen years since the First Punic War had started, the Roman logistical system had gone from the naive rashness of Claudius Caudex in 264 to the confident organisation of massive fleets in 249. The Roman army was gradually learning how to deal with long distance supply.

By the opening of the Second Punic War in 218, the Romans were capable of suppling armies at great distances, as is illustrated by their early campaigns in Spain.[182] During the siege of Syracuse (213-211), grain was supplied to the army from as far away as Etruria. To store this grain, the commander Marcus Claudius Marcellus first made Morgantina his main supply depot, and then, when the latter was captured, he used Leontini.[183] The Roman supply line was complex; due to Carthaginian activity in the interior of the island, Panormos and Messana were both used as operational bases. Livy (XXIV. 36. 4-6) relates how reinforcements landed at Panormos and were forced to march overland along the north coast to rendezvous with one of Marcellus' officers at Messana; from there they proceeded south to Syracuse. At the same time on the Italian mainland the Romans were besieging Capua. Here again we see a combination of land and seaborne transport, as two supply depots were set up on the Volturnus River.[184] These examples serve to illustrate that the supply system of the Roman army was born out of the First Punic War, and came to maturity in the Second.[185]

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[182]Liv. XXII. 11. 6, XXIII. 48. 10-49. 4.

[183]Grain from Etruria: Liv. XXV. 5. 15, Plb. VIII. 7; supply depots: Liv. XXIV. 37. 10, 39. 11.

[184]Liv. XXV. 20. 1.

[185]Badian 1972, p. 218, Erdkamp 1995, p. 171-175, 1998, 50-52, Nicolet 1976, p. 69-79, Roth 1999, p. 159, 161.

(iii) Winter Quarters

Finally, as the First Punic War was the first time the Romans had retained troops in the field throughout a given year, mention should be made of the role of winter quarters in the Roman supply system. The operational bases and supply depots established by the Roman army usually served as winter quarters.[186] The latter could simply be Roman camps that were made into winter quarters (*castra hiberna*), as would be the case when an army was operating in a territory that suffered from a lack of urban centres. In such circumstances, it is well known that the Romans were capable of constructing their own camps, but construction technologies for winter camps were in their infancy during the third century, as they had not been in use by the Romans for long. So more often than not, the mid-Republican army was billeted upon cities or towns for the winter.[187] Cicero (*Man.* 38. 15) once asked his audience, 'What do you think to have been destroyed more often in recent years - the cities of your enemies by the arms of your soldiers or the cities of your friends by winter quarters?' A critical factor in choosing the location of a winter camp would have been the availability of food and water, and most cities or towns would have met these criteria. In addition, many cities would have been walled, consequently affording the army a strong defensive position. Thus the logistical system that gave the Roman army the ability to supply itself over long distances, also gave them the capacity to maintain themselves in the field throughout an entire year.

Supply and transport were very difficult in the winter. Vegetius (IV. 40) claims that seaborne transport was only possible in the Mediterranean from March to November, and only safe from late May to early September. Land transport was also affected by the winter months; large baggage trains and pack animals could not be used due to the scarcity of fodder. In fact,

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[186]Liv. XLI. 5. 1-2, 10. 1-2, XLII. 67. 8-9. See Erdkamp 1995, p. 94, Roth 1999, p. 179.

[187]Liv. XXXI. 18. 9, XXXVII. 39. 1-2, 45. 19, XXXVIII. 41. 10, XLII. 67. 8-9, XLIII. 7. 11, XLV. 8.8-9.1.

one of the main reasons for the campaign season only beginning in March in the ancient Mediterranean was due to lack of fodder and grazing for both pack animals and cavalry horses.[188]

It is likely that before the winter set in an army would gather up as many provisions as possible through external supply, foraging, and, judging from Cicero's above statement, a hefty demand upon the citizens on whom they were quartered. However, there seem to have been times when this was not enough, and an army had to be supplied externally during the winter. This could have been necessary for any number of reasons - a force could have found itself in a mountainous or infertile area; the territory around them may have suffered a poor harvest; or they could have been deep inside hostile territory or even under siege (for example the Roman garrison in the citadel at Tarentum that held out from 212-209[189]). So on these occasions the army did risk winter resupply. Our examples of winter resupplying refer only to transport by sea, but still these serve to illustrate that the Romans over time became bolder in their logistical techniques, and were forced to learn how to resupply desperate units during the winter months.[190] This again was born out of the First Punic War and the early use of winter camps.

The Destinations of Sicilian Grain

This section will address the question of whether Rome or the army was in fact the main beneficiary of Sicilian grain. As has been demonstrated, the grain produce of Sicily, either in the form of the *lex Hieronica* or specific requisitions, supplied the Roman armies based on the island throughout the third century. We have also seen that, beginning in 204, this grain, for the first

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[188]Le Bohec 1994, p. 155-157. For the importance of fodder and grazing to military animals see Blakely and Bade 1985, p. 585-593, Erdkamp 1998, p. 37, Roth 1999, 177-178, Shean 1996, p. 168 n. 42. See also Liv. XXVII. 12. 8, XXXIV. 34. 2-6, Plb. III. 101, VIII. 26, IX. 4.

[189]Liv. XXV. 7-11, 25. 3-5, XXVI. 39. 1-2, 20-23, Plb. VIII. 24-36.

[190]Winter resupplying: Liv. XXXII. 18. 1-4, Sal. *BJ*, 100. 1.

time that we know of, went directly to supply an army operating externally when provisions were sent to Scipio in Africa. After the defeat of Carthage, this process seems to have continued almost immediately, as Livy (XXXII. 27. 2-3) tells us that in 198 Sicily sent both food and clothing to the Roman army in Macedonia. This would appear to be another special levy, as the statement does not mention either the regular annual Sicilian tithe or one of the second tithes exacted periodically. Of the latter, there is no doubt that they went directly to the army and were indeed imposed solely for this purpose. For each second tithe, exacted from 191-189 and again in 171, Livy says that they went to feed the Roman armies operating in the eastern Mediterranean.[191] This leaves little doubt that the majority of Sicilian grain went to the legions operating in the field. The *lex Hieronica*, in whole or in part, was specifically adopted for the purpose of military logistics, and one of the reasons for Sicily's conversion into a regularised *provincia* was to take greater control of the grain tithe, thus insuring great provision for the army. The Roman control over Sicily was not a cause, but an effect of their efforts to obtain greater amounts of Sicilian grain for their armies.

Yet we have little knowledge about the exact destinations of the regular annual tithes from Sicily, and in certain years part of the tithe may have gone to the city of Rome. In 202, we know that a very large quantity of grain came to the city of Rome from Sicily. While Livy (XXX. 38. 5) does not explicitly say this was the produce from the *lex Hieronica*, he does imply that such a quantity was unexpected. This would point to the conclusion that the grain coming into Ostia or Puteoli was a percentage of the Sicilian yield, that for this year had been quite large, and was therefore part of the percentage system that governed the *lex Hieronica*. In Ostia specifically, the office of *quaestor aerarii Ostiensis* may have been created in the third century to deal with the

[191]Liv. 191: XXXVI. 2. 12; 190: XXXVII. 2. 12; 189: XXXVII. 50. 9; 171: XLII. 31. 8.

incoming tithes from Sicily.[192] From 191-189 it is certain that both tithes in fact went to the army, but in 171 it was only the second tithe that was sent east. In other years, the destination of the regular Sicilian tithe is unknown. In 189, Livy (XXXVIII. 35. 5) implies that there was a shortage within the city of Rome as traders were fined for hoarding grain. This might suggest that the produce of the *lex Hieronica* was normally shipped to Rome, and, having gone without it for three years, by 189 there was a shortage that resulted in hoarding and, presumably, profiteering.[193] Grain was sold cheaply to the people of Rome by the government in 203, 201-200, and 196, while in 191 Sardinian grain was present in the city.[194] For 196 this was the product of a massive gift of one million *modii* by the people of Sicily to the city of Rome, but for the other years it is significant that there was indeed grain shipped to the city, and it is not impossible that some of this may have come from the *lex Hieronica*, due to the productive capacity of Sicily and its proximity to Italy. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the years 187 and 182-180 saw disease and famine strike the city, and therefore the tithes from Sicily would have been more vital than ever to the people of Rome.[195] The evidence of 202, and the presence of foreign grain in Rome in the late third and early second centuries, combined with the shortage of 189 when we know Sicilian grain was sent elsewhere, implies that the annual Sicilian tithe at times went to Rome.

It has been argued that the regular Sicilian grain tithe, like the double tithes, in fact went exclusively to the Roman armies operating in both the eastern and western Mediterranean.[196] The legions relied heavily on external supply and this grain had to come somewhere - Sicily is an

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[192]Coarelli 1994, p. 39-40, Garnsey 1988, p. 194-195, Meiggs 1973, p. 30, Rickman 1980, p. 44. Specifically on the *quaestor aerarii Ostiensis* see Harris 1976, p. 98-99.

[193]Garnsey 1988, p. 193, Rickman 1980, p. 44.

[194]Liv. 203: XXX. 26. 5-6; 201: XXXI. 4. 5; 200: XXXI. 49. 8-50. 1; 196: XXXIII. 42. 8; XXXVI. 2. 12.

[195]Garnsey 1988, p. 193.

[196]Erdkamp 1995, p. 176-179, 1998, p. 84-94.

obvious choice. Furthermore, the produce of the *lex Hieronica*, estimated at two million *modii*, was hopelessly inadequate to meet the demands of the population of Rome.[197] If it did feed the population, then its removal from 191-189 would have meant more than price hikes, it would have spelt disaster.

Cicero (*Dom.* 11) remarks that in his day, the absence of grain imports into Rome from the provinces could spell disaster for the populace. Following some modern estimates for the population of Rome in the second century, if the city is calculated at one million people, then these would have required approximately sixty million *modii*.[198] Therefore, the Sicilian tithe could only feed approximately three and a half percent of the population in any given year. While, even if these numbers are treated generously, it remains true that the *lex Hieronica* could only feed a very small amount in Rome, this in no way leads to the conclusion that the tithe did not make a contribution to the city. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that foreign imports of grain would not have been required for all citizens; the aristocracy owned their own lands, and undoubtably many others were able to get by on purchases from local markets at regular prices.[199] It was also impossible to predict whether enough grain could be imported into the capital from any one region, as bad harvests were not infrequent, and in some years it would seem unlikely that Italian grain would not have to be supplemented after the occasional lean season. Therefore, following the words of Cicero on provincial grain, Sicilian produce may have acted as a top up to Italian grain and provincial imports, and although the *lex Hieronica* certainly could not feed all those in Rome requiring cheap grain, it was perhaps substantial enough to have been able to play a strong

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[197]Estimation of the *lex Hieronica*'s yield: Scramuzza 1959, p. 240.

[198]The numbers I have used for the population of Rome in the second century were called into question by Prof. G. Rickman during my *viva*, and are liable to modification in the published version of this work.

[199]Brunt 1971, p. 476-481, H. Galsterer, 'Supplying the City: Administration and Organisation in Rome' (unpublished; cited in Rickman 1991, p. 111), Garnsey 1988, p. 193-195, Hopkins 1983, p. 86, Rickman 1971, p. 307-309.

role in the Roman marketplace.[200]

In the majority of years, most if not all of the Sicilian tithe went to the Roman army. While it remains true that the army has been significantly underestimated as a consumer, it should be noted that the number of legions in service dropped sharply after the defeat of Hannibal in 201, and remained at ten or under for most of the 190s.[201] Although it is true that most of the produce of the *lex Hieronica* did go to the military, the small size of the Roman army in the early second century, coupled with the import from Sicily in 202, the island's substantial gift in 196, and the price gouging in 189 leads to the conclusion that imported grain was required on a much more significant scale in the capital, and therefore it remains a strong possibility that some of the produce of the *lex Hieronica* did in fact reach Rome.[202]

Conclusion

The Roman decision to permanently occupy Sicily was taken for two main reason - security and supply. The previous chapter attempted to deal with the former aspect, while the present one has put forth the argument that the main reason for the expansion of the Roman bureaucracy on Sicily was born out of the fact that the needs of the military overseas were growing at an exponential rate. The legions had to be fed, and the main source of supply was Sicily, thus necessitating greater control over the island's grain tithe.

It has been demonstrated that the *lex Hieronica* involved a high degree of organisation, with every aspect under regulation, from the original auctioning of the tithes to the transport of the grain overseas. In relation to the former, uncharacteristically of Roman provinces, the tithes

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[200]Rickman 1971, p. 309, 1980a, p. 261.

[201]Brunt 1971, p. 424. For the army as a consumer see Middleton 1983, p. 75-83.

[202]See Garnsey 1994.

were bid upon mainly by non-Romans, many of whom could very well have been Sicilians. Furthermore, those Italians who did participate appear to have been resident in Sicily. In other areas of the Roman dominion, it was the large *societates publicanorum* who vied for the right to collect revenues in cash and kind. But Sicily was the oldest Roman province, and the Roman tithe on the island was a continuation of Greek and Punic agricultural taxes from preceding ages. When the island came under Roman domination the *publicani* were not as yet the massive companies they would become by the first century, and their role as tax farmers with large provincial contracts was yet to coming into being. Therefore including them in the bidding after the first settlement of Sicily in 241 was simply not an option; the tithes continued to be auctioned off to Sicilians as they traditionally had been.

The chapter has also put forward a fuller explanation of the individual statuses of cities on the island. The majority were *civitates decumanae*, and paid the tithe. Three were *civitates foederatae*; places that had treaties with Rome, and all of their land was exempt from the tithe. The *civitates sine foedere immunes ac liberae* were four, all of whom defected to Rome in the year 263 and could trace their status back to the First Punic War. Every citizen farmer in these places was immune from the tithe. Finally, three places were put forth as candidates for having the status of *civitates censoriae*: Amestratos, Leontini, and Thermai. These had their lands seized by Rome and were forced to pay both rent and tithe, the former being under the auspices of the censors at Rome. Yet, contrary to the standard narrative that puts cities into this category as a means of punishment for past disobedience, it would appear more probable that their lands were made *ager publicus* strictly for economic gain.

In 264, an army made up of seasonal militia soldiers invaded Sicily under the guise of protecting the Mamertines. This army had very little logistical structure and had never left the Italian peninsula. As a consequence it had never had to worry very much about supply. Upon

invading Sicily however, the Romans soon began to realise that things could not always be as they were on the mainland; their army could not be rotated as easily on an annual basis. When the war with Carthage became one of protracted sieges, this problem became acute, as now it was necessary to maintain the legions for years at a time. But this brought with it a new and unexpected problem; now that an entirely new army was not being dispatched every winter, there was no means to convey new supplies to the front. The First Punic War brought the Romans face to face with the problem of long distance supply.

Through the mid-Republic, Roman military supply was characterised by its unrehearsed nature. Systems seem to have been put in place to meet only the immediate situation; very little remained permanent and few routines appear to have been established. That said, over time, Roman logistics did begin to take on some form of organisation, with certain important elements in transport and supply becoming standard practice. They developed a system whereby they would first establish a main operational base in an area; from there they proceeded along a line of march. On this route they would place various forts and depots to guard their supply line. These depots usually were in settlements along the line, and a major supply depot might be founded nearer to the front line; this was especially true in the case of a siege. This system facilitated the supply of the army overland. Yet most supplies, whenever possible, came in from the sea. Again beginning with the First Punic War, the Romans had to send masses of provisions to the troops at the front by means of seaborne transport. The Sicilian grain tithe played a crucial role in supplying both the army and the city of Rome in the late third and early second centuries. This shipping was undertaken primarily by the *publicani*. While we have no concrete evidence to say that the *publicani* supplied the army and the capital on all occasions, it would appear that they were the only group within Roman society that had the power to do so. Thus the third century was the age in which Roman military logistics was born. By use of supply lines and public

contracts for transport, the Roman army took one of its first major steps towards dominating the Mediterranean. By the end of the second Punic War in 201 it could be said that, 'The Roman supply capabilities advanced enormously...over the course of the first two major struggles with the Carthaginians. By the end of the third century BC, the Roman state could move enormous amounts supplies for long distances over land and sea.'[203]

The Romans invaded Sicily in 264 as a natural expansion of their aggressive aims. By 262 they sought to conquer the entire island. In the third and second centuries, when the Romans conquered an area, they did not necessarily occupy the place. In the east, they maintained armies in the field only periodically; full occupation would have brought them few economic advantages with great military commitment. Sicily was a different affair. Here they were forced to permanently occupy the island from 241 onwards because of the place's proximity to Carthage and because of their military's growing need for Sicilian grain, theus precipitating the eventual expansion of Roman provincial bureaucracy. It is significant that Roman administration in Sicily appears to have grown out of Roman military need; the legions required Sicilian grain and therefore the Romans gradually instituted more government to facilitate the harvesting, transportation, and distribution of the yearly agricultural yield to forces operating around the Mediterranean. Put more simply, 'State structure appeared chiefly as a by-product of rulers' efforts to acquire the means of war.'[204]

Appendix: Roman Supply of the African Expedition of 256

The numbers of Polybios concerning the size of the expedition to Africa in 256 have rightly been called into question, mainly because they do not match the numbers he puts forth later

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[203]Roth 1999, p. 220.

[204]Tilly 1990, p. 14.

in his narrative. Our conclusions concerning the fledgling Roman long-distance supply system of the First Punic War illustrate that the Romans could not have fielded such a large force in 256 because they did not have the capabilities for provision. Polybios (I. 25. 7) at first claims a double consular army (40 000 men) and three hundred and thirty warships for Rome at the start of the expedition to Africa in the spring of 256. After the failure of the expedition he says (I. 36. 10-11) that a further three hundred and fifty ships were dispatched to ferry home the survivors and that these then captured one hundred and fourteen vessels at the Battle of Cape Hermaia. Later still (I. 37. 2), when relating the disaster of the storm off Kamarina, he says the Romans lost two hundred and eighty-four out of three hundred and sixty-four, not four hundred and sixty-four (three hundred and fifty of relief expedition plus one hundred and fourteen captured) as one would expect. This has led scholars to reduce the total of the Roman fleet from the very beginning of the expedition in 256 to two hundred and thirty sail. Since by all accounts the numbers of both sides were roughly equal at the Battle of Ekonomos in 256, the Carthaginian numbers have been reduced accordingly.

This angle of argument is made superfluous by Lazenby's (1996, p. 82-84, 107, 108) correct statement that one simply cannot draw numbers from Cape Hermaia and place them on Ekonomos; the two battles were over a year apart and even if Polybios is mistaken for the numbers of 255 this does not automatically mean his numbers for 256 are also wrong. Lazenby also provides a strong argument for retaining the numbers of Polybios, pointing out that this was the supreme naval effort of both sides. He argues it was possible that the Romans could not get over five hundred (the four hundred and sixty four mentioned above plus forty that were left in Africa) back to Italy and so chose the three hundred and sixty or so most serviceable and burnt

the rest.[205] Tarn (1907, p. 48-54), Thiel (1954, p. 84-86, 214-217), and Walbank (1957, I, p. 82-85) however, all reject the numbers of Polybios and espouse compelling arguments supporting their trains of thought. Tarn reckons that Polybios has mistakenly included the transports that were in tow with the fleet in his numbers of warships, therefore the Roman fleet at Ekonomos was composed of three hundred and thirty sail: two hundred and thirty warships and one hundred transports. While agreeing with Tarn's numbers, Thiel actually negates this point. Polybios (I. 26. 14, 29. 9) says that all the transports were for ferrying the cavalry, of which there were five hundred. According to Thucydides (VI. 43), a horse transport in the fifth century carried about thirty horses and riders, and there is no reason to assume any different in the third century.[206] Therefore seventeen transports at the absolute most would have been required to ferry five hundred horse. So it seems likely that the other eighty-three transports carried supplies, siege equipment, and legionaries. Thiel then adds new dimension to the argument by drawing attention to where Polybios (I. 36. 8-9) states that the Carthaginians had to build new ships to bolster up their numbers to two hundred for Hermaia. Yet if the Polybian figures for Ekonomos are trusted, then two hundred and fifty Punic ships would have survived the battle. Clearly Polybios is, on this occasion, in error. Walbank rounds out the discussion by suggesting that the number of three hundred and fifty for the Carthaginian fleet of 256 came to Polybios by way of Fabius Pictor, who would have naturally sought to upgrade Roman prestige by showing what a massive armada they defeated at Ekonomos. For what it is worth, Tarn also points out that never in its history up until this point did Carthage outfit a fleet of more than two hundred ships.[207]

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[205]Other authors who accept the Polybian figures are Brisson 1973, p. 62-63, Caven 1980, p. 33, Dorey and Dudley, 1971, p. 10, Erdkamp 1998, p. 58-59, Morrison 1995, p. 69, Tipps 1985, p. 436-447.

[206]Launey 1949-1950, p. 522.

[207]Those in agreement with these figures are Errington 1971, p. 23, Scullard 1989, p. 554, Warmington 1969, p. 175.

The arguments of Tarn, Thiel, and Walbank are all convincing and certainly contain elements of truth. Nevertheless all three have ignored the most obvious reason for it to have been impossible for the Romans to have had three hundred and thirty warships in 256 - the Roman supply system did not yet have the capability to provision such an enormous force. Polybios (I. 26. 7) states that each warship had a crew of three hundred and a contingent of one hundred and twenty marines, giving the Romans a total of 140 000 men. Thiel (1954, p. 76) actually increases this number by claiming that forty of the soldiers on each warship were regular marines and not part of the legions, thus giving us 153 000.[208] These are astounding figures. At the height of the Second Punic War in 212 and 211, Rome had twenty-five legions in service at one time. If we generously assume that each legion was at full strength (which is highly unlikely) then this would only give us 125 000 men, and this during the greatest crisis the Republic had yet to face. What is more, in the Second Punic War these forces were spread all over Italy and the western Mediterranean, easing the burden of supply. It seems highly improbable, given the infancy of their system of long-distance supply, that the Romans could sustain a force this large in the mid-third century. Therefore it would appear that Polybios, or more likely his source, has made a mistake or intentionally exaggerated here. If we take the revised figures of two hundred and thirty Roman ships however, this leaves us with the more believable sum of 97 000 men. All things considered, this figure is much more reasonable than the former, as we know they supplied at least 76 000 men during the operations of 260.[209] Therefore, the revised numbers of two hundred and thirty ships for the Romans for the year 256 should be accepted as being within the limits of Roman supply capabilities.

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[208]See Erdkamp 1998, p. 58-59.

[209]Plb. I. 20. 9, 21. 4, 22. 1.

Conclusion

After the fall of Syracuse in 211, Sicily ceased to play a major role in the politics of the Mediterranean world. The island was now under Roman control and would remain so for the next seven centuries. The importance of Sicily may actually have increased in the late third and second centuries however. In these years, grain production and exports reached an unprecedented scale, and much of the produce went to Roman armies as they conquered the Mediterranean. Sicily was now a permanent part of an empire that it was helping to build.

Although flourishing, Sicily would still have to wait for nearly two centuries before any lasting peace would come, and even then, much of the place remained in poverty, as the small farmers of the island shared little in the benefits that came with prosperity. This was due to the fact that the *lex Hieronica* favoured large estate owners, and therefore Sicily's agricultural lands from the second century onwards saw an increased amount of large-scale farming. The appalling conditions upon these massive slave-run estates led to two huge slave insurrections on the island (135-132 and 104-100), both of which were put down only with difficultly. After the first revolt, the Roman consul Publius Rupilius spent a year in Sicily at the head of a commission putting together what would become known as the *Lex Rupilia*, a law that regulated many aspects of Roman provincial government, and provided the governor with strict guidelines covering nearly every area of his administration. This has been seen as the first provincial constitution, and was another crucial step in the development of regularised *provinciae* that took place first in Sicily.

This failed to stop the voracious praetorship of Verres from 73-71, but Sicily soon recovered, and its importance to the empire was recognised when its people were granted Latin Rights by Julius Caesar in 49. These privileges were short-lived however, as the island fell under the control of Sextus Pompey from 42 until 36, in his civil war with Octavian and the Second Triumvirate. When Sicily was retaken, the future emperor's vengeance was swift, as he punished

cities that had sided against him with indemnities and deportations, and by stripping them of their Latin Rights. After 27, Augustus forced several veteran colonies on Sicily, but by this point the importance of the island to the empire was beginning to wane, as the expansive grain fields of Egypt rapidly overshadowed Sicily as the breadbasket of Rome and its legions.

Yet for all of this Romanisation, Sicily remained largely Greek in culture, religion, and language well into the Imperial period. Despite its proximity to Italy and the fact that Romans were settling there in increasing numbers, the island was a bastion of Hellenic culture in the west. Modern scholarship has taken a renewed interest in the economic development of the island under the Romans, and the interactions between the native Greeks and the Italian newcomers. These and other new currents in Sicilian studies are examined in *Sicily from Aeneas to Cicero: New Approaches in Archaeology and History*, a book that was edited over the course of this thesis by C.J. Smith and myself. As Roger Wilson shows, the archaeological evidence for Sicily in the aftermath of the praetorship of Verres does not illustrate a downturn in wealth, but a redirection of capital to certain urban centres, in response to the economic conditions created by Roman demand. Yet this process, as with the period covered by this thesis, was not one way; Kathryn Lomas demonstrates how Augustus clearly contributed to the Romanisation of the island, and created a new hybrid culture that was both Greek and Italian, but remained markedly different from mainland Greece and Italy.

This thesis has attempted to illustrate firstly how Sicily was militarily incorporated into the Roman Empire, and to show that Roman administration of the island increased and control tightened as the place became more important as a means of supplying the army. Sicily was the first place where Rome ruled over others as subjects rather than partners within an empire, and as such its importance to the study of imperialism and early provincial structures cannot be understated. In terms of imperialism, scholarship traditionally has been split between making the

Romans out to be the aggressors and saying that they had a reluctance to occupy. This work has attempted to demonstrate that both of these hypotheses are compatible, that the Romans occupied a place when it was beneficial to them, and when regions provided them with substantial agricultural or mineral wealth. In this vein, Sicily was occupied because it provided security for Italy against Carthage and because it was logistically crucial to the Roman legions. From the *ad hoc* and temporary nature of the early Roman governing of the *provincia* to the installation of an annually elected praetor, the systematisation of the grain supply, and the creation of a regularised *provincia*, this thesis has sought to bring out the evolutionary nature of Roman imperialism, and to show that imperialism did not cease with military conquest; although it took on an administrative form, it was still used as a means of control. I hope that this work has contributed something to our understanding of the evolution and development of the structures of the earliest regularised *provinciae*, and towards the study of Roman imperialism as a whole.

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